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Thesis Summary: 
The present thesis examines Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as politically negotiated 
texts and their different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions. Its aim is to make 
a contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of translation and recontextualization 
of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict. 
In modern Translation Studies, although research exists on the translation of political 
texts following functional (e.g. Schäffner 2002) or systemic-linguistic (e.g. Calzada-Pérez 
2001) approaches or applying narrative theory (Baker 2006), peace initiatives and 
politically negotiated texts are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts.  
The thesis – which takes 31 Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of 5 
different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as its corpus – operates within the framework 
of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and 
Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). For all of the peace initiatives analysed, 
there exist several language versions which were made available in different contexts by 
different institutions and for different readerships and purposes. The thesis pursues a top-
down approach. It begins with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the 
production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and 
their different language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and 
principles of audience design. It then moves to examine how the textual profiles of the 
language versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and 
power relations at both the macro- and micro-structural levels. The final step is to account 
for these aspects in terms of socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of 
the translations. 
The overall textual analysis demonstrates that when translated, peace initiatives can 
be interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempt to promote their 
respective political interests and narratives. Also, it is very frequently that translations 
produced in one specific institutional context are recontextualised for use in another one. 
Such recontextualisation goes hand in hand with further textual amendments.  
To summarize, the thesis demonstrates how these translations – as products – are 
(re)framed and (re)contextualized in different institutional settings in order to serve 
different purposes. These texts, thus, play different roles in situations of ongoing 
contemporary conflict depending on the institutional context in which they are presented 
and the purposes they set to serve. These main findings make an original contribution to 
the discipline of Translation Studies in respect of emphasizing the need to study 
translations in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts. 
 
Keywords: Peace initiatives, translation studies, ideology, power relations, translation 
institutions, Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
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  يمــــــالرَّ ح ِِن ـــم الله الرَّ ْحم ـــــــبس
لاَّ  م ــــمم ل منم ــكم لام ِعلْ ـــــس ُ ْبحم َـٰ نم  "
ِ
ن َّ ــــــا عمل َّْمتمنم ــــآ  ا
ِ
لْعم ِلــــيــــم ُتم ـــــكم أَن ْ ـــــآ  ا
 
لْحم ِكــــُيم"  أ
 
 أ
 
 هداء  ا  
 ،رحه اللها لى روح والدي، 
 ،رحها الله ا لى روح جدتي أ م يوسف،
 
 عمي الغالي عز عياد، ا لى
 عبد الحليم عياد، الغالي خالي ا لى
 
 ،ا  لى نور العيون ب،ـست الحباي ا  لى
 ،ب وبين الجفونـالقل تـا  لى من سكن
 ،يـت و مازالت تضحـمن ضح ا لى
 ،بيـى قلـان علـى انسـأ غل ا لى
 .يــــــــــى أ مـا  ل، ا لى صاحبة القلب الطيب
 
 وطني فلسطين، انا باقون مابقي الزعتر والزيتون، ا لى
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Arabic Transliteration System
1
 
 
 
Consonants 
 
   
Glottal stop ´ ص ṣ 
أ a ض ḍ 
ب b ط ṭ 
ت t ظ ẓ 
ث th ع ‘ 
ج J غ gh 
ح ḥ ف f 
خ kh ق q 
د d ل l 
ذ dh م m 
ر r ن n 
ز z  ه h 
س s  و w 
ش sh  ي y 
     
     
          Long vowels               Short   vowels 
          a ā              Fatḥa a 
          i Ī              Kasrah i 
          u ū              Damah u 
                                                          
1
 This transliteration system is adapted from the UNESCO, UNESCO website,  published on 27 October 
2006:  http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/32265/11619358083arabic_en.pdf/arabic_en.pdf [last accessed 
24 November 2011]. 
This transliteration system was not applied to names, words in titles or quoted passages. In such cases, these 
are reproduced without modification. 
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Hebrew Transliteration System
2
 
 
 
א ' מ m 
בּ b נ n 
ב v ס s 
גּ ,ג g ע ' 
ד,  דּ  d פּ p 
ה h פ f 
ו v צ ts 
ז z ק k 
ח h ר r 
ט t שׁ sh 
י y שׂ s 
כּ k תּ,  ת   t 
כ kh   
ל l   
    
א     א i 
  א a   
  א    א  
    א o 
  א    א  
  א e   
  א    א u 
  א  וּא  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 This transliteration system is adapted from the Academy of Hebrew Language, Academy of Hebrew 
Language website, published in July 2006: http://hebrew-
academy.huji.ac.il/hahlatot/TheTranscription/Documents/taatiq2007.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
In specific cases where a conventional spelling different from this transliteration system, the standard version 
is followed, for example, Eretz Israel, Kotel as well as particular place names. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
Those who formulated the Geneva initiative were, quite naturally, eager to please the Israeli 
public (Amir 2004). 
The initiators of the Geneva document are, of course, entitled to express their views and 
publicize them in any manner they see fit. But do they have the right to brazenly lie to the 
public as to what the document does or does not contain? (Avineri 2003).  
What was published in Arabic does not truly reflect the agreement and this is an insult to the 
Palestinian citizen. This is a clear fraud (Harisha 2003). 
 
  
These comments respectively made by Shmuel Amir
3
 and Shlomo Avineri
4
 – two Israeli 
academics – and Hassan Harisha5 – a Palestinian politician – clearly carry sharp criticism 
for one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord. These writers accuse the drafters of this 
particular initiative of misleading and manipulating the Israeli and the Palestinian publics 
in order to achieve their political aims. The Geneva Accord was drafted originally in 
English (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). In international politics, it is common for negotiated texts to be 
made available in other languages, i.e. translations. The above comments on the Geneva 
Accord were not based on its original English source text but on its Hebrew and Arabic 
translations respectively. That is to say, these political reactions were based on translation. 
Some of these reactions and debate – specifically with regard to the issue of the 
“Jewishness” of the state of Israel – will be discussed in Chapter 6.3.  
 
The Geneva Accord is one of the five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in the corpus. A 
peace initiative is a genre of political texts which can be defined as a text negotiated – 
officially or unofficially – by key international, regional or local political players in 
                                                          
3
 Shmuel Amir is a political activist and a lecturer at the Hebrew University in Israel. 
4
 Shlomo Avineri is a professor of history and political science at the Hebrew University in Israel, and a 
former director-general of Israel's Foreign Ministry. This excerpt is taken from an article that was published 
in the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot in Hebrew on 1 December 2003. It was then translated into English 
by Moshe Kohn and published on the website of Independent Media Review and Analysis available at 
www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=19061 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
5
 Hassan Harisha was elected in January 1996 as member of the Palestinian Parliament and served as the 
chairperson of the Parliament's Oversight Agency at that time. Harisha was the re-elected as a member of the 
Palestinian Parliament in the January 2006 elections.  
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situations of ongoing contemporary conflict as an attempt to outline a specific political 
solution to that conflict. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict, an intractable conflict – i.e. 
“protracted, irreconcilable, violent, of zero-sum nature, total, and central” (Bar-Tal and 
Salomon 2006: 20) – is regarded in the thesis as extremely asymmetric: a conflict between 
an occupying power, i.e. Israel
6
 and people under occupation, i.e. the Palestinian people. 
These two unequal rivals have fundamentally incompatible goals and interests as well as 
competing narratives
7
 – understood as “public and personal ‘stories’ that we subscribe to 
and that guide our behaviour” (Baker 2006: 19) – that have been influencing the conflict 
throughout. 
 
The Palestinian-Israeli Peace initiatives were put forward by key international, regional 
and local political players after the collapse of the peace process following the failure of 
the negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis in Camp David II and outbreak of the 
second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 September 2000
8
 (cf. Chapter 1.1.3). Since the 
players are international, regional and local, the texts have operated in international and 
local languages: three of these documents were produced in English, one in Arabic and one 
in Hebrew and they have then been translated into Arabic, English and Hebrew (cf. 
Chapter 3.2.3).The decision to translate these initiatives in particular languages is in itself 
political. For example, the League of Arab States translated its initiative – the Arab Peace 
Initiative – into English but not Hebrew. This could be explained with regard to the fact 
that only two member states of the League, i.e. Egypt and Jordan, have official peace 
treaties and full diplomatic relations with Israel.  
 
For all of the peace initiatives analysed there exist several translations. For example, there 
exist six Arabic and four Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan which was 
originally drafted in English. Language versions of peace initiatives were made available 
in different contexts by different institutions – e.g. international, governmental, non-
                                                          
6
 In numerous United Nation Security Council Resolutions, e.g. 468 (1980), 607 (1988), 694 (1991), 726 
(1992), 1544 (2004) as well as those of the General Assembly, e.g. 40/161 (1985), 61/118 (2006), 65/179 
(2011), Israel is referred to as ‘the occupying power’. 
7
 The concept of ‘narrative’ is used in this thesis because of its “ability to serve as a tool for describing events 
and developments without presuming to voice a historical truth” (Shenhav 2006: 246). 
8
 The second Palestinian intifada – which was named after the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem 
– broke out  “following Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to affirm Israeli sovereignty over the third holiest 
site in Islam and the killing of seven unarmed Palestinian protestors the following day” (Khalidi 2001: 83).  
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governmental and mass media and for different readerships and purposes – e.g. to instruct, 
inform, persuade, etc. This initially provided the motivation to investigate in detail five 
peace initiatives drafted between 2000 and 2003 and their different language versions into 
Arabic, English and Hebrew. 
 
This thesis presents original research; it examines the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from a 
language and translation standpoint focusing entirely on a largely under-researched genre 
of political texts, i.e. peace initiatives – specifically those initiatives which were negotiated 
between September 2000 and April 2003 – and their Arabic, English and Hebrew language 
version as its corpus of study.  
 
The thesis presents a product-oriented textual analysis of 13 Arabic, 5 English and 13 
Hebrew language versions of five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives (See Table 
1.1 below). It aims to examine how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power 
relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on the translations 
of the most recent of these initiatives which were drafted after the collapse of the peace 
process following the failure of the Camp David negotiations in 2000. In doing this, the 
thesis aims to make a contribution to a deeper understanding of the role of translation and 
recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing contemporary 
conflict, namely, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It also demonstrates the complexity of 
analysing political discourse in translation and hopes to raise awareness among negotiators, 
politicians and translators of the ideological, political and ethical implications of linguistic 
choices in both, original texts and translations (cf. Chapter 7). 
 
The thesis first presents the socio-cultural and political contexts of production of the 
original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and their different 
language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of 
audience design. It then moves to examine how the textual profiles of the language 
versions of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power 
relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels. The final step is to account for these 
aspects in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the 
translations. 
 
The methodology applied in this thesis is based on Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS), 
namely, the analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Critical 
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Discourse Analysis, namely, Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model (cf. Chapter 
3.3). In linking textual profiles to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example 
of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).  
 
1.1 The Narratives of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 
The Middle East
9
 – known as the “Cradle of Civilization” (Wilcox 2004: 2) and the 
birthplace of the three monotheistic world religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
(Bunzl 2004: 2) – has always been of significant importance to the key political players in 
the world (Sørli et al 2005: 146). This significance has been evident for a number of 
reasons, notably, the region’s strategic geographic location and natural resources.  
 
Firstly, the Middle East is located between “Africa and Eurasia and between the 
Mediterranean world and between Asia and India and between the Far East Nations of 
China and Japan” (Chaurasia 2005: 1) and at “the major crossroads of global cultures” 
(Anderson 2000: 11). In the past, the Middle East was home to significant trade routes 
such as the ‘silk road’ that linked China with Europe and acted as the “breadbasket”10 of 
the region (Lowrance 2007: 192). 
 
Secondly, most of the world’s oil is located in the Middle East. This region has 65% of the 
world’s proven reserves of oil and just one-third of global production (Salameh 2009: 199). 
Many Western governments are dependent on this oil. For example, 17% of the United 
States’, 45% of Europe’s and 90% of Japan’s import of oil, respectively, come from the 
Middle East (Lowrance 2007: 194). Other than oil, the Middle East has 40% of the world’s 
proven gas reserves (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 2). Based on these facts, there is no 
other alternative to an increasing global dependence on the Middle East region energy for 
at least the coming twenty-five years (Cordesman and Al-Rodhan 2006: 2). 
                                                          
9
 On the origin and history of the term ‘the Middle East’, see for example, Milton-Edwards (2006: 6-7), 
Peretz (1994: 2-3) and Sharp (2011: 1-9). 
10
 The Middle East was of particular interest to European powers during the era of colonialism (Lowrance 
2007: 192). For instance, the French colonisation of Egypt, from 1798 to 1801, was due to “Egypt’s 
perceived ability to supply France with grain and its location at the intersection of the African and Asian 
continents and the Mediterranean and Red Seas would give France the ability to control military and 
commercial traffic and threaten the British in India” (Lowrance 2007: 192-193). 
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Although privileged by its strategic location and natural resources, the Middle East region 
has not been immune from political and economic instability
11
 (Lowrance 2007: 194). One 
of the major sources of such regional instability – and also “for the world at large” (Uzer 
2009: 123) has been the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 
particular (Kim and Morey 2005: 785; Milton-Edwards 2009: 173). This conflict continues 
to be a potential “flashpoint of a war” (Lieber 1995: 69) that could break out “on short 
notice” (Kim and Morey 2005: 785). This state of instability threatens the vital interests of 
key international players, i.e. “the energy reserves of the region”, most notably the United 
States of America (Chomsky 1999: 17). These key political players are aware that 
stability
12
 in the Middle East cannot be achieved unless the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is 
resolved (Behrendt 2007: 2). 
 
The Palestinian-Israeli
13
 conflict has been extensively researched within a number of 
disciplines, most notably Political Science, History and Conflict Resolution. Detailed 
accounts of this conflict can be found in Bassiouni and Ben-Ami (2009); Ben-Ami 2(006); 
Chomsky (1999, 2003); Finkelstein (2003); Masalha (1992); Morris (2009); Pappé, (1999, 
2006a); Rabinovich (2008); Said (1980); Shlaim (1995a, 2009) and Tessler (1994).
14
 
 
As this thesis makes its contribution specifically to the discipline of Translation Studies, 
the following overview of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not intended to provide a 
detailed historical chronology of all events of the conflict nor intends to contribute to the 
political and ideological debate of the more complex issue of validity of claims of each 
side of the conflict. It aims rather to provide a brief overview of the conflict by focusing on 
the issues of competing narratives of the two sides of the conflict, the peace process and 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. The aim of this overview is thus twofold: firstly, to 
situate the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in their wider geopolitical context and 
secondly, to provide the reader with necessary background knowledge which is needed to 
                                                          
11
 Other recent sources of instability include what is now termed as ‘the Arab Spring’, namely, the 
revolutions which have swept throughout the Arab world in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya and still ongoing in 
Yemen and Syria. 
12
 On the long-term economic benefits of stability and peace in the Middle East, see Winckler (2002). 
13
 This term – i.e. ‘Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ is used throughout this thesis – except in cases of direct 
quotations – in accordance with the Palestinian discourse on the conflict. 
14
 The common factor between all of these political and historical accounts of the conflict is that “no scholar 
on either side has ever presented an account of the two peoples’ history which has satisfied both Arabs and 
Jews” (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: xii). The historical overview of the conflict provided in this thesis is 
not an exception. 
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help explain the political and ideological implications of the translation shifts between the 
different language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 5). 
 
This overview proceeds as follows. The first section presents a summary of the competing 
Palestinian and Israeli narratives vis-à-vis the main final-status issues of the conflict, 
namely, land (including the issue of Jewish settlements)
15
, Jerusalem and the Right of 
Return for the Palestinian refugees. The next section presents an overview of the narrative 
of the Middle East Process which was launched at the Madrid Conference in Spain in 
1991. The last section outlines the narrative of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives, 
focusing particularly on those initiatives drafted after the collapse of the Camp David II 
negotiations and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, both in 2000.  
 
1.1.1 The Competing Palestinian and Israeli Narratives  
Conflicts, it is argued, “depend on narratives, and in some senses cannot exist without a 
detailed explanation of how, why the battles began, and why one side, and only one side, is 
in the right” (Rotberg 2006: vii). The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a case in point. The 
Palestinians and Israelis have contradictory and intertwined narratives about the conflict, 
generally and in every single detail. These narratives are “more often than not, mutually 
exclusive” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). In this sense, the conflict between the Palestinians and 
Israelis is one of “mutual denial and mutual rejection” (Shlaim 1994: 25). The Palestinian 
and Israeli narratives examine the same events of the conflict from extremely different – 
and more than often conflicting – standpoints (Rotberg 2006: 4).  
 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict revolves broadly around three major symbols: land, 
Jerusalem and the Right of Return.
16
 The Palestinians and Israelis maintain fundamentally 
conflicting narratives of each of these symbols. More importantly, within-group narratives 
are not fully homogenous but rather exist at “different levels of generality, and as having 
elements that can be added, discarded, rearranged, emphasized, and deemphasized” (Ross 
2007: 32). With time, some of these narratives – including the within-group narratives – 
achieve resonance through many “processes of reinforcement and contestation” (Baker 
2006: 20). The Palestinians and Israelis have invested heavily over the years in their own 
narratives to the extent that they have become a fundamental part of their national 
                                                          
15
 The term ‘Jewish’ will be used in this thesis rather than ‘Israeli’ to describe settlements and settlement 
outposts because they are entirely established and inhabited by ‘Jewish’ settlers. 
16
 Of course, there are other important symbols in the conflict such as water, sovereignty, security, etc. 
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identities. This is why giving up or even adjusting these narratives “could result in major 
personal trauma for them” (Baker 2006: 21) and usually met with strong resistance.  
 
Political discourse relies extensively on “narrative patterns” (Shenhav 2006: 246). 
Examining these narrative patterns and the way they compete to achieve currency is of 
significant importance to understanding the political discourse of peace initiatives and 
translation shifts found between their different language versions. Many of these 
narratives, whether deliberately or not and to some extent, find their way to these language 
versions (cf. Chapter 5). 
 
The Narratives of Land 
The struggle to control land has been, and continues to this day to be, the core of the 
conflict between Zionism
17
 and the Palestinian national movement (Abu Hussein and 
McKay 2003: 1; Amro 2002: 183; Khalidi 1991: 5-6). The origins of this conflict go back 
to more than a century ago when the Zionist leaders in their first congress in Basel, 
Switzerland on 29 August 1897 – which was arranged by Zionism’s founder, Theodor 
Herzl – decided to create “a home for the Jewish people in Palestine to be secured by 
public law” (Khalidi 1991: 6-7; Neff 1995: 156) (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). At that time, Palestine 
was – and since the fifteenth century – part of the Ottoman Empire (Abu Hussein and 
McKay 2003: 4).  
 
Following the First World War and the consequent defeat of the Ottomans, Palestine was 
placed under the British Mandate which came into effect on 26 September 1923. Almost 
five years earlier, the British government had already committed itself for facilitating the 
establishment of a “national home” for the Jews in Palestine in the infamous Balfour 
Declaration of 2 November 1917 (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 4). 
 
The Zionist narrative of claim of ownership to Palestine (Arabic: ‘نيطسلف’) as “Eretz Israel” 
– a land portrayed by the Zionist leaders as “empty” (Doumani 1999: 13; Shobat 1995: 
225) or “a land without a people for a people without a land” (Finkelstein 2003: 95; 
Masalha 2007: 95; Pappé 1992: 2) – is based on biblical narratives, namely that God 
                                                          
17
 Zionism is “a political ideology which holds that the Jewish people constitute a nation and have a right to a 
sovereign nation-state in their ancestral homeland” (Eisenberg and Caplan 2010: 3). 
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promised this land to the Jewish people
18
 (Eisenberg and Caplan 2010: 3; Karmi 1999: 
107; Masalha 2007: 1). According to the Zionist-Israeli narrative, the Jews were “a nation 
in exile for 2,000 years who, beyond all reason, returned to their ancestral country and re-
established sovereignty there” (Sharan 2003: 38). By contrast, the Palestinians – who have 
always rejected Zionism and considered it as “a form of settler colonialism which employs 
a religious/cultural narrative to justify its aims” (Karmi 1999: 109) – base their narrative of 
ownership to Palestine on uninterrupted living as the majority population on – and 
cultivation of (Yiftachel 2005: 66) – the land for thousands of years (Dajani 1994: 8). 
According to the Palestinian narrative “greater powers imposed a European migration, a 
national home for the Jews, and finally a Jewish state, in cynical disregard of the wishes of 
the overwhelming majority of the population, innocent of any charge” (Chomsky 2003: 
46).  
 
At the time of the Basel Congress, the Jewish community made up less than 7% of the total 
population of historic Palestine (Khalidi 1991: 6). The rest of the population were Arab 
Palestinians who owned 99% of the land (Neff 1995: 156). By 1948, the Jewish 
community owned only some 6% of historic Palestine (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 4). 
However, the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 of 29 November 1947 – 
which proposed the partition of historic Palestine against the will of its indigenous people 
into two states, one Arab and one Jewish – assigned the Jewish community 5,893 square 
miles or 56.47% of the total territory of Palestine (the Palestinians were assigned 4,476 
square miles or 42.88% of the total territory and Jerusalem, comprising 68 square miles or 
0.65% was accorded the status of internationally administered Corpus Separatum) (Hadawi 
1991: 67). Based on this resolution, the leaders of the World Zionist Organization 
proclaimed on the eve of 15 May 1948 the establishment of the state of Israel (Jiryis 1988: 
83). By this date, the Zionists had already seized territory beyond that allocated to the 
Jewish state, i.e. 77% of total territory of historic Palestine (Hadawi 1991: 79; Masalha 
2000: 8). This historical event, i.e. the division of historic Palestine, marked the first phrase 
of struggle between the Palestinians and Zionists to control land. 
 
                                                          
18
 This promise is recorded in Genesis (17: 1, 7, 8): “I will establish My covenant between Me and thee and 
they seed after thee throughout the generations for an everlasting covenant to be a God unto three and they 
seed after thee. And I will give unto thee and to thy seed after three, the land of their sojournings, all the 
lands of Canaan for an everlasting holding and I will be their God” (Lassner and Troen 2007: 292). 
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The second phrase of struggle to control land occurred in 1967 when Israel occupied the 
remaining 22% of historic Palestine, i.e. the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and the 
Gaza Strip (Falah 2004: 956) (Israel also occupied other Arab territories, i.e. the Syrian 
Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai Desert). The Israeli occupation gave rise in 1974 to 
“an extremist religious-nationalist settlement movement, Gush Emunim, bent on rebuilding 
the Temple and populating the whole of the Promised Land in perpetuity with Jews in 
fulfillment of the covenant with Jehovah” (Khalidi 2003: 59). This settlement movement19 
– which endorsed the narrative of “Greater Land of Israel” – opposed the withdrawal from 
any territories occupied in 1967 (Zertal 2005: 218). The settlers “saw themselves as 
fulfilling a national mission of historical magnitude and as following in the footsteps of the 
Zionist founders of Israel” (Shamir 2007: 12) and the state of Israel encouraged them to 
move to settlements built on land occupied in 1967 (Klein 2008: 90) (cf. Chapter 5.6.2 and 
5.6.3). 
 
The third phrase of struggle to control land has started – and continues to this day – with 
the Oslo process in the mid-1990s which has been marked with intensive Palestinian land 
expropriation, rapid Jewish settlements expansion and the building of Israel’s Wall20 since 
2002 (ruled as illegal by the International Court of Justice in 2004)
21
 in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. These three accelerating processes threaten the very fundamental 
principles of the peace process, i.e. ‘the land for peace’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.1) and the ‘two-
state’ solution and warn of more coming rounds of confrontations in the near future, 
particularly when the construction of Israel’s illegal Wall is completed (cf. Chapter 1.1.3). 
 
 
                                                          
19
 The ‘Gush Emunim’ was formally replaced by ‘Yesha Council’ (Hebrew: ע"שי תצעומ, lit. “Council of 
Judea, Samaria and Gaza”), the political umbrella organization of the Settlements (Zertal 2005: 218). For 
more on ‘Gush Emunim’, see for example, Newman (1985). 
20
 Names and labels used to refer to this Wall are controversial. In the Israeli official discourse, this wall is 
referred to as “the Security Fence”. By contrast, the Palestinians refer to it as ‘the Separation Wall’ or more 
polemically as ‘the Apartheid Wall’ (Warren 2011: 81). The Palestinians see this wall as “part of a continued 
ethnic-cleansing campaign” whereas Israel claims that it is “necessary to ensure the safety of Israeli citizens” 
(Thomas et al 2010: 304). The erection of this wall (built on confiscated Palestinian land and in contravention 
of the international law) started on 16 June 2002, stretching over a total area of 723 kilometers in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, including in and around Occupied East Jerusalem and ranging from 6-8 
meters in height (Norman 2010: 100). For comparison purposes, the ‘Berlin Wall’, for example, was 155 
Kilometers long and 3.6 meters in height.  
21
 The International Court of Justice – which used the term “the Wall” – ruled on 9 July 2004 that “the 
construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated régime, are contrary to international law”. This 
ruling is available at www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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The Narratives of Jerusalem 
The question of Jerusalem – often described as “controversial, emotional and intricate” 
(Abu Odeh 1992: 184) – is at the heart of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Khalidi 2001: 83; 
Dumper 1997: 11-12) (see for example, Klein 2001; Ma’oz and Nusseibeh 2000; Molinaro 
2009). 
 
The Old City of Jerusalem, approximately one square kilometre in size, is the only place 
on earth that has always been sacred to the three Abrahamic faiths – Judaism, Christianity 
and Islam – and civilizations (Ma’oz 2009: 99). The Palestinians and Israelis – who both 
consider Jerusalem as part of their national identities – have two completely exclusive and 
conflicting narratives of claim of ownership to the same city (Sha'ban 2007: 43). These 
conflicting narratives revolve around the political status of the city, its territory, future, 
institutions and inhabitants. 
 
The conflict over Jerusalem starts with the very names given to this holy city as ‘سدقلا’ (Al-
Quds) in Arabic and as ‘םילשורי’ (Yerushalayim) in Hebrew as well as the names of its 
holy places, notably, what is called in Arabic ‘فيرشلا مرحلا’ (al- aram al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the 
Noble Sanctuary’) and in Hebrew as ‘תיבה רה’ (Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the Temple Mount’) (cf. 
Chapter 5.3.2). 
 
The Palestinian narrative of ownership of Jerusalem derives from the city’s sanctity in 
Islam. Jerusalem had been the first Qibla (direction of prayers) which Muslims around the 
world faced when they carried out their prayers five times a day; it was also the destination 
of the Prophet Mohammad’s night journey and the site from which he ascended to heaven 
(both events being recorded in the holy Qur’an) (Dumper 1997: 13). Jerusalem is also the 
home of the al- aram al-Sharīf which is the third holiest place for Muslims after Mecca 
and Medina (Dumper 1997: 14). The Palestinians’ claim to Jerusalem – other than due to 
its Islamic significance – is part of the more general claim to Palestine based on centuries-
long occupation (Quigley 2005: 225). 
By contrast, according to the Jewish-Israeli narrative of ownership, Jerusalem “has been 
for more than 3,000 years the only unique center of Judaism and the Jewish people” 
(Ma’oz 2009: 102) and though “the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed twice (in 
586 BC and AD 70) and Jews were exiled, they have never disengaged from Jerusalem or 
forgotten it. Jews continued to reside in Jerusalem for centuries, albeit in small numbers 
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and, along with their brethren in the Diaspora, they pray toward Jerusalem three times a 
day” (Ma’oz 2009: 102). Jerusalem is also home to Har ha-Bayt (the Temple Mount) 
which is Judaism’s most holy site (Klein 2007: 29-30). Accordingly, many Israelis are 
“convinced that the city is theirs by divine right” (Dumper1997: 2).  
 
To the Israelis, Jerusalem (both Eastern and Western
22
 parts) is their “unified” (Peteet 
2005: 163-164) and “eternal capital” (Sha'ban 2007: 43). By contrast, the Palestinians – 
backed up by the international community and international legitimacy which is 
manifested in numerous United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions (e.g. UNGAR 2253, 2245; UNSCR 242, 252) – consider East 
Jerusalem an occupied territory (Peteet 2005: 163-164) and thus “subject to the 
applicability of the law of belligerent occupation” (Sha'ban 2007: 49).  
 
The struggle between the Palestinians and Israelis to control Jerusalem has been radically 
intensified since Israel’s occupation of East Jerusalem – including the Old City – along 
with the rest of the West Bank following the June 1967 war (Jabareen 2010: 28). 
Immediately after the conclusion of the war, Israel has employed a range of tactical 
measures in order to legitimize its claim of ownership over the city. These measures 
include annexing East Jerusalem to its territory, evicting the Palestinians from the Jewish 
Quarter
23
 and settling Jews there (Ma’oz 2009: 103), demolishing the historic Muslim al-
Maghāriba Quarter (Arabic: ‘ةبراغملا ةراح’,  ārat al-Maghāriba) adjoining the Western 
Wall in order to enlarge the ‘Wailing Wall’ plaza and make room for Jewish worshipers to 
pray (Dakkak 1981: 139; Ma’oz 2009: 103) (cf. Chapter 5.3) and initiating large-scale 
excavations along the southern and western walls of the al- aram al-Sharīf in order to 
expose large areas of important archaeological remains (Silberman 2001: 498) (cf. Chapter 
5.7.2). 
 
Other Israeli measures and practices in the occupied city – which are still ongoing– 
include, erasing Arab names in the city and replacing them with Hebrew ones (cf. Chapter 
5.3), cancelling “residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians” (cf. Chapter 5.3.1), building 
                                                          
22
 Khalidi (1992: 136) explains that “much of what today is commonly thought of as ‘Israeli West Jerusalem’ 
in fact consisted of Arab neighborhoods before the fighting of the spring of 1948, when over 30,000 of their 
inhabitants were driven out or fled from their quarters like [Upper and Lower] Baqa', Qatamon and Talbiyya, 
several months before some 2,000 Jews were forced out of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City”. 
23
 On the specific issue of the Israeli reconstruction of the Jewish Quarter after the 1967 war, see Ricca 
(2007). 
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illegal Jewish settlements (cf. Chapter 5.6.2), closing Palestinian institutions (cf. Chapter 
5.3.2) and building Israel’s illegal Wall. The Palestinians – who have aspirations of having 
East Jerusalem as a capital for their future state – perceive these measures and practices as 
attempts by Israel to change the geography and demography of Occupied East Jerusalem 
(cf. Chapter 5.3.1) and ultimately consolidate its exclusive claim of sovereignty and 
control of the city. 
 
Resolving the question of Jerusalem is of significant importance to the success of any 
future peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis. As Khalidi (2001: 83) 
explains, “[C]ertainly, there will be no end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, no Arab-
Israeli reconciliation, and no normalization of the situation of Israel in the region without a 
lasting solution for Jerusalem”. 
 
The Narratives of the Right of Return 
The 1948 war – a “war of liberation” for the Israelis and a “war of conquest” for the 
Palestinians (Chomsky 2003: 47) and its major catastrophic consequence, namely, the 
creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy  – constitutes a key chapter in the history of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict (see for example, Pappé 2006b, Masalha 1992, 2003; Morris 
1987, 2004). This historical event – termed al-Nakba (Arabic: ‘ةبكنلا’, lit. ‘The Catastrophe’ 
or ‘The Disaster’) by the Palestinians – turned at least 80% of the indigenous Palestinian 
people (estimated as 750,000-800,000) into refugees (Abu Lughod and Sa’di 2007: 3) and 
led to the destruction of some 420 Palestinian towns and villages (Sa'di 2007: 297). Other 
than this, the Zionist gangs of the Hagana, Irgun and Ster committed massacres against 
unarmed innocent Palestinian civilians, including in Dayr Yassin on 9 April 1948 (Khalidi 
2003: 53) resulting in the “massacre of several thousands” (Pappé 2003: 229). 
Simultaneous with this systematic process of destruction there was an organized process of 
erasure of the Arab Palestinian names and replacing them with Hebrew-Zionist ones (cf. 
Chapter 5.3)  
The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy and its 
causes have always been a point of a heated debate between the Palestinians and Israelis. 
The two sides approach the question of the Palestinian refugees and their Right of Return 
from fundamentally conflicting standpoints (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). The Palestinian 
narrative of 1948 – which considers what happened in 1948 as  “a form of ethnic 
cleansing, a colonial enterprise which covets the land without the people” (Aruri 2011: 3) – 
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accuses the “Zionists of deliberately and forcefully expelling the Palestinian Arabs who 
lived in what has become the state of Israel in 1948” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). The 
Palestinians – while insisting on Israel’s sole responsibility in the creation of the 
Palestinian refugees tragedy – demand the Right of Return of the Palestinian refugees to 
their homes and properties, a demand anchored in the UN resolution 194 which provides 
that “the Palestinian refugees have a choice: either to return to their homes or to resettle 
elsewhere” (Abu Hussein and McKay 2003: 5).  
For the Palestinians, their forced displacement from their homes and properties in 1948 
“cuts to the core of the Palestinian identity and more than one hundred years of struggle 
against Zionism and its project in Palestine” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). To them, it is a 
matter of principle that Israel acknowledges their Right of Return and the wrongs and 
suffering it caused them. 
The Israeli official narrative in turn rejects the Palestinian refugees’ Right of Return 
altogether (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). According to the Israeli official narrative, the 
Palestinian refugees in 1948 “fled ‘voluntarily’ (meaning not as a result of Jewish 
compulsion) or that they were asked or ordered to do so by their leaders and by the leaders 
of the Arab states” (Morris 2004: 2) despite “Jewish pleas for the local Arab population to 
stay and demonstrate that peaceful coexistence was possible” (Chiller-Glaus 2007: 67). 
Accordingly, Israel officially denies its responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian 
refugees problem (Ghanem 2001: 195) and upholds the position that “any Palestinian 
rights over land must be dealt with by payment of compensation” (Abu Hussein and 
McKay 2003: 5) in the context of “a return to a future Palestinian state” (Peters 2011: 24). 
 
Israel’s denial of any responsibility of the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy 
stems from ethical considerations:  
For the Israeli Jews recognizing the Palestinians as victims of their own evil is deeply traumatic, 
for it not only questions the very foundational myths of the state of Israel and its motto of “A state 
without a people for a people without a state,” but it also raises a whole panoply of ethical 
questions with significant implications for the future of the state…Thus, having been the just party 
at that time, in the formative period of the conflict, justifies the existence of Zionism and the whole 
Jewish project in Palestine; in  the same way it doubts the wisdom and morality of Palestinian 
actions in that period. It obliterates out of any discussion the ethnic cleansing carried out by the 
Jews in 1948 (Pappé 2003: 228-229). 
The official Israeli narrative of 1948 was contested by a group of Israeli historians who 
published research since the mid-1980s and became known later as the ‘new historians’, 
most notably Morris (1987; 2004), Pappé (1992) and Shlaim (1995b). The most influential 
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research on this issue is the one by Benny Morris (1987) who – after examining 
declassified documents in the Israel State Archive – concluded that: 
“[T]he Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not design, Jewish or Arab. It was largely a 
by-product of Arab and Jewish fears and of the protracted, bitter fighting that characterized the 
first Israeli-Arab war; in smaller part it was the deliberate creation of Jewish and Arab military 
commanders and politicians” (Morris 1987: 286 quoted in Finkelstein 2003: 52). 
 
That is to say, the Zionists did not expel the Palestinians with pre-meditation, as in the 
Palestinian narrative and the “invading” Arab states did not encourage the Palestinians to 
leave, as in the Israeli narrative but the truth, according to Morris, lies somewhere in the 
middle ground of these two extremes (Finkelstein 2003: 52) (for more on the critique of 
Morris’s argument, see for example, Finkelstein 1991; Masalha 1991, 1995). 
 
Although it has been 63 years since its creation, the Palestinian refugees problem has not 
been resolved yet and millions of Palestinian refugees are still living in refugee camps 
under harsh living conditions. According to the official statistics of the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), as of 30 
December 2010, there are 4,966,664 registered Palestinian refugees worldwide.
24
 One-
third of those registered refugees – more than 1.4 million – live in 58 recognised refugee 
camps in Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem.
25
 The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer the worst living 
conditions. According to the UNRWA those refugees “do not enjoy several basic human 
rights”, for example, they do not have the right to work in as many as 20 professions, lack 
social and civil rights, have no access to public services and very limited access to public 
health or educational facilities.
 26 
 
1.1.2 The Narrative of the Middle East Peace Process 
The unofficial start of the Middle East peace process can be traced back to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization’s (PLO thereafter) acceptance of the American preconditions27 for 
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 ‘UNRWA in Figures’, UNRWA website, published in July 2011:   
http://www.unrwa.org/userfiles/2011080123958.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
25
 ‘Palestine Refugees’, UNRWA website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=86 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
26
  ‘Lebanon’, UNRWA website: http://www.unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=65 [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
27
 These preconditions are based on a U.S. commitment to Israel in 1975 that it would not “recognize or 
negotiate with the PLO unless it 1) recognized Israel’s right to exist; 2) accepted UN Resolutions 242 and 
338; and 3) renounced terrorism” (Hunter 1991: 159). These are the very same current American 
preconditions to talk to the Palestinian faction, Hamas.  
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establishing diplomatic relations: the acceptance of Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 
242 as the basis of peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict
28
, recognition of 
“Israel’s right to exist” and the formal renunciation of “terrorism” in all its forms 
(Goldberg 1990: 98; Vatikiotis 1997: 46). These preconditions were met by the PLO in the 
text of the Palestine Declaration of Independence and a political communiqué, both 
adopted during the 19
th
 session of the Palestine National Council (PNC) – the Palestinian 
parliament in exile – in Algeria on 15 November 1988 (Goldberg 1990: 98).  
 
The Palestinian acceptance of these preconditions meant that the PLO officially endorses 
the principle of partitioning historic Palestine and a ‘two-state’ solution29 to the conflict 
(Shlaim 1994: 26). Israel, led by a Likud government at the time, rejected the Palestinian 
declaration setting claim to the whole of the “Land of Israel” including the Occupied West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip (Shlaim 1994: 26). 
 
The Palestinian diplomatic move represented “the most significant expression of the PLO’s 
change in its attitude vis-à-vis Israel and regional peace” (Ghanem 2002: 17). Following 
this move, the Americans significantly modified their attitude towards the PLO and the 
Palestinians (Ghanem 2002: 18) and decided on 14 December 1988 to start unprecedented 
talks with the PLO (Hunter 1991: 160). These developments paved the way for the 
convening of the international peace conference in Madrid on 18 October 1991 (Ghanem 
2002: 18) which was based on the UNSCR 242 (cf. Chapter 5.2) and the principle of ‘land 
for peace’ (Shlaim 1994: 27). The Palestinians participated in the conference as part of a 
joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation which crucially provided them with “the opportunity 
to have their voice heard by the international community” (Cebeci 2011: 141). The Madrid 
Peace Conference launched bilateral and multilateral, i.e. negotiations between Israel, 
Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians. The bilateral talks between Israel and the Palestinians 
were held in Washington; however, these talks (six rounds) did not produce any important 
progress (Ghanem 2002: 18). 
 
                                                          
28
 The PLO had refused to accept the UNSCR 242 before because it denied the national rights of the 
Palestinian people and refer to them solely in the context of a refugee problem (Chomsky 1999: 41). 
29
 The principle of partitioning historic Palestine or ‘the two-state’ solution was first proposed by the Peel 
Commission in 1937 and then in UN resolution 181 of 1947. The ‘two-state’ solution was then emphasized 
in other UN General Assembly (UNGA) and Security Council (UNSC) resolutions including,  UNGAR 3236 
(1974), 65/16 (2010) and UNSCR 338 (1973) and 1397 (2002), 1515 (2003) and 1850 (2008). 
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At the same time, secret negotiations between the PLO and Israel were carried out in Oslo, 
Norway which led later to the conclusion of a set of interim agreements which became 
known as the Oslo Accords (Shlaim 1994: 24) (see for example, Abbas 1995; Freedman 
1998; Qurie 2006; Said 2000; Watson 2000). The Oslo Accord I – also known as the 
Declaration of Principles (DOP) – was signed on 13 September 1993 on the White House 
lawn by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat under the auspice of then American president 
Bill Clinton (Bennis 2003: 63; Shlaim 1994: 24). The Oslo Accord II – also known as 
Gaza-Jericho Agreement – was signed at a ceremony in Cairo, Egypt on 4 May 1994. 
 
In the Oslo Accords, the PLO recognized “Israel’s right to live in peace and security” and 
in return, Israel recognized the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people” 
(Shlaim 1994: 25). This declaration led to the establishment of Palestinian Authority (PA) 
and Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and from “unspecified areas in the West bank, 
leaving Jewish settlements and military security areas under Israeli control” (Thorpe 2006: 
172). One of the key features of the Oslo process is that it divided the Occupied West Bank 
into three areas of jurisdiction (Rubenberg 2003: 67) in a “Swiss cheese-like design”30 
(Bennis 2003: 63) (cf. Chapter 5.2.1). The PA had enormously limited control over only 
17.2% of the total area of the Occupied West Bank (Khalidi 2004: 134). Another key 
feature of Oslo is that the Palestinians were allowed to negotiate a 5-year interim 
agreement for self-government; However, they were seriously “forced to accept” the 
indefinite deferment of the negotiations on all of the most significant final-status issues 
including sovereignty, statehood, final borders, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem, refugees 
and water (Khalidi 2004: 134) 
 
The Palestinians and Israelis had different interpretations of the Oslo process and its 
expected outcome. The Palestinians hoped and imagined that – after recognizing “Israel’s 
existence on the 78% of their homeland” (Falah 2005: 1361) – the implementation of the 
Oslo Accords would lead eventually to the establishment of an independent Palestinian 
state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Thomas 2009: 125). Israel, on the other hand, 
considered the Oslo Accords as a guarantee of ‘autonomy’, but not for an independent state 
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 For an  illustration of this point, see for example the map published by the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in 2011, available at http://www.internal-
displacement.org/8025708F004BE3B1/(httpInfoFiles)/D9A44FEE2F3F0BCBC12578CB00509072/$file/opt
_ocha_area-c-west-bank_feb2011.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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(Thorpe 2006: 171). Bennis (2003: 64) argues that the Oslo process was not designed to 
end the Israeli occupation and lead to the establishment of such a state. As a matter of fact, 
the texts of the Oslo Accords (I and II) do not mention any of the words ‘occupation’, 
‘occupied’ (Bennis 2003: 64; Rubenberg 2003: 59) or  ‘Palestinian state’ (Armajani 2011: 
106). Thorpe (2006: 267) argues that Israel inserted language in the texts of the Oslo 
Accords – which the “creative ambiguity” played a major role in their drafting – 
“suggesting a Palestinian State, but with loopholes that enabled Israel to deny statehood”.  
 
The Oslo Accords were fundamentally a reflection of the power imbalance between the 
Palestinians and Israelis which was inevitably weighted in favour of the latter at the 
expense of the former (Zreik 2003: 40-41).  
 
Conditions on the ground have worsened for the Palestinians during the Oslo process 
through a  sharp rise in unemployment, reduction of GDP, erection of military checkpoints, 
restrictions on movement of people and goods and expropriation of land to build and 
expand Jewish settlements (Yasmeen 2010: 202). Most importantly, due to the fact that 
there was nothing in the Oslo Accords to prevent the creation of Jewish settlements or their 
continued expansion (Tessitore and Woolfson 1997: 54; Zreik 2003: 40), the number of 
Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories had doubled from two hundred 
thousand in 1991 to four hundred thousand by the end of the interim period in 2000 (Aruri 
2011: 4; Khalidi 2004: 136). Thus, rather than ending the Israeli occupation, Oslo 
“released Israel from the occupier’s obligations” (Aruri 2011: 4) and more significantly 
became a tool that “has prolonged and consolidated the Israeli occupation of Palestine by 
pseudo-diplomatic means” (Aruri 2011: 6). 
 
The final-status issues of the conflict were discussed for the first time in detail at the Camp 
David II Summit on 11 July 2000. This summit brought together the Israeli Prime Minister 
Ehud Barak and the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat under the auspices of the 
American President Bill Clinton (Aruri 2011: 7). The summit collapsed on 25 July 2000 
with no agreement. The reason for this has been a point of a heated debate between the two 
sides with each side blaming the other for its failure (for the Palestinian narrative of the 
summit, see for example, Qurie 2008; whereas for the Israeli-American narrative, see for 
example, Ben-Ami 2006; Ross 2005; Sher 2006).  
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According to Khalidi (2003: 57), the widely circulated Israeli-American narrative of what 
happened at Camp David – which was promoted by the Prime Minister Ehud Barak, 
Shlomo Ben-Ami and Dennis Ross and subscribed to by President Bill Clinton – claims 
that “Barak offered Arafat the most generous peace settlement conceivable but Arafat 
walked away from it. Why? Because Arafat’s commitment to a negotiated settlement in 
Oslo in 1993 had been a subterfuge”. Consequently, the Palestinians – who were perceived 
as “rejectionists” – were blamed for the failure of the negotiations.  
 
However, such a “generous” offer simply did not exist (Bisharah 2003: 23). Pappé (2003: 
227) offers an interpretation of what happened at Camp David: for the Israelis – led by the 
Israeli left since 1999 – the summit was “a stage for dictating to the Palestinians their 
concept of fairness: maximizing the divisibility of the visible (evicting 90 per cent of the 
occupied areas, 20 per cent of the settlements, 50 per cent of Jerusalem) while demanding 
the end of Palestinian reference to the invisible layers of the conflict: no right of return, no 
full sovereign Palestinian state, and no solution for the Palestinian minority in Israel”. By 
contrast, for the Palestinians the summit was meant “to produce the final stages in the 
Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (according to resolution 242 and 
338 of the UN security council) and prepare the ground for new negotiations over a fair 
settlement on the basis of UN resolution 194 – the return of the refugees, the 
internationalization of Jerusalem, and a full sovereign Palestinian state” (Pappé 2003: 227).  
 
Following the Camp David negotiations, a new narrative emerged to explain what was 
perceived by some as the total collapse of the peace process (Ghazi-Bouillon 2009: 119-
120). This narrative – which focused on the alleged Palestinian rejection of Barak’s 
“generous offer” and the Israeli claim that there was ‘no partner’ for peace – gained 
currency and became part of the mainstream discourse in Israel (Ghazi-Bouillon 2009: 
119-120). The American President then, Bill Clinton, presented on 23 December 2000 the 
two sides with a proposal to bridge the gap between their positions (Ben-Ami 2005: 82). 
Although no agreement was reached during the summit, Clinton’s bridging proposal 
formed more or less a reference to any future negotiations between the two sides. 
 
The collapse of peace process following the failure of the Camp David II negotiations and 
the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 September 2000, have 
resulted in an atmosphere of tremendous political despair and frustration among the 
Palestinians and have consequently given rise to new set of peace initiatives or plans aimed 
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at reviving the dead peace process and restoring hope in the ‘two-state’ solution to the 
conflict.  
 
1.1.3 The Narrative of the Palestinian-Israeli Peace Initiatives 
The diplomatic efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are as old as the conflict 
itself. Since the start of this conflict more than a hundred years ago, numerous plans or 
initiatives have been drawn up by key international, regional and local political players in 
attempts to outline a possible settlement to this conflict. Many of these initiatives – 
specifically since the mid-1970s – have been drafted within the political framework of the 
‘two-state’ solution, i.e. a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip on the 
1967 borders living side by side with Israel (Chomsky 1999: 41).  
 
The framework of the ‘two-state’ solution was officially accepted by the PLO in June 1988 
in Algiers (Deeb 2003: 5). This kind of solution, other than being supported by the 
international community since the mid-1970s (Chomsky 1999: 41), is also supported by 
the Palestinian and Israeli publics and the entire Arab world (Thomas 2009: 176). The 
framework of the ‘two-state’ solution was the basis of Middle East process that was 
launched in Madrid in 1991 and consequently the Oslo Accords which were signed 
between Israel and the PLO in the mid-1990s (cf. section 1.1.2). Examples of peace 
initiatives within this framework – particularly during the last three decades – include the 
Fahd Plan (1981)
31
, Reagan Plan (1982)
32, Clinton’s Parameters (2000)33 and Moratinos 
Non-Paper (2001).
34
 What characterizes these specific peace initiatives is that they all 
belong to what is called ‘track-one’ diplomacy, i.e. negotiations carried out by “diplomats, 
high-ranking government officials, and heads of states” (Mapendere 2006: 67) (cf. Chapter 
2.3.2). 
 
                                                          
31
 The Saudi King Fahd’s Plan of 1981 was adopted during the Arab Summit in Fas on 25 November 1982, 
available at http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=416&level_id=202 [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
32
 ‘Reagan Plan’ is a script drafted by George Shultz in close consultation with Henry Kissinger on 1 
September 1982. The main elements of this plan are opposition to Jewish settlements in the Palestinian 
Occupied Territories and that a negotiated settlement should be based on ‘an exchange of territories for 
peace’ (Stork 1993: 141). 
33
 ‘The Clinton Parameters’,  Israel-Palestine Center for Research and Information website, published on 23 
December 2000: http://www.ipcri.org/files/clinton-parameters.html [last accessed: 24 November 2011].  
34
 ‘Moratinos ‘Non-Paper’ 2001’, Jerusalem Media and Communication Centre website, published 14 
February 2002: http://www.jmcc.org/Documentsandmaps.aspx?id=424 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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The most recent diplomatic efforts – within the same framework and as mentioned before –
came immediately after the collapse of the peace process following the failure of the Camp 
David II summit in August 2000 and the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-
Aqsa on 28 September 2000.
35
 Those two major events resulted in an overwhelming 
atmosphere of political despair and frustration and consequently gave rise to a new set of 
peace initiatives. These peace initiatives can be seen as part of the rigorous diplomatic 
efforts by key international, regional and local political players – e.g. the Quartet, the 
League of Arab States, politicians, etc. – to reach a ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict.  
 
However, this solution is “rapidly becoming less likely to occur” (Winnick 2009: 47). This 
is fundamentally due to what has actually been happening on the ground in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories since the signing of the Oslo Accords in the mid-1990s, namely the 
division of the Palestinian territories into Areas ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ (cf. chapter 5.2.1), the 
continued expansion of Jewish settlements and what has been further worsened since the 
outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada in 2000, namely the construction of Israel’s 
illegal Wall. This situation has been described as the ‘Ghettoization’ (e.g. Said 1995; 
Pappé and Chomsky 2010b: 145), the ‘Enclavisation’ (Falah 2005: 1342), the 
‘Cantonisation’ (e.g. Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29) and even the ‘Bantustanization’ (e.g. 
Alissa 2007: 130; De Cesari 2009: 46; Farsakh 2002: 14-15) of the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. Today, these territories stand as: 
a canonised set of physically separated Palestinian localities, with local Palestinian government for 
municipal services, but subject to overarching Israeli military occupation and rule over all else of 
importance. The construction of the fences, the expansion of Israeli settlements and the 
progressive destruction of the Palestinian Authority fit with this model. This means that the longer 
the continuation of the status quo, the less likely becomes a peace settlement based on a viable, 
sovereign and territorially contiguous Palestinian state (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29). 
The option of a ‘one-state’ solution – also known as the ‘bi-national state’36 – cannot be 
ruled out in light of these facts. Indeed, it is warned that the current situation of 
‘cantonisation’ of the Palestinian lands will soon become the default scenario of the ‘one-
state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 29). This kind 
of solution – which has never been endorsed by any government but rather proposed by 
academics and political activists (e.g. Abunimah 2007; Makdisi 2010; Tilley 2005) and 
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 The second Palestinian intifada, unlike the first one (1987-1993), was armed. 
36
 Ghanem (2009: 120) argues that “[I]n recent years, following the evident impasse of other solutions, the 
Bi-National State (BNS) alternative has once again become part of the political discourse among Israelis and 
Palestinians”. 
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regarded by majority of Israeli Jews as “a strategic threat to the Jewish State” (Ghanem 
2009: 126) – envisions a one ‘bi-national’ state in which citizens, Palestinians and Israelis 
“live democratically side by side, with equal rights and equal obligations” – i.e. ‘one man, 
one vote’ (Klein 2008: 89).  
The failure of the ‘two-state’ solution and the rejection of the ‘one-state’ solution – and 
taking into account the geographic and demographic changes on the ground 
37
 – would lead 
eventually to a third option – i.e. “apartheid” (Bishara 2007: 72). In such a situation, a 
Jewish minority will rule a Palestinian majority. The Palestinians – who “have suffered a 
severe historical injustice in that they have been deprived of a substantial part of their 
traditional home” (Chomsky 2003: 77) – 78% of historic Palestine – and faced with the 
impossibility of establishing a viable state on the remaining 22% – will have no other 
alternative but to dismantle the Palestinian Authority and start a South African-like-style 
struggle for equal political, social and economic rights within a single democratic state for 
all of its citizens (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 33).  
In order to avoid these two scenarios – i.e. the ‘one-state’ and the ‘apartheid’– key 
international, regional and local political players decided to intervene and intensified their 
efforts following the collapse of the negotiations at Camp David II (cf. Section 1.1.2). 
These intensified efforts resulted in the drafting of five Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives 
in less than two years (cf. Chapter 3.2). The ‘two-state’ solution – which the international 
community endorses and promotes – would allow Israel to keep a Jewish majority on 78% 
of historic Palestine. In this sense, the creation of a Palestinian state on the lands occupied 
in 1967 – is not only a Palestinian interest but also an Israeli one. 
The texts in the corpus and equally their different translations play a crucial role in not 
only keeping the ‘two-state’ solution on the table but also making sure it is the only 
solution under discussion.
38
 These peace initiatives largely build on the outcome of 
previous negotiations and agreements between Israel and the PLO – e.g. Clinton’s Proposal 
(2000) and Taba Talks (2001). For example, the Clinton’s Proposal formed the basis of the 
                                                          
37
 According to Klein (2008: 93), there are “5,658 million Jews as compared to 5,057 million Palestinians in 
what was once Mandatory Palestine. In a few years’ time, given the current demographic trends, if no 
alternative solution is found, a Jewish minority will be ruling over a Palestinian majority”.  
38
 For example, the Roadmap Plan, which envisions a ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
is officially endorsed in the United Nations General Assembly resolution 1515 of 2003 as the only way to 
move forward. 
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Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Roadmap 
Plan was based largely on the report of Sharm al-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee – better 
known as ‘the Mitchell Report’– (2001).39 Moreover, these peace initiatives address – in 
more or less detail – the final-status of the conflict which have been impeding resolving the 
conflict for a long time and offer political solutions to them.   
Furthermore, peace initiatives range from one page (e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative) to forty-
nine pages (e.g. the Geneva Accord). Some of these initiatives were the outcome of direct 
unofficial bilateral negotiations (e.g. the Geneva Accord), others were the outcome of 
indirect official negotiations (e.g. the Roadmap Plan) (cf. Chapter 2.4.2), whereas a third 
group were unilateral attempts by one side (e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative) to outline a 
political solution to the conflict. As the outcome of direct or indirect negotiations (cf. 
Chapter 3.2), peace initiatives reflect political compromises and power relations which find 
their way in the textual profiles of the different language versions (cf. Chapter 5).  
 
These peace initiatives – following a chronological order – are the Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative, the Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan. The 
following table (1.1) lists the authors, dates of publications and language versions of each 
initiative. 
 
Table 1.1 Corpus of the Study 
Initiative  Authors Language 
Date of 
Publication 
 Translations 
The Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles 
for Peace Agreement 
 
The Gush-Shalom                
Organization 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
Arabic  (1) 
English (1) 
 
 
The Arab Peace Initiative 
 
The League of  
Arab States (LAS) 
Arabic 
 
2002 
 
 
English (4) 
Hebrew (6) 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles 
 
Ami Ayalon and         
Sari Nusseibeh 
 
English 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
 
Arabic   (5) 
Hebrew (2) 
 
The Geneva Accord 
 
 
 
Yossi Beilin and 
Yasser Abed-
Rabbo 
 
English 
 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Arabic   (1) 
Hebrew (1) 
 
                                                          
39
 ‘The Mitchell Report’, BBC website, published on 29 November 2001: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/middle_east/2001/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1632064.s
tm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Quartet: the  
United Nations    
(UN), the United 
States, Russia and  
the European Union 
 
 
English 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Arabic   (6) 
Hebrew (4) 
 
 
 
 
 
What distinguishes peace initiatives in the corpus from previous peace initiatives drafted 
throughout the history of the conflict is the increasing role of civil society
40
 – both in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel – in the efforts to resolve the conflict, 
particularly since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 
September 2000. 
Conflict situations, unlike peaceful societies, may produce “more intense mobilization of 
civil society” (Marchettia and Tocci 2009: 201). The fact that three out of the five 
Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in the corpus belong to what is called ‘track-two’ 
diplomacy or ‘unofficial diplomacy’ (e.g. Chataway 1998; Fisher 2006) (cf. Chapter 2.3.2) 
is indicative of such increasing mobilization of civil society. ‘Track-two’ diplomacy – a 
term coined by Joseph Montville (1987) – is defined as “unofficial, informal interaction 
between members of adversary groups or nations that aim to develop strategies, to 
influence public opinion, organize human and material resources in ways that might help 
resolve their conflict” (Montville 1991: 162 quoted in Mapendere 2006: 68). 
 
The term ‘civil society’ includes a multiplicity of actors “ranging from local to 
international, independent and quasi-governmental players” (Marchettia and Tocci 2006: 
201). Examples of groups and members of civil society in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories and Israel include the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC), Gush-Shalom 
organization, Peace Now, National Consensus, B’Tselem, etc. in addition to individual 
citizens such as Sari Nusseibeh, Ami Ayalon, Yossi Beilin and Yasser Abd-Rabbo (cf. 
chapter 3.2.2) who have been involved in unofficial negotiations or ‘track-one’ diplomacy. 
 
In order to keep the ‘two-state’ solution on the table and to challenge the narrative of there 
being no Palestinian ‘partner for peace’ (cf. Section 1.1.2), these civil society groups 
decided to intervene after they lost faith in the ability of their political leaderships to bring 
any change to the impasse in the peace process. These groups believed that power lies in 
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 There is also an emerging international civil society movement which promotes boycotts, divestment and 
sanctions ‘BDS’ against Israel  that is similar to the Palestinian movement for ‘BDS’ (Bisharat 2011: 316). 
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the hands of people and thus decided to resort to civil society in order to secure the backing 
of public opinion to the political solutions their propose. They tried to avoid mistakes made 
in the Oslo Accords, namely, deferring the discussion of the final-status of the conflict 
until the end of the process (cf. Section 1.1.2) by tackling them from the outset. 
 
Given this situation, peace initiatives present a genuine case of interaction and engagement 
between different political and social agents: mainly those who belong to ‘track-one’ and 
‘track-two’ diplomacy. These agents compete over power, political supremacy and 
legitimacy. Such a competition can be summarized as who has the power to negotiate a 
peace agreement: governments or people (cf. Chapter 2.3.2). 
 
The drafters of peace initiatives decided to put the texts which they negotiated in front of 
their respective publics. Translation played a central role in this context. Peace initiatives 
drafted for example, originally in English, were made available in Arabic and Hebrew. 
These peace initiatives and their translations are presented in different frames in order to 
serve different purposes or functions and fulfil different roles in different institutional 
contexts. As these initiatives are featured on the public agenda, they play a decisive role in 
determining which course the conflict takes in the future. It is precisely here that 
translation plays a key role by being an important source of information and part of a 
political propaganda to achieve certain political aims. 
What is interesting here is that some of the negotiators themselves acted as translators of 
these texts, such as Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon. Other translators were peace activists, 
such as Hagit Ofran, or academics, such as Ilai Alon. This shows the increasing role of 
non-professional translators in translation. The aim of these particular translations, other 
than dissemination of information (i.e. fulfilling an informative function), is to influence 
Palestinian and Israeli public opinions (i.e. fulfilling a persuasive function). It can be 
argued then that these peace initiatives have a major social and political role to play in this 
conflict, namely, preparing and shaping public opinion in Israel and the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories with regard to any future political settlement to the conflict.  
Public opinion is of the utmost importance in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict 
and its resolution. In this regard, Shamir (2007: 6) emphasizes that “the premise that public 
opinion affects foreign policy is now widely accepted among political scientists, scholars 
of international relations, and public opinion experts”. That is why some of these 
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initiatives, such as ‘track-two’ peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.2) directly target public 
opinion in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and strive to elicit their 
support. Drafters of these initiatives try to pressure their respective governments to 
negotiate a peace agreement by gaining support from people at grassroots level. 
Some of these peace initiatives, such as the Geneva Accord, generated heated debates in 
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. This was mainly due to their political 
content as well as the political credibility of their drafters. Consequently, some of these 
initiatives were well received as potential proposals to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, whereas others were severely criticized for giving up so much to the other side of 
the conflict. Some of these criticisms were based on the original source texts of these 
initiatives; other cases were based on translations, e.g. the Arabic and Hebrew translations 
of the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 6.3).  
1.2 Objectives and Analytical Progression of the Study  
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been playing a major role in shaping the political 
landscape of the Middle East for more than a hundred years. This conflict has been 
attracting considerable interest from political scientists, historians and sociologists for 
many years (e.g. Finkelstein 2003; Hajjar 2005; Kimmerling 2008; Nakhleh and Zureik 
1980; Pappé 2011; Said 1995; Schulze 2008; Shlaim 2000) but the role of language and 
translation in this context has not yet received as much attention as the study of other 
political contexts. As Schäffner (1997: 119) notes, the term ‘political text’ is vague as it 
covers a variety of genres such as treaties, speeches, editorials, etc. This thesis examines 
peace initiatives – which have been playing a significant role in the context of this conflict 
for many years – as a largely under-researched genre of political texts. 
 
Power relations and other ideological considerations have a significant impact on discourse 
practices (Chilton and Schäffner 2002) and all levels of linguistic organisation in political 
texts, including the authors’ lexical choices and their deliberate use of ambiguity or 
vagueness. But the sensitivity of political texts (Schäffner 2002) is multiplied and refracted 
in international politics, understood in this thesis as “a struggle for power, between those 
who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it” (Chilton 2004:  
3). Governments, political parties as well as ordinary citizens rely on translation as a 
source of information which constitutes acts of mediation and, potentially, may add to the 
complexity of the ideological clashes underpinning peace initiatives. Amid the growing 
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internationalisation of politics and the increasing social visibility of its consequences, 
whether in the form of conflict-induced displacement or clashes between competing 
approaches to the resolution of diplomatic tensions, the translation of political texts has 
gained significant attention within Translation Studies in recent years (e.g. Baker 2006, 
2009; Salama-Carr 2007; Schäffner 1997, 2004). 
 
Existing research on the translation of political texts includes a number of scholarly 
strands, ranging from functional analyses (Schäffner 1997, 2002) and systemic-linguistic 
approaches (Mason 1994, Calzada-Pérez 2001), to research on political discourse analysis 
(Chilton and Schäffner 2002) and narrative theory (Baker 2006). In this thesis, translation 
is understood as a social practice in the hands of a variety of social agents within specific 
socio-cultural and institutional context. As Wolf (2002: 33) explains: 
[a] sociological approach to the study of translation would follow the insight that translation is a 
socially-regulated activity and consequently analyze the social agents responsible for the creation 
of translation. The analysis of the social implications of translation helps us to identify the 
translator as constructing and constructed subject in society, and to view translation as a social 
practice. 
 
The main focus of investigation in this thesis is on texts, i.e. peace initiatives and their 
translations. Nevertheless, aspects of agency and institutions involved in the translation 
and publication of these texts are partly accounted for as detailed information about these 
two is not available.  
The study of peace initiatives, as sensitive political texts, and their translations, in their 
respective socio-political, historical and institutional contexts, can shed more light on the 
major role that these texts play in society in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, 
the institutional practices and the way in which the different social agents – including 
translators, publishers, political institutions, etc. – involved in their production and 
publication interact and “take up positions and build alliances” to accomplish their “aims 
and ambitions” (Hermans 1996: 10). 
 
The positions of the social agents involved in the production of the texts under scrutiny in 
this thesis, both the original and translated versions, are influenced by ideological and 
political considerations. In other words, their positions emanate from their ideologies,
41
 
understood as “representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to 
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 The concept of ideology in this thesis is used following Fairclough (1995) in a critical rather than a neutral 
way. 
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establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and 
exploitation” (Fairclough 2003: 9). Against this backdrop, translators emerge as active 
social agents – “within complex structures of power” (Hermans 1995: 6) – who are 
politically aware of the choices they make and play “a crucial role in both disseminating 
and contesting public narratives [i.e. collective stances or dispositions that circulate and 
operate in structural units and institutions of society or a nation as a whole] within and 
across national boundaries” (Baker 2006: 4).  
This thesis presents a product-oriented textual analysis of 31 Arabic, English and Hebrew 
language versions of five different Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. Methodologically, 
the thesis pursues a top-down approach in analysing data. After outlining the socio-
political conditions of text production of the drafting of the Palestinian-Israeli peace 
initiatives (original source texts), the thesis examines the textual profiles of the different 
Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of these initiatives, focusing on their 
functions and underlying principles of audience design. The thesis then moves on to 
establish how these textual profiles reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and 
power relations at the macro- and micro-structural levels level. The final step in the 
analysis attempts to account for these aspects in terms of the socio-political and 
institutional conditions of the production of the translations. 
 
The main body of the analysis draws on concepts and methods of Descriptive Translation 
Studies (DTS) (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 
1992). This thesis is informed by previous applications of Critical Discourse Analysis to 
Translation Studies as it works from the assumption that “discourse is both socially 
conditioned and shapes social relationships, and that it is necessary to adopt a critical 
stance towards the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed” (Saldanha 
2008: 151). Political discourse analysts examine texts in one language and cultural context 
whereas a translation approach to the investigation of political discourse can shed new 
light on the various processes involving the production of political discourses in more than 
one language (Arabic, English and Hebrew in the case of this thesis). 
 
This thesis goes beyond description of actual translation profiles to explanations of these 
profiles with reference to their institutional contexts of production. For this purpose, 
Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model of Critical Discourse Analysis (cf. Chapter 
3.3.3) will be applied to answer the main research questions of this thesis:  
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1) What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically 
negotiated texts? 
2) What happen to these texts in translation? 
3) How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political 
affiliation and power relations? 
4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be 
accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the 
production of the translations? 
 
The framework of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) – a politically engaged form of 
discourse analysis – is a useful framework for the study of peace initiatives and their 
translations because, among other reasons, it accounts for three levels of analysis: text 
production, text interpretation and institutional contexts and emphasizes that texts have a 
role in social and political change (for more in depth justification of CDA as the 
methodological framework in this thesis, see Chapter 3.3.3). 
By attempting to answer these research questions, this thesis makes an original 
contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies by contributing to a deeper 
understanding of the translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in 
their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts during situations of ongoing 
contemporary conflict. 
 
1.3 Structure of the Study 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter Two consists of two main sections, reviewing the main studies on political and 
negotiated texts. The first section reviews the major studies on negotiated and political 
texts in the discipline of Translation Studies. It provides the justification for conducting 
this study and its relevance to the discipline of Translation Studies. The second section 
reviews the main studies on peace initiatives and politically negotiated texts in the 
neighbouring disciplines of Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Negotiation Theory, 
Diplomatic Studies and Genre Studies. This review helps in identifying the nature of peace 
initiatives and their characteristic features (e.g. use of deliberately ambiguous or vague 
drafting, naming practices, choice use of politically sensitive concepts and terms, etc.). 
These features would then guide data analysis at the macro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5). 
This section shows that peace initiatives are still largely under-researched genre of political 
texts and that more research is still needed in this direction. On the other hand, it shows 
similarities between peace initiatives and peace treaties.  
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Chapter Three consists of four main sections introducing the corpus and methodology of 
the study. The first section introduces the aims of the chapter. The second section presents 
the corpus of the study. It starts with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of 
the production of the original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts). 
It then presents the different language versions of these initiatives (the target texts) in their 
different institutional contexts. The third section presents the methodology of the study. 
The thesis operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation 
Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis. It applies the analytical model suggested by 
Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of Critical 
Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). In linking the textual profiles of peace initiatives to 
conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal models as described by 
Chesterman (1997).  
Chapter Four examines the textual organization of the individual translation profiles of 
the various language versions of peace initiatives. It aims to show how the various 
components of textual organization of translation profiles of the different language 
versions of peace initiatives (the target texts) at the macro-structural level – e.g. layouts, 
paratexts, chapter heading, etc. – reflect ideological and political interests. For this 
purpose, the Descriptive Translation Studies model of Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) is 
applied. This descriptive account of textual profiles answers the following questions: Are 
these texts complete? How were they introduced? What labels were given to them? Were 
there any translator’s notes, footnotes? etc.  
Chapter Five moves on to examine the textual profiles of the different language versions 
of peace initiatives at the micro-structural level as the second level of analysis. This 
product-oriented textual analysis starts by justifying the selection of data examples and it 
then moves on to the discussion of relevant examples. This chapter aims to examine how 
aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations impinge on the different 
language versions of peace initiatives. Identified translation strategies are classified 
according to Chesterman’s categories (1997).  
Chapter Six consists of two main sections aiming to turn to explaining textual profiles of 
the language versions in terms of their institutional contexts. The first section presents the 
aim of the chapter as linking aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations in 
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the different textual profiles of peace initiatives (i.e. target texts) – at both macro- and 
micro-structural levels – to their socio-political and institutional conditions of the 
production of the translations. It will show that in many cases translations produced in one 
specific institutional context are recontextualised for use in another one. Such 
recontextualisation goes hand in hand with further textual amendments. The second section 
presents a case of a political debate initiated based on the Yes to an Agreement Hebrew 
translation of the Geneva Accord. The last section presents a conclusion to the chapter. 
Chapter Seven consists of three main sections presenting the major conclusions of the 
thesis. The first section presents the major conclusions and findings for the translation of 
peace initiatives. The second section presents the original contribution of the study to the 
discipline of Translation Studies and Critical Discourse Analysis. The final section points 
the reader to further research on political texts and peace initiatives in the discipline of 
Translation Studies and other neighbouring disciplines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
41 
 
Chapter Two  
Translation, Ideology and Politics  
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical premises of the thesis. It consists of three main 
sections. Section 2.2 reviews the main research on negotiated and political texts in the 
discipline of Translation Studies. Section 2.3 investigates the main studies on negotiated 
texts, including peace initiatives, within neighbouring disciplines such as Political Science, 
Conflict Resolution, Genre Studies and Negotiation Theory. These studies inform the 
research on the key features of peace initiatives and later on their analysis. Section 2.4 
provides a conclusion to this chapter.  
 
2.2 Translation, Peace Initiatives and Politics  
In an edited volume, entitled A Companion to Translation Studies (2007) covering main 
areas of research in Translation Studies, such as culture, literature, gender and media, 
Schäffner’s contribution on ‘Politics and Translation’ provided a detailed overview of what 
has been ongoing in the area of translation of political texts. Schäffner (2007) reviews the 
issue of ‘Translation and Politics’ from three main points of views: the politics of 
translation, the translation of political texts and the politicisation of translation. Reflecting 
on research in the area of political texts, Schäffner (2007: 138) points out that – although 
aspects of politics have been paid attention to within Translation Studies – still there is no 
‘major monograph’ on the translation of political discourse. Moreover, keywords such as 
‘politics’ and ‘political texts’ do not appear in reference works such as Cowie and 
Shuttleworth (1997), etc. (Schäffner 2007: 138). Surprisingly, ten years later, these 
keywords still do not appear in major reference works, e.g. Baker and Saldanha (2008).  
 
Schäffner (1997: 119) points out that the term ‘political text’ itself is a vague one. It is an 
umbrella term which covers a range of genres. Genres are defined following Chilton and 
Schäffner (2002: 19) as “global linguistic patterns which have historically developed for 
fulfilling specific communicative tasks in specific situations”. Political discourse includes 
various genres such as treaties, speeches, parliamentary debates, editorials, etc. This list, of 
course, is not exhaustive. It would also include peace initiatives or plans, petitions, 
manifestos and press releases.  
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Political texts can be identified and characterized according to their functions and themes 
(Schäffner 1997: 119). These texts normally serve a particular political function which 
varies from one genre to another, e.g. political speeches usually have a persuasive function, 
while treaties have a regulatory one. Any significant change in this function or 
‘communicative purpose’ is likely to result in a different genre (Bhatia 1993: 13). 
However, minor changes in the communicative purpose(s) help in distinguishing 
subgenres. 
 
Despite the existence of research on the translation of political texts, following functional 
(e.g. Schäffner 1997; 2002) or systemic-linguistic approaches (e.g. Calzada-Pérez 2001, 
Mason 1994) and research on Political Discourse Analysis (e.g. Chilton and Schäffner 
2002), peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts. In the 
Arab world, research on the translation of political texts includes very few studies on 
translation of political speeches from Arabic into English (e.g. Al-Harrasi 2001, Shunnaq 
2000) and on peace treaties from English into Arabic (e.g. Masa’deh 2003). Moreover, 
there are no studies on the translation of political texts between Arabic, English and 
Hebrew languages. 
 
Translation Studies scholars interested in political texts have examined specific genres of 
political texts – e.g. negotiated texts, political speeches and/or effects of translation 
solutions. Masa’deh’s PhD thesis The Application of the theory of Norms to the 
Translation of International Treaties: A Case Study of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty 
(2003) is the only major study found on the translation of negotiated texts between English 
and Arabic. Masa’deh’s thesis fundamentally addresses the complexity of legal translation 
from English into Arabic and attempts to find a method by which legal terms in English 
and Arabic can be standardized, hoping that this would reduce political conflicts arising 
from misinterpretations. Applying norms theory to the Arabic translation of the text of the 
treaty, Masa’deh’s research aimed “to explain whether or not translators are governed by 
norms during the act of translation, and how this affects the resulting product” (Masa’deh’s 
2003: 4).  
 
A team of professional translators working for the Jordanian government officially 
translated the treaty into Arabic. For the purpose of his research, Masa’deh did not use the 
Arabic official translation, but data gained from a survey of four groups of informants: 
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professional translators, lecturers in translation, MA students of translation and 
undergraduate students of translation, who produced one hundred different translations. 
These translations comprised the corpus of study. 
 
The author focuses merely on linguistic aspects of legal terminology in peace treaties. He 
argues that the mistranslation of legal terms – e.g. boundary, territory, territorial waters, 
airspace, etc. – might lead to the outbreak of political conflicts but does not provide any 
evidence based on his data analysis about how this might happen. In his opinion, to reduce 
the chances of political conflicts arising because of misinterpretations, Arabic legal 
terminology in peace treaties – such as the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty – needs to be 
standardized. One might wonder how the standardization of Arabic legal terminology in 
the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty would help in preventing a political conflict between Jordan 
and Israel, taking into account that the English source text is the only authoritative one and 
that there is an official translation in Arabic.  
 
Finally, as mentioned before, Masa’deh’s findings are based on data collected from four 
groups of informants. Using such unauthentic translations, i.e. translations produced by 
informants rather than institutions, comments on the possibility of the outbreak of a 
political conflict can only be hypothetical. This highlights the need to examine genuine 
data in their socio-political, historical and institutional contexts. 
 
Some other research on the translation of political texts focused on particular linguistic 
problems in such texts and solutions to them. This can be seen, for example, in the work of 
Newmark (1991). Newmark, following a prescriptive approach, wrote a chapter on the 
‘Translation of Political Language’ with focus on lexical aspects, e.g. acronyms, 
metaphors, pronouns, etc. Although recognizing culture-boundedness and historical-
ideological conditioning of political discourse, Newmark largely overlooks that the 
production of texts relies on different functions and personal attitudes. Furthermore, 
Newmark’s discussion is generally de-contextualized and he views meaning as something 
that can be derived from words and within texts. For example, in his discussion of political 
terms, he argues that they are either positive or negative (1991: 151). He gives the example 
of one value-laden term, ‘normalisation’, and how it acquired a negative currency when it 
was employed by Soviet leaders in order to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia. 
Newmark here overlooks the fact that political concepts and terms, other than being 
positive or negative, can also be neutral depending on the context in which they are used. 
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For example, ‘normalisation’ in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict is perceived as 
negative in Arabic, neutral in English and positive in Hebrew. This term has different 
connotations in these three languages as will be shown later (cf. Chapter 5.6.6). 
 
Similarly, some research focused on linguistic features in particular genres of political 
texts, for example, political speeches. Tilford (1991) examined the adaptation of political 
texts in translation to meet the expectations of the target audience. He examined an English 
translation of a speech by the former German Chancellor, Kohl, given in English to an 
audience of British historians. This speech was translated by public service translators in 
Germany. Tilford (1991: 226) points out that readership or audience design was a crucial 
factor in adapting the message of the source text in translation. Tilford (1991: 226) 
speculates that the decision of such adaptation and responsibility is either the source text’s 
author or the translator’s. Such uncertainty reflects the complexity of translating political 
texts, particularly in governmental institutional contexts. Information on the actual 
translation process and motivation for certain translation solutions – as it is in the case of 
peace initiatives – is not available and in many cases cannot be accessed.  
 
Al-Harrasi (2001) examined the translation of ideological metaphors in Omani political 
speeches from Arabic into English. He remarks that “translation choices for particular 
metaphors helped create an image of the speaker of the source text” (Schäffner 2007: 143). 
Shunnaq (2000) examines the issues of repetitive and emotive expressions in the political 
speeches of the former Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser. Shunnaq (2000: 207) 
argues that ‘repetition’ and ‘emotiveness’ are of significant importance in translating 
Arabic political discourse into English. In addition, he stresses the importance of the 
translator’s familiarity with the text author’s idiolect, here Nasser’s Egyptian dialect, for 
better translation. In these two studies, the authors emphasize distinctive features of Arab 
political language, namely, use of ideological metaphors, repetitive and emotive 
expressions to achieve certain political functions. 
 
These different analyses were conducted using different methodologies and within 
different frameworks. Schäffner (e.g. 1997, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2007) has written 
extensively on translation of political texts and political discourse analysis (cf. Chapters 
5.4 and 7.2.1). In her research, Schäffner covers different genres including political 
speeches, contracts and policy papers. She borrows concepts of Critical Discourse Analysis 
and text linguistics and applies them to translation.  
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Schäffner (2004) takes translation as a “cross-cultural activity”. This emphasis on ‘culture’ 
reflects the social aspects of translation. In her writings, Schäffner emphasizes that the 
determining factor in the translation of any text, and thus a political text as well, is the 
function it is supposed to fulfil in the target culture. Therefore, the function of the target 
text will determine what translation strategies are to be followed (Schäffner 1997: 120). All 
translations are ideological since “the choice of a source text and the use to which the 
subsequent target text is put are determined by the interests, aims, and objectives of social 
agents” (Schäffner 2003: 23). Schäffner (2004: 131) rightly remarks that “textual features 
need to be linked to the social and ideological contexts of text production and reception”. 
However, she does not explain how feasible such a goal would be, particularly in the case 
of negotiated texts such as treaties and peace initiatives, taking into account that general 
information on conditions of target text production, let alone ideological motivation for the 
choice of certain structures and concepts, is not normally available to researchers or the 
public. 
 
Finally, Schäffner (2007: 146) argues that translations – as products – are used “as tools for 
political action”. However, she does not provide sufficient examples to illustrate this point. 
In fact, there are still no major studies which fundamentally address the question of how 
translations are used as tools for political action particularly in times of conflict. Research 
on peace initiatives could provide some answers in this direction. 
 
Baumgarten (2007) analysed eleven different English translations of Hitler’s political book 
Mein Kampf in their sociocultural and situational environments. Following a descriptive 
and partly discourse-analytical approach, Baumgarten aimed to contribute to a better 
understanding of the translation of politically sensitive texts by investigating the numerous 
ways in which ideology and power relations influence the different English translations of 
Mein Kampf (2007: 13). One of the key findings of his thesis is that “translation of 
politically sensitive texts is heavily dependent on ideological interests” (Baumgarten 2007: 
173). Moreover, Baumgarten (2007: 176) argues that “the recontextualization of political 
discourse in translation needs to be seen as motivated by contrastive goals and interests”.  
 
Baker (2004, 2006 and 2007) has recently become interested in investigating the role 
played by translators and interpreters in mediating conflict. Baker (2007: 153) advocates 
the use of narrative theory as a framework for studying translations because it allows 
  
46 
 
perceiving “social actors, including translators and interpreters, as real-life individuals 
rather than theoretical abstractions”. Moreover, Baker (2006: 4) emphasizes the active role 
that translators and interpreters play in situations of violent conflict, namely, disseminating 
and contesting public narratives “within and across national boundaries”. In her major 
work, Translation and Conflict (2006), Baker investigates the role played by translators 
and interpreters in situations of violent conflict, namely, disseminating, and contesting 
public narratives “within and across national boundaries” (2006: 4). Baker (2006) 
considers translation an active promotion of narratives rather than the traditional view of 
‘building bridges’ or ‘facilitating communications’. One of Baker’s (2008: 10) 
fundamental arguments is that “translations (and translators) can never be absolutely 
neutral, objective, since every act of translation involves an interpretation – just as no 
observation of any scientific data is ever entirely theory free”. 
 
Trosborg (1997) investigated hybrid political texts. Following Schäffner (1997), Trosborg 
classifies political discourse into ‘inner-state discourse’ and ‘inter-state discourse’. Inner-
state discourse includes texts that are considered as culture-bound, e.g. speeches and 
statements, whereas inter-state discourse or the diplomatic discourse includes political 
texts which are “interactively negotiated in a supranational setting, for the overall purpose 
of achieving and reflecting consensus”, such as treaties, documents of NATO and the 
European Union (Trosborg 1997: 145). According to Trosborg, hybrid texts are the result 
of cultures and languages in contact which are produced in “a supranational multicultural 
discourse community where there is no linguistically neutral ground” (1997: 145-146). 
Such a text results from “a translation process and shows features that somehow seem ‘out 
of place/’strange’/‘unusual’ for the receiving culture” (Ibid.: 146). Here Trosborg’s 
definition overlooks the fact that a source text in such a case is a hybrid text as the result of 
interaction between more than one culture. In international negotiations, political texts – as 
the result of such negotiations – are drafted in a way that shows consensus over points of 
conflict. Here political concepts and terms, as well as other features, need to be negotiated 
and compromises need to be reached. This results in politically, and in some cases, 
culturally hybrid political texts. Therefore, hybridity starts in the source text and is not only 
a result of a translation process. 
 
Koskinen (2000, 2008) examined the translation policy practices in institutions with 
special reference to the European Commission. She remarks that translations are produced 
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in different institutions: international and supranational organizations (e.g. the United 
Nations and the European Union), governmental institutions and public services (Koskinen 
2008: 2). Koskinen (2008: 2) notes that translations produced in all of these institutional 
contexts are “constrained and controlled by the translating institution and the official 
nature of the institutions endows the documents with authority and performative power”. 
This is true if translations of documents drafted in these institutions are produced in these 
institutions and not outside them. Some of these institutions, such as the United Nations, 
also translate documents drafted in other institutions and then recontextualize them in 
translation. Other types of institutions, e.g. non-governmental ones, although frequently 
producing translations, often label them as ‘unofficial translation’ for political purposes 
(see chapter 6.2.3) 
 
2.3 Peace Initiatives in Other Disciplines 
Peace initiatives are the subject of study for a number of disciplines, including Political 
Science, Conflict Resolution Studies, Negotiation Theory and Diplomatic Studies. In the 
following section, the main studies on peace initiatives in these disciplines will be 
examined for their relevance to this thesis. 
 
2.3.1 Political Science and Conflict Resolution 
The Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian-Israeli in particular have been the 
focus of extensive research in the discipline of political science since the start of the 
conflict (e.g. Khalidi 2007; Masalha 2000; Morris 1999; Rabinovich 2004; Said 2004; 
Shlaim 2000). 
 
There has been an increasing interest in the study and analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli 
peace initiatives from a Political Science point of view. Peace initiatives are of interest to 
political scientists due to their political content and significance. Golan (2007) provides a 
comprehensive overview and analysis of the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process” and its 
peace plans from the Oslo Accords to the Israeli disengagement plan. A detailed account of 
the Geneva Accord is to be found in Beilin (2004), Kardahji (2004), Klein (2007) and 
Lerner (2004). In these four major studies, the political content, the processes of 
negotiations, the drafting and the public reactions to this initiative are examined and 
commented on in detail from a political science point of view.  
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Peace initiatives are also the subject of study for Conflict Resolution Studies. Articles 
about the role of public opinion in conflict resolution, the impact of framing on decision 
making and the impact of constructive ambiguity on negotiations, with regard to some of 
these peace initiatives – e.g. the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the 
Geneva Accord – are to be found in Astorino-Courtois (2000), Shamir (2007) and Shamir 
and Shikaki (2002, 2005).  
 
Public opinion has a significant effect on the way conflicts unfold. It is of the utmost 
importance at times of conflict as it directly affects both domestic and foreign policies and 
consequently, the resolution or aggregation of conflicts. To measure public opinion, 
authors of these studies have conducted surveys and opinion polls.  
 
The role of language and translation is largely overlooked in all of these studies. For 
example, the fact that the drafters of the Geneva Accord distributed Arabic and Hebrew 
translations to the Israeli and Palestinian public in order to win their support was not 
mentioned at all in books in Political Science. Furthermore, the authors of these studies do 
not recognize that the reactions of the Israeli and Palestinian public, whether for or against 
the Geneva Accord, are in many cases reactions to the Arabic and Hebrew translations. 
They would thus not be aware of any potential differences between them and the original 
English text. This means that in Conflict Resolution Studies, opinion polls and surveys are 
actually based on translations, which in many cases differ from the original source text. In 
this sense, public reactions to a specific peace initiative could in fact be reactions to a 
translation. 
 
2.3.2 Negotiation Theory and Diplomatic Studies 
In negotiations, the role of language as a means of communication is of high significance, 
especially if it is different from the language(s) of the parties of a conflict. In the case of 
the Palestinians and Israelis, who do not speak the same language, negotiations usually 
take place in English as a third neutral language. Language is thus a means of 
communication and a way of bridging the gap between the positions of the parties of the 
conflict. But language is also a means for expressing ideology and asymmetrical power 
relations. Compromises reached in negotiations are reflected in specific textual features 
(syntax, vocabulary, style, etc.). 
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Scholars in Diplomatic Studies and Negotiation Theory pay attention to the use of what in 
diplomacy is called “creative ambiguity” in peace treaties (e.g. Isaacson 1992; Klieman 
1999, Pehar 2001). Ambiguity is a trademark of peace agreements. Diplomats, negotiators 
and politicians advocate the use of ambiguous formulations in order to reach an agreement 
between the parties of a conflict.  
 
Pehar (2001), a Diplomatic Studies scholar, investigates the reasons why politicians and 
negotiators resort to ambiguity in drafting peace agreements and whether or not this use is 
justifiable. Pehar (2001: 164), following Munson (1976), defines ambiguity as an 
expression which has “more than one meaning and it is used in a situation or context in 
which it can be understood in at least two different ways”. This expression needs not only 
to create “at least two different meanings” but also “two incompatible and unrelated” ones 
(Pehar 2001: 164). Pehar lists some of the famous examples of political texts negotiated at 
different times and in various institutional contexts in which ambiguity was used both 
effectively and ineffectively. For example, the Athenian Constitution (drafted in the 16
th
 
Century), W.Wilson’s 14 points (USA principles to end World War I, 1918), the UNSC 
Resolution 242, the 6-Point Agreement (truce between Egypt and Israel in 1973), and the 
Oslo Peace Accords (peace agreement between Israel and the PLO in 1993). Pehar 
advocates the use of “creative ambiguity” in agreements and argues that negative attitudes 
towards this use “may have its source in particular historical experiences” (2001: 189). So, 
for example, if Palestinian diplomats focus on the UNSCR 242, they would probably have 
a negative view, whereas if they focus on the Good Friday Agreement, then they would 
have a positive one. Pehar here overlooks the impact of using ambiguity on texts when 
they are translated. He focuses on the ‘source text’ culture and overlooks what would 
happen in the ‘target text’ culture and the effect of this on the reception of these 
agreements and consequently their success or failure.  
 
Cohen (2001), another Diplomatic Studies scholar, reflects on the role of cultures and 
languages in negotiations in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He presents the Middle 
East Negotiating Lexicon (2001: 67) which is an “interpretive dictionary” of essential 
negotiating words in four languages: Arabic, Farsi, Hebrew and Turkish. This lexicon is 
intended to help English-speaking negotiators interested in clearing up any linguistic 
discrepancies regarding controversial terms such as ‘normalisation’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.6). 
Furthermore, the lexicon draws attention to the specific use of terms, describes their 
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possible religious and historical connotations and analyses the social and cultural 
associations evoked by a word for the native speaker (Cohen 2001: 68). 
 
Peace initiatives can be broadly classified as either belonging to ‘track-one’ or ‘track-two’ 
diplomacy. ‘Track-one’ peace initiatives are the outcome of official negotiations or talks 
between ‘first-level’ players, i.e. governments or government representatives authorized to 
negotiate a peace deal (Shamir and Shikaki 2005). ‘Track-one’ diplomacy includes 
political players such as “the European Union, the Arab League, the African Union (AU), 
the Organization of American States (OAS), and many others” (Mapendere 2006: 67). 
 
Examples of ‘track-one’ peace initiatives in the corpus are the Arab Peace Initiative and 
the Roadmap Plan. ‘Track-two’42 peace initiatives are the outcome of “unofficial talks 
between elements in the elite of two societies, acting as citizens and not as government 
representatives” (Klein 2007: 158). Examples of this kind of initiatives in the corpus are 
the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord. ‘Track-two’ peace initiatives address 
people at the grass-roots level and seek their support whereas ‘track-one’ peace initiatives 
target first level political players, i.e. governments. In this way, it can be said that ‘track-
one’ peace initiatives adopt a top-down approach, whereas ‘track-two’ peace initiatives 
adopt a bottom-up one. 
 
The interaction between first- and second-level players reflects power relations and the 
struggle over political legitimacy. Klein notes that “[t]rack two is one of the areas in which 
civil society can enter the vacuum that governments have created, deliberately or by lack 
of initiative” (2007: 159). Governments perceive initiatives negotiated by second-level 
players as a threat to their power and as interference in the political decision-making that is 
reserved exclusively to them. The Geneva Accord is one case in point. Shamir and Shikaki 
(2005: 316) explain that: 
In two-level game terms, these initiatives can be seen as bold attempts of second-level players to 
interfere with the first-level game in an attempt to expand both sides’ win-sets through public 
opinion. Nevertheless, they have been perceived as a threat to the game played by the Palestinian 
and Israeli leaderships. The Geneva initiative, in particular, has been viewed as a challenge to the 
leadership capacity of both sides, given its ambition to offer a full-blown alternative game with 
different assumptions, rules and perhaps even different players. 
 
                                                          
42
 On the weaknesses of ‘track-two’ diplomacy, see Mapendere (2006: 68-69). 
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Peace initiatives have focused largely on final-status issues that address the concerns and 
aspirations of both Palestinians and Israelis. These initiatives accommodate, to a certain 
extent, the conflicting political positions of the two sides of the conflict. Moreover, peace 
initiatives have a significant role to play in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Although not legally binding, political compromises made in these initiatives can be used 
to extract further concessions in any future negotiations. These initiatives could therefore 
constitute the starting point of any future negotiations. Moreover, more than sketching out 
possible formulas for the resolution of a particular conflict, these initiatives can influence 
and shape the outcome of any future final agreement. 
2.3.3 Genre Studies 
In the field of Genre Studies, there are no specific studies on peace initiatives as a genre in 
its own right or as a sub-genre of political texts. This gap in knowledge made the 
identification of the characteristic features of peace initiatives at the beginning of this 
research a challenging task. Peace initiatives comprising the corpus of the study are not 
homogeneous with regard to the way they are referred to and the labels given to them (e.g. 
initiative, accord, framework, plan, proposal or document). This raised the question: what 
kind of texts are peace initiatives? More importantly, do they all fulfil the same criteria? 
Regardless of labels given to these texts, they are politically negotiated texts during 
situations of ongoing contemporary conflict. In addition, they belong to the general 
framework of the “peace process”.   
 
A “peace process” is defined as “a value judgment attached to efforts to resolve a conflict 
at a particular time” (Bell 2000: 16). Bell (2000: 20) makes the point that peace agreements 
emanate at different stages of a peace process and they can be “loosely” classified into 
three types: pre-negotiation agreements, framework-substantive agreements, and 
implementation agreements. The relevant stage for the study of peace initiatives is the first 
one, i.e. pre-negotiation agreements. 
In explaining the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bell (2000: 107) classifies the 
unsuccessful peace plan blueprints, which were agreed by some parties of the conflict, as 
pre-negotiation agreements. She points out that although these agreements were 
unsuccessful, they started to “sketch out possible formulas for resolution” which later on 
affected the conclusion of the final agreement (Bell 2000: 107). The Palestinian-Israeli 
peace initiatives in the corpus too could be considered as unofficial “pre-negotiation 
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agreements,” as they might form the basis for future negotiations between the Israeli and 
Palestinian sides. In addition, either side in future negotiations cannot ignore the 
concessions made in these initiatives. 
 
Contrasting already established sub-genres of political texts such as peace treaties to peace 
initiatives helps in identifying the key characteristic features of peace initiatives. Sarcevic 
(1997: 131) points out that the term ‘treaty’ is a generic one comprising all kinds of 
international agreements among which are peace treaties. All treaties have common 
generic features. These include ‘titles’, ‘preambles’, ‘main parts’ and ‘final clauses’ 
(Sarcevic 1997: 131). The title functions as means of identification (Sarcevic 1997: 131). 
The preamble states the reason behind drafting the treaty and it is introduced by a standard 
formula such as “considering, recognizing, desiring, etc.” (Sarcevic 1997: 131-132). One 
distinguishing feature of a preamble is that it is “formulated as a single sentence and 
usually ends with an agreement clause (…have agreed as follows)” (Sarcevic 1997: 131-
132). This feature is only found in the case of the Geneva Accord, the Arab Peace Initiative 
and the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. For example, the 
preamble of the Geneva Accord stipulates that “[T]he State of Israel and the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization, reaffirming their determination to put an end to decades of 
confrontation and conflict…recognizing that peace requires the transition from the logic of 
war and confrontation to the logic of peace… have agreed on the following”. 
 
A treaty would also include legal statements of obligations, authorizations, permissions, 
requirements and prohibitions which are set in the provisions constituting the main body of 
the treaty and which are “enforceable by law” (Sarcevic 1997: 133). These legal statements 
are expressed by the using modal verbs, e.g. ‘shall’, ‘may’, ‘must’, etc. Modal verbs are 
found in all peace initiatives in the corpus. However, some modal verbs are only found in 
some peace initiatives but not others. For example, ‘shall’ is only found in the text of the 
Geneva Accord. This modal verb is used to express obligations. In other peace initiatives, 
for instance, the Roadmap Plan, obligations are expressed by using the simple present 
tense. 
 
Peace treaties are officially negotiated and signed by governments and later ratified and 
endorsed in their national parliaments. Moreover, they are legally binding to all parties of a 
particular conflict. It thus implies that “the signatory powers accept the settlement of 
disputes present in the treaty as being final” (Lesaffer 2004: 37). Unlike peace treaties, 
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peace initiatives are, in majority of the cases, unofficially negotiated by key international, 
regional, or local political players in a given conflict. Thus, these texts are not legally 
binding to any party of the conflict unless officially accepted by governments. In such 
cases, a peace initiative seizes to function as an ‘initiative’ and becomes an ‘agreement’ or 
‘treaty’.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the main studies on political and negotiated texts in the 
discipline of Translation Studies and other neighbouring disciplines. This chapter justified 
the need to study politically negotiated texts in translation. It showed that despite the 
existence of some studies on aspects of politics using different methodologies and within 
different frameworks (e.g. functional, systemic-linguistics, descriptive, etc.), the study of 
peace initiatives and of politically negotiated texts is still a largely under-researched genre 
of political texts. Thus, this thesis contributes to filling this gap in knowledge by presenting 
authentic data of negotiated texts – drafted during situations of ongoing contemporary 
conflict – and their different language versions. 
 
The review of the major studies on peace initiatives in neighbouring disciplines (e.g. 
Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Diplomatic Studies, etc.) showed that these texts are 
studied for their political content and functions in society rather than their linguistic 
features. In addition, the role of translation in the production of these texts is largely 
overlooked. 
 
This review also helped in identifying some of the main generic features of peace 
initiatives, such as ambiguity, use of political concepts, intertextuality, etc. It showed that 
peace initiatives are still a largely under-researched genre of political texts which share 
some generic features with similar genres such as peace treaties. These characteristic 
features would guide the data analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5).  
The next chapter introduces the corpus and methodology of the study. It begins by 
presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the original 
versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts). It then presents the different 
language versions of these initiatives (the target texts). Finally, it presents the methodology 
of the study. 
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Chapter Three  
Corpus and Methodology of the Study  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two presented the theoretical framework of the study and the need for conducting 
this study. Chapter Three introduces the corpus and methodology of the study. The 
discussion in this chapter moves from the source text to the target text context. Section 
3.2.1 presents the original source texts of the respective peace initiatives in their socio-
cultural and political contexts of production, focusing on their functions and underlying 
principles of audience design. Section 3.2.2 presents the textual profiles of the different 
language versions of peace initiatives focusing on their functions and underlying principles 
of audience design. 
 
Section 3.3 presents the methodology of the study. The thesis operates within the 
framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies and Critical Discourse 
Analysis. It applies the analytical model suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and 
methods of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). In linking the textual profiles of 
peace initiatives to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of causal 
models as described by Chesterman (1997). For categorizing functions of the different 
language versions of peace initiatives, audience design classifications will be used (Mason 
2000). Section 3.4 provides a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
3.2 Corpus of the Study  
This sub-section outlines the political and socio-cultural background leading to the 
production of the original source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. These 
initiatives are classified in this thesis as either ‘track-one’ or ‘track-two’ and will be 
introduced in the following sub-sections. 
 
3.2.1 Track-One Peace Initiatives 
There are two ‘track-one’ peace initiatives in the corpus: the Arab Peace Initiative and the 
Roadmap Plan. The drafters – first-level political players – of these two initiatives are the 
League of Arab States (LAS) and the Quartet respectively.  
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The Arab Peace Initiative 
The Arab Peace Initiative (Arabic: ‘ةيبرعلا ملاسلا ةردابم’) – also known as the Beirut 
Declaration – is a one-page peace proposal negotiated in Arabic among the 22 members of 
the Arab League on 28 March 2002 during its  14
th
 summit in Beirut. The Arab Peace 
Initiative is based on the principle of “land for peace”. It offers Israel full normal relations 
with all Arab and Islamic states in return for a complete withdrawal from all occupied 
Arab territories of 1967, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital and a just solution for the Palestinian refugees question (Golan 
2004: 40). The initiative does not offer a detailed agreement but instead outlines a general 
framework for a permanent agreement. Historically speaking, this initiative constitutes a 
major turning point in the history of the Middle East conflict as it offers Israel, and for the 
first time since the Khartoum Arab League’s Summit in 1967 and its three famous ‘noes’ 
(no peace, no recognition, no negotiation with Israel)
43, full recognition and “the right to 
exist”. 
 
The initiative was proposed by then-Crown Prince (now King) Abdullah Ibn Abdul-Aziz 
of Saudi Arabia to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Prince revealed his proposal in an 
interview with the columnist Thomas Friedman of The New York Times. This interview 
was published on the pages of the same newspaper in English on 17 February 2002. In that 
interview, the Prince told Friedman that he had drafted a speech to deliver at the coming 
summit of the League of Arab States in Beirut which offered Israel “normalizing relations” 
with all the Arab states in return for full Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab lands, 
including Jerusalem. The Prince added that he decided not to deliver the speech due to the 
policies of the Israeli Prime Minister at that time, Ariel Sharon’s, particularly the so-called 
Israeli military offensive, “Operation Defensive Shield” (Hebrew: ‘ןגמ תמוח עצבמ’, Arabic: 
‘بوبصملا صاصرلا’) – against the Palestinian people in the Occupied West Bank in 2002. 
Friedman persuaded the Prince “to go on record with the proposal” (Gambill 2002). The 
Saudis reviewed the text of the interview before it was published. The next day, the 
Prince’s office “carefully reviewed the quotations and gave the go ahead for the paper to 
publish his remarks on February 17” (Gambill 2002).  
 
                                                          
43
 The Khartoum Arab League Summit was held in 1967 after the conclusion of the June 1967 war between 
Arab states and Israel. The resolution of this summit is published on the League of Arab States website: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=397&level_id=202 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
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During the two-day summit in the Lebanese capital of Beirut, the Arab leaders discussed 
the Palestinian issue, amongst others. The summit revolved on the one hand around the call 
of some of the Arab countries (e.g. Jordan and Egypt) to revive peace talks between Israel 
and the Palestinian Authority, and on the other hand, the call of some other Arab countries 
(e.g. Syria and Lebanon) to offer firm support to the Palestinian resistance against the 
Israeli occupation and aggression. These two conflicting ideologies had an effect on the 
final wording of the initiative (see below). On the first day of the summit, Prince Abdullah 
presented his vision for a comprehensive ‘land-for-peace’ deal with Israel. According to 
CNN, at the end of the two-day summit on 28 March 2002, the plan “was adopted in a 
closed session following hours of wrangling over its final wording”.44 Prince Abdullah’s 
proposal for peace was revised and then adopted by the League of Arab States as the ‘Arab 
Peace Initiative’ and it was endorsed unanimously by all Arab states. The revisions to the 
proposal were due to the conflicting Arab positions on two main issues: normalisation of 
relations with Israel and the question of the Palestinian refugees. 
 
The term ‘تاقلاعلا عيبطت’ (taṭbī‘ al-‘ilāqāt, lit. ‘normalisation of relations’) which appeared in 
the first proposal (the English text of the interview with Friedman)
45
 was replaced by the 
term ‘ةيعيبط تاقلاع’ (‘ilāqāt ṭabī‘iyah, lit. ‘normal relations’) in the final draft in Arabic, a 
term described at that time by the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, as “too vague” 
(Thorpe 2006: 297(. This change, as Daniel Sobelman notes, was to avoid using such a 
term, i.e. normalisation which has negative connotations in Arabic, namely, 
‘domestication’ and ‘submission’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.6). 
  
As a result of negotiations between the member states of the Arab League, two clauses 
were added to the initiative vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees question: Firstly, “the 
rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special 
circumstances of the Arab host countries” and, secondly, the call to achieve “a just solution 
to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General 
Assembly Resolution 194”. These clauses – which were introduced based on Syrian and 
                                                          
44
 ‘Arab summit adopts Saudi peace initiative’, CNN website, published on 28 March 2002: 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-03-28/world/arab.league_1_arab-summit-arab-league-delegates-prince-
saud?_s=PM:WORLD [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
45
 ‘Saudi Peace Initiative: Interview with HRH Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz’, Reliefweb website, 
published on 18 February 2002: http://reliefweb.int/node/96639 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Lebanese demands
46
 – caused a heated debate and controversy in Israel. However, these 
two phrases were drafted ambiguously which allowed for multiple interpretations of which 
one could perhaps be “palatable to Israel and the U.S” (Podeh 2007). 
 
The initiative offers Israel full recognition and normal relations with all 22 members of the 
League of Arab states. In return, the initiative requires full Israeli withdrawal from all 
occupied Arab territories since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights and the 
remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon; achievement of a just 
solution to the Palestinian refugees problem “to be agreed upon” in accordance with the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 194; and the establishment of a sovereign independent 
Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4 June 1967 with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
The initiative was unanimously ratified at the meeting of the League of Arab States in 
Khartoum in May 2006. The League decided to re-activate the initiative during the 19th 
Arab summit in Riyadh in March 2007. Following this re-activation, the Arab Quartet 
(similar to the Roadmap Quartet, see below) consisting of Egypt and Jordan – which have 
diplomatic ties with Israel – Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
was formed. The Arab Quartet was given the task of presenting the initiative directly to 
Israel and the Palestinian Authority. In its effort to promote the initiative to the Israeli 
public, the Palestinian Authority advertised full-page notices in Hebrew (Hebrew 
translation of the initiative) in four major Israeli newspapers (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). The 
authority also published the Arabic original text of the initiative in the major Palestinian 
newspapers of Al-Quds, Al-Ayyam and Al-Hayat Al-Jadida. 
 
Drawing on Bell’s (1984) model of ‘audience design’, it can be argued that the original 
source text of the Arab Peace Initiative addresses a multi-layered audience. On the one 
hand, the representatives of the member states of the Arab League and the general Arab 
public constitute the ‘main addressees’, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed 
‘participants’. On the other hand, the American and Israeli governments as well as non-
governmental political stakeholders, such as the different Palestinian factions or the Israeli 
opposition, qualify as potential ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly 
addressed readers. Finally, the range of translating and publishing institutions that will be 
                                                          
46
 For example, the term “special circumstances” in the final draft of the initiative refers to the Lebanese 
constitution that prohibits the settlement of its 455,000 Palestinian refugees on its territory.  
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examined later in section 3.2.3 qualify as ‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known 
but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text. The main function of 
this text is referential and informative. Ban It informed the Arab states’ representatives of 
what they were going to sign on and the Arabic public of what had been agreed on in 
Arabic. 
 
Generally, the Arab Peace Initiative was well received in the United States, but not in 
Israel. The Israeli media, politicians and critics depicted the initiative as “a blueprint for 
Israel’s destruction” (Remba 2007) by requiring Israel to accept the possible return of 
millions of Palestinian refugees. On the other hand, some Israeli critics viewed the 
initiative as a positive move. In opposition to the Arab position since the 1967 Khartoum 
summit, some critics regarded the Beirut declaration as “a consummation of a long and 
painful process in the Arab world of recognizing the Israeli state” (Podeh 2007). 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
The Roadmap Plan is a three-phase blueprint (about six pages long) which was designed to 
reach a permanent resolution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by 2005. The Roadmap was 
originally drafted in English by key players to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the ‘Quartet’ 
(the United Nations, the United States of America, Russia and the European Union) in 
consultation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (through indirect negotiations) and 
released officially on 30 April 2003. This plan is the most recent diplomatic effort to 
resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the only one accepted officially by both sides of 
the conflict.  
 
The Roadmap is based on former US president George W. Bush’s “vision for peace” in the 
Middle East. On 10 November 2001, Bush delivered a speech
47
 at the United Nations in 
which he adopted, for the first time in the history of the American foreign policy in the 
region, the United States, the principle of creating a sovereign and independent Palestinian 
state to exist side by side with Israel. In another speech on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
delivered on 24 June 2002
48
 – which went through 28 drafts (Thorpe 2006: 280) – Bush 
                                                          
47
 ‘Statement by H.E. Mr. George W. Bush President at the 56th Session of the United Nations General 
Assembly, New York’, delivered on 10 November 2001, United Nations Website: 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/56/statements/011110usaE.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
48
 ‘Full text of George Bush's speech on Israel and a Palestinian state’, White House Rose Garden, delivered 
on 24 June 24, The Guardian Website: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/25/israel.usa [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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outlined the general political process that would lead to the end of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict by establishing a Palestinian state on the Palestinian lands occupied since 1967. 
This shift in the American administration’s foreign policy sought to restore the status quo 
prior to the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000 and 
thus bring both Palestinians and Israelis back to the negotiating table. But, more 
importantly, Bush’s purpose was “to secure cooperation in the war on terrorism from Arab 
states’ leaders, who had made it perfectly clear that there would be no cooperation unless 
Bush dealt forcibly with the Middle East crisis” (Thorpe 2006: 281).  
 
Soon after the delivery of the second speech, the Quartet was formed with the aim of 
turning President’s Bush formula into a plan for peace in the Middle East. At the wish of 
then-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the American administration agreed to postpone 
the plan’s release until after the 28 January 2003 Israeli elections (Thorpe 2006: 291). This 
plan, known since then as the ‘Roadmap’, was to be implemented in three stages. Phase I 
(until May 2003) would bring an end to “terror and violence”, normalise Palestinian life, 
build Palestinian institutions following a process of institutional reform, withdraw Israeli 
army from areas occupied since 28 September 2000, dismantle Jewish settlement 
outposts
49
 and freeze on all settlement activity. Phase II (June 2003-December 2003) 
would revolve around an international conference in support of Palestinian economic 
recovery and the subsequent establishment of an independent state with provisional 
borders. Finally, Phase III (2004-2005) would cultivate with an agreement on the final-
status issues (e.g. Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, borders and Jewish settlements) and put 
an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
 
The text of the Roadmap went through three drafts. The first draft, in English, was issued 
to both sides on 15 October 2002. Following several objections by both Palestinians and 
Israelis, the Quartet issued a second draft on 22 December 2002 that accommodated a 
number of amendments. The third and final draft, almost identical to the second one, was 
issued on 30 April 2003. 
 
The Palestinian side declared its official unconditional acceptance of the plan on 2 May 
2000; the Israeli government declared its acceptance on 23 May 2003, subject to fourteen 
                                                          
49
 For a detailed list of the Jewish Settlement outposts in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Peace Now 
report available at their website: http://peacenow.org.il/eng/sites/default/files/outposts_database_1.xls [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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reservations
50
 or pre-requirements to be met during implementation of the plan. This raises 
the question of whether the two sides accepted the same text or not. 
 
The Roadmap was produced by the Quartet to be presented to the two sides of the conflict. 
Therefore, the ‘main addresses’ of the English source text are the Israeli and Palestinian 
leaderships, i.e. politicians and policy makers who speak English. They are known, ratified 
and directly addressed. ‘Auditors’ of this text are political players other than the two 
governments, e.g. Palestinian factions, Israeli opposition, etc. Translating and publishing 
institutions, as in the case of those mentioned below, qualify as ‘overhearers’. Their 
presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed. The source text has an 
instructive function as it stipulates what is required from both sides in order to implement 
the plan. 
 
The Roadmap has attracted wide international attention and firm support (Klein 2007: 180-
181). However, it has been severely criticized for its ambiguous nature and lack of robust 
implementation mechanisms. To date, the Roadmap Plan has not yet been fully 
implemented. 
 
3.2.2 Track-Two Peace Initiatives 
There are three ‘track-two’ peace initiatives in the corpus: the Gush-Shalom Declaration of 
Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the 
Geneva Accord. The drafters – second-level political players – of these initiatives are the 
Gush-Shalom Organization, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, and Yasser Abd-Rabbo and 
Yossi Beilin respectively (see below). In the following, these three initiatives will be 
presented chronologically in their political and socio-cultural contexts. 
 
The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement 
The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement is a five-page peace 
proposal drafted originally in Hebrew in August 2001 by the Gush-Shalom Peace 
Organization. Gush-Shalom (Hebrew: ‘םולש שוג’, lit. ‘the Peace Bloc’) is an Israeli-Jewish 
left-wing peace organization founded in 1992 by Uri Avnery – an outstanding peace 
activist – and others.  
                                                          
50
 ‘Israel’s Response to the Road Map’, published on 25 May 2003, the Knesset website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/roadmap_response_eng.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Gush-Shalom describes itself as “an extra-parliamentary organization, independent of any 
party or other political grouping”.51 Nevertheless, some of its activists belong to some 
Israeli political parties such as the ‘Labor’ and the ‘Meretz’ parties. This organization aims 
primarily “to influence Israeli public opinion and lead it towards peace and conciliation 
with the Palestinian people”.52 Although, this initiative is an Israeli one, some Palestinians 
were involved in its drafting. In this regard, Avnery (2003) notes that “we acted in close 
consultation with Palestinian colleagues”. These consultations and the implicit inclusion of 
those Palestinian colleagues found their way into the Arabic version of the proposal (cf. 
Chapter 5.7). The peace declaration or proposal tackles the final-status issues of the 
conflict (e.g. land, Jewish settlements, Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees) and 
proposes political solutions to them. The declaration stipulates an end to the Israeli 
occupation in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as in the Arab East Jerusalem and 
the establishment of a Palestinian state there, the evacuation of Jewish settlers and 
settlements and a solution to the Palestinian refugee question based on an Israeli 
acknowledgment of share of responsibility for the creation of this tragedy. 
 
The drafting of this initiative came almost a year after the outbreak of the second 
Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2000 and aimed to show that an alternative 
to military solution to the Palestinian intifada exists. The declaration was published in 
Hebrew in the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz as an advertisement by Gush-Shalom, as well as 
on its website on 10 August 2001. Ha’aretz has a left-of-centre position (see mass media 
below). The choice of Gush-Shalom to publish its proposal in this particular newspaper 
rather than other newspapers can be explained with regard to the political left-wing 
affiliation of both the Gush-Shalom and Ha’aretz newspaper.  
 
On the one hand, the general Israeli public, particularly those who share the Gush-
Shalom’s ideological and political stance on the Palestine-Israel conflict, such as its 
members and supporters as well as other peace groups in Israel, constitute the ‘main 
addressees’, i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. On the other hand, 
the Israeli government as well as other political stakeholders, such as the different Israeli 
opposition factions, qualify as potential ‘auditors’ as their presence is known, ratified but 
                                                          
51
 ‘About Gush Shalom’, Gush-Shalom Organization website, http://zope.gush-
shalom.org/home/en/about/general_info/ [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
52
 Ibid. 
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not directly addressed readers. Finally, the range of translating and publishing institutions, 
such as Palestinian newspapers, are potential as ‘overhearers’ as their presence is known 
but they are neither ratified nor directly addressed by the authors of the text. 
 
The Hebrew source text has a persuasive function as it attempts to persuade the Israeli 
public of certain political solutions to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This 
persuasive function is also evident, for instance, in the introduction attached to the original 
text (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). Regarding the purpose of the proposal, Avnery (2003) points out 
that: 
We wanted to light a candle in the darkness. To prove to the public that there is a solution, that 
there was somebody to talk to and something to talk about. And most important, to tell the people 
what the price of peace is, and that it was worthwhile to pay it. 
 
After its publication (in Hebrew), the declaration did not achieve the effect that Avnery 
hoped it would leave on the Israeli public opinion. In this regard, Avnery (2003) points out 
that the initiative “did not cause much of a stir. As usual, all the Israeli media boycotted it 
and even abroad, it attracted only limited attention. But we had opened a path, and that 
others would use it in due course”.  
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles – also known as The People’s Voice – is 
a one-page (six-point) statement of general principles for the resolution of the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. The grassroots initiative was drafted originally in English and signed on 27 
July 2002 by Ami Ayalon (Hebrew: ‘ןולייא ימע’) and Sari Nusseibeh (Arabic: ‘ةبيسن يرس’) 
 
Ayalon is an Israeli military man who spent most of his life working for the security 
service. He was appointed as the Head of the Shin Bet after the assassination of the Israeli 
Prime Minister Rabin in 1995. Before Joining the Shin Bet, he served 33 years in the 
Israeli Navy, including service as its commander, from 1963 to 1996.
53
 Ayalon has been a 
member of the Israeli Parliament, the Knesset, from the Labor party since April 2006. 
Nusseibeh – a noted Palestinian intellectual and a long-time peace activist54 – is currently 
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 ‘Ami Ayalon’, Four Troop website: http://www.fourtroop.com/top-officials/governmental/ami-ayalon [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
54
 For more information on Sari Nusseibeh bibliography and publications, see his personal website which is 
available at http://sari.alquds.edu [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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the president of the only Arab university, Al-Quds in the Occupied East Jerusalem,
55
 where 
he teaches Philosophy. He served briefly as PLO representative in Occupied East 
Jerusalem from October 2001 to December 2002 – replacing the late Faisal Al-Husseini. 
Nusseibeh currently does not hold any Palestinian official position.
56
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is considered as a track-two initiative as it 
was negotiated and drafted by politicians acting as citizens rather than representatives of 
their governments. The reason behind the drafting of this initiative was that the two 
drafters lost faith in their respective governments to break the standstill in the negotiations 
and, thus, decided to appeal directly to the Israeli and Palestinian publics (Klein 2007: 28). 
The two drafters believed that people are the moving force behind any future agreement 
and they have an important role to play in decision-making regarding such an agreement. 
They also believed that “heavy grassroots pressure” is needed if any political change is to 
take place (Klein 2007: 172-173). The two drafters wanted to show their respective 
governments what “the people really want by circulating a one-page joint statement of 
principles”.57  
 
The Statement of Principles outlines, very broadly, a political solution to some of the final-
status issues of the conflict, particularly, borders, Jerusalem, the Palestinian refugees and 
the nature of the future Palestinian state. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principle 
suggests an Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 4 June 1967 with some modification, keeping 
Jerusalem as “an open city” with “Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem under Palestinian 
sovereignty, Jewish neighbourhoods under Israeli sovereignty with no sovereignty for any 
side over the holy places”. Finally, the Palestinians will concede the right of return to their 
homes in Israel and instead they are allowed to return only to the future Palestinian state 
and the future Palestinian state will be demilitarized. 
 
                                                          
55
 This term – i.e. ‘the Occupied East Jerusalem’– is used in this thesis (unless in direct quotations) in 
accordance with the numerous United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, most 
notably UNSCR 478,  which all consider East Jerusalem to be part of the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
since June 1967. 
56
 ‘Palestinian Biographies: Sari Nusseibeh’, Lawrence of Cyberia website, published on 21 July 2004: 
http://lawrenceofcyberia.blogs.com/palestinian_biographies/sari-nusseibeh-biography.html [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
57
 ‘Alternative Diplomacy: Inside a Grassroots Israeli-Palestinian Peace Initiative featuring Ami Ayalon and 
Sari Nusseibeh’, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy website, published on 29 October 2003: 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2125 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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In their efforts to appeal to the Israeli and Palestinian publics at grassroots level, the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was drafted in a clear language specifying the 
endgame of the process rather than in ambiguous formulation. In this regard, Delyani 
(personal communication 2005) points out: “we are not an elite campaign. We are a 
grassroots campaign led by local political leaders at the villages and neighbourhoods 
levels”. For this reason, the drafters opposed the use of “creative ambiguity” in drafting 
their initiative: “we tried to get away from what was known during the Oslo years as 
creative ambiguity, and we are totally against such a term, because look at Oslo, look at the 
results. If you do not know where are you going, how could you get there?” (Delyani, 
personal communication 2005).  
 
The ‘main addressees’ – i.e. known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’– of the 
original English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration Principles are politicians 
and policy makers who have interest in resolving the conflict. The Palestinian and Israeli 
governments as well as non-governmental political stakeholders, such as the different 
Palestinian factions or the Israeli opposition, qualify as ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, 
but not directly addressed readers. Potential ‘overhearers’ are Palestinian and Israeli media 
outlets as well as other translating and publishing institutions as their presence is known 
but they are neither ratified nor addressed by the authors of the text. The English source 
text has an informative and declarative function: it presented to the international 
community and donors what the two politicians had agreed on. In addition, it is used for 
publicity and promotion purposes. 
 
Although the authors launched a massive advertising campaign to promote their initiative 
in Israel and Palestine (also internationally), it was not well received by their respective 
publics: “the Israeli establishment ignored their initiative. In the Palestinian territories the 
initiative was criticized by refugee organizations and senior Fatah figures” (Klein 2007: 
28). 
 
It was possible to join the initiative on its both Israeli and Palestinian websites. In late 
2007, the Palestinian website of the campaign, People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy (Arabic: ‘ةيطارقميدلاو ملاسلل ةيبعشلا ةلمحلا’, www.hashd.org), went off-line as the 
campaign stopped due to political and financial reasons. Since its launch in 2002, 100,000 
Israeli and 65,000 Palestinians have signed the initiative in support (Thorpe 2006: 323).  
 
  
65 
 
The Geneva Accord 
The Draft Permanent Status Agreement, better known as the Geneva Accord,
58
 is a fifty-
page blueprint: a detailed model for a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
negotiated over the course of two years and drafted in English in 2003. This Swiss-
sponsored unofficial initiative enlarges on previous compromises reached between the two 
sides in the Camp David II in 2000 and Taba negotiations in 2001 (Klein 2007). 
 
Two teams – an Israeli one and a Palestinian one – negotiated the initiative in 2003. On the 
one hand, the Israeli negotiating team, led by Yossi Beilin (Hebrew: ‘ןילייב יסוי’) (former 
Israeli Justice Minister), included a number of members of the Knesset, Israeli 
intellectuals, and some military people from the Israeli army. On the other hand, the 
Palestinian negotiating team, led by Yasser Abed Rabbo (Arabic: ‘هبر دبع رساي’) (former 
Palestinian Information minister), included a number of members of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council and Palestinian intellectuals. Most of the members of the Israeli team 
were affiliated with the Israeli Left (the Labor Party and Meretz), whereas most of the 
members of the Palestinian team were high-ranking Palestinian officials closely linked to 
the Palestinian leadership. 
 
Yasser Abed Rabbo is the founder of the Palestinian Democratic Union in 1991 which is 
one of the Palestinian factions and part of the PLO. He also served as the Palestinian 
Minister of Culture and Information from 1994 to 2001. He was part of the negotiating 
team in all major Palestinian-Israeli talks and is currently a member of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) executive committee. Yossi Beilin had held many cabinet 
posts in several Israeli governments of Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Ehud Barak. 
Beilin is also well known as one of the architects of the Oslo Accords. The two men took 
part in many previous negotiations between the two sides. 
 
The heads of two negotiating teams signed the accord on 12 October 2003 in Jordan. The 
accord was officially launched on 1 December 2003 at a ceremony in Geneva, Switzerland. 
Although known as negotiated by these two politicians, it was called the Geneva Accord, 
as it “is not the work of one person on each side but rather of large and heterogeneous 
teams” (Klein 2007: 4). More than that, the name Geneva was chosen “because the Swiss 
foreign ministry lent the most support to the process” (Klein 2007: 18). The actual legal 
                                                          
58
 The Geneva Accord is also called the ‘Geneva Plan’, ‘the Swiss Accords’ and ‘Beilin-Abed Rabbo 
Agreement’. 
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drafting of the document in English was the work of two political advisors to Beilin and 
Abd-Rabbo: Daniel Levy,
59
 a graduate of Cambridge University and Ra’ith Al-Omari,60 
who studied at Oxford (Klein 2007: 32). 
 
The Geneva Accord offers a detailed blueprint for a permanent Palestinian-Israeli peace 
agreement. Compared to other peace initiatives, it is the most detailed and comprehensive 
draft for a permanent settlement of the conflict. The political significance of the accord is 
that it presents a model for a final settlement agreement. As Klein (2007: VIII) states: 
Few will dispute my claim that the Geneva plan has become the principal reference framework in 
the discourse on the Israeli-Palestinian relations and as the principal model of a permanent 
agreement between the two peoples.  
 
In fact, the initiative stands now as a reference to any future negotiations between the 
two sides. This is because compromises made in these negotiations cannot be ignored. 
In addition, the agreement represents a ceiling of negotiations. The agreement also 
presents an alternative to official policies in Israel with regard to the conflict. In this 
sense “the Geneva initiative stands against the unilateral moves that Israel is imposing 
on the Palestinians, and against the approach that the conflict is to be managed instead 
of resolved” (Klein 2007: VIII). The Geneva Accord presents political solutions to all 
final-status issues of the conflict. The political solution that the Geneva Accord suggests 
revolves around the main points of recognition of Palestine and Israel as the homelands 
of their respective peoples and a Palestinian sovereignty over the al- aram al-Sharīf / 
‘the Temple Mount’ and an Israeli sovereignty over ‘the Wailing Wall’. With regard to 
borders, the two sides agree that the 4 June 1967 lines are the basis with reciprocal 1:1 
modifications. Finally, although the Geneva Accord stipulates that resolving the 
Palestinian refugee problem will be based on UNGAR 194, UNSC Resolution 242 and 
the Arab Peace Initiative, it makes it clear that the permanent place of residence options 
from which the refugees may choose is one of five options: 1) the state of Palestine 2) 
Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap 3) third countries 4) Israel 
– subject to Israeli decision – or 5) present host countries.  
 
                                                          
59
 Daniel Levy “was a senior policy advisor to Yossi Beilin and a member of the Israeli negotiation team in 
the second Oslo negotiations and in Taba” (Schiff 2010: 100). 
60
 Ra’ith al-Omari was “a legal advisor for the Palestinian negotiation team since 1999. He participated in all 
negotiation rounds on the final status agreement, including Camp David and Taba” (Schiff 2010: 100). 
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The Geneva Accord was negotiated and drafted in English, as it is the common language 
between the Israeli and Palestinian negotiating teams. The English-speaking politicians and 
policy makers – including governments and organizations (e.g. the US government, the 
United Nations, the European Union, etc.) – who are interested in resolving the conflict 
qualify as the ‘main addressees’ of the English source text, i.e. known, ratified and directly 
addressed ‘participants’. The Palestinian and Israeli governments as well as non-
governmental political stakeholders, such as the different Palestinian factions or the Israeli 
opposition, are the ‘auditors’, i.e. known and ratified, but not directly addressed readers. 
Finally, media outlets as well as other translating and publishing institutions qualify as 
‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed 
by the authors of the text. 
 
The English source text has an informative and referential function: it presents to the 
international community what has been agreed on. This text is used for publicity and 
promotion purposes. Also, it represents the authoritative version and the main reference in 
the case of any future disputes vis-à-vis implementing the agreement.  
 
The Geneva Accord was criticized by many Israeli politicians and commentators, most 
notably by Shlomo Avineri (2003), Moty Cristal (2004) and Susser (2003), particularly 
with regard to the issue of Israel as a Jewish state. Some of these criticisms were based on 
the Hebrew translation of the document which the Israeli team distributed to the Israeli 
public. These critics accused the drafters of the initiative of lying and misleading the Israeli 
public (cf. Chapter 6.3). 
 
3.2.3 Translations and Institutions 
The Palestinian-Israeli Peace initiatives were translated into Arabic, English and Hebrew 
by a variety of institutions and news media – inside as well as outside the Middle East – for 
different readerships and functions. There exist 31 language versions of these peace 
initiatives. Institutions responsible for the production of these versions can be classified as 
international organizations, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations and 
mass media. Drawing on Bell’s (1984) model of ‘audience design’, it can be argued that 
translations of peace initiatives, the same as original source text of peace initiatives, 
address a multi-layered audience. In the following, the profiles of the institutions 
responsible for the production and publication of these translations, in addition to the 
audience design and functions of translations, will be explained. 
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International Institutions 
The United Nations (UN) is the only international organization that produced translations 
of peace initiatives in the corpus. The UN translated and published on its website an Arabic 
translation of the Roadmap Plan in fulfilment of its language policy, whereby institutional 
documents must be translated into its five official languages, including Arabic (cf. Chapter 
6.2.1). The ‘main addressees’ of this translation are the Arab-speaking members of the UN 
Security Council – as confirmed by the letter that Kofi Anan, the UN Secretary General at 
the time this version was produced, enclosed to the translation asking for it to be forwarded 
to the relevant Security Council members (cf. Chapter 4.4.1). Global media outlets, 
governments, non-governmental organizations, researchers and any interested Arabic-
speaking individual qualify as ‘overhearers’ of the UN Arabic translation. The main 
function of this translation – commissioned for internal circulation – is largely informative. 
Table 3.1 shows the place and date of publication of this translation. 
 
Table 3.1 Translations published by International Institutions 
Translation publisher 
 
 
Initiative                    Language 
                   
 
Place of  
Publication 
 
Date of publication  
 
 
The United Nations (UN) 
 
The Roadmap Plan     Arabic 
 
www.un.org      
  
7 May 2003 
 
 
Governmental Institutions 
Five governmental institutions were involved in the production of translations of peace 
initiatives. These institutions – in alphabetical order – are Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset, the League of Arab States (LAS), the Palestinian Authority 
(PA) and the US Department of State (USDS). Table 3.2 lists the places and dates of 
publications of these translations. 
 
Table 3.2 Translations published by Governmental Institutions  
Translation publisher 
 
 
Initiative 
 
 
Language 
 
 
Place of publication 
 
 
Date of 
publication 
Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA) 
 
The  
Roadmap 
Plan 
Arabic 
 
  
www.altawasul.com 
 
 
30 April 2003 
 
 
 
The Knesset 
 
 
 
The 
Roadmap 
Plan 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
 
www.knesset.gov.il 
 
 
 
30 April 2003 
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The League of Arab States 
(LAS) 
 
 
The Arab 
Peace 
Initiative 
 
English 
 
 
 
www.arableagueonline.org 
 
 
 
28 March 2002 
 
 
 
The Palestinian Authority 
(PA) 
 
 
The Arab 
Peace 
Initiative  
 
Hebrew 
 
 
  
Ha’aretz, Yediot Aharonot, 
Ma’arive and Yisrael 
Hayom newspapers 
 
20 November 
2008 
 
 
The US Department of 
State (USDS) 
 
 
The 
Roadmap 
Plan 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
www.state.gov 
 
 
 
1 May 2003 
 
 
 
The first institution, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) (Hebrew: ‘ץוחה דרשמ’), 
published an Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan on its Arabic-language website 
‘لصاوتلا’ (altawāsul, lit. ‘interaction’) whose content is available, beside Arabic, in Hebrew, 
English and Farsi. Altawāsul is “intended to expose audiences in the Arab world to 
information about Israel, addressing Israel’s neighbors in their own language, and to 
provide a platform for dialogue with the Arab world”.61 The ‘main addressees’ of this 
translation – which has both an informative and a persuasive function – are Arab visitors to 
the website, particularly those based in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.  
 
The second institution, the Israeli Parliament – the Knesset (Hebrew: ‘ תסנכה’) – also 
translated the Roadmap Plan but into Hebrew and made it available on its website for 
internal circulation. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation were therefore members of 
the Israeli Parliament and other officials of different political persuasions, with the Israeli 
media qualifying as potential ‘auditors’. The function of this translation is to inform Israeli 
legislators about the provisions contained in the Roadmap Plan. 
 
The third institution, the League of Arab States (Arabic: ‘ةيبرعلا لودلا ةعماج’) (LAS), released 
an official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative to the media at the conclusion of 
the Arab Summit in Beirut on 28 March 2002. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation 
were therefore English-speaking audiences (e.g. journalists, reporters, politicians, etc.). 
The function of this translation was informative, i.e. to inform journalists, reporters, etc. 
about the details of the Arab Peace Initiative. 
 
                                                          
61
 ‘Altawāsul’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, published on 12 January 2004: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Structure+and+departments/Altawasul.htm [last accessed: 
24 November 2011]. 
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The fourth institution, the Palestinian Authority (Arabic: ‘ةينيطسلفلا ةطلسلا’) (PA), published 
a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative as a full-page advertisement in four major 
Israeli newspapers, Ha’aretz, Yediot Aharonot, Yisrael Hayom and Ma’arive (cf. Chapter 
4.2). The ‘main addressees’ of this translation were the Israeli public. The Arab Peace 
Initiative – after its release in English – received little attention in Israel and more than 
this, it was dismissed as danger to the state of Israel. This was the main reason behind the 
publication of the Hebrew translation in major Israeli newspapers, i.e. to explain the details 
of the initiative to the Israeli public in order to win their support.  
 
The fifth institution, the US Department of State (USDS), published an Arabic translation 
of the Roadmap Plan on its official website. This translation is aimed at a global Arabic- 
speaking readership, i.e. its ‘main addressee’. The Palestinian Authority and international 
media outlets, on the other hand, are the ‘auditors’ of the translation, as their presence is 
known and ratified but they are not directly addressed. In that the primary aim of this 
translation is to make the original English text available to readers in a different language, 
it has an informative and referential function. 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations 
Six non-governmental organizations were involved in the production of translations of 
peace initiatives and they are – in alphabetical order – the Gush-Shalom organization, 
National Consensus (NC), People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), Peace 
Now and Yes to an Agreement (YA). Table 3.3 shows the list of the Arabic, English and 
Hebrew translations and their dates of publications. 
 
Table 3.3 Translations published by Non-Governmental Organizations  
Translation publisher 
 
Initiative 
 
Language 
 
Place of publication 
 
Date of 
publication 
The Gush-Shalom 
Organization 
 
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of 
Principles for 
Peace Agreement 
Arabic  
 
 
 
www.gush-shalom.org 
 
 
 
20 November 
2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of 
Principles for 
Peace Agreement 
 
English 
 
 
 
 
www.gush-shalom.org 
 
 
 
 
13 May 2001 
 
 
 
 
National Consensus (NC) 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
 
www.mifkad.org.il 
 
 
 
 
27 July 2002 
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The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
 
 
www.mifkad.org.il 
 
 
 
 
27 July 2002 
 
 
 
 
The Palestinian Peace 
Coalition (PPC) 
 
 
The Geneva 
Accord 
 
 
Arabic  
 
 
 
www.al-ayyam.com 
 
 
 
1 November 
2003 
 
The People’s Campaign 
for Peace and Democracy 
(PCPD) 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
Arabic 
 
 
 
www.hashd.org 
 
 
 
27 July 2002 
 
 
 
 
Peace Now 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
www.peacenow.org.il 
 
 
5 October 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
The Roadmap 
Plan 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
www.peacenow.org.il 
 
 
Unknown  
 
 
Yes to an Agreement 
(YA) 
 
 
 
The Geneva 
Accord 
 
 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
 
 
www.Heskem.org.il 
 
 
 
 
Unknown 
 
 
 
 
The first non-governmental organization, the Gush-Shalom (Hebrew: ‘םולש שוג’; lit. ‘the 
Peace Bloc’), made Arabic and English language versions of its peace proposal available 
on its website, whose content – beside Arabic and English – is available in Hebrew and 
Russian. On the one hand, ‘  وينيطسلفلا48 ’ (lit. ‘the Palestinian of 1948’)62 or ‘لخادلا برع’ (lit. 
‘Arabs of the inside’)63 constitute the ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic language version, i.e. 
known, ratified and directly addressed ‘participants’. On the other hand, the Palestinian 
government and public are the ‘auditors’ of this version, i.e. known and ratified, but not 
directly addressed readers. Finally, Arab governments and media qualify as the 
‘overhearers’, insofar as their presence is known but they are neither ratified nor addressed 
by the authors of the text. As the analysis in chapter 5.7 shows, this translation fulfils both 
an informative and a persuasive function as it appeals to the Arab-Israeli public to win 
their support.  
 
The ‘main addressees’ of the English version are the general English-speaking visitors to 
the website who are based in Israel, the Middle East and the world. This version has an 
                                                          
62
 This term refers to Palestinians who remained in their homes (and their descendants) in what became Israel 
after 1948. They constitute approximately 1.3 million (nearly 20% of Israel’s population) (Bassiouni and Ben 
Ami 2009: 227). 
63
 This term is preferred by Palestinian nationalists who live in Israel because it implies that “the State of 
Palestine still exists and that some Palestinians are outside of Palestine, while others are still inside” 
(Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: 227).  
  
72 
 
informative function, providing the organisation’s members and supporters with access to 
the content of the document originally negotiated in Hebrew. 
 
Translators of these two language versions are anonymous. Gush-Shalom depends on 
volunteer translators from all over the world. This is evident, for example, in e-mails 
circulated by the organization and others calling for volunteer translators to help in 
translating documents in various languages, including Arabic (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). After 
July 2004, on the one hand, the first Arabic and English versions of the proposal – under 
the title “peace agreement, draft proposal” – were replaced by other Arabic and English 
versions under the title of “declaration of principles for peace agreement, draft proposal for 
Israeli-Palestinian discussion”. On the other hand, the Hebrew original text remained the 
same. These two language versions, as well as the original Hebrew text, are labelled as 
‘versions’ (cf. Chapter 4.3) and presented as equals on the Arabic, English and Hebrew 
websites of the organization. 
 
The second organization, the National Consensus (NC) (Hebrew: ‘  דקפמהימואלה ’), 
published on its website two translations, one Hebrew and one Arabic of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. The National Consensus (NC) and the People’s 
Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), were established by the two drafters of the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh, exclusively 
for the purpose of marketing the initiative to the Israeli and Palestinian public, and 
ultimately, win their support for its main points. The Hebrew translation was produced by 
Ami Ayalon whereas the Arabic one (published on the website of the People’s Campaign 
for Peace and Democracy with some changes, see below) was produced by Sari Nusseibeh. 
On the one hand, the ‘main addressees’ of the Hebrew translation – which has a mainly 
referential and informative function – are the Israeli public as they are ratified and directly 
addressed, with Israeli government and media qualifying as potential ‘auditors’, i.e. known 
but not directly addressed. On the other hand, the ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic 
translation – which also has a mainly referential and informative function – are the 
Palestinian of 1948. 
 
The third organization, the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) (Arabic: 
‘ ةلمحلا  و ملاسلل ةيبعشلاةيطارقميدلا ’), as mentioned above, was established in order to promote 
the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles to the Palestinian public. The ‘main 
addressees’ of Arabic translation published on the website of this organization are the 
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Palestinian public in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, as their presence is known, 
ratified and directly addressed. The  Palestinian government and Palestinian media qualify 
as potential ‘auditors’ of this translation as their presence is known and ratified but not 
directly addressed. This translation has a persuasive function, which is reflected in one 
statement by Sari Nusseibeh: “we try to persuade people that this is in our self-interest and 
to join” (Nusseibeh 2003).  
 
This Arabic translation differs from the one published on the website of the National 
Consensus (NC) in the sense that it contains an added introduction by Sari Nusseibeh (cf. 
Chapter 4.4.3). This introduction, as Delyani (2005) explains, was meant to give the 
Palestinian people an idea about what they were about to read and sign on. Moreover, this 
introduction also has ideological and political significance as it presents claims of each 
side of the conflict to land, whether historical or religious, as equal (see analysis on 
‘historical claims to land’, cf. Chapter 5.6.1). A number of organizations, both 
governmental, for example, the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department,
64
 and non-
governmental, for example, Meretz USA for Israeli Civil Rights and Peace
65
 and the 
Jewish Peace Lobby,
66
 added this introduction in English and treated it as part of the 
original initiative. This introduction is referred to on the websites of these organizations as 
the ‘cover letter’ of the initiative. 
 
The two drafters, Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, worked on getting large numbers of 
Israeli and Palestinian citizens to sign their one-page statement of principles (Klein 2007: 
172-173). However, citizens on both sides would sign on translations and not the original 
English text. Ultimately, by having the majority of the two peoples signing this statement 
or petition, the drafters hoped to influence the political process from grassroots (Klein 
2007: 28) and, consequently, drive their leaders to conclude a peace agreement based on 
the principles they were proposing.  
 
The fourth organization, Peace Now (Hebrew: ‘וישכע םולש’), published on its website two 
Hebrew translations of peace initiatives, one of the Arab Peace Initiative and one of the 
                                                          
64
 ‘The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement’, PLO Negotiations Affairs Department website, published on 3 
September 2002: http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=274 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
65
 ‘The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement’, Meretz USA website, published on 6 August 2002: 
http://www.meretzusa.org/nusseibeh-ayalon-agreement [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
66
 ‘The Nusseibeh-Ayalon Agreement: Final Draft’, the Jewish Peace Lobby website, published in 2008: 
http://www.peacelobby.org/nusseibeh-ayalon_initiative.htm  [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Roadmap Plan. Peace Now is the largest and oldest extra-parliamentary peace movement 
in Israel. This left-wing organization views “peace, compromise, and appeasement with the 
Palestinians and with our Arab neighbors as crucial to the future of our country and to 
maintain our security and the nature of the State of Israel”.67 The ‘main addressees’ of 
these two Hebrew translations are members and supporters of the organisation who share 
its ideological and political stance on the Palestine-Israel conflict. ‘Auditors’ of this 
translation include the wider Israeli public, the Israeli government and politicians; all other 
Hebrew-speaking readers, both inside and outside Israel, qualify as ‘overhearers’.  
 
On the one hand, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative – that was produced 
by Professor Ilai Alon – has a persuasive function. This persuasive function can clearly be 
seen in the introduction and notes that Alon added to the text of the Arab Peace Initiative 
in order to appeal to the Israeli readers and win their support (cf. Chapter 4.4.3 and Chapter 
4.7). Alon – who is a professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University and author on issues 
of negotiations in the Arab World and Islamic political thought – published his translation 
under the title of ‘ הגילה השיקה לע ונתלד ,ונאו ונעדוה ונניאש תיבב ’ (lit. ‘the league knocked on 
our door and we answered that we are not at home’). Alon – as the title of article suggests 
– is trying to convince the Israeli readers that the Arab Peace Initiative deserves serious 
consideration.  
 
On the other hand, the Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan – that was produced by 
Hagit Ofran
68
 – has an informative function, providing the members and supporters of the 
organisation with access to the content of the initiative originally negotiated in English. 
Ofran is the director of the Peace Now watchdog on Jewish settlements in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). 
 
Finally, the Israeli organization, Yes to an Agreement (YA) (Hebrew: ‘םכסהל ןכ’) and the 
Palestinian organization, the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) (Arabic: ‘ ملاسلا فلاحت
ينيطسلفلا’) – which were launched simultaneously in order to promote the Geneva Accord to 
the Israeli and Palestinian public (Klein 2007: 7) – produced one Hebrew and one Arabic 
translation of the accord respectively. The Yes to an Agreement (YA), besides publishing 
                                                          
67
 ‘What we stand for’, Peace Now website: http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/what-we-stand [last accessed: 
24 November 2011]. 
68
 For a short bio data of Hagit Ofran and a sample of her activity as a blogger, see 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hagit-ofran [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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the Hebrew translation on its website, mailed it (also in Arabic and Russian) to two million 
households in Israel as part of its marketing campaign. Therefore, the ‘main addressees’ of 
this translation are Israeli readers of all political affiliations as their presence is known, 
ratified and directly addressed. Israeli government and media qualify as ‘auditors’ of this 
translation as their presence is known and ratified but not directly addressed.  
 
The Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC), unlike the Israeli partner, could not mail the 
document to every Palestinian home in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as “the mail 
did not function properly because of the occupation” (Klein 2006: 14). Instead, the 
Palestinian organization disseminated the Arabic translation to the Palestinian public 
through publishing it in a special weekend supplement in the Palestinian newspaper, Al-
Ayyam. The ‘main addressees’ of the Arabic translation are the Palestinian readers of all 
political affiliations in the Occupied Palestinian Territories as their presence is known, 
ratified and directly addressed. ‘Auditors’ of this translation include the Palestinian 
government and media as their presence is known and ratified but not directly addressed; 
all other Arabic-speaking readers, outside the Occupied Palestinian Territories, qualify as 
‘overhearers’.  
 
The drafters of the Geneva Accord had public opinion in their minds from the outset and 
thus, decided to put the agreement before their respective public (Klein 2006: 6). That is 
why the two marketing campaigns and packages were launched simultaneously. Arabic 
and Hebrew translation of the accord played a major role in these two campaigns. They 
fulfil both informative and persuasive functions, i.e. providing the public, on both sides, 
with access to the content of the document originally negotiated in English and persuading 
and eliciting the public to support the initiative. Ultimately, the political leaders on both 
sides would be persuaded to adopt the initiative after it has been “accepted by large 
portions of the public on each side and by the international public opinion” (Klein 2007: 
16).   
 
The persuasive function of the Arabic and Hebrew translations is reflected in shifts 
between the source and target texts (cf. Chapter 5.3.2, 5.5 and 5.6.4) and the carefully 
drafted summary of the accord which the Israeli negotiating team mailed along with the 
Hebrew translation. This summary focuses on what is considered as the selling points of 
the agreement: 
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(ST) םכסהב ,םיניטסלפה םיריכמ ותוכזב לש םעה ידוהיה ותנידמל .םה םג םיריכמ תנידמב לארשי 
.ימואלה ונתיבכ 
כ-033 ףלא םילארשי םייחה םויה רבעמ וקל קוריה וראשיי םהיתבב םהיבושיבו וללכייו  ךותב
.לארשי תנידמ לש םימכסומה היתולובג 
ישוג חופיסל הרומתב י חרזמב תונוכשה ,תויולחתהה-ריבעת לארשי ,םיינוחטבה םיחטשהו ,ם 
דחאל דחא לש סחי י"פע םייפולח םיחטש םיניטסלפל. 
םיניטסלפה וריכי םילשוריב תריבכ לארשי. 
האלמ תילארשי תונובירב ויהי ידוהיה עבורהו יברעמה לתוכה. 
 רה לש תידוחייה תועמשמבו ירוטסהה רשקב םיריכמ םיניטסלפהידוהיה םעל תיבה. 
תיבה רהל םילארשי לש תישפוחה השיגה תחטבומ. 
תיבה רהב הינבהו הריפחה רוסיא תא ףוכאת תימואלניבה הרקבה תרגסמ. 
.לארשיל םיניטסלפ םיטילפ לש הביש תוכז םכסהב ןיא 
 
[Back 
translation]: 
In the agreement, the Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to its state. 
They also recognize Israeli as our national home. 
Around 300,000 Israelis who live today across the Green Line will stay in their 
homes and within the agreed borders of the state of Israel. 
In return of annexing the bloc of settlements, the neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, 
and the security zones, Israel transfers to Palestinians alternative territories on the 
basis of one to one. 
The Palestinians will recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. 
The Western Wall and the Jewish quarter will be under full Israeli sovereignty. 
The Palestinians recognize the historic link and the unique significance of the Temple 
Mount to the Jewish people. 
Guaranteed free access to Israelis to the Temple Mount. 
International Verification group enforces the prohibition of digging or building in the 
Temple Mount. 
There is no right of return of Palestinian refugees to Israel in this agreement. 
 
These points are of significant political and ideological importance. For example, the claim 
of Israeli sovereignty over the ‘Western Wall’ in point five in the above summary explains 
the shift in the Hebrew translation of the Yes to an Agreement from ‘the Wailing Wall’ to 
‘יברעמה לתוכה’ (lit. ‘the Western Wall’) (cf. Chapter 5.3.2), while the claim that the 
Palestinian negotiating team recognized Israel as a Jewish state in point one of the 
summary explains the translation shift from ‘homelands’ to ‘ תיב ימואלה ’ (lit. ‘the national 
home’) (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). Of particular interest is the latter translation shift which was the 
subject of a heated political debate in Israel (cf. Chapter 6.3). 
 
Mass Media  
In this thesis, mass media is classified into three main categories: newspapers, news 
agencies and online networks. To begin with, four newspapers, two Palestinian ones, Al-
Ayyam and Al-Quds and two Israeli ones, Ha’aretz and Yediot Aharonot, were responsible 
for the production of Arabic and Hebrew translations of peace initiatives. Table 3.4 shows 
the list of these translations – in alphabetical order – and their dates and places of 
publications. 
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Table 3.4 Translations published by Israeli and Palestinian newspapers  
Translation publisher 
 
 
Initiative 
 
 
Language 
 
 
Place of publication 
 
 
Date of 
publication 
Al-Ayyam newspaper  
 
The Geneva 
Accord 
Arabic 
 
www.al-ayyam.ps 
                       
1 November 
2003 
 
Al-Quds newspaper 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
 
www.alquds.com                        
 
 
 
 
4 September 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Initiative The 
Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
www.alquds.com                        
 
 
 
1 May 2003 
 
 
Ha’aretz newspaper  
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
www.haaretz.co.il                      
 
 
28 March 2002  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
 
 
www.haaretz.co.il                      
 
 
 
 
2 September 
2002  
 
 
 
 
 
The Roadmap 
Plan 
Hebrew  
 
www.haaretz.co.il                      
 
1 May 2003 
 
 
Yediot Aharonot 
newspaper 
 
 
 
 
 
The Arab Peace                
 
The Roadmap 
Plan 
 
 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
 
www.ynet.co.il                           
 
 
www.ynet.co.il                           
 
 
 
6 December 
2008 
 
1 May 2003 
 
 
 
The first newspaper, the Palestinian Al-Ayyam, published one Arabic translation of the 
Geneva Accord. Al-Ayyam (Arabic: ‘مايلأا’, lit. ‘the days’) is an independent Palestinian 
daily newspaper with the second largest circulation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
It began to appear in December 1995 and introduced “new printing and layout technology” 
(Jamal 2000: 48). Al-Ayyam is considered to be close to the Palestinian Authority (PA). It 
“hews to the PA line even while maintaining a critical distance” (Jamal 2000: 49). Al-
Ayyam targets “a discerning readership of intellectuals69” in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories.  
 
The choice of publishing the Geneva Accord in the Al-Ayyam newspaper, instead of other 
Palestinian newspapers, e.g. Al-Quds, was politically motivated. Leaders of the Palestinian 
private sector own Al-Ayyam newspaper and although nominally independent, its chief 
editor, Akram Haniya, was a long-time advisor to the late Palestinian president Yasser 
                                                          
69‘The Palestinian press’, BBC Website, published on 13 December 2006: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6176691.stm [last accessed: 28/02/2011]. 
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Arafat (Jamal 2000: 49). Moreover, Haniya and Yasser Abed Rabbo (one of the two 
drafters of the agreement) are long-time friends and share the same political views. This 
choice is an example of alliances formed between various political and social agents in 
order to achieve certain political purposes.  
 
This translation – which was published in a special supplement distributed with the 
newspaper – has both an informative and a persuasive function. Firstly, it provides 
Palestinian readers with information on what has been agreed on in the English source text. 
Secondly, it attempts to elicit the support of the Palestinian public to the agreement. 
 
The second newspaper, the Palestinian Al-Quds (Arabic: ‘سدقلا’, lit. ‘Jerusalem’), published 
one Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and one of the 
Roadmap Plan. Al-Quds is an independent Palestinian daily newspaper with the largest 
circulation in the West Bank (including Occupied East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip 
(Jamal 2000: 46). The readership of Al-Quds consists of Palestinian readers of all political 
affiliations, although it is widely regarded as more of a left-wing newspaper which “is 
daily subject to Israeli censorship
70, owing to its location in East Jerusalem”. 71 Moreover, 
although it supports the Palestinian Authority and the “peace process” between Israel and 
the Palestinian Authority, it has “an intentional lack of orientation to any clear political 
faction” (Alimi 2007: 89).  
 
Al-Quds translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles has both 
informative and persuasive functions. On the one hand, it informs Palestinian readers about 
what was negotiated in English. On the other hand, it leads them to view the initiative from 
a particular point of view by including in the translation an evaluative introduction that 
frames the initiative negatively. The Arabic translation of the Roadmap has an informative 
function providing Palestinian readers as it contributes to disseminating the content of the 
original English text among Arabic-speaking Palestinian readers. 
 
The third newspaper, the Israeli Ha’aretz, published three Hebrew translations of three 
peace initiatives: the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, and the Arab Peace 
Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. Ha’aretz (Hebrew: ‘ץראה’, lit. ‘the land’), is a broadsheet 
                                                          
70
 For a detailed account of the Israeli censorship of the Palestinian press in the occupied West Bank, see 
Najjar (1995). 
71
 Ibid. 
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Israeli paper founded in 1919 and is considered as the most ‘leftist’ and influential 
newspaper in Israel.
72
 Its readership, i.e. its ‘main addressees’, consist predominantly of 
the political and social elites with a left-of-centre political affiliation (Levin 2003: 33). 
Although, it embraces a moderate liberal stance, the op-ed pages of the paper are open to a 
wide variety of political opinions. Israeli politicians, academics and researchers qualify as 
‘auditors’ of this translation, while Palestinian media outlets such as Al-Quds and Al-
Ayyam – that have the custom of translating articles and documents published by Israeli 
newspapers – are examples of potential ‘overhearers’. In fact, the Al-Quds newspaper’s 
Arabic translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was based on the 
Ha’aretz Hebrew translation of the same initiative. The three translations of Ha’aretz 
broadly fulfil an informative and referential function, i.e. presenting Israeli readers with 
negotiated peace initiatives in the Hebrew language.  
 
Finally, the Israeli daily newspaper Yediot Aharonot published one Hebrew translation of 
the Arab Peace Initiative and one Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan. Yediot 
Aharonot (Hebrew: ‘תונורחא תועידי’, lit. ‘evening news’) – founded in 1939 – is a tabloid 
format-paper which “dominates the market, reaching more than two-thirds of all Israelis” 
(Caspi and Limor 1999 quoted in Levin 2003: 31) and gives space to commentators from 
the political right and left. The ‘main addressees’ of the two translations consist of Israeli 
readers with secular centrist political affiliation. Potential ‘auditors’ and ‘overhearers’ of 
these two translations are the same as those of the translations of the Ha’aretz translations. 
The function of the Yediot Aharonot translations is informative.  
 
News Agencies 
Two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, were responsible for the production and publication 
of Arabic and English translations of peace initiatives. Table 3.5 shows a list of these 
translations and their dates and places of publication. 
 
Table 3.5 Translations published by News Agencies   
Translation publisher 
 
 
Initiative 
 
 
Language 
 
 
Place of publication 
 
 
Date of 
publication 
CNN 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
English 
 
www.cnn.com    
                         
28 March 2002 
 
                                                          
72
 ‘The press in Israel’, BBC Website, published on 8 May 2006: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4969714.stm [last accessed: 28/02/2011]. 
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CNN 
 
 
The Roadmap 
Plan 
 
Arabic 
 
 
http://arabic.cnn.com 
 
 
1 May 2003 
 
 
Reuters  
 
 
The Arab Peace                
 
 
English  
 
 
www.globalpolicy.org 
 
 
25 March 2002 
 
 
CNN published the Roadmap in Arabic and the Arab Peace Initiative in English, whereas 
Reuters published the Arab Peace Initiative in English. CNN (Cable News Network) is a 
major American news television network founded in 1980 that is widely considered as the 
main cable news source in the United States of America. It also provides news to other 
media outlets. Reuters is regarded as the world's largest international multimedia news 
agency that provides various types of news, e.g. headline news, political, business, 
technology, etc.  
 
As the Arabic translation of the Roadmap was published on the Arabic website of CNN, 
the ‘main addressees’ of this version were Arabic-speaking audiences all over the world. 
‘Auditors’ of this translation – which also has a mainly referential and informative function 
– include other media outlets in the Arab world as well as Arab governments and 
politicians. The ‘main addressees’ of the English translations of the Arab Peace Initiative 
that were published by CNN and Reuters are English-speaking audiences all over the 
world. ‘Auditors’ of this translation – which also mainly fulfils a referential and 
informative function – include other media outlets in the English-speaking world as well as 
western governments and politicians. 
 
Online Networks  
Finally, five online networks
73
 were involved in the publication of language versions of 
peace initiatives. These are – in alphabetical order – Al-eman (Arabic: ‘ناميلاا’), Almtym 
(Arabic: ‘ميتملا ةكبش’), Baheth Center (Arabic: ‘ثحاب زكرم’), God Bless Israel (GBI) and 
Haayal Hakore (Hebrew: ‘ארוקה לייאה’). Table 3.6 lists the Arabic and Hebrew translations 
and the details of their publication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
73
 Names of these networks are the same as the originals. 
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Table 3.6 Translations published by Online Networks   
Translation publisher 
 
 
Initiative 
 
 
Language 
 
 
Place of publication 
 
 
Date of 
publication 
Al-eman  
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh    
declaration of 
Principles 
Arabic 
 
 
 
www.al-eman.com                     
 
 
 
5 September 
2002 
 
 
 
Almtym 
 
 
The Roadmap 
Plan 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 www.almtym.com   
                   
 
2 June 2003 
 
 
Baheth Center 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh    
declaration of 
Principles 
 
Arabic  
 
 
 
                     
www.bahethcenter.net               
              
 
 
 
6 August 2002 
 
 
 
God Bless Israel (GBI) 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative       
 
Hebrew 
 
 
http://israelblessgod.com           
 
 
28 March 
2002 
 
Haayal Hakore 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
www.haayal.co.il                       
 
4 April 2002 
 
 
The first online network, Al-eman, published an Arabic translation of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. This online network largely discusses Islamic topics 
such as interpretations of the Quran and Hadith. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation – 
which fulfils a persuasive function as evident in its introduction (cf. Chapter 4.4.4) – are 
thus Muslims who speak Arabic from all over the world. 
 
The second online network, Almtym, published an Arabic translation of the Roadmap 
Plan. The ‘main addressees’ of this translation are the Arabic-speaking visitors to this 
website. This translation has an informative function as it provides information about the 
Roadmap in Arabic.  
 
The third online network, Baheth Center, published an Arabic translation of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Baheth Center is a non-profit strategic research centre 
which was established in 2002 “upon an initiative taken by a group interested in the issues 
of researching and compiling and concerned with their nation’s causes primarily the 
Palestinian cause”.74 The goal of this centre is as follows:  
                                                          
74
 ‘About us: overview’, Baheth Center website: http://www.bahethcenter.net/english/pagedetails.php?pid=1 
[last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Propagating and deepening the scientific awareness of the nature of Zionist project - Zionist entity 
- Zionist International Movement - Zionist lobbies - Zionist Messianic - Zionist entity's foreign 
relations etc..... in addition to contributing with building up the Palestinian national resistant 
project as a part of nation's project of settling up its future.
75
 
 
The website of this centre is available in both Arabic and English. The centre published 
Arabic translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva 
Accord only. The translation of the Geneva Accord is an Arabic translation of its first draft 
which was translated from Hebrew and circulated as the translation of the accord by some 
websites. The translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is based on 
the Hebrew translation published by Ha’aretz newspaper as it has the same cover letter 
which Ha’aretz newspaper published. 
 
The fourth online network, God Bless Israel (GBI), is an American-based online network. 
The website is available in both English and Hebrew. The ‘main addressees’ of the Hebrew 
translation are a religious and far right Hebrew-speaking audience. This website discusses 
religious topics such as the Old Testament. It also discusses important political issues 
concerning the Jewish people and the state of Israel. 
 
Finally, Haayal Hakore published a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative on its 
website. Haayal Hakore is an Israeli online magazine for culture and current affairs. The 
website of this online magazine – established in 1999 – “sports a Slashdot-style response-
engine with several enhancements which allow for discussions lasting for hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of replies, over months or even years”.76 This feature of the website – 
i.e. allowing for discussions explains the introduction added to Hebrew translation of the 
Arab Peace Initiative published on this website (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). The ‘main addressees’ 
of this translation are mainly Hebrew-speaking visitors to the website in Israel. This 
translation fulfils both an informative as well as a persuasive function. In that the primary 
aim of this translation is to make the original Arabic text available to readers in a different 
language, it has an informative and referential function. However, encouraging Israeli 
readers to consider the Arab Peace Initiative and to join the debate on its main points 
makes this translation fulfil a persuasive function too.  
                                                          
75
 Ibid. 
76
 ‘Israeli news websites, Haayal Hakore’: http://www.middleeastexplorer.com/Israel/Haayal-Hakore [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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3.3 Methodology of the Study 
This thesis operates within the framework of product-oriented Descriptive Translation 
Studies (Lambert and Van Gorp 1985) and Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 1992). 
In linking textual profiles to conditions of text production, the analysis is an example of 
causal models as described by Chesterman (1997). 
 
Methodologically, the thesis pursues a top-down approach towards the analysis of data. It 
begins with presenting the socio-cultural and political contexts of the production of the 
original versions of the respective peace initiatives (the source texts) and their different 
language versions (target texts), focusing on their underlying functions and principles of 
audience design. It then moves to examine how language versions of peace initiatives 
reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro- and 
micro-structural levels. The final step is to go beyond description to explanation of textual 
profiles by accounting for these aspects in terms of institutional conditions and constraints 
of text production. This methodology will be used to provide answers to the main research 
questions of the thesis: 
1) What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically 
negotiated texts? 
2) What happens to these texts in translation? 
3) How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political 
affiliation and power relations? 
4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be 
accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the 
production of the translations?  
  
The first three questions concern the description of language versions of peace initiatives 
(target texts) as products. This research is product-oriented because the focus here is on 
translations (target texts) as products in their socio-cultural contexts rather than translation 
agency or translation process. Detailed information about the last two is not available. The 
fourth question concerns how translations
77
 of peace initiatives as products are (re)framed 
and (re)contextualized in different institutional settings for different purposes and 
readerships. This highlights the roles translations play during situations of ongoing 
contemporary conflict depending on the institutional context in which it is presented and 
the purposes it sets to serve. In the following three sub-sections, the three models 
comprising the methodology of the study will be discussed in more detail. 
                                                          
77
 The terms ‘translation’ and ‘language version’ will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
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3.3.1 Lambert and Van Gorp’s Descriptive Model 
The descriptive translation scholars, José Lambert and Hendrik Van Gorp (1985), have 
developed an analytical model for “the comparison of the ST and TT literary systems and 
for the description of relations within them” (Munday 2008: 119). Although this model 
was developed initially for literary translation and predominantly used by scholars in 
literary translation, it can be applied – to some extent – to other types of texts or genres 
such as politically negotiated texts. 
 
Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) propose to move from a description of preliminary data 
(e.g. title page, layout, paratext, completeness) towards macro- and micro-structural data 
(e.g. text division, titles and linguistic choices). For the purposes of this study, macro-
structural analysis is discussed under the heading textual organization, whereas micro-
structural analysis is discussed under textual analysis.  
 
The analysis of textual organization of the various translation profiles of peace initiatives 
aims to show how components of textual organization of these texts – e.g. layouts and 
covers, paratexts, chapter heading, etc. (sections 4.1-4.7) – reflect ideological and political 
positions. Questions of particular interest in this context include: are these texts complete, 
i.e. are there any omissions or additions? Do the various language versions of these texts 
have the same chapter headings? Are there any prefaces, footnotes, or translator’s notes? 
These questions lie within the framework of Descriptive Translation Studies (e.g. Lambert 
and Van Gorp 1985) (cf. Chapter 4).   
 
The textual analysis aims to account for how aspects of ideology, political affiliation and 
power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict manifest themselves on these 
language versions. Selection for data examples will be based on a detailed comparison 
between target and source texts and identified characteristic features of peace initiatives as 
negotiated texts (e.g. use of ambiguous formulations, proper names, modality, politically 
sensitive terms, etc.) in the literature (e.g. Translation Studies, negotiation theory, etc.). For 
classifying translation strategies, Chesterman’s (1997) categories will be used. 
 
3.3.2 Causal Model  
The Translation Studies scholar, Andrew Chesterman (2000: 16) points out that in 
Translation Studies three basic models are used: comparative, process and causal. The 
Comparative Model is a product-oriented one that is centred on a relation of equivalence or 
  
85 
 
identity between two entities – i.e. source and target text (Chesterman 2000: 16). 
According to Chesterman, this relation has been found to be “an inaccurate representation 
of translation” and thus the relation between two texts is better described as more of 
similarity or difference (2000: 16). A comparative model makes it possible to formulate 
statements about ‘language-pair translation rules’, ‘language-system contrasts’, or 
‘translation product universals’ (Chesterman 2000: 17). 
 
The process model examines translation as a process rather than a product. This model is 
useful if a researcher is interested in “sequential relations between different phases of the 
translation process” (Chesterman 2000: 18). Such a model makes it possible to formulate 
statements about typical translation behavior and possible process universals (Chesterman 
2000: 18).  
 
These two models, i.e. comparative and process, though they may be open to a causal 
intrepretation, they cannot be considered as ‘explicitly causal’ (Chesterman 2000: 18). 
They help in describing translation as both a product and a process but they do not answer 
questions of ‘why the translation looks the way it does’ or ‘what effects it causes’  
(Chesterman 2000: 19). Questions asked by these two models are thus of ‘what’ and 
‘when’ rather than ‘why’. The causal model as developed by Chesterman (1998, 2000) (see 
Figure 3.1 below) makes it possible to formulate statements and hypotheses about causes 
and effects of translations – i.e. questions of ‘why’. These statements, according to 
Chesterman (2000: 21), can be made based on answers in response to questions such as the 
following: 
 Why is this translation the way it is?  
 Why do people react like this to that translation?  
 Why did this translator write that?  
 Why did translators at that time in that culture translate like that? 
 How do translations affect cultures? 
 What causal conditions give rise to translations that people like/d (What 
people…?) 
 Why do people think this is a translation? 
 What will happen if I translate like this? 
 
The causal model would thus link “causal conditions, translation profile features and 
translation effects” (Chesterman 2000: 26). 
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Figure 3.1: Chesterman’s Causal Model (2000: 20) 
 
 
Socio-cultural conditions                (norms, history, ideologies, languages ...) 
 
 
Translation event                            (skopos, source text, computers, deadline, pay ...) 
 
 
Translation act                                (state of knowledge, mood, self-image ...) 
 
 
Translation profile                          (linguistic features) 
 
 
Cognitive effects                             (change of cognitive or emotional state ...) 
 
 
   Behavioural effects                         (individual actions, criticism ...) 
 
  Socio-cultural effects                       (on target language, consumer behaviour,  
                                                           discourse of translation, status of translators ...) 
 
The aim of this thesis is to go beyond describing the different textual profiles of peace 
initiatives to explaining these profiles with reference to their socio-political, historical and 
institutional conditions and constraints of text production. The causal model is useful here, 
as product-oriented Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS) does not offer answers about 
causes and effects of translations. However, the causal model as developed by Chesterman 
does not account for (re)contextualization and (re)framing processes. In this way, this 
thesis contributes to causal models in translation (cf. Chapter 7).  
 
3.3.3 Fairclough Three-dimensional Discourse Analytical Model 
Translation in this thesis is regarded as a social practice governed and controlled by 
institutions (cf. Chapter 6). This thesis examines aspects of ideology, political affiliation 
and power relations as realised in translations of politically negotiated texts, i.e. 
Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives in their socio-cultural, political and institutional 
contexts. For this purpose, the thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) three-dimensional 
model of Critical Discourse Analysis. According to Fairclough (1995: 87), CDA “looks to 
establish connections between properties of texts, features of discourse practice (text 
production, consumption and distribution), and wider sociocultural practice”.  
 
Fairclough’s model is designed for analysis in one language and one culture. This thesis 
applies this model twice, once for original text production where all the negotiations play a 
role and where English is the language of negotiations in the majority of cases, and then 
  
87 
 
this model is applied to the context of translation production, i.e. Arabic, English and 
Hebrew. Fairclough’s model provides a useful framework for research on production and 
reception processes of more than one translation of one text. Furthermore, this model helps 
in accounting for translation as a socio-cultural activity and in identifying the social 
context in which text production and reception take place as well as the interaction 
between these elements. Finally, it makes it possible to move from text to the social 
context of translations. 
 
In this model, Fairclough (1992: 2) proposes the following three dimensions for the 
analysis of discourse: analysis of texts, discourse practice (processes of text production, 
distribution and consumption) and analysis of discursive events as instances of 
sociocultural practice. These three analyses cover ‘text production’, ‘text interpretation’ 
and ‘institutional contexts’. 
 
                       Figure 3.2: Fairclough’s Three-dimensional concept of Discourse (1992) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, ‘text production’ will be covered in chapter three under the heading of ‘corpus of 
the study’. In this section, the socio-cultural, political and institutional contexts of the 
production of the original versions of peace initiatives (i.e. the source texts) and their 
different language versions will be provided. This includes accounting for functions and 
principles of audience design of both source and target texts.  
 
                             
Social practice 
 
 
 
Discursive practice 
(production, distribution, 
consumption) 
Text 
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Secondly, ‘text interpretation’ (textual organization and textual analysis) will be covered in 
chapters 4 and 5. On the one hand, data analysis at the macro-structural level (cf. Chapter 
4) focuses on describing the textual organization of translations of peace initiatives (target 
texts), e.g. layouts and covers, labels, introductions, maps, etc. On the other hand, data 
analysis at the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5) focuses on the mediation of a number 
of characteristic features of peace initiatives in translation, namely, naming practices 
(including protagonists of the conflict, holy places), instances of deliberately ambiguous or 
vague drafting, instances of intertextuality, modality, politically sensitive terms in addition 
to instances of addition and omission of information. The analysis aims to show how 
ideological factors inform translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated 
texts by readers. Full historical and political contexts of these translational choices are 
provided. This rigors work outside the text helps validate claims about what is in it and 
thus answers criticisms of bias (see below). 
 
Finally, ‘institutional contexts’ will be covered in Chapter 6. This chapter aims at 
accounting for aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations (at macro- and 
micro- levels) in terms of institutional policies and practices. In other words, how 
translational choices reflect certain ideologies and policies of the publishing institutions. In 
linking aspects of ideology and power struggles to conditions of text production, the 
analysis is an example of causal models as described by Chesterman (1997).  
 
There are a number of methodologies and theoretical frameworks through which analysis 
of translations of peace initiatives – as negotiated texts – can be conducted, including, pure 
Descriptive Analysis (e.g. Toury 1995), Narrative Theory (e.g. Baker 2006) and Critical 
Discourse Analysis (e.g. Fairclough 1992) (CDA hereafter). In the following, it will be 
explained why methods of CDA are the most promising for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
To begin with, CDA
78
 is not one single or specific theory but broad and interdisciplinary in 
nature (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 271) which derives from “quite different theoretical 
backgrounds, oriented towards different data and methodologies” (Wodak and Meyer 
2009: 5). Three main approaches can be distinguished in CDA: socio-cognitive approach 
(e.g. Van Dijk 1988, 1991, 2001), discourse-historical approach (e.g. Reisigl and Wodak 
2001; Wodak 2001) and social approach (e.g. Fairclough 1992, 1995, 2003).  
                                                          
78
 For further overviews of CDA, see for example, Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000), Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough (1999) and Reisigl and Wodak (2001). 
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This thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992, 1995) three-dimensional model of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. This model accounts for three levels of analysis: text production, text 
interpretation and institutional contexts. CDA is interested not only in what is produced 
(i.e. original source texts and translations of peace initiatives) but also how it is produced 
(i.e. institutional conditions of text production) and in the history and contexts that 
surround its production. In other words, CDA is interested in interpretation of data as well 
as processes of production. This allows peace initiatives and their translations to be 
situated within their wider context (i.e. the societal context). 
 
Although the thesis applies Fairclough’s (1992) model, in providing further historical 
contextualization to aid interpretations of data examples, the linguistic analysis (cf. 
Chapter 5) is also an example of the discourse-historical approach as developed by Wodak 
(2001). 
 
Methods of CDA are the most promising for the purposes of this thesis for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, this thesis shares with CDA its aims of revealing power relations and 
aspects of ideology in texts
79
 – considered as manifestations of social action and largely 
determined by social structures (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10). Power – “the ability of 
people and institutions to control the behavior and material lives of others” (Fowler 1985: 
61), particularly, power asymmetry – is a central concept for CDA (Wodak and Meyer 
2009: 7). CDA aims at making explicit power relations that are often obscured and 
concealed (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 20). Power is realized in terms of “asymmetries 
between participants in discourse events” and in terms of “unequal capacity to control how 
texts are produced, distributed and consumed” (Fairclough 1995: 1). In the case of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the two sides of the conflict, i.e. the Palestinians and Israelis, 
are enormously unequal with opposing narratives and conflicting political and ideological 
positions (cf. Section 1.1.1). This affects the negotiation process between them and 
consequently the final product of such negotiations.  
 
One important perspective in CDA – which is closely linked to the concept of power – is 
that “it is very rare that a text is the work of any one person. In texts, discursive differences 
are negotiated; they are governed by differences in power that is in part encoded in and 
                                                          
79
 For Fairclough (1995: 4), a text can be either written or spoken language. For the purposes of this thesis, a 
text is regarded as written language only. 
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determined by discourse and by genre. Therefore, texts are often sites of struggle in that 
they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for 
dominance” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 10). This applies to Peace initiatives which are the 
work of many authors (e.g. local, regional, international). Political players involved in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict negotiate political solutions to the conflict. The final product of 
these negotiations, i.e. peace initiative, often reflects political compromises and 
asymmetric power relations of those players. The sensitivity of these compromises and 
asymmetric power relations are usually refracted in translation (cf. Chapter 5). 
 
Ideology is another central concept for CDA. CDA aims at uncovering the “ideological 
loading of particular ways of using language and the relations of power which underlie 
them” (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). As Schäffner (2004: 132) notes, in CDA, this is 
usually done based on discourse in one language and one culture whereas in the case of 
translation “textual features, ideological contexts, and underlying relations of power apply 
both to the source text and culture and to the target text and culture”. Aspects of ideology 
and power have been addressed in Translation Studies since what is termed the ‘cultural 
turn’ but mainly with regard to literary texts (e.g. Bassnett and Lefevere 1990; Tymoczko 
and Gentzler 2002; Venuti 1995). In this thesis, these aspects are examined in politically 
negotiated texts. 
 
Secondly, CDA approaches and modern Translation Studies both focus on the on the social 
aspects of texts. CDA aims to establish “connections between properties of texts, features 
of discourse practice (text production, consumption and distribution), and wider 
sociocultural practice” (Fairclough 1995: 87). CDA views discourse80 – language use in 
speech and writing – as a social practice (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258) which is “both 
determined by social structure and contributes to stabilizing and changing that structure 
simultaneously” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 7). In modern Translation Studies, translation is 
considered as a social practice in the hands of local agents to be studied in its socio-
political and institutional contexts.  
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 Fairclough (1992: 3) points out that “[D]iscourse is a difficult concept, largely because there are so many 
conflicting and overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical and disciplinary 
standpoints…‘discourse is used in linguistics to refer to extended samples of either spoken or written 
language…’discourse’ is widely used in social theory and analysis, for example in the work of Michel 
Foucault, to refer to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice”. 
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Context is of significant importance to Critical Discourse Analysis which “deals with the 
study of text and talk in context” (Van Dijk 1999: 291). As Blackledge (2005: 6) notes, 
“[N]o text stands alone and outside its context. A text relates to features of the same text, 
to other texts which represent the same social event to other texts which make similar 
arguments, and to the broader socio-political and historical context within which the text 
was produced”.  
 
Thirdly, methods of CDA provide tools and conceptual frameworks for rigorous textual 
analysis comprising linguistic analysis and intertextual analysis (Fairclough 1995: 185). 
Fairclough’s approach to discourse analysis is textually (and therefore linguistically) 
oriented (1992: 37). The focus on textual analysis suits one of the aims of this thesis which 
is on analysing the textual profiles of translations of peace initiatives.  
 
Of particular interest to this thesis is that CDA approaches account for the intertextual 
nature of texts and the way they are embedded in socio-political contexts. Therefore, CDA 
approaches emphasize the significance of intertextual analysis as “a necessary complement 
to linguistic analysis within the analysis of texts” (Fairclough 1995: 8). Intertextuality – 
“how texts draw upon, incorporate, recontextualize and dialogue with other texts” 
(Fairclough 2003: 17) is key to the investigation of Peace initiatives which largely build on 
other peace proposals and agreements drafted throughout the history of the conflict and the 
language versions of these peace initiatives which show snatches of key documents of the 
conflict (cf. Chapter 5.). 
 
Fourthly, CDA acknowledges that textual analysis is never exhaustive and thus more 
analysis is always possible. Fairclough (2003: 14) explains that “no analysis of a text can 
tell us all there is to be said about it – there is no such thing as a complete and definitive 
analysis of a text”. Textual analysis in this thesis is intended to account for the differences 
between language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 4) and how they reflect aspects 
of ideology, political affiliation and power relations (cf. Chapter 5). This analysis 
represents only one interpretation of these texts in open-ended interpretations. The 
interpretation provided in this thesis is never final, as the emergence of new information 
would lead to new interpretation of these texts.  
 
Fifthly, CDA adopts a postmodern view that meanings are not fixed in texts themselves 
(Chilton 2004: 61) but derived from the readers’ interpretations based on “their 
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background knowledge and the information they already have about the subject in 
question” (Van Dijk 1993: 242).  
 
This means that any text can be interpreted or understood in different ways and that these 
different understandings of the text stem from “different combinations of the properties of 
the text and the properties (social positioning, knowledge, values, etc.) of the interpreter” 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 67). Moreover, these processes of interpretations are 
continuous and not restricted to one and only one reading. Translations of peace initiatives 
continuously undergo processes of recontextualisation as they are published by various 
types of institutions, largely on the internet (cf. Chapter 6). A CDA framework gives room 
for this changing nature of translations of peace initiatives that may be affected by new 
readings and new contextual information that could become available in the future. This 
issue of meanings and interpretations of texts has been the subject of debate in Translation 
Studies between ‘essentialism’ and ‘non-essentialism’ (see for example, Olohan 2004: 6). 
 
Sixthly, one of the tenants of CDA is that texts – as elements of social events – have 
‘effect’, both social and political (Fairclough 1995: 208, 2003: 8); they play a role in social 
and political change. Fairclough (2003: 8) explains this effect as follows: 
Most immediately, texts can bring about changes in our knowledge (we can learn things from 
them), our beliefs, out attitudes, values and so forth. They also have  longer-term causal effects – 
one might for instance argue that prolonged experience of advertising and other commercial texts 
contributes to shaping people’s identities as ‘consumers’, or their gender identities. Texts can also 
start wars, or contribute to changes in education, or to changes in industrial relations, and so forth. 
Their effects can include changes in the material world, such as changes in urban design, or the 
architecture and design of particular types of buildings. In sum, texts have causal effects upon, and 
contribute to changes in, people (beliefs, attitudes, etc.), actions, social relations, and the material 
world. 
 
Peace initiatives – as politically sensitive texts – and equally their translations play a 
crucial role in shaping public discourses, attitudes and ideological thinking during 
situations of ongoing contemporary conflict regarding and its future settlement.  
 
Finally, CDA allows for the reflection on the analyst position without jeopardising 
academic ‘objectivity’ (cf. Chapter 3.3.3). As Wodak and Meyer (2009: 3) note, CDA 
researchers “attempt to make their own positions and interests explicit while retaining their 
respective scientific methodologies and while remaining self-reflective of their own 
research process”. 
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The discourse on translation and conflict belongs in the main to a branch of ‘committed 
approaches’ in Translation Studies, which while not promoting particular methods of 
translating, highlights the impossibility of neutrality and thus the necessity of recognizing 
the interventionist role of translators (Brownlie 2007: 135). CDA – a politically engaged 
form of discourse analysis – shares with modern Translation Studies, particularly, 
‘committed approaches’ (e.g. Baker 2006, Hermans 1999), the conviction that “neutrality 
is an illusion” (Baker 2006: 128) and instead stresses the status of the analyst/translator as 
an active social agent. 
 
The methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) has received several criticisms. 
The main criticisms have to do with the social and political stand as well as bias of the 
analyst and the analysis (see for example, Billing 1999, Billing and Schegloff 1999; 
Schegloff 1997, 1999; Wetherell 1998; Widdowson 1996, 2004).  
 
CDA has been criticized that it determines its research interests in advance (Meyer 2001: 
15). Widdowson (1995) – one of the major critics of CDA – argues that CDA is 
“prejudiced on the basis of some ideological commitment, and then it selects for analysis 
such texts as will support the preferred interpretation” (Widdowson 1995: 169 quoted in 
Meyer 2001: 17). In other words, it is a biased interpretation. This opinion is shared by 
Schegloff who also argues that CDA analysts “project their own political biases and 
prejudices onto their data and analyse them accordingly” (Schegloff 1997 quoted in 
Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 455-456).  
 
Fairclough (1996) in reply to Widdowson’s criticism points out that “CDA, unlike most 
other approaches, is always explicit about its own position and commitment” (quoted in 
Meyer 2001: 17). Moreover, CDA researchers try “to make their own positions and 
interests explicit while retaining their respective scientific methodologies and while 
remaining self-reflective of their own research process” (Wodak and Meyer 2009: 3). 
 
CDA does not take itself as “objective” social science but as an “engaged and committed” 
one (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). It promotes “interventionism in the social 
practices it critically investigates” (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000: 449) and in fact, many 
CDA analysts are politically active against racism or as feminists, or within the peace 
movement, etc. (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). 
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Fairclough (2003: 14), regarding accusations of bias, emphasizes the inevitable selective 
nature of textual analysis: “we choose to ask certain questions about social events and 
texts, and not other possible questions”. Therefore, “[T]here is no such thing as an 
‘objective’ analysis of a text, if by that we mean an analysis which simply describes what 
is ‘there’ in the text without being ‘biased’ by ‘subjectivity’ of the analyst…our ability to 
know what is ‘there’ is inevitably limited and partial. And the questions we ask necessarily 
arise from particular motivations which go beyond what is ‘there’” (Fairclough 2003: 15). 
 
Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 259) further defend CDA by arguing that by declaring its 
motives and interests in advance “does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other 
research: standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis apply with equal force to 
CDA as to other approaches”. Thus, from CDA point of view, these prior interest or 
agenda are not seen as a shortcoming of CDA but as an advantage of it.  
For Meyer (2001: 17) these criticisms are linked to the wider debate of whether it is 
possible to “perform any research free of a priori value judgment” and whether it is 
possible to possible to “gain insight from purely empirical data without using any 
performed categories of experience”.  
The issue of “bias” has been of serious concern for the researcher from the outset of this 
research. This concern has originated from two preliminary points: first, the topic of 
research and second the profile of the researcher. First, the topic of this thesis – i.e. the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict – is highly sensitive and complex. Translation Studies scholars, 
as Baker (2008: 11) points out, “by and large tend to shy away from dealing with issues 
relating to ongoing contemporary conflict of this type because they are inevitably 
controversial”. This controversy, Baker (2008: 11) explains, is because “consensus has not 
yet been reached on who is the victim and who is the oppressor, as it has in the case of 
South Africa or Nazi Germany, for instance. There is also still an element of risk – 
sometimes very high risk – involved in discussing these contemporary conflicts”. 
The issue of “bias” becomes even more complicated taking into account the personal 
profile of the researcher. The researcher is a Palestinian who lived part of his life in the 
suburbs of Occupied East Jerusalem. He has witnessed first-hand, as other more than four 
million Palestinians, the oppressive practices and policies of the Israeli occupation in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories on a daily basis.  
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He has also lived the era of Oslo Accords and its false promises to end the longest military 
occupation in modern history and achieve freedom for the Palestinian people. These 
agreements instead, led to prolonging the occupation, more land expropriation and 
expansion of the Jewish settlements. 
The researcher is not trying to escape his national narrative location as a Palestinian who 
stands firmly against the illegal Israeli occupation to his land and people but tries to 
present potentially “unbiased” interpretation of texts under scrutiny which include both 
sides of the story, i.e. Palestinian and Israeli. This turns to be more than difficult in many 
cases and impossible in others. One example of this is regarding back translations which 
are provided to help readers of this thesis who have no command of either Arabic or 
Hebrew or both to understand what is in the texts under scrutiny. Keeping “unbias” in 
these back translations has proven to be a very challenging task for the researcher. 
The notion of “neutrality” or “impartiality” underpins much of the current epistemology in 
the humanities and social sciences including the discipline of Translation Studies. The 
notion of “neutral” translator has dominated the discipline of Translations Studies for many 
years as an ethical principle of the profession. Baker (2009: 24) in this context explains 
that “[O]ne of the unexamined assumption that continues to underpin discussions of 
translation and interpreting is that translators and interpreters neutral disinterested, 
apolitical creatures, who take no sides and participate in no activities that might 
compromise their neutrality in the eyes of employers”. However, recent research in 
Translation Studies (e.g. Baker 2006; Salama-Carr 2007) has shown that translators take 
sides and play an active role in dissemination of narratives. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the corpus and methodology of the study. It described the socio-
cultural and political contexts of the production of the original versions of the respective 
peace initiatives (the source texts) as well as their different translations (the target texts). In 
doing so, this chapter focused on the contexts of text production of both peace initiatives 
and their translations. These contexts are different. Peace initiatives have different 
functions than their translations. Translations of peace initiatives were produced in 
different institutional contexts for different purposes and readers. These translations were 
produced generally for either internal or external purposes. However, translations produced 
for internal purposes in one institution are sometimes republished by other institution for 
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different purposes (e.g. the United Nations Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan). That 
is to say, these translations are recontextualized for different purposes and audiences. The 
next chapter describes the textual profiles of peace initiatives at the macro-structural level. 
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Chapter Four 
Textual Organization 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter Three presented the corpus and methodology of the study. Chapter Four examines 
the textual organization of the individual translation profiles. This chapter focuses on the 
how the various components of textual organization of translation profiles of the different 
language versions of peace initiatives (the target texts), e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter 
heading, etc., reflect ideological and political interests. For this purpose, the Descriptive 
Translation Studies model of Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) is applied.  
 
Lambert and Van Gorp (1985: 52; cf. Chapter 3.3.1) developed this model for translation 
comparisons. They propose moving from preliminary data (e.g. title page, completeness of 
texts, metatexts, etc.) to the macro- and micro-structural data (e.g. division of the text, titles 
of chapters, linguistic features, etc.). For the present purposes, macro-structural analysis 
will be covered under the chapter heading textual organization, whereas micro-structural 
analysis will be covered under the chapter heading textual analysis. The textual 
organization of a text is closely connected to its dominant rhetorical function (Hatim and 
Mason 1997:  224). What happens on the macro-structural level could be an indication of 
the translation shifts on the micro-structural level and both are closely related.  
 
Paratextual materials are significant parts of recontextualization of the language versions 
of peace initiatives. The concept of ‘paratext’ – as used by Genette (1997) – refers to 
materials which surround a text (Kovala 1996: 120). Paratexts include prefaces, titles, 
dedications, illustrations, etc. Of particular interest about paratexts is their “potential 
influence on the reader’s reading and reception of the works in question” (Kovala 1996: 
120). In the case of peace initiatives, paratextual materials exert a considerable influence 
on the readers of peace initiatives by framing these texts in a specific way (see section 4.4 
below). 
 
Some paratextual materials (e.g. blurbs, prefaces, translation notes, translator’s footnotes, 
advertisements) are not expected to be found in the translation profiles of peace initiatives. 
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For example, the translator’s footnotes could be found in drafts of translations but not in 
the final text (see section 4.7 below). This is because of the nature of these texts – i.e. they 
are politically negotiated texts and usually do not include any references to translation. In 
other words, translation is kept invisible. Some other paratextual materials, for example, 
titles and added introduction, are contained in in the translation profiles of peace 
initiatives. Titles and introductions are the first thing to catch the reader’s attention. They 
could reveal institutional positions with regard to peace initiatives. 
 
Based on the model developed by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985), a descriptive account of 
textual profiles examines the layouts and covers of texts and the way these texts were 
labelled. It also examines how these texts they were introduced and whether or not 
introductions were added to them and, if so, by what kind of institution and to serve what 
purpose. It examines the completeness of texts, i.e. whether there are major omissions or 
additions, and, finally, whether or not these texts share the same chapter headings and sub-
headings and whether they have any prefaces, footnotes, translator’s notes, images, and 
illustrations.  
 
4.2 Layouts and Covers 
Layouts and covers are the first elements in the recontextualization process of the 
translations of peace initiatives. Original source texts of peace initiatives do not have any 
special page layout. Comparing translations of peace initiatives to their source texts 
revealed that all target texts share the same feature except in two cases: firstly, the Hebrew 
translation of the Geneva Accord published by the Israeli campaign Yes to an Agreement 
and, secondly, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the 
Palestinian Authority in four major Israeli newspapers. In the following sections, both 
these cases will be discussed and commented on. 
 
Figure 4.1 represents the cover of the booklet of the Hebrew translation of the Geneva 
Accord. This booklet was distributed to every household in Israel as part of promoting the 
initiative to the Israeli public. Covers are of high significance as they are the first thing 
readers see and therefore they draw their attention. 
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                           Figure 4.1: Cover of the Hebrew Translation of the Geneva Accord                                                           
 
 
The cover of this booklet is particularly interesting. The first aspect is the choice of colour 
scheme. The white and blue colour scheme presents the accord in a nationalistic and 
patriotic frame. These are the colours of Israel’s flag and had been deliberately chosen to 
appeal to the general Israeli public. The second aspect is the very careful choice of text 
imprinted on the cover. The cover has a blue strip surrounded by white space and is 
divided into two parts by the title in the middle. The title says ‘Geneva Initiative: A Model 
for an Israeli-Palestinian Final Status Agreement’. The blue strip quotes a number of the 
selling points of the initiative from its summary. The most eye-catching points are the 
recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people, and Jerusalem as the capital of 
Israel, and the promise that most of the Israeli settlers will remain in the territory of Israel. 
 
The selection of these specific points is of high political significance. They were intended 
to catch the attention of the Israeli reader and contribute to the marketing efforts of the 
accord to the Israeli public. The most important point here is the ‘recognition of Israel as 
the state of the Jewish people’ which appears on the cover but nowhere in the actual text of 
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the accord. This very specific point was the issue of a heated debate in Israel as will be 
explained in chapter 6.  
 
The last feature of the cover is the red stamp at the lower right-hand corner. It says ‘ חלשנ
 תיב לכללארשיב ’ (lit. ‘sent to every home in Israel’). The fact that this translation was sent to 
more than two million households in Israel shows the scale of the marketing campaign of 
the Geneva Accord and the intention of its drafters to influence the Israeli public. 
 
Figure 4.2 represents the layout of one Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative. 
This translation was published by the Palestinian Authority in four major Israeli 
newspapers ahead of the general Israeli elections in 2008. The publication of this Hebrew 
translation was designed to help promote the initiative in Israel and mobilize the Israeli 
public’s support. 
 
                       Figure 4.2: Layout of Hebrew Translation of the Arab Peace Initiative  
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The layout of this translation has three main features. Firstly, the translation is presented in 
a frame of flags of Arab and Islamic states. This frame reflects the support of the members 
of the League of Arab States (22 states) and the Organization of the Islamic conference (57 
states) to the main points of the initiative. Secondly, the logos of the two organizations at 
the bottom of the translation indicate official endorsement and support of these two 
organizations to this initiative. Thirdly, there is the two-line persuasive introduction added 
under the Israeli and Palestinian flags in Hebrew and in Arabic at the end of the translation 
(see section 4.4.2). 
 
The layout and cover of the two translations were designed to achieve a positive visual 
impact on the Israeli readers and to persuade them to support these initiatives. The cover of 
the Geneva Accord – particularly the inclusion of the accord’s main points – was designed 
to market the agreement to the Israeli public by highlighting its main proclaimed 
achievements. The layout of the Arab Peace Initiative also was meant to appeal to the 
Israeli public and win its support. 
 
4.3 Labels Given to Translations of Peace Initiatives 
The second important element in the recontextualization and framing processes is 
labelling. Labels given to language versions indicate the status of translation, the visibility 
of the translator and the translation practices within institutions. Issues of status of 
translation and (in)visibility of the translator have been the focus of research and debate in 
the discipline of Translation Studies for a long time (cf. Chapter Six). 
 
Language versions of peace initiatives were labelled differently, for example, as 
‘translation’, ‘unofficial translation’, ‘unofficial text’, ‘official text’, ‘full document’, ‘text 
of the document’, etc. whereas some others had no labels whatsoever. This section closely 
examines what labels were given to language versions of peace initiatives published by 
different institutions. Institutions are classified into international, governmental, non-
governmental and mass media. 
 
Table 4.1 Labels of translations published by International Organizations  
Translation publisher  Initiative                          Language                   Label  
The United Nations (UN) 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan          Arabic 
 
 
 
 
Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the 
Secretary   General addressed to the 
President of the Security 
Council…The text of the Roadmap. 
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The label ‘translation’ (as in both ‘translation and unofficial translation’) was used seven 
times in language versions of peace initiatives. The label ‘unofficial translation’ was used 
with translations published by governmental institutions, e.g. the Knesset, and mass media, 
e.g. Al-Ayyam and CNN. 
 
Table 4.2 Labels of translations published by Governmental Institutions  
Translation publisher  Initiative                          Language                            Label  
Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA) 
 
The Knesset 
 
The League of Arab 
States (LAS) 
 
Palestinian Authority 
(PA) 
 
The US Department of 
State (USDS) 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan           Arabic 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan           Hebrew    
      
The Arab Peace                English 
Initiative 
 
The Arab Peace                Hebrew  
Initiative 
 
The Roadmap Plan            Arabic 
 
 
 
Text of the Roadmap  
 
 
The Roadmap, unofficial translation 
 
Official translation 
 
 
The Arab Peace Initiative 
 
 
The full official Arabic text of the 
Roadmap 
 
 
 
 
The label ‘official text’ was used twice in cases of the Roadmap Plan published by the US 
Department of State and the Al-Quds newspaper. Some mass media and governmental 
institutions treated this translation as the ‘official translation’ of the plan into Arabic. For 
example, the Palestinian Authority reprinted and distributed it to the Palestinian people in 
order to engage them in the plan. The Roadmap is the only initiative accepted officially by 
the Israeli and Palestinian governments. Both the Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace 
Initiative have ten translations, which make them the most translated initiatives. The label 
‘unofficial text’, on the other hand, was used only once (with the label ‘unofficial 
translation’) in the case of the Roadmap Plan published by CNN.  
 
Different labels were also used to describe language versions of peace initiatives published 
by non-governmental organizations (see table 4.3 below). The most interesting translations 
here are those published by the Israeli organization Peace Now. What is interesting about 
these two specific cases is the visibility of the translators: Ilai Alon (of the Arab Peace 
Initiative) and Hagit Ofran (of the Roadmap Plan). These are the only two cases (out of 31) 
where the name of the translator appears in the text of the translation itself. Translators of 
peace initiatives in the corpus are largely unknown and anonymous. Out of 31 language 
versions, four translators are known: the two mentioned above plus two politicians, 
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namely, Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh (the two drafters of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles). The names of these two translators do not appear in the 
translations. They were known only by personal communications.  
 
Table 4.3 Labels of translations published by Non-Governmental Organizations 
Translation publisher  Initiative Language                   Label given  
Council for Peace and  
Security (CPS) 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative  
 
English 
 
 
The peace initiative-translation from 
Arabic 
 
Gush-Shalom 
Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of 
Principles for Peace 
Agreement  
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of 
Principles for Peace 
Agreement 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
English 
 
 
 
Declaration of Principles of Peace 
Agreement 
 
 
 
Declaration of Principles of Peace 
Agreement 
 
 
 
The National Consensus 
(NC) 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
Declarations of Principles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon- Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
 
Declarations of Principles 
 
 
 
The People’s campaign 
For Peace and Democracy 
(PCPD) 
 
 
The Ayalon- Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
The text 
 
 
 
 
Peace Now 
 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
Document of the Arab Peace 
initiative-  
a translation from Arabic by Ilai Alon 
 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
 
Hebrew       
 
 
The Roadmap, translation from 
English by Hagit Ofran 
 
 
Yes to an Agreement 
(YA) 
 
 
The Geneva Accord 
 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
 
The full agreement 
 
 
 
 
‘Official translation’, according to Sarcevic, is a translation, which is “prepared by a 
government or international organization on its own responsibility” (1997: 20). This 
definition needs to be modified in order to be applicable to the case of translations of peace 
initiatives. Thus, an ‘official translation’ is a translation prepared and approved by drafters 
of a peace initiative on their own responsibility. This definition applies to the English 
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translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by the League of Arab States, which is 
the only translation in the corpus labelled as ‘official translation’. In this case, the League 
of Arab States, which is the drafter of the initiative, is the one responsible for the quality of 
the translation and, consequently, responsible for any translation ‘mistakes’. However, the 
label ‘official’ is sometimes used not only by governmental institutions but by mass media 
and for different purposes than those to which Sarcevic refers. 
 
Table 4.4 Labels of translations published by Mass Media  
Translation publisher  Initiative Language        Label given  
 
Al-Ayyam newspaper 
 
 
The Geneva Accord 
          
 
Arabic 
 
 
The Geneva Accord-unofficial 
translation.  
 
Al-eman Online Network 
(Al-eman) 
 
 
The Ayalon- Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
Dangerous Israeli-Palestinian 
document…Text of the document 
according to a translation. 
 
Almtym Online Network 
(Almtym) 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
This is an Arabic translation of the 
first phase of the suggested Roadmap 
plan. 
 
Al-Quds newspaper 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
 
 
 
Arabic  
 
 
 
 
 
As published by Ha’aretz 
newspaper…Text of document of 
principles reached by Nusseibeh and 
Ayalon. 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Arabic  The official text of the Roadmap. 
 
Baheth Center 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
document…text of the document. 
 
CNN 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative   English 
 
Arabic Arab Peace Initiative, a translation 
 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Arabic       
 
 
Unofficial text of the Roadmap, 
unofficial translation. 
 
 
 
 
Ha’aretz newspaper 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
Document of Nusseibeh-Ayalon. 
 
 
 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
The peace initiative that was accepted 
at the Arab summit. 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Hebrew       
 
Document of the Roadmap.  
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Haayal Hakore 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
The Saudi initiative for peace, 
unofficial translation. 
 
God Bless Israel (GBI) 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
The Arab Peace Initiative 
 
 
Reuters 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
English 
 
 
Saudi-initiated Peace Plan Document 
 
 
    
Yediot Aharonot 
newspaper 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
Hebrew 
 
Document: from the Saudi initiative 
to the Arab initiative. 
 
 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
The Roadmap, the full document. 
 
 
In conclusion, labels such as ‘official translation’ and ‘unofficial translation’ are more 
commonly used by governmental institutions (e.g. the Knesset and the League of Arab 
States) and rarely used by mass media (e.g. newspapers). In the mass media, labels such as 
‘text of the document’ or ‘the document’ are more commonly used. Translations of peace 
initiatives in the mass media are not necessarily labelled. In the majority of cases they are 
referred to by the name of the initiative (e.g. The Arab Peace Initiative). 
 
4.4 Introductions of Translations of Peace Initiatives 
Introductions as one type of paratexts are of significant importance. They contribute 
largely to the framing and contextualization processes of texts. These textual materials play 
a significant role in the reading process of a given text and, consequently, in the reactions 
to it, i.e. for or against. In the case of politically negotiated texts, such as peace initiatives, 
introductions become interesting material to study and examine.  
 
An ‘introduction’ is defined as any kind of information which is not part of the original 
source text and which is either part of the recontextualization and framing processes or 
presented as an integral part of translations. These introductions, based on their content and 
the context in which they are produced, can have informative, evaluative or persuasive 
functions.  
 
An informative introduction provides specific information about a particular text. This 
information can be about the time of original text production, authors or the overall 
political aim of a text. A persuasive introduction, as the name suggests, is devised in order 
to influence the readers’ opinion and to persuade them to respond to a particular text in a 
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particular way. In the case of peace initiatives, such introductions aim to urge readers to 
take an action, namely, either to support or oppose a particular peace initiative. An 
evaluative introduction usually has a value-judgment statement(s) which places a particular 
text in either a positive or a negative frame. 
 
Comparing translations of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives to their source texts revealed 
that 19 of these translations had introductions added to them (see tables below). These 
translations were published by international organizations (table 4.5), governmental 
institutions (table 4.6), non-governmental organizations (table 4.7) and mass media (table 
4.8). The majority of the introductions are part of recontextualization and framing 
processes. 
 
Table 4.5 Introductions of Translations published by International Organizations  
Translation publisher  Initiative                        Language 
Introductio
n 
Type of introduction 
The United Nations (UN) The Roadmap Plan         Arabic   Yes Informative  
 
 
Table 4.6 Introductions of Translations published Published by Governmental Institutions  
Translation publisher  Initiative Language 
Introductio
n 
Type of introduction 
Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA) 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
     
 
Arabic  
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Informative  
 
 
The Knesset 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Hebrew 
 
No 
 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
The League of Arab 
States (LAS) 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
English 
 
No 
 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
The Palestinian Authority 
(PA) 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
Hebrew 
 
Yes    
 
 
 
Persuasive 
 
 
The US Department of 
State (USDS) 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Arabic                   
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Informative 
 
 
 
Introductions of translations published by international organizations and governmental 
institutions have mainly informative functions, with the exception of the one published by 
the Palestinian Authority. These informative introductions appeared in some translations of 
the Road Map Plan and only in Arabic. The persuasive introduction of the translation 
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published by the Palestinian Authority corresponds to the overall translation purpose, i.e. 
to influence the Israeli public opinion (see 4.4.2 below). 
 
Table 4.7: Introductions of of Translations  Published by Non-Governmental Institutions  
Translation publisher  Initiative Language 
Introductio
n 
     Type of 
introduction 
Council for Peace and 
Security 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
English Yes 
 
 Persuasive  
 
Gush-Shalom 
Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Peace Proposal 
 
The Gush-Shalom 
Peace Proposal 
 
 
English 
 
Arabic  
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
Not  Applicable 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
 
The National Consensus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
 
 
Arabic 
 
 
 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
 
 
 
Peace Now 
 
 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Hebrew  
 
 
Hebrew 
 
Yes 
 
 
No 
 
 
Persuasive  
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
The People’s Campaign 
for Peace and Democracy 
 
 
The Ayalon-
Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
Principles 
Arabic 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
Persuasive  
 
 
 
Yes to Agreement The Geneva Accord Hebrew  Yes 
 
Persuasive  
 
 
Table 4.8 Introductions of translations published published by Mass Media  
Translation publisher  Initiative                         Language Introduction Type of Introduction 
Al-Ayyam newspaper 
 
The Geneva Accord 
 
Arabic 
 
No 
 
Not Applicable 
 
Al-eman Online Network 
(Al-eman) 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Evaluative 
 
 
 
Almtym Online Network 
(Almtym) 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
 
Arabic                   
 
 
No 
 
 
Not Applicable 
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Al-Quds newspaper 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Evaluative 
 
 
 
     
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Arabic                   
 
Yes 
 
Informative 
 
Baheth Center 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
principles 
 
Arabic 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Persuasive  
 
 
 
CNN 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative   
English 
 
Yes 
 
Informative 
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Arabic 
   
Yes 
 
Informative 
 
Ha’aretz newspaper 
 
 
 
The Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of 
principle 
 
Hebrew 
 
 
 
Yes 
 
 
 
Persuasive  
 
 
 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative  
Hebrew 
  
No 
 
Not Applicable  
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Hebrew 
 
No 
 
Not Applicable 
 
Haayal Hakore 
 
The Arab peace 
Initiative 
Hebrew 
 
Yes 
 
Persuasive 
 
 
God Bless Israel  
 
 
The Arab peace 
Initiative 
Hebrew 
 
No 
 
 
Not  Applicable 
 
 
Reuters  
 
 
The Arab peace 
Initiative 
 
English 
 
 
No 
 
 
Not Applicable 
 
 
Yediot Aharonot 
 
The Arab peace 
Initiative 
Hebrew 
 
Yes 
 
Evaluative  
 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
Hebrew 
 
Yes 
 
Informative 
 
 
Unlike introductions of translations published by international organizations and 
governmental institutions, those published by non-governmental organizations only have 
persuasive functions. In addition, introductions of translations with an evaluative function 
were only published by the mass media as in table (4.7). 
 
In the following sub-sections (4.4.1- 4.4.4), introductions are categorized according to the 
place where these introductions were published. This will provide the institutional context 
for these introductions as part of translations and the way they were framed and presented. 
 
4.4.1 Introductions of Translations Published by International Organizations 
The United Nations (UN) is the only international organization involved in the translation 
and publication of translations of peace initiatives. The UN translated the Roadmap Plan 
into Arabic and published it in its official website. Part of this translation was an 
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introduction in the form of a letter sent from the former Secretary General of the United 
Nations, Kofi Annan, to the president of the UN Security Council as in the following 
example: 
(ST)  ةخرؤم ةلاسر٧رايأ/ ويام٣٠٠٢ ةهجوم  نم   نيملأا   ماعلا   سلجم سيئر ىلإ نملأا  :  
فرشتأ نأب ليحأ مكيلإ هيط صن ةطيرخ قيرط قيقحتل ةيؤرلا ةلثمتملا يف دوجو ،نيتلود ليئارسإ ،نيطسلفو 
ناشيعت ابنج ىلإ بنج يف ملاس ،نمأو امك وه دكؤم يف سلجم رارق نملأا  ٧٢٣٧  (٣٠٠٣)رظنا قفرملا. دقو 
تدعأ اذه صنلا ةنجللا ةيعابرلا ةفلؤملا نم نيلثمم تايلاولل ةدحتملا داحتلااو ،ةيكيرملأا يبورولأا داحتلااو 
يسورلا مملأاو ،ةدحتملا مدقُو ىلإ ةموكح ليئارسإ ةينيطسلفلا ةطلسلاو يف٢٠ ناسين/ليربأ ٣٠٠٢ وجرأو انتمم 
اذه ضرع صنلا ىلع ءاضعأ سلجم نملأا. 
)عيقوت   ( يفوك أ. نانع 
  
Back 
translation: 
Letter dated 7 May 2003 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the 
Security Council: 
I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Roadmap to realize the 
vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security, as 
affirmed in Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002). The text has been prepared by the 
Quartet-consisting of representatives of the United States of America, the European 
Union, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations-and was presented to the 
Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority on 30 April 2003. I should be 
grateful if you would bring this text to the attention of the members of the Security 
Council. (Signed) Kofi A. Annan). 
 
This introduction is part of the recontextualization process and institutional context in 
which this translation was produced. This translation was made available for circulation 
purposes among members of the UN Security Council. It has both informative and 
persuasive functions. On the one hand, it provides basic information about the Roadmap 
Plan and on the other hand, it urges the members of the Security Council to take an action, 
that is, read it and then vote. The Roadmap Plan was endorsed in the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1515 (cf. Chapter 6.2.1). 
 
4.4.2 Introductions of Translations Published by Governmental Institutions 
Three governmental institutions – the US Department of State, the Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Palestinian Authority – published three translations of peace 
initiatives with introductions. The introductions of the translations published by the US 
Department of State and Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs are part of framing and 
contextualization processes. They present these translations in their institutional contexts. 
The introduction of the translation published by the Palestinian Authority was presented as 
an integral part of the translation. The first two introductions have informative functions 
whereas the third has a persuasive one. These three cases will be now discussed. 
 
(ST) طسولأا قرشلا ملاسل قيرطلا ةطيرخ ردصت ةيكريملأا ةيجراخلا ةرازو : 
 ،لماكلا يمسرلا صنلا30 ،ليربإ/ناسين 2003 
  ،نطنشاو30  ،ليربإ/ناسين2003-  موي ةيكريملأا ةيجراخلا ةرازو تردصأ30  ،ليربإ/ناسين2003 صنلا ،
 نيلوؤسملا ىلإ اهنم نيتخسن ميلست مت نأ دعب كلذو ،طسولأا قرشلا ملاسل قيرطلا ةطيرخل لماكلا يمسرلا
يرخ صن نلاعإ نمازتو .راهنلا نم قباس تقو يف نيينيطسلفلاو نييليئارسلاا تيبلا هردصأ نايب عم قيرطلا ةط
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 يتلا ،ةردابملا هذه حرط ةصرف زاهتنا ىلإ ينيطسلفلاو يليئارسلاا نيفرطلا هيف اعد شوب سيئرلا مساب ضيبلأا
 ذيفنت ىلإ لاوصو ،امهنيب تاضوافملا راسم ىلإ ةدوعلاو فنعلا لامعأ فقو لجأ نم ،ةيعابرلا ةعومجملا اهتدعأ
لع ةمئاقلا شوب سيئرلا ايؤر.نيطسلفو ليئارسا يتلود ساسأ ى  امك قيرطلا ةطيرخل لماكلا صنلا يلي ام يفو
.ةيكريملأا ةيجراخلا مساب يمسرلا قطانلا بتكم نع ردص 
 
Back 
translation: 
The US Department of State releases the Roadmap Plan for Peace in the Middle East 
The full official text, 30 April 2003 
Washington, 30 April 2003. The U.S. Department of State released on 30 April the full 
official text of the Roadmap for peace in the Middle East. Two copies of the plan were 
handed in to the Israeli and Palestinian officials earlier today. The release of the text of 
the Roadmap coincided with a statement by the White House in which President Bush 
called on both Israeli and Palestinian parties to take the chance of releasing this 
initiative, which was prepared by the Quartet in order to stop acts of violence and go 
back to negotiations. This to lead to achieving president Bush’s vision, which is, based 
on two states, Israel and Palestine. Moreover, the following is the full text of the 
Roadmap as it was released by the office of the spokesperson of the US Department of 
State. 
 
The above introduction was part of a press release of the Roadmap Plan by the US 
Department of State. It provided basic information about the plan’s date of release, drafters 
and main aims. This introduction is significant as it was more or less reproduced (with 
some reduction) by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as some media outlets, 
namely, CNN, Al-Quds and Yediot Aharonot newspapers, which all published Arabic 
translations of the plan. The Roadmap Plan is the only initiative in the corpus, which only 
has informative introductions added to its translations.  
 
The third introduction is part of a Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published 
by the Palestinian Authority (see figure 4.2) in its effort to promote the initiative in Israel. 
[Back 
translation] 
57 Arab and Islamic states will establish normal diplomatic relations with Israel in 
return of full peace agreement and end of occupation. 
 
This two-line Hebrew introduction comes under the sub-title ‘Beirut Declaration’ and the 
Palestinian and Israeli flags (see figure 4.2). It starts with the political benefits of peace for 
Israel, i.e. normal diplomatic relations with all Arab and Islamic states and finishes with 
what is required from Israel in return of this, i.e. end of occupation. On the other hand, the 
two-line Arabic paragraph which comes towards the end of the translation starts with what 
is required from Israel, i.e. end of occupation and finishes with the political benefits of 
peace, i.e. diplomatic relations. 
 (ST)  ملاسلل ةيبرعلا ةردابملا 
 راذا نانبل توريب يف رشع ةعبارلا ةيبرعلا ةمقلا اهترقا يتلا2002.  تاقلاع لباقم لماش ملاس و للاتحلاا ءاهنا
ليئارسا و يملاسلاا و يبرعلا نيملاعلا و نيينيطسلفلا نيب ةيعيبط و  ةيسامولبد 
Back 
translation: 
The Arab Peace Initiative 
As adopted by the Arab fourteenth summit in Beirut, Lebanon, in March 2002. End of 
occupation and comprehensive peace in return of normal and diplomatic relations 
between the Palestinians and the two Islamic and Arab worlds and Israel. 
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This textual organization of themes can be explained with regard to the intended audiences 
of this Hebrew translation. The information in Hebrew targets Jewish Israeli citizens 
whereas the information in Arabic targets the Palestinian Israeli citizens. 
 
4.4.3 Introductions of Translations Published by Non-Governmental Organizations 
Five non-governmental organizations – Gush-Shalom, People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy, Yes to an Agreement, Peace Now and Council for Peace and Security –
published five language versions of peace initiatives with introductions. These 
introductions were drafted for influencing readers’ opinions. In the following section, these 
introductions will be discussed in detail.  
 
The Gush-Shalom Organization published an English translation of its original Hebrew 
text peace proposal. Part of this translation is an introduction which was intended to 
influence the Israeli public opinion as in the following example: 
(ST) Now, more than at any other time, the struggle for peace must not stop. The following 
declaration of principles is a proposal for joint Israeli-Palestinian discussion. It should not 
be considered a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We went into details in order to express our 
conviction that all the issues at stake the components of the conflict can be resolved. Not by 
diktats, not by an overbearing master-and-servant attitude, but by negotiations between 
equals. The government and the army leadership are leading us into a hell of blood and fire. 
We call upon all peace-seekers in Israel to unite for the future of the two peoples of this 
country, Jewish Israelis and Palestinian Arabs. The country has given birth to us as twins. 
 
The People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy published an Arabic translation of the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and added an introduction to it. This 
introduction was written originally in Arabic by Dr. Sari Nusseibeh himself for the needs 
of the Palestinian readers. Delyani (2005) argues that this introduction provides necessary 
information for the Palestinian reader with regard to what he or she is going to sign on. 
However, this introduction reaches beyond a merely informative function to a declarative 
and persuasive one. One interesting thing about this introduction is that it was published by 
many websites both in English, e.g. ‘Foundation for Middle East Peace’ (www.fmep.org), 
‘Meretz USA for Israeli Civil Rights and Peace’ (www.meretzusa.org) and the ‘Palestinian 
Negotiations Affairs Department’ (www.nad-plo.org ) and in Hebrew, e.g. Ha’aretz 
newspaper, (www.haaretz.co.il) as part of the original English text of the initiative and was 
referred to as the ‘cover letter’ of the initiative (see  section 4.4.4 below). 
(ST)  . ةدحاو ضرأب قلعتي اميف امهنم لكل ةيخيراتلا قوقحلا يليئارسلإاو ينيطسلفلا نابعشلا كردي  دارأ ، لايجأ ذنمف
 لك يف ةلود ةماقإ ينيطسلفلا بعشلا دارأ امنيب ليئارسإ يضارأ يف ةيليئارسلإا ةلودلا ةماقإ يليئارسلإا بعشلا
.نيطسلف يضارأ خيرات ةيوست لوبق ىلع نابناجلا قفتاو نيتلود دوجو أدبم ىلع موقت ةي ابنج نيتيويحو نيتلقتسم
.بنج ىلإ .سانلا نم ةيبلغلأا ةبغر نع ريبعت وه اياونلا نلاعإ  مهنكمي ةردابملا هذه للاخ نم هناب نافرطلا نمؤي
. ةقطنملا خيرات يف ديدج لصفب ءدبلا مهنكمي مث نمو مهتداق ىلع ريثأتلا بعشلا خيرات يف ديدجلا لصفلا اذه فوس ني
. اهداصتقا ريوطتو شاعنا يف ةدعاسملاو ةقطنملا يف نملأا نامضل يلودلا عمتجملا ةوعد للاخ نم اضيا ققحتي 
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 ةمث نإف ، ةيوست اذكه ىلا لصوتلل علطتن ذإ اننكل ، ةلوبقملا ةيوستلل ماع راطإ نع ربعي امنإ نلاعلإا اذه نإ
عو ، ةيوستلا هذه قيقحت لجأ نم اهذاختإ بجي تاوطخ نيذلا نيينيطسلفلا ةيرحلا ىرسلأ ةيرحلا قيقحت اهسأر ىل
ةيضق نع مهتيضق لصف بجي لا اهلجأ نم اولضان نيذلا ينيطسلفلا بعشل. 
 
Back 
translation: 
The Palestinian people and the Jewish people each realize the other's historic rights with 
respect to one land. The Israeli people for generations wanted to establish the Israeli 
state in all the Land of Israel, while the Palestinian people wanted to establish a state in 
all lands of Palestine. The two sides agreed to accept a historic compromise based on the 
principle of the existence of two sovereign and viable states side by side. The statement 
of intentions is an expression of the will of the majority of the people. Both sides believe 
that through this initiative they can influence their leaders and thereby open a new 
chapter in the region's history. This new chapter will also be achieved by calling on the 
international community to guarantee security in the region and to help in rehabilitating 
and developing the region's economy. This declaration represents the general framework 
for accepted settlement. However, as we are looking to reach such a settlement, there are 
steps, which should be taken in order to reach this settlement, most notably, achieving 
freedom to the Palestinian prisoners of freedom. Their cause must not be separated from 
the cause of the Palestinian people for whom they fought. 
 
In fact, this introduction touches on the very politically and ideologically sensitive issue of 
the claims of each side to the same land and represents an acknowledgment of the 
conflicting Palestinian and Israeli narratives of land as equal. This issue has always been 
the subject of heated debates between the Israeli and Palestinian sides (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). 
 
Moreover, this introduction acknowledges the importance of the issue of the Palestinian 
political prisoners in Israeli detentions centres and jails and emphasizes the need for their 
release if any settlement to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to succeed. The issue of 
Palestinian prisoners was and still is “a central theme in the Palestinian political 
struggle…The Palestinian public honoured the prisoners and their families, considering 
them heroes who were paying the day-to-day price of the Palestinian struggle for 
independence” (Sher 2006: 8). According to the Palestinian Prisoner Society, today there 
are around 7,000 Palestinian and Arab political prisoners in Israeli detentions centres and 
jails.  
 
The inclusion of this issue – which has always featured on the Palestinian public agenda – 
in Nusseibeh’s introduction is designed to appeal to the Palestinian people who complain 
that it was neglected in all agreements between Israel and the PLO, most notably, the Oslo 
agreements. 
 
The Yes to an Agreement published a Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord along with 
an introduction written by the renowned Israeli novelist and writer David Grossman. This 
introduction was part of a well-organized and planned campaign to promote the initiative 
in Israel. A booklet (including the 49-page Hebrew translation and Grossman’s 
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introduction) was sent to every household in Israel as part of this campaign. Grossman’s 
known distinctive style in writing, particularly his choice of words, metaphors and 
structures, are evident in his introduction. Therefore, the very choice of Grossman to write 
this introduction rather than anyone else is not a matter of coincidence but the outcome of a 
very well planned campaign. 
 
The two-page introduction has a very persuasive function. It aims first at catching the 
Israeli readers’ attention and then persuading them to support the initiative. In this context, 
Halevi and Oren (2003) make the point that: 
In his introduction to the Hebrew version, renowned novelist David Grossman assured Israeli 
citizens, ‘who have withstood innumerable wars and horrible terrorist attacks,’ that the Accords 
will produce a ‘thriving and …egalitarian’ Israel, freed ‘from the fear of war and annihilation’.   
In fact, the introduction appeals to the Israeli people by evoking their emotions regarding 
war and peace and promises a better future if they give their support to this initiative. This 
was criticized by Halevi and Oren (2003) who argued that: 
For Israelis, exhausted after three years of terrorism, Grossman’s words are seductive. Indeed, the 
Geneva Accords coincides with an historic transformation in Israeli public opinion. Most Israelis 
are now ready to forfeit the results of the 1967 war—control over the West Bank, Gaza and East 
Jerusalem—in return for Palestinian acceptance of the outcome of the 1948 war. Most Israelis also 
view the creation of a Palestinian state not as a mortal threat but as the only means of preserving 
Israel’s Jewish and democratic identity. 
On the macro-structural level, this introduction and the cover of the translation (see figure 
4.1 above) in addition to translation shifts on the micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5.3.2, 
5.5.1 and 5.4) are all part of the efforts to market this initiative to the Israeli people.  
 
The most interesting case of persuasive introductions is the one added by Professor Ilai 
Alon. Alon translated the Arab Peace Initiative from Arabic into Hebrew. This translation 
was published on the website of Peace Now. He added a persuasive introduction to this 
translation. In his introduction, Alon explains to the Israeli readers why the Arab Peace 
Initiative should be given a chance and be supported. This is done with the help of a 
number of points based on his analysis to the initiative as in the following: 
(ST) המדקה:
81
 
ץרמב 2002 הטילחה הגילה תיברעה ץמאל תא תמזי םולשה תידועסה תנשמ 1981 המסרפו 
תא ךמסמה ןלהלד.  
ומוגרת ירבעה לש ךמסמה, יפכ ץפוהש רובצב, יוקל, רשפאו םרתש תומלעתהל תילארשיה, 
השעמל, ןמ המזיה. 
הארנ יכ ובור לש רובצה וניא עדומ, וליפא, תועמשמל תיתימאה לש תמזי םולשה תיברעה. 
 ונונגס לש ךמסמה דמלמ לע יונש יתוהמ תסיפתב תונידמ הגילה תיברעה רשאב םולשל ןהיניב 
ןיבל לארשי: 
                                                          
81
 Hebrew spelling in this passage as well as other Hebrew passages presented in this thesis is the same as the 
one the original sources.  
  
114 
 
העצהה הנכ הדוסיב (םא יכ רפסמ תויואטבתה תודדוב תוריאשמ םוקמ הקידבל. 
העצהה הניא תניחב "הזכ האר לבקו!", אלא העיצמ עלבומב ומ"מ לע היביכרמ. הזמב"ת ומ"מ 
ליחתמ ירחא העגה םכסהל. 
האוושהב יכמסמל תודיעו הגספ תומדוק והז ךמסמה יבויחה רתויב תניחבמ לארשי זאמ 
םלועמו. 
ךמסמב הז תעלבומ, יתעדל, תועמשמה הגילהש תלטונ לע המצע תא גוציי םיניטסלפה ומב"מ, 
ףאו תא תייפכ םכסהה םהילע, םא היהי ךכב ךרוצ. 
תנידמ לארשי דימת החקל תא תורהצה םיברעה תוניצרב. המל אל םעפה, ךות תטיקנ יעצמא 
תוריהז؟ 
Back 
translation: 
Introduction: 
In March 2002, the League of Arab States decided to adopt the Saudi Peace Initiative of 
1981 and published it. 
The Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is faulty. This may 
have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it.  
It seems that most of the Israeli public is not aware of the true significance of the Arab 
Peace Initiative. 
The general tenor of the Document is evidence of a significant change in the attitude of 
the states of the Arab League with regard to peace between them and Israel: 
The proposals set forth in the Document are basically sincere (though there are a few 
remarks in it that leave room for further scrutiny).  
The proposal is not a “take it or leave it”. Rather it invites negotiation on its content. 
Note however that negotiations tend to begin after agreement has been reached. 
Compared with Documents issued earlier by the League, this one is, from Israel’s 
standpoint, the most positive of all.  
In my opinion, the document implies that the League will take upon itself to represent 
the Palestinians, and even impose an agreement upon them if that becomes necessary.  
Israel always took Arab declarations seriously. With due caution, why not this time? 
 
This introduction – which is meant to guide the reading process and consequent reactions 
to the initiative in a certain direction – is a clear example of intervention by the writer who 
is also the translator of the initiative. This kind of addition of information is common in 
political texts but not in translations. The Alon’s text is a mix of both. 
 
Finally, the Council for Peace and Security published on its website an English translation 
of the Arab Peace Initiative which had an introduction added to it. What is also interesting 
about this translation is that it was based on the Hebrew translation of Ilai Alon: 
(ST) The Arab League knocked on our Door and We pretended not to be at Home 
Ilai Alon - 21/11/2008  
In March 2002, the League of the Arab States adopted a Saudi Peace Initiative, originally 
drafted in 1981. The Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is 
faulty. This may have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it. It seems that most of 
the Israeli public is not aware of the true significance of this Arab Peace Initiative. The 
general tenor of the Document is evidence of a significant change in Arab attitudes towards 
peace with Israel: 
The proposals set forth in the Document are basically sincere (though there are a few 
remarks in it that leave room for further scrutiny). It is not a “take it or leave it” proposal. 
Rather it invites negotiation on its content. Note however that negotiations tend to begin 
after agreement has been reached! Compared with Documents issued earlier by the League, 
this one is, from Israel’s standpoint, the most positive of all. In my view, the Document 
implies that the League will take upon itself to represent the Palestinians, and even impose 
an agreement upon them if that becomes necessary. In the past Israel always took Arab 
declarations seriously. With due caution, why not this time? The Peace Initiative – 
Translation from Arabic. 
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Alon’s Hebrew translation was picked up by the Council of Peace and Security and then 
translated into English. The English translation follows the Hebrew source text except in 
some parts where it summarizes the main points of the translation Alon provided. 
Surprisingly, the name of the writer and translator, Ilai Alon, still appears on the English 
translation. 
 
4.4.4 Introductions of Translations Published by Mass Media 
Ten mass media outlets, three newspapers, Al-Quds, Ha’aretz and Yediot Aharonot, one 
news agency, CNN and three online networks, Baheth Center, Al-eman and Haayal 
Hakore, published ten translations of peace initiatives with introductions. In the following 
section, these introductions will be discussed in detail. 
 
The Haayal Hakore translation of the Arab Peace Initiative had the following introduction: 
(ST)  הגילה לש הגספב לבא ,םולש תומזוי לע ולא םימיב רבדל רזומ תצק  םימי ינפל תיברעה
היואר איהש םיבשוח )ונחנא קר אלו( ונחנאו ,הרהצה החסונ םירופס  ארוקה לייאה ,ןכ לע .ןוידל
 םוגרת םכינפל איבמאל-תילגנאב ימשרה ךמסמה לש ימשר, וניארוק ןיב ןוידל ותוא חתופו. 
 
Back 
translation: 
It is a little strange in these days to talk about peace initiatives. However, in the summit 
of the League of Arab States few days ago, there was a declaration, and we (and not only 
we) think that it is a vision for a settlement. Therefore, Haayal brings before you an 
unofficial translation of the official document in English and puts it to discussion among 
our readers. 
 
This introduction is obviously inviting the Israeli reader to take an action, i.e. to consider 
this initiative. The reason why it starts with saying ‘it is weird to talk nowadays about 
peace initiatives’ is due to the fact that the launch of the Arab Peace Initiative coincided 
with some Palestinian attack inside Israel which left many Israelis dead.  
The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published one Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles: 
(ST)  התויוכזב דחא לכ םיריכמ ידוהיה םעהו יניתשלפה םעה המדא התואל סחיב ותלוז לש תוירוטסיה. 
 םעהש דועב ,לארשי ץרא יקלח לכב תידוהיה הנידמה תא םיקהל ידוהיה םעה שקיב תורוד ךשמב
 הרשפל תאזב םימיכסמ םידדצה ינש .ןיתשלפ יקלח לכב הנידמ םיקהל אוה ףא שקיב יניתשלפה
 .וז דצל וז ומייקתיש ,אמייק תונבו תוינוביר תונידמ יתש לש ןורקיעה לע ססבתתש ,תירוטסיה
ווכה תרהצה וז המזויש םינימאמ םידדצה ינש .םעה בור לש ןוצרל יוטיב איה הזב תאבומה תונ
 הז שדח קרפ .רוזאה תודלותב שדח קרפ חותפל ךכ ידי לעו ,םהיגיהנמ לע עיפשהל םהל רשפאת
 החותיפו המוקישב עייסלו רוזאה ןוחטיבל בורעל תימואלניבה הליהקל האירקב םג שומימ ידיל אובי
רוזאה תלכלכ לש. 
 
The comparison between the original Arabic introduction and the Ha’aretz Hebrew 
translation reveals some changes. To begin with, the paragraph on the Palestinian political 
prisoners was not translated at all into Hebrew. This major omission was accompanied by 
other textual amendments (cf. Chapter 5.8.1).  
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 sduQ-lA yb pu dekcip neht saw noitcudortni eht fo noitalsnart werbeH ztera’aH ehT
 cibarA otni ti detalsnart yeht dna krowten enilno name-lA dna retneC htehaB ,repapswen
 esehT .)woleb snoitcudortnI evitaulavE ees name-lA dna sduQ-lA fo snoitcudortni eht rof(
 hcus ,noitalsnart ztera’aH eht ni deniatnoc segnahc citnames eht tpek snoitalsnart cibarA
 eht no hpargarap eht fo noissimo eht sa llew sa ,’hsiweJ‘ otni ’ilearsI‘ morf tfihs eht sa
 .srenosirp lacitilop nainitselaP
يعترف الشعب الفلسطيني والشعب اليهودي كل واحد للآخر بالحقوق التاريخية في ذات الأرض. فعلى مدى الأجيال   )TS(
سعى الشعب اليهودي إقامة الدولة اليهودية في كل أرجاء أرض "إسرائيل"، فيما سعى الشعب الفلسطيني هو الآخر على 
بهذا، يتفق الطرفان على حل وسط تاريخي يقوم على مبدأ دولتين ذات سيادتين قابلتين  إقامة دولة في كل أرجاء فلسطين.
يؤمنان بأن هذه   للعيش تعيشان جنباً إلى جنب، وإعلان النوايا التالي هو تعبير عن إرادة أغلبية الشعبين. فالطرفان
ريخ المنطقة. كما يتحقق هذا الفصل بدعوة الأسرة المبادرة ستتيح لهما التأثير على قياداتهم، وبالتالي فتح فصل جديد في تا
 الدولية إلى ضمان أمن المنطقة والمساعدة في ترميم وتطوير اقتصادها.
 
 yb ylevitagen evitaitini eht demarf )woleb 11.4 elpmaxe( sduQ-lA fo noitcudortni ehT
 fo thgir nainitselaP eht fo pu gnivig ,yleman ,snoissecnoc nainitselaP eht no gnisucof
 sihT .etats nainitselaP erutuf eht fo noitaziratilimed eht dna learsI ni semoh rieht ot nruter
 siht pu dekcip sduQ-lA .ztera’aH fo noitalsnart werbeH eht no desab saw noitalsnart
 nainitselaP eht fo ecitcarp dradnats a si hcihw cibarA otni ti detalsnart dna txet werbeH
 .)4.2.6 retpahC .fc( srepapswen
التي قالت ان الدكتور سري نسيبة مسؤول ملف  ايالون-نشرت صحيفة هارتس الاسرائيلية امس ما اسمته وثيقة نسيبة  )TS(
القدس و عامي ايالون رئيس المخابرات العامة الاسرائيلية السابق قد اعداها. و تتضمن هذه الوثيقة مبادىء رئيسية لاتفاق 
عن حق سلام دائم بين الجانبين الفلسطيني و الاسرائيلي تضمن اقامة دولة فلسطينية منزوعة السلاح و تنازل فلسطيني 
 .العودة. و فيما يلي النص كما نشرته الصحيفة
 
 krowten enilno name-lA eht yb dehsilbup noitcudortni eht si ereh esac gnitseretni tsom ehT
 noitaralceD hebiessuN-nolayA eht fo noitalsnart cibarA sti fo trap sa )woleb 21.4 elpmaxe(
 htiw strats gnimarf evitagen sihT .ylevitagen demarf osla saw evitaitini sihT .selpicnirP fo
 rof nruter on ,tnemucod nainitselaP-ilearsI suoregnaD“ :elcitra eht fo enildaeh eht
 ni snoissecnoc nainitselaP eht fo sliated htiw seunitnoc ti ,noitidda nI .”seegufer nainitselaP
 eht fo noitnetta eht hctac ot dengised si ’tnemucod suoregnad‘ lebal ehT .evitaitini siht
 .yaw niatrec a ni evitaitini eht fo ssecorp gnidaer eht sediug dna redaer
 "(عودة لللاجئين الفلسطينيين وثيقة إسرائيلية فلسطينية خطيرة (لا" )TS(
البروفيسور سري  الوثيقة التي توصل اليها مسؤول ملف القدس في منظمة التحرير الفلسطينيةلـ عن نص  كشفت مصادر
الشاباك"، عامي ايالون، الى جانب مجموعة من " نسيبة، مع الرئيس السابق لجهاز المخابرات الاسرائيلية العامة
  .لحل الدائم بين اسرائيل والفلسطينيينوالتي هي بمثابة اعلان نوايا حول شكل ا .الشخصيات الفلسطينية والاسرائيلية
انها لا تدخل في تفاصيل  وتتضمن الوثيقة خطوط عريضة لاصعب القضايا وهي القدس واللاجئين والمستوطنات، إلا
ويتضح ان من ابرز الشخصيات الفلسطينية التي   .قاطع دقيقة، الامر الذي يجعل بعض القضايا الساخنة عالقة ودون حل
آخرها في السادس من آب/ اغسطس الماضي في مدينة اسطنبول التركية، ممثل منظمة  قاءات، والتي كانشاركت في الل
الشعبية لتحرير فلسطين في  المقبل في واشنطن، حنا سنيورة، ورياض المالكي الذي كان في الماضي قائد الجبهة التحرير
المشاركين انهم من كبار قادة الجيش واجهزة المخابرات  غالبية أما عن الجانب الاسرائيلي فإن ما يميز .الضفة الغربية
ويدعو  ايالون، السابق ذكره، والذي ينشط بكثافة ضمن اطر اليسار وحركات السلام الاسرائيلية، السابقين، وعلى راسهم
من كبار قادة والى جانبه دافيد كمحي  ،7651جهارة الى اقامة دولة فلسطينية على اساس حدود الرابع من حزيران/ يونيو 
واللواء احتياط شلومو غازيت من كان رئيس جهاز المخابرات العسكرية،  جهاز المخابرات الخارجية الموساد سابقا،
ومنها عدم عودة اي  وفي قراءة للوثيقة يبرز فيها عدة امور،  .وهو ايضا من قادة الموساد السابقين ورؤوفين مرحاف
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ا( ليئارسا ىلا اقلاطا ينيطسلف ئجلا ـلا يضار48مهتدوع لباقم )  يف هنا نيح يف اذه ،ةينيطسلفلا ةلودلا قاطن ىلا
 وحن لبق ترج يتلا اباط تاثداحم21  ةدوع نع ثيدحلا يرجي ناك ةينيطسلفلا ةطلسلاو كاراب دوهيا ةموكح نيب ارهش
 نيب ام70  ىلا فلا130  ـلا يضارا ىلا ينيطسلف ئجلا فلا48. وه رظنلل تفلملا نم كلذك  هلك ملاعلا دوهيب فارتعا
ةينويهصلا ةكرحلا هيلا رصت ام اذهو ،ةنايد سيلو بعشك  نا نيح يف ،ليئارسا ىلا ةيدوهيلا ةرجهلا تاجوم ريربتل
نم نومورحم نيينيطسلفلا مهنط ىلا ةدوعلا.  دنب يف تانطوتسم ةملك سيلو "نينطوتسم" ةملك لامعتسا كانه كلذك 
قبي نل هنا ءاج ذإ ،ناطيتسلااءلاخا ينعي لا اذهو ،ةينيطسلفلا ةلودلا يف نطوتسم يا ى  ىلع تميقا يتلا تانطوتسملا ةفاك
يضارلاا رثكا ىلع ترطيسو ةينيطسلفلا يضارلاا لضفا ةبوصخ.   ىنعمب ،يضارا لدابت نع نع ثيدحلا ىرج نيحو
تانطوتسملا يضارا لدب هنا  ضرا ىلع نوينيطسلفلا لصحيو ،ليئارسا اهمضتس يتلاةحاسم نع ثيدحلا مت ،ةيواستم 
تاذ وا نكسلل ةحلاص اهنا وا ةيعيبط دراوم اهيف يضارا نع ثيدحلا رجي ملو ةيواستم  دق يذلا رملاا ،ةيعارز ةبوصخ
يف ضيوعتلا" نوكي نأب حمسي ةلحاق ةياورحص يضارا! 
 
The introduction of the Yediot Aharonot newspaper in example (4.13) below, starts with 
the requirement of the initiative of Israeli withdrawal from all the ‘territories’, including 
Jerusalem. The evaluative element here is that the introduction draws the reader’s attention 
that in this initiative there is the ‘Right of Return’. The argument that the Arab Peace 
Initiative calls for the implementation of the right of return, which means the possible 
return of millions of Palestinians to Israel, is the very reason why the initiative was 
attacked and rejected in Israel. In fact, the omission of the adjective ‘to be agreed on’ in 
some of the Hebrew translations, e.g. Ha’aretz newspaper, would encourage such 
argument. 
(ST)   ללוכ ,םיחטשה לכמ לארשי תגיסנל תארוק ,ולא םימיב ךכ לכ תרבודמה ,תידועסה םולשה תמזוי
 ,תיברעה םולשה תמזויב לבא .םילשורי חרזמ התריבש תיניטסלפ הנידמ םיקהלו ןלוגה תמר
 שקומ סנכוה ,הילע תססובמה-  .הבישה תוכזynet ל רזוח-2332  ,םולשה תמזוי תא םכל איבמו
הנושלכו הבתככ. 
 
Finally, the introduction of CNN (e.g. example (4.3)) below provides some background 
information about the initiative: 
(ST) Arab Peace Initiative detailed 
BEIRUT, Lebanon (CNN) -- At the League of the Arab States summit Thursday, The 
League of Arab States Secretary-General Amr Moussa read the Arab Peace Initiative to 
reporters and said a committee will be formed to push the initiative forward. 
 
To summarize, 18 out of 31 different language versions had introductions added to them. 
These introductions, particularly persuasive and evaluative ones, are part of the framing 
and contextualization of peace initiatives. A number of points can be concluded from the 
review of these introductions. Firstly, the Roadmap Plan is the only peace initiative which 
had no persuasive introductions added to any of its language versions. This could be due to 
the fact that it is the only officially accepted initiative and that it targets governments rather 
than people at grassroots level, such as in the case of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles. Secondly, evaluative introductions were added by the mass media (e.g. 
newspaper and online networks). This shows the role of the media in framing and 
recontextualizing peace proposals in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict. Thirdly, 
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no governmental institutions added any persuasive or evaluative introductions. These 
institutions (e.g. the UN, US Department of State, Israel MOFA) only added informative 
introductions. Fourthly, introductions cannot be only persuasive or informative. Persuasive 
introductions do have an informative function but the main function is persuasive.  
 
4.5 Completeness of Texts  
This section examines completeness of texts to establish whether there are major omissions 
or additions in the different language versions of peace initiatives. To begin with, a simple 
word count
82
 will be provided for each peace initiative and its translations. The word 
counts will then be compared to establish which language versions have major omissions 
or additions of information. 
 
4.5.1 The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement 
The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement has two Arabic and two 
English versions. The first and second English versions are available whereas only the 
second Arabic version is available. Table 4.1 shows the word count for the Hebrew source 
text and the second English and Arabic texts. 
 
Table 4.9 Word Count for Arabic and English translations  of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for 
Peace Agreement 
 
Source text (Hebrew)  Arabic version (2
nd
)  English version (2
nd
) 
1,067 1,446                     1,867 
 
The table shows that there are no major additions or omissions in these texts. The Hebrew 
source text has an introduction added to it, which is not the case for the Arabic and English 
language versions. 
 
4.5.2 The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
The table (4.2) below shows that the Arabic translation of the National Consensus is 
significantly different from the other Arabic translations. Close examination of these 
language versions and comparing them to the English source text showed that the 
difference in word count is because Sari Nusseibeh added an introduction (in Arabic) to the 
                                                          
82
 Word count here includes introductions added to language versions. 
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People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) for the needs of the Palestinian 
readers (see below).   
 
Table 4.10 Word count for Arabic translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
Source text (English)  
 
People’s Campaign for  
Peace and Democracy                         
(PCPD) 
 
 
National 
Consensus  
(NC) 
 
 
Baheth        Al-eman      Al-Quds  
Center 
  
348 431 278               348              393              394  
 
Table 4.11 Word Count for Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
Source text (English)  National Consensus (NC)  Ha’aretz   
348 431                     356 
 
There is a difference in the word count between the two Hebrew versions above. This 
difference indicates that something was either added or deleted in translation. A closer 
examination of the two language versions revealed that the translation of the Ha’aretz 
newspaper had major addition of information. This is because Ha’aretz picked up the 
Arabic introduction added by Nusseibeh and treated it as part of the original document and 
translated it with the initiative into Hebrew. This Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz 
(including the introduction) was then translated into Arabic and published in all other 
Arabic translation, except the one published by the National Consensus. 
 
4.5.3 The Arab Peace Initiative 
The two language versions of the Council for Peace and Security and CNN, particularly 
the latter, compared to the other two language versions, show major omission of 
information. A close examination revealed that, in fact, the first three paragraphs in CNN 
translation were deleted. This translation looks like a summary of the initiative. In addition, 
the translation by the Council for Peace and Security has some omissions but the 
translation mentions that in certain parts it is a summary.  
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Table 4.12 Word count for English translations of the Arab Peace Initiative 
Source text (Arabic)  
 
 
The League of  
Arab States (LAS)     
 
CNN 
   
 
Reuters           Council for Peace  
                        and Security 
  
398 509 250                512                 335                   
 
 
Table 4.13 Word count for Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative 
Source text (Arabic)  
 
 
 
Haayal Hakore    God      
                              Bless  
                              Israel   
                              (GBI)  
Ha’aretz 
      
   
 
Yediot            Palestinian   Peace  Now 
 Aharonot     Authority   
                      (PA) 
                         
398 359                      363 269            365               353                412                          
 
Table (4.5) shows that the translations of the Ha’aretz newspaper and Peace Now are 
significantly different from other Hebrew language versions. Close examination and 
comparison of these language versions to the original Arabic source text revealed that the 
translation of the Ha’aretz had major omissions whereas the translation of Peace Now 
contained some additions of information.   
 
4.5.4 The Geneva Accord 
Examination of the word count of the different language versions of the Geneva Accord 
showed that there are no major additions or omissions of information. Table 4.14 shows 
the word count for the English, Arabic and Hebrew language versions of this initiative. 
 
Table 4.14 Word Count for Arabic and English translations of Geneva Accord 
Source text (English) 
   
 
 
Palestinian Peace Coalition  
(PPC)  
 
 
 
Yes to an Agreement (YA) 
 
9,887 8,591                     7,246 
 
 
4.5.5 The Roadmap Plan 
Table 4.7 shows that the Almtym Online Network translation has the smallest word count 
of all Arabic language versions. Close examination of this specific translation showed that 
the first four paragraphs were deleted. These paragraphs outline the main aims of the plan: 
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the need for a new Palestinian leadership to emerge, putting an end to “violence and 
terrorism”, the need for each party to perform its obligations, and the role of the Quartet. 
 
Table 4.15 Word count for Arabic translations of the Roadmap Plan  
Source text (English) 
 
 
US Department    United         
of State (USDS)    Nations     
                               (UN) 
CNN   Almtym Al-
Quds   
 
 
Israel  Ministry 
of Foreign  
Affairs (IMFA) 
2,223 2,044                    2,216                        1,927    2,101      1,714 2,167 
 
This translation was based on an English source text published by the United Nations. The 
English text states that ‘this is the first phase of the Roadmap’. The translation published 
by CNN had one paragraph, regarding humanitarian situation and prospects for economic 
development in the West Bank, deleted. 
 
Table 4.16 Word Count for Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan 
Source text (English)  The Knesset       Ha’aretz    Yediot Aharonot         Peace Now 
2,223 1,843                   1,774    1,695                            1,771 
 
Examination of Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan showed that the Ha’aretz 
translation deleted one paragraph, which discusses the draft constitution for the Palestinian 
state. The Arabic language versions include five cases of information change: four 
additions in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and one omission in the 
Almtym translation of the Roadmap Plan. The addition of information concerns the 
inclusion of an introduction, which was authored by Sari Nusseibeh. These four cases can 
be considered as ‘addition of information’ if it is assumed that these translations were 
based on the English source text, which does not have an introduction. However, if it is 
assumed that these four texts were based on the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz, which 
added the introduction and treated it as part of the original text, then these cases would 
cease to be considered as examples of ‘addition of information’. These would, therefore, be 
better referred to as part of a ‘recontextualization’ process. This case shows the complexity 
of the study and translation of peace initiatives and, more generally, political texts. 
 
The only case of omission of information is with regard to the Almtym translation of the 
Roadmap Plan. Comparing this Arabic translation to the English source text revealed that 
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this translation had major omissions. However, this translation was based on another 
English text of the Roadmap Plan published by the United Nations. In this English text, the 
first four paragraphs are deleted and the same happened in the Arabic translation. In light 
of such information, would this case still be considered as ‘omission of information’? This 
example shows that it is not always the case that a target text is based on an original source 
text.  
 
The English language versions of peace initiatives also included two cases of information 
change: one addition and one omission of information, both in the Arab Peace Initiative. 
Whereas the addition of information was done by the Council for Peace and Security, the 
omission of information occurred in the text written/translated by CNN.  
 
The Hebrew language versions of peace initiatives contained four cases of information 
change: two additions and two omissions which appeared in the Israeli newspaper Ha´aretz 
and in Peace Now. The former added major information to the translation of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and omitted major information in the translations of 
the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. The latter, Peace Now, added information 
in the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative. 
 
In conclusion, major information change (additions and omissions) occurred in the Arabic 
and Hebrew language versions more than in the English language versions. In addition, 
omissions of information in all three languages were produced by the mass media (CNN, 
Ha’aretz and Almtym Online Network). 
 
4.6 Headings and Sub-Headings 
Peace initiatives range from one page (e.g. the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles) to forty-nine pages (e.g. the Geneva Accord). These initiatives tackle the final-
status issues of the conflict. Headings and sub-headings are more common in long texts 
than short ones. They are expected in long texts as they facilitate smooth reading and 
comprehension. The following section deals with headings and sub-headings of the 
language versions of peace initiatives. This section covers addition, omission, changes of 
headings and sub-headings besides re-arrangement of headings, sub-headings and 
paragraphs. 
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4.6.1 Addition and Omission of Headings/Sub-Headings 
With regard to the headings and sub-headings of the 31 different language versions of 
peace initiatives, additions appear in six sub-headings while omissions appear in one 
heading and one sub-heading.  
 
One addition appears in the Roadmap Plan, one in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles and seven in the Arab Peace Initiative. The Al-Quds Arabic translation of the 
Roadmap Plan added two sub-headings: firstly, ‘ينيطسلفلا باهرلاا و فنعلا ءاهنا’ (lit. ‘ending 
the Palestinian violence and terrorism’) and secondly, ‘  ةينيطسلف ةلودةايحلل ةلباق ةلقتسم ’ (lit. ‘an 
independent viable Palestinian state’). 
 
What might be interesting about the addition of the first sub-heading is that the Roadmap 
stipulates ending ‘terrorism’ (three occurrences) but does not explicitly mention 
“Palestinian terrorism”. The National Consensus Arabic and Hebrew translation of the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles had the sub-headings ‘  عزنحلاسلا ’ (lit. 
‘disarmament’) and ‘קשנמ זוריפ’ (lit. ‘demilitarization’) respectively added. These two 
translations were published on the Israeli website of the campaign which was designed to 
promote the initiative in Israel. However, the same sub-heading was not added in the same 
Arabic translation which was published on the People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy website.  
 
The two Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace Initiative, published by Peace Now and the 
Palestinian Authority, also had some sub-heading added to them. The translation of the 
Palestinian Authority added the sub-heading ‘Beirut declaration 3/2002’ whereas the 
translation of the Peace Now added the sub-headings of ‘introduction’, ‘clarifications’ and 
‘conclusion’. Also, the English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative, published by the 
Council for Peace and Security, added the sub-headings of ‘the initiative- translation form 
Arabic’, ‘comment and clarification’ and ‘to sum up’. 
 
One omission takes place in the heading and three omissions in the sub-heading of the 
Roadmap Plan translated into Arabic. Firstly, the translations published by CNN and 
Almtym Online Network omitted the main heading of the initiative: “A performance-based 
Roadmap to a permanent two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict”. Secondly, 
CNN’s translation omitted the two sub-headings “civil Society” and “settlements”. Thirdly, 
the Al-Quds translation omitted the sub-heading “Civil society”. 
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4.6.2 Change of Headings/Sub-Headings 
Change in headings and sub-headings of texts took place across the entire corpus, except in 
the case of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. Two Hebrew 
translations of the Roadmap Plan published by the two Israeli newspapers, Yediot 
Aharonot and Ha’aretz, included some changes or reductions. The Yediot Aharonot 
changed the main heading “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” to “Leadership that acts against terror” and also 
reduced the following sub-headings: 
‘Phase I: Ending Terror and Violence, Normalizing Palestinian Life, and Building Palestinian 
Institutions -- Present to May 2003’ to ‘Phase I- present to May 2003’ (my translation). 
 
 ‘Permanent Status Agreement and End of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict- 2004-2005’ to ‘the third 
phase-till end of 2005’ (my translation). 
 
Furthermore, the Ha’aretz translation changed the main heading from “A performance-
Based roadmap to a permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict” into 
“the goal: final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict” (my 
translation).  
 
4.6.3 Rearrangement of Headings/Sub-Headings 
Rearrangement in the entire corpus of study only took place with regard to the Roadmap 
Plan and specifically with regard to re-arrangement of paragraphs. These rearrangements 
took place in the Arabic translation published by the Palestinian Al-Quds newspaper and 
the Hebrew translation published by the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper. The Roadmap Plan is 
a three-phase plan, which stipulates a set of steps required of each side in each phase. 
Moving from one phase to another depends heavily on the performance of each side and 
fulfilment of their obligations. Both translations took paragraphs from phase one and put 
them under phase two, thus changing the requirements and their sequence in the plan. 
Rearrangement of paragraphs here is of high political significance.  
 
In the English source text of the plan, and under the sub-heading of ‘Palestinian Institution-
Building’, there is one paragraph, out of nine paragraphs, about the re-opening of closed 
Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem. In the Arabic translation of Al-Quds, 
this paragraph was put under the heading of the ‘Second Phase’. Similarly, the sub-heading 
‘Humanitarian Response’ which includes three paragraphs and part of phase one, was put 
under the second phase. 
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Under this ‘Humanitarian Response’, Israel, according to the Roadmap Plan, is required to 
take measures to improve the humanitarian situation such as ‘lifting curfews’, and ‘easing 
restrictions on movement of persons and goods’ (Roadmap 2003). Moving from one phase 
to another, according to the Roadmap Plan, depends on the performance and fulfilling of 
obligations of each side. This means that unless the Palestinian Authority fulfils its 
obligations in the first phase, the humanitarian situation will remain the same, i.e. closures, 
curfews, deportations, etc. In the English source text of the plan, the following issues are 
part of phase one: 
Palestinian Institution-Building (e.g. GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other 
closed institutions in East Jerusalem). 
 
Humanitarian Response (e.g. Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation). 
Civil Society and Settlements (e.g. GOI dismantles settlement outposts and freeze all settlement 
activities).  
 
In the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz, these issues were introduced as part of phase two. 
 
4.7 Prefaces, Footnotes, and Translators’ Notes 
Prefaces, footnotes, and translators’ notes are common features in translations of literary 
texts. This is not the case in translations of political texts. Translations of political texts, 
unlike literary texts, are largely anonymous. Names of translators do not usually appear 
anywhere in the translation. 
 
Although highly uncommon and unexpected, the corpus examination provided one case of 
translator’s footnotes and one case of translators’ notes. The translators’ footnotes 
appeared in an early Arabic draft translation of the Geneva Accord. This translation – 
which is published on the Palestinian website of the initiative, i.e. the Palestinian Peace 
Coalition (PPC) – looks identical to the Arabic translation published in the Palestinian Al-
Ayyam newspaper with minor changes, most notably the omission of these footnotes. This 
translation has three footnotes. The first footnote concerns the terms al- aram al-Sharīf / 
the Temple Mount (al- aram), as in the following example:  
(ST)  ةظحلام نم نيمجرتملا: لضفي مادختسا ءامسلأا ةيبرعلا ةيربعلاو (اعم) يف صنلا يزيلجنلإا امل كلذل نم ةيمهأ 
ةيسايس نلأو دودحلا ةيفارغجلا دق فلتخت لايلق بسح ةيمستلا امبسحو ربتعي لك فرط هتقطنم نم هذه عقاوملا. 
 
Back 
translation: 
A note from the translators: it is preferable to use the Arabic and Hebrew names 
(together) in the English text because of its political importance and because the 
geographical borders might slightly differ according to names given and according to 
what each side considers as its area in these sites. 
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The second footnote concerns one of the gates of the Old City of Jerusalem, ‘نويهص باب’ 
(lit. ‘Gate of Zion’), as in the following example: 
[ST] لاؤس نم نيمجرتملا: له هذه يه ةيمستلا ؟ةيبرعلا  
Back 
translation: 
A question from the translators: is this the Arabic name? 
 
In addition, the third footnote concerns two Jewish cemeteries in Occupied East Jerusalem, 
‘  لبج ةربقمينولوك نامريجلا ةربقمو نويهص ’ (lit. ‘Cemetery of mountain of Zion and Cemetery of 
the German Colony’), as seen in the following example:  
[ST]  ريشأ يف ةرقفلا ةقباسلا ىلإ "ةربقم لبج نوتيزلا"، لهف ثدحتن انه نع سفن ةربقملا. صنلا ريغ حضاو 
Back 
translation: 
In the previous paragraph, it was referred to the cemetery of the Mount of Olives so are 
we talking here about the same cemetery. The text is unclear. 
 
These three footnotes concern questions and suggestions the team of translators
83
 had when 
translating this 49-page document. What is strange about the first footnote is that the 
translators are drawing the attention of politicians or perhaps revisers or editors to the use 
of the Arabic and Hebrew names of ‘al- aram al-Sharīf’ and ‘the Temple Mount’ together 
in the English text while the English text already mentions both at the same time. This 
shows that translation of such sensitive documents goes through many revisions before 
being approved. Moreover, in cases of long texts such as the Geneva Accord, usually a 
team of translators and revisers is involved in the translation and revision process. Thus, 
responsibility for translational choices cannot be solely the translator’s but rather, it is a 
‘collective responsibility’.  
 
With regard to the second footnote, in the Arabic translation published in Al-Ayyam, the 
Hebrew name of the gate ‘نويهص باب’ (Bāb Ṣahyūn, lit. ‘Gate of Zion’) was changed into 
the Arabic name ‘دواد يبنلا باب’ (Bāb al-Nabi Dāwūd lit. ‘Gate of the Prophet David’). These 
footnotes were directed towards revisers or politicians rather than the potential ordinary 
readers. They are not meant to provide some background information or explanation of a 
vague term or sentence but rather were meant as questions from the team of translators.  
 
The translators’ notes appear in the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative 
published on the website of the Israeli Peace Now and translated by Professor Ilai Alon. 
The translator’s notes take the form of persuasive explanations. The translator attempts to 
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 The three footnotes talk about ‘translators’ rather than ‘the translator’. Thus, it is assumed that more than 
one translator was involved in the translation of this document. 
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convince his readers to give support to the initiative. He starts with a persuasive 
introduction (see 4.4.2 above) and finishes his translation with a number of bullet points to 
convince his readers of his point of view. These notes are: 
(Hebrew 
translation) 
: תורהבה 
עצומ לארשיל עיגהל םויסל ךוסכסה, בצמל לש םולש, םיסחילו םיילאמרונ. אלה לע התפיאש 
ךכל הריהצה לארשי זאמ םלועמו؟ 
תפסוהב יוטיבה "םכסומ", תעצומ לארשיל תוכז וטו לע תונורתפ םניאש החורל תייעבל 
םיטילפה. 
תוסחייתהה םילשוריל כ"תיחרזמ" אלו "תיברע" וא "םילשורי" םתס (םשכ היהש םיכמסמב 
םימדוק), תזמור חתפל ומל"מ לע תקולח ריעה. 
לארשי "תשקבתמ" אלו "תשרדנ", יפכ היהש חסונה יתרוסמה לכב תויואטבתהה םיכמסמהו 
םייברעה רבעב 
לארשי תשקבתמ "ןייעל שדחמ התוינידמב" אלו "תונשל" התוא, יפכ היהש חסונה םיכמסמב 
םייברע םימדוק. 
ןיב םילוקישה םיעצומה – הרכה םתורצבנב לש םיעצמא םייאבצ רותפל תא היעבה, הגאדו 
ייחל םדא. 
ךמסמב הינפ הרישי םעל לארשיב ץמאל תא המזיה 
לארשי תשקבתמ "תוטנל םולשל", יוטיב ינארוק לעב תועמשמ תקיחרמ-תכל הנימאו. 
םוכס: ןונגס ךמסמה, םותחה ע"י לכ ישאר תונידמ ברע, ענכשמ תונכב תונווכ ויחסנמ, ונהו 
קומנ עייסמ תלבקל המזיה. 
 
[Translation 
of the 
Council for 
Peace and 
Security] 
Comment and Clarification  
Israel is being offered an opportunity to end the Arab-Israeli conflict and achieve a 
peace with normal neighbourly relations. Surely, this is what Israel has been striving 
for from the very beginning.  
Concerning a solution of the Refugee Problem the Document is careful to use the term 
“agreed”, thereby giving Israel the right to veto solutions she cannot accept.  
Referring to Jerusalem, in a departure from previous Arab statements, the Document 
uses the term “East Jerusalem” rather than ”Arab Jerusalem” or just “Jerusalem”. This 
hints upon willingness to negotiate a rational division of the city.  
The phrase “Israel is requested” rather than “Israel is required” is used throughout. 
This too is a major departure from previous wordings.  
The Document asks Israel to “review her policies”, and not “to change her policies” as 
it used to be phrased.  
The Document states that in the Arab view, military means will not solve the problem. 
It also expresses concern for the danger to human life.  
The Document appeals, not only to the Government of Israel but also to the People of 
Israel, asking them to adopt the Initiative.  
Israel is asked to “lean towards peace”. This is a Koranic expression of great 
significance.  
 
To sum up  
The style of the Document, signed by almost all the Heads of Arab States, is 
convincing in its sincerity and intent. This is a strong reason to accept the Initiative. 
 
The purpose for these notes is clearly not to provide the Israeli reader with some 
background information or explanation of a vague term or sentence but rather to be 
persuasive. These notes are a distinctive sign of the presence or visibility of the translator 
in the translation. In translations of political texts, the visibility of the translator is 
manifested in other ways. 
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4.8 Maps 
Maps have always played a major role in politics and conflicts. In the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict, they continue to play a major role in representing that conflict (Collins-Kreiner et 
al 2006: 381). Moreover, maps “have advanced each community’s claims through both 
form and content, including or excluding boundaries and emphasizing or ignoring place 
names and settlements with a politicized nomenclature” (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 381). 
In short, they are powerful tools of political propaganda and “the most explicitly spatial 
form” (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 383) of such propaganda at the disposal of politicians. 
 
Maps also reflect political positions and narratives. These positions and narratives can be 
derived from maps representing borders and frontiers. According to Collins-Kreiner et al 
(2006: 383), a number of techniques are used to reinforce such positions and narratives 
including “choice of map projection and scale, inclusion and omission of data, use of 
certain symbols and colours, and the message incorporated in the title and accompanying 
caption”. 
 
Maps are not common paratextual material in translations of peace initiatives. In the entire 
corpus of the study, only two maps were found, both in the Geneva Accord. One shows the 
land swap between Israel and the future Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip. The other shows the division of the old city of Jerusalem. These maps were 
published in the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper on 20 October 2003 as part of the English text 
of the initiative obtained exclusively by the newspaper. They were also published in the 
Palestinian Al-Ayyam newspaper as part of the Arabic translation of the initiative designed 
to promote the initiative for the Palestinian public. The two maps published for the Israeli 
public are different from those published for the Palestinian one.  
 
As part of the political campaign to market the agreement to the Israeli and Palestinian 
peoples, maps published in Hebrew serve a different purpose to those published in Arabic. 
Moreover, each one communicates a different message. These visual images have 
powerful ability in presenting and advancing agendas (Collins-Kreiner et al 2006: 381). In 
the following, the differences between these four maps and the political messages they 
communicate will be discussed and commented on. 
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Figure 4.3: Map of the Old City of Jerusalem as published by Ha’aretz newspaper 
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Figure 4.4: Map of the Old City of Jerusalem as published by Al-Ayyam newspaper 
In figure (4.4), the only place names that appear on the Palestinian map are ‘the Dome of 
the Rock’ and ‘Jerusalem the old City’. In figure (4.5), the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
appear empty of any Jewish settlements. It is worth noting here that the Geneva Accord 
does not specify which settlements will be annexed to Israel and which will be evacuated. 
This issue, together with other security issues were only published on 15 September 2009 
in the annexes of the agreement. By contrast, figure (4.6), shows in detail all Jewish 
settlements, including those which will be annexed to the territory of Israel and those 
which will be evacuated. In figure (4.3), it is noted, for instance, that all the names used of 
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the Old City’s gates are the Jewish ones. It also shows what is called ‘Greater Jerusalem’ 
under Israeli sovereignty and the Old City (which will be divided) as a small portion of this 
‘Greater Jerusalem’. 
 
Figure 4.5:  Map of land swap as published by Al-Ayyam newspaper 
 
 
 
In figure (4.4), the map displays the area that will come under Israeli sovereignty as only a 
small portion of the Old City of Jerusalem and at the same time the Old City as a large 
territory, which will come under the Palestinian sovereignty. By contrast, in figure (4.6), 
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the map shows the Old City as a small portion of the ‘Greater Jerusalem’ under Israeli 
sovereignty. This map shows that it is only the Old City that will be divided.  
 
Figure4.6:  Map of land swap as published by Ha’aretz newspaper 
 
 
In figure (4.6), the map confirms the political message in the summary of the Accord 
distributed to the Israeli public, namely, ‘Greater Jerusalem under our sovereignty’. In this 
sense, visual images play a decisive role in advancing political agenda and propaganda of 
the Israeli side of the initiative. 
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Table 4.17 Summary of Israeli and Palestinian Maps of the Old City of Jerusalem84  
Features  Palestinian Map                           Israeli Map 
Titles 
 
Jerusalem-the Old City 
 
  
The plan to divide the Old City  
according to Geneva Accord 
Language Arabic   Hebrew  
Place of Publication 
 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Al-Ayyam newspaper 
  
Israel, Ha’aretz newspaper 
 
Time of Publication 1 November 2003   20 October 2003 
Targeted Public Palestinian   Israeli 
Function of the map Informative and persuasive   
Informative and persuasive  
Territory under Israeli sovereignty 
Territory under Palestinian 
sovereignty 
Territory under Palestinian 
sovereignty with special 
arrangements for Israelis  
Gate under Israeli sovereignty 
Free access for Israelis to the 
Mount of Olives 
Gate under Palestinian sovereignty 
Road on which there will be Israeli 
policing  
Headquarters of the Multinational 
Force 
Gate under Palestinian sovereignty 
with joint policing 
Public territory 
 
 
Information in the Legend  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Territories under Palestinian 
sovereignty  
The Jewish quarter under Israeli 
sovereignty  
Road under Palestinian 
sovereignty with Israelis’ right to 
use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Place Names The Dome of the Rock    
 
 
 
Table 4.18 Summary of Israeli and Palestinian maps of land swap  
Features  Palestinian Map                          Israeli Map 
Titles 
 
No title  
 
 
Territories Swap according to  
the Geneva Accord 
Language Arabic  Hebrew 
Place of Publication 
 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Al-Ayyam newspaper 
 
Israel; Ha’aretz newspaper 
 
Time of Publication 1 November 2003  20 October 2003 
Targeted Public Palestinian   Israeli 
Function of the map Informative and persuasive   Informative and persuasive 
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 Tables (4.17) and (4.18) are based on the classifications in Collins-Kreiner et al (2006). 
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Information in the Legend  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The 1967 truce line International 
borders. 
Jordan’s River 
Lands from Israel came under the 
Palestinian sovereignty in the 
suggested swap 
Lands in the West Bank came under 
the Israeli sovereignty in the 
suggested swap 
No man’s land divided in the 
suggested swap 
 
 
The Green Line 
Territories transferred to  Israel 
Territories transferred to Palestinians 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Place Names 
 
 
 
 
Palestine 
Palestinian cities 
Israel 
 
 
 
Israeli cities 
Jerusalem 
Israeli settlements 
Palestinian cities and towns 
the Gaza Strip 
 
 
4.9 Conclusion  
This chapter has described the overall textual organization of the corpus on the macro-
structural level. The discussion showed that different language versions of peace initiatives 
are framed and contextualized for different purposes, especially influencing the reader’s 
opinion. This is most evident with regard to persuasive and evaluative introductions added 
to some of these language versions. Paratexts added, such as introductions, for example, 
are designed to govern the reading of the text and to leave a certain effect on the reader, 
namely, supporting or opposing the political solutions suggested by a particular peace 
initiative (cf. Chapter 3.3.3, page 94). Paratexts, thus, play a crucial role in the framing of 
peace initiatives and, consequently, reactions to them.  
 
This chapter also showed that translation is largely invisible in the different language 
versions of peace initiatives. This raises the question of whether these texts are translations 
based on original source texts or just recontextualized and reframed already existing texts. 
In many cases, translations produced in specific institutional contexts for specific readers 
and purposes are recontextualized for use in others. This is supported by the large 
similarities between these texts. The next chapter describes the textual profiles of the 
different language versions at the micro-structural level. 
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Chapter Five 
Textual Analysis 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter Four examined how the various components of textual organization of translation 
profiles of the different language versions of peace initiatives (the target texts), e.g. 
layouts, paratexts, chapter heading, etc., reflect ideological and political interests. Chapter 
Five – drawing on the premises that ideological and political positions as well as power 
relations largely determine the outcome of negotiations and consequently drafting of 
agreements and that ideology acts as a filtering mechanism during the translation process – 
aims to examine how aspects of ideology
85
, power relations and political affiliaiton are 
reflected at the micro-structural level. In other words, this chapter sets to establish how 
ideological factors inform translational choices as well as the interpretation of translated 
texts by readers. 
 
Although it is difficult to read ideology off texts based on the existence of certain linguistic 
features (e.g. ambiguous formulations, modality, choice of sensitive key political terms and 
toponyms, etc.), these features are likely to have ideological significance.  
 
The motivation for selecting data examples in this chapter is based on the following 
criteria. First, a detailed comparison between peace initiatives (the source texts) and their 
target texts was conducted. This was done by comparing different translations of the same 
source text, i.e. comparing several language versions of the same peace initiative into one 
target language and into different target languages. These comparisons revealed that some 
translation strategies such as addition and omission of information occur dominantly in the 
translations published by Palestinian and Israeli newspapers (cf. Sections 5.6 and 5.7 
below). The second criteria is identified key characteristic features of peace initiatives as 
the outcome of negotiations such as the use of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, 
use of naming practices, intertextuality, modality and use of politically sensitive terms (cf. 
Chapter 2.4). 
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 In this thesis,  features of texts are regarded as ideological “in so far they affect (sustain, undermine) power 
relations” (Fairclough 1995: 25). 
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The typology of translation strategies for the following discussion is the one proposed by 
Chesterman (1997) who attempts to arrive at a systematic classification of translation 
strategies. These strategies will be used to categorize shifts found in the language versions 
of peace initiatives in the corpus.  
 
Chesterman (1997: 96) classifies translation shifts into three main categories: syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic. Syntactic translation strategies are those which manipulate form. 
They are identified by comparing source and target texts and indicate a change in the 
grammatical form. ‘Literal translation’ strategy, one example of syntactic translation 
strategies, is found throughout the corpus where meaning is maximally close to the source 
language form, nevertheless grammatically correct according to the target language 
conventions.  
 
Semantic translation strategies – which manipulate meaning – change or modify the 
meaning of the text, sentence, clause or even a word. The list of semantic translation 
strategies by Chesterman (1997) does not include a label for those shifts where lexical 
items – which have different meaning from the source text’s possible meaning and belong 
to a different class and register – are opted for. For the purpose of this study, these shifts 
will be labelled as ‘meaning shifts’.  
 
Pragmatic translation strategies – which have to do with the selection of information in the 
target text – manipulate the message of the translation itself. ‘Explicitness change’ strategy 
refers to making information more explicit or implicit in the target text. This, for example, 
includes change in definiteness which occurred primarily in the Arabic and Hebrew 
language versions of the Roadmap Plan. ‘Information change’ strategy refers to either the 
addition or omission of source text information for reasons other than being perhaps 
(ir)relevant to the reader. Such addition and omission of information occur at both macro- 
(cf. Chapter 4) as well as micro-structural level (cf. Chapter 5). At the macro-structural 
level, ‘information change’ is related to the recontextualization of texts for different 
audiences and purposes.  
 
Finally, ‘cultural filtering’ refers to the adaptation of source culture specific terms to target 
culture norms and expectations. This translation strategy particularly applies to naming 
practices (e.g. protagonists of the conflict and holy places; cf. Section 5.3) but also to the 
  
137 
 
overall strategy employed in some texts to make it conform to the expectations of a 
particular readership. 
 
The discussion in this chapter focuses on the  mediation of a number of textual elements in 
the different language versions of peace initiatives. Key characteristic features of peace 
initiatives – e.g. instances of deliberately ambiguous or vague drafting, use of naming 
practices, intertextuality, modality and instances of politically sensitive terms – will be 
covered in sections (5.2-5.5) whereas cases of omissions and additions of information will 
be examined across corpus in sections (5.6-5.7). Occasionally, some examples are referred 
to more than once to discuss different points. For comprehensive discussion of examples 
under scrutiny, full historical and political contexts are explained. 
 
5.2 Creative Ambiguity 
Ambiguity – and more specifically, the “creative ambiguity” – has been traditionally 
regarded as a key element in diplomacy negotiations (e.g. Isaacson 1992, Pehar 2001) (cf. 
Chapter 2.4.2). The issue of “creative ambiguity” is prominent in the long history of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and its numerous documents, including the United Nations 
resolutions. The most significant case of using “creative ambiguity” in this context can be 
found in the drafting of UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)
86
 which in its English 
version called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 
recent conflict” without specifying how much territory was involved. This resolution is 
legally binding in its English as well as French version which called for “retrait des forces 
armées israéliennes des territoires occupés lors du récent conflit”. The use of the form 
‘des’ in the french version could be interpreted as either ‘all’ (de + les) or ‘some’ (des). 
Ambiguity – as is often the case in diplomacy – played a major role in the drafting of this 
resolution and consequently its later endorsement (Gorenberg 2006: 126). 
 
Since the passing of this resolution, Israel has always interpreted it – based on its English 
version – to mean that it should give up “some” but “not necessarily all” of the occupied 
territories (Gorenberg 2006: 126) – or only to the extent it “deemed not to detrimentally 
affect Israeli security” (Uzer 2009: 123) – a possibility afforded by the fact that the term 
‘territories’ is preceded by a ‘zero article’ signalling indefinite reference. The Arab states 
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 ‘UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967)’, adopted on 22 November 1967, United Nations Website: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/240/94/IMG/NR024094.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
  
138 
 
and the Palestinians opposed this interpretation and took the resolution – based on its 
French version – to mean “a full retreat to the prewar lines” (Gorenberg 2006: 126). The 
inclusion or exclusion of the definite article in different language versions of a single 
source text has been, in this case, of profound political significance to both sides: it has 
allowed both parties to defend the interpretation of the resolution which best suited their 
political agenda and, in doing so, demand territorial concessions. Missing definite articles 
have been points of suspicion in Middle East peace proposals ever since. 
 
This historical case of resorting to “creative ambiguity” in negotiated texts provided the 
motivation to examine this linguistic feature in more detail in the language versions of 
peace initiatives.  
 
Peace initiatives are not homogeneous. Some characteristic features such as ambiguity are 
found across corpus as these texts are the outcome of direct or indirect negotiations. 
However, detailed analysis of corpus revealed that the particular issue of (in)definiteness, 
i.e. change from the indefinite to definite form, was only significant in the case of the 
Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap Plan. This could perhaps be 
because the Roadmap is the only officially accepted plan to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict. 
 
Ambiguity and, in some cases, vagueness are central to the Roadmap Plan
87
 in terms of the 
proposed sequencing of negotiations and the actual drafting of stipulations on particularly 
sensitive matters. While other peace initiatives (e.g. the Geneva Accord) were conceived as 
permanent status agreements to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and resolve substantive 
issues (such as sovereignty over Jerusalem, an agreement on permanent borders, or the 
status of Palestinian refugees), the proponents of the Roadmap Plan deliberately steered 
clear from such thorny issues and postponed them to the final settlement negotiations. As 
Klein (2007:180-181) explains, the drafters of the plan: 
[s]aw no hope in bridging the huge gap between the two sides. The international effort was aimed 
at a staged process, which would focus on short-range goals, cognizant that the positions of the 
Sharon and Arafat governments were polar opposites. In this, the Road Map was a continuation of 
the report produced in 2001 by a commission headed by former senator George Mitchell, and 
another report prepared by then-CIA chief George Tenet. 
                                                          
87
 The Roadmap Plan was drafted in line with the long-term American Middle East ‘step-by-step’ – or small 
steps – diplomacy, originated and promoted by former American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 
Kissinger defined diplomacy as “a series of steps, merging into a continuum. Step-by-step diplomacy, 
therefore, progress through a series of interim agreements” (Otte 2001: 197). 
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The Palestinian Authority and Israel thus set out to – willingly or unwillingly – indirectly 
negotiate less controversial issues that they could agree on – including a range of security 
matters, the Palestinian humanitarian situation as well as Israel’s withdrawal from the re-
occupied territories and return to the borders of 28 September 2000 – while deferring the 
most sensitive trigger points for confrontation to the end of the process. 
 
In the following sections, the pervasiveness of ambiguity in the text of the Roadmap Plan 
will be discussed in relation to three issues that designate sensitive aspects of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict: Israeli withdrawal, Jewish settlement outposts and the re-
opening of closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem.  
 
5.2.1 Israeli Withdrawal 
Negotiations between Israel and the PLO during the early 1990s led to the drafting of the 
Oslo Accords in 1993 (cf. Chapter 1.1.2). The Oslo Accords divided the Occupied West 
Bank (excluding Occupied East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip into three types of areas: 
Areas ‘A’ (Palestinian-controlled), Areas ‘B’ (jointly Palestinian-Israeli-controlled) and 
Areas ‘C’ (Israeli-controlled) (Campbell 2002: 61).  
 
Areas ‘A’, consisting of all main Palestinian “urban centres” (excluding Occupied East 
Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip (excluding the Jewish settlements that existed at that time, 
mostly in the south of the Strip) were transferred to full Palestinian control (Newman 1997: 
5). The Palestinian Authority had full civil jurisdiction and internal security control over 
these areas which consists of nearly 17.2% of the Occupied West Bank (Fischbach 2005: 
298).  
 
Areas ‘B’ – which comprised almost 23.8% of the Occupied West Bank (Fischbach 2005: 
298) – were placed under full Palestinian civil jurisdiction but shared Palestinian-Israeli 
security control was in place in these areas. The many parts of Areas ‘A’ are separated 
from each other and surrounded by Areas ‘B’ and more significantly, Areas ‘C’ (Masri 
2002: 113).  
 
Areas ‘C’ – which cover nearly 60% of the territory and include all Jewish settlements in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (at that time) and their bypass roads in addition to 
military installations, meanwhile – were kept under full Israeli control (Newman 1997: 5). 
Israel has been expropriating Palestinian private lands in Areas ‘C’ – after declaring them 
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“State Land” in order to build new settlements and expand existing ones (Thorpe 2006: 
243-244). 
 
In the aftermath of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa – which broke out on 28 
September 2000 – the Israeli army reoccupied all of the Palestinian territories (Areas ‘A’ 
and ‘B)’ along with Areas ‘C’, which it already controlled. The Roadmap Plan requires 
Israel to withdraw from the reoccupied territories (mainly Areas ‘A’) and return to the lines 
of 28 September 2000. Nevertheless, this demand was expressed in ambiguous terms in the 
English source text and the subsequent range of possible interpretations are reflected in the 
different Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap, as shown in the set of 
translations below (throughout this chapter, underlining is used to identify the textual 
elements under scrutiny in each example): 
(5.1) As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from 
areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed 
prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The 
Roadmap Plan: 2]. 
 
[UN] 
Back 
translation: 
 نـم اـيجيردت ةيليئارـسلإا عاـفدلا تاوـق بحـسنتقطاـنملا  ذـنم اهـلتحت يتـلا28  ربمتبـس /لوـليأ2000.  
The Israel defense forces withdraw progressively from the territories, which they 
occupy since 28 September 2000.  
 
[IMFA] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًايجيردت يليئارسلإا عافدلا شيج بحسنيقطانم اهللاتحا مت لا ذنم28 ربمتبس لوليأ نم.2000 
The Israel defense army withdraws progressively from territories, which were 
occupied since 28 September 2000. 
 
[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًاجيردت باحسنلااب يليئارسلإا شيجلا موقيقطانملا ةلتحملا  ذنم28  ،ربمتبس/لوليأ2000. 
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the occupied territories since 28 
September 2000. 
 
[Almtym] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ةدرطضم ةروصب يليئارسلإا شيجلا بحسنيقطانملا  دعب ةلتحملا18  ماعلا لوليأ2000. 
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the territories occupied after 18 
September 2000. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًاجيردت يليئارسلإا شيجلا بحسنيقطانملا  ذنم اهلتحا يتلا28  لوليأ2000.  
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the territories it occupied since 28 
September 2000. 
 
[CNN] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 نم درطم باحسناب يليئارسلاا شيجلا موقيقطانملا   دعب   ةلتحملا28    ماع لوليا ربمتبس2000.  
 
The Israeli army makes a progressive withdrawal from the territories occupied 
after 28 September 2000. 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
 הגרדהב ל"הצ גוסנםירוזאמ ה זאמ םישובכה-22  רבמטפסב0222. 
 
occupied since 28 September 2000. areasIDF withdraws progressively from  
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
הצ"ל גוסנ הגרדהב םירוזאמ זאמ ושבכנש 82 רבמטפסב 2000. 
 
IDF withdraws progressively from areas, which were occupied since 28 September 
2000. 
 
  
141 
 
[Ha'aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
הצ"ל גוסיי הגרדהב םיחטשמ םיקזחומה זאמ ה-82 רבמטפסב 2000. 
IDF will withdraw progressively from territories held since 28 September 2000. 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 הגרדהב גוסיי ל"הצםירוזאמ ה זאמ ושבכנש-22  רבמטפסב0222. 
 
which were occupied since 28  areasIDF will withdraw progressively from 
September 2000. 
 
The lexical item ‘areas’ appears three times in the English source text of the Roadmap and, 
in all three cases, it is rendered in the indefintie form, i.e. zero article. All Arabic 
translations, except the translation produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(IMFA), employed an explicitness change strategy, thus translating the term ‘areas’ as 
‘قطانملا’ (al- manāṭiq, lit. ‘the areas’ or ‘the territories’). Despite the fact that it is possible 
to retain the ambiguity of the original text, translators prefered to use the definite form, 
which resulted in a different reading of the English source. According to this reading, 
Israel is required to withdraw from all and not some of the Palestinian territories it 
reoccupied since the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa. By contrast, the Arabic 
translation produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) followed a literal 
translation strategy and thus kept the lexical item ‘areas’ in the indefinite form. A literal 
translation strategy was also opted for in all the Hebrew versions: although ‘areas’ was 
translated as either ‘םירוזא’ (azurim, lit. ‘areas’) or ‘םיחטש’ (shtahim, lit. ‘territories’), the 
indefinite form prevailed.  
 
The issue of the Israeli withdrawal from all or some of the reoccupied Palestinian areas 
becomes more sensitive and complicated in light of the facts that Israel has been creating 
on the ground since 28 September 2000. The bulk of these facts have to do with Israel’s 
continued appropriation of hundreds of thousands of dunums of Palestinian private land – a 
dunum is 1000 meters – under various pretexts. For example, to construct its illegal Wall88 
– which cuts away nearly 9% of the Occupied West Bank (Klein 2008: 90) – expand its 
illegal settlements and construct bypass roads that exclusively serve them in addition to 
creating buffer zones, military closed areas and military bases, of which some became 
permanent. The proposed Israeli withdrawal is further complicated in light of statements 
made by many Israeli and American officials such the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin 
                                                          
88
 To illustrate how this Wall fragments the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see for example, the map 
published by B’Tselem in 2008: http://www.btselem.org/download/separation_barrier_map_eng.pdf [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Netanyahu,
89
 and the former American president, George W. Bush,
90
 in which they 
emphasized that any future settlement between the Palestinians and Israelis should take 
into account facts created on the ground since 4 June 1967. This automatically includes 
those facts which were created since 28 September 2000.  
 
Against this backdrop, the existence or absence of the definite article in negotiated texts in 
the context of the struggle for land becomes an extremely sensitive issue and more than a 
mere linguistic formulation as it entails significant territorial concessions that both sides try 
to avoid at all cost. 
 
5.2.2 Jewish Settlement Outposts 
The phenomenon of the Jewish settlement outposts – which started in the mid-1990s and 
have intensified since 2000 – is an inseparable part of the long history of the Jewish 
settlements enterprise in the Occupied Palestinian Territories since 1967. The same as 
Jewish settlements, Jewish settlement outposts are also illegal under international law as 
they are built on what is internationally recognized to be an occupied Palestinian land. The 
term ‘settlement outpost’, according to the Peace Now website, refers to “small clusters of 
caravans or other buildings, usually on hilltops, which give settlers a foothold for 
expanding existing settlements”.  
 
Jewish settlement outposts – found “often but not necessarily in the vicinity of already 
existing settlements” – are in fact “small temporary settlements” (Golan 2007: 80). The 
main aim of these settlement outposts is twofold: “on the one hand, to create a continuity 
                                                          
89
 After his meeting with President Obama on 20 March 2011, the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin 
Netanyahu, stated that “I think for there to be peace, the Palestinians will have to accept some basic realities. 
The first is that while Israel is prepared to make generous compromises for peace, it cannot go back to the 
1967 lines - because these lines are indefensible; because they don't take into account certain changes that 
have taken place on the ground, demographic changes that have taken place over the last 44 years”, published 
on Israel Ministry of foreign Affairs website: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches%20by%20Israeli%20leaders/2011/President_Obama_P
M_Netanyahu_after_meeting_20-May-2011.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
 
90
 Former American president George Bush, in a letter to the former Israeli Prime Minister Areal Sharon on 
14 April 2004, reiterated his commitment that “[I]n light of new realities on the ground, including already 
existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status 
negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to 
negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion. It is realistic to expect that any final status 
agreement will only be achieved on the basis of mutually agreed changes that reflect these realities”, 
published on Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website:  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-
Apr-2004.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011].  
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of Israeli presence by taking over as much land as possible and on the other, creating a 
barrier between the various Palestinian population centers. That is to say: forestalling the 
possibility of creating a Palestinian region that can be self-sufficient”.91 This strategic 
objective is in line with Ariel Sharon’s call, then Foreign Minister, to the Jewish settlers at 
the time of the Wye Memorandum in the late 1990s to “grab every hill and piece of land 
possible” (Golan 2007: 80). In this way, Jewish settlement outposts play a significant role 
in consolidating Israel’s control of the Occupied West Bank (Honig-Parnass 2007: 214) by 
creating facts on the ground prior to concluding any deal with the Palestinian leadership 
(Ghanem 2010: 32). 
 
The phenomenon of the Jewish settlement outposts has become a separate issue from the 
long old history of the Jewish settlement enterprise in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. 
This phenomenon has generated a heated debate with regard to the dismantlement of these 
settlement outposts. According to Peace Now, there are 99 settlement outposts throughout 
the West Bank with an estimated population of over 4,000 settlers.
92
  
 
The distinction between ‘settlement outposts’ and the settlement effort in general has 
considerable political significance. Etkes (2005), for instance, argues that this distinction 
“serves as a line of defense protecting” the general settlement effort: while the media 
attention is diverted to recently created outposts, ‘legal’ settlements have quadrupled in 
size. Against this backdrop, the Roadmap’s reference to the dismantlement of settlement 
outposts becomes the source of considerable and heated debate, as reflected in the different 
Arabic and Hebrew translations listed under the following example: 
(5.2) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap 
Plan: 3]. 
 
[UN] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 روـفلا ىـلع ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا موقتةيناطيتـسلاا عـقاوملا ةـلازإب  سرام /راذآ ذنم تئـشنأ يتـلا ةـلغوتملا
2001. 
The Israeli government immediately removes the settlement locations advanced 
deep into land, which were established since March 2001. 
 
[IMFA] 
Back  
translation: 
 روفلا ىلع ليئارسإ ةموكح موقتطاقنلا ءلاخإب ةيناطيتسلاا سرام راذآ ذنم تميقأ يتلا2001. 
The government of Israel immediately evacuates the settlement points, which 
were established since March 2001. 
[USDS]  
Back 
translation: 
ككفت روفلا ىلع ليئارسإ ةيناطيتسلاا عقاوملا سرام/راذآ رهش ذنم تميقأ يتلا2001 .  
Israel dismantles immediately the settlement locations, which were established 
since March 2001. 
                                                          
91
 Ibid. 
92
 ‘West Bank Settlements-Facts and Figures, June 2009’, Peace Now Website:  
http://peacenow.org.il/eng/node/297 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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[Almtym] 
Back 
translation: 
 ًاروف ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ككفتةيناطيتسلاا رؤبلا لك ماع )سرام( راذآ رهش ذنم تميقا يتلا2001  .  
 The Israeli government dismantles immediately all the settlement focal points 
which were established since March 2001. 
 
[Al-Quds]  
Back 
translation: 
كيكفتب يروف لكشب ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا موقت  ةيناطيتسلاا عقاوملا  ماع راذا نم تبصن يتلا2001 . 
The Israeli government immediately dismantles the settlement locations which 
were created since March 2001. 
 
[CNN] 
Back 
translation: 
 اروف ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ككفتةيناطيتسلاا رؤبلا عيمج   ماع راذا سرام رهش ذنم تميقا يتلا2001. 
The Israeli government immediately dismantles all the settlement focal points, 
which were established since March 2001. 
 
In the above example, the indefinite reference signalled by the use of zero-article before 
‘settlement outposts’ is responsible for the ambiguity of the sentence at hand. All Arabic 
translations employed an explicitness change strategy. Although Arabic would have 
allowed translators to mirror the ambiguity of the original text, they chose to invest the 
term with a definite reference which allows for a different reading of the English source. 
By adding, whether intentionally or not, the determiners ‘عيمج’ (jamī‘, lit. ‘all’) and ‘لك’ 
(kul, lit. ‘all’), respectively, in their translations, CNN and Almtym disambiguate the 
English text even further and reinforce the interpretation that ‘all’ settlement outposts, ‘not 
just some’ of them, will have to be dismantled. The use of an information change strategy 
– involving the addition of the sequence ‘ تملاةـلغو ’ (lit. ‘advanced deep into land’) – in the 
United Nations version represents an extreme instance of disambiguation. 
 
As for the Hebrew translations (see example 5.3 below), the Knesset version is the only one 
which followed a literal translation strategy, i.e. using the term ‘settlement outposts’ 
preceded by zero-article. The translations published by Peace Now and Ha’aretz, on the 
other hand, opt for an explicitness change strategy, which invests the term ‘settlement 
outposts’ with a definite reference. A meaning shift also arises during the process of 
translation in the Ha’aretz version, where ‘settlement outposts’ is rendered as ‘תויולחנתהה’ 
(lit. ‘the settlements’) – thus widening the semantic scope of the term included in the 
stipulations of the Roadmap Plan. 
(5.3) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap 
Plan: 3]. 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
 רתלאל תקרפמ לארשי תלשממםיזחאמ  סראמ זאמ ומקוהש0222. 
 
Government of Israel immediately dismantles settlement outposts, which were 
established since March 2001. 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
תלשממ לארשי תקרפמ תידיימ תא םיזחאמה ומקוהש זאמ סראמ 2001. 
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Back 
translation: 
Government of Israel immediately dismantles the settlement outposts, which were 
established since March 2001. 
 
[Ha'aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
תלשממ לארשי קרפת תידיימ תא תויולחנתהה ומקוהש שדוחמ סראמ 2001. 
Government of Israel will immediately dismantle the settlements, which were 
established from March 2001. 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 קרפת לארשי תלשממ תאםיזחאמה  סרמ זאמ ומקוהש0222. 
 
Government of Israel will dismantle the settlement outposts, which were 
established since March 2001. 
 
5.2.3 Closed Palestinian Institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem  
The political status, territorial boundaries and sovereignty of Jerusalem have always been 
of particular significance in the Arab-Israeli conflict because of the importance that the city 
has for the national identity of both Palestinians and Israelis (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). The 
Roadmap Plan consists of three phases in which the sensitive issue of Jerusalem is deferred 
until the third phase – i.e. final negotiations. However, the particular issue of closed 
Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem is discussed in phase one. The re-
opening of these institutions has been a priority for the Palestinian side since they were 
closed down by the Israeli army after the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-
Aqsa in September 2000. 
 
In August 2001 – and in the midst of the Al-Aqsa intifada – the Israeli government headed 
by the Israeli Prime Minister then, Ariel Sharon, issued orders for the closure of several 
Palestinian institutions in the Occupied East Jerusalem. Among the closed institutions were 
“the Orient House, the Chamber of Commerce, the Small Projects Office, the Department 
of Land and Mapping and the Old City Rehabilitation Committee” (Ju'beh 2007: 21). 
Unlike the other Palestinian institutions, the Orient House – a symbol of the power struggle 
between Israel and the Palestinians to control East Jerusalem – has been playing an 
important political role in the occupied city. The Orient House – since late 1992 – has 
effectively served as the “Palestinian Foreign Ministry” in the occupied East city where 
Palestinian politicians met diplomatic delegations from all over the world (Rekhess 2008: 
275). It has also acted as the “political and institutional umbrella” and representative of the 
Palestinian People in the occupied city (Ju'beh 2007: 19). Israel saw this as eroding its 
sovereignty over the city and as an attempt by the Palestinians to consolidate their foothold 
in the city as the capital of their future Palestinian state. Against this background, Israel’s 
decision to close down this institution, i.e. the Orient House, effectively ended “one of the 
most important centers of Palestinian power in the city” (Rekhess 2008: 278). Such a 
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decision was meant to signal Israel increasing control of the city and to reinforce 
Jerusalem’s image as the “eternal unified” capital of Israel.  
 
In early drafts of the Roadmap, the Chamber of Commerce was the only closed Palestinian 
institution that Israel agreed to reopen in Occupied East Jerusalem as the following excerpt 
shows: 
GOI [government of Israel] reopens East Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce and other closed 
Palestinian economic institutions in East Jerusalem. 
 
The final draft of the Roadmap confirms the re-opening of this commercial institution, but 
remains ambiguous with regard to the future of ‘other’ Palestinian institutions. The 
following example shows how Arabic and Hebrew translations have dealt with this issue: 
(5.4) GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in East 
Jerusalem [The Roadmap Plan: 3]. 
 
 
[USDS] 
 
Back 
translation: 
و ةينيطسلفلا ةيراجتلا ةفرغلا حتف ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ديعتةقلغملا ةينيطسلفلا تاسسؤملا نم اهريغ  سدقلا يف
ةيقرشلا. 
The government of Israel reopens the Palestinian chamber of commerce and other 
Palestinian closed institutions in Eastern Jerusalem. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
Back 
translation: 
 و ةيراجتلا ةفرغلا حتف ليئارسا ديعتةقلغملا ىرخلاا تاسسؤملا ةيقرشلا سدقلا يف.                           
Israel reopens the chamber of commerce and the other closed institutions in 
Eastern Jerusalem. 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
תלשממ לארשי תחתופ שדחמ תא תכשל רחסמה תיניטסלפה תודסומו םיניטסלפ םירחא 
ורגסנש חרזמב םילשורי.    
Government of Israel reopens the Palestinian commerce and other Palestinian 
institutions, which were closed in East Jerusalem.  
 
The ambiguity in the phrase ‘other closed Palestinian institutions’ is retained in all 
language versions, except in the Arabic translation produced by Al-Quds newspaper. In this 
version, an explicitness change strategy is used to disambiguate the original text and, in 
doing so, emphasises that Israel is required to reopen ‘all and not only some’ Palestinian 
institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem. This kind of interpretation is advocated by the 
chief negotiator of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Saeb Erikat (2007: 34), 
who stresses that (relevant stretches underlined):
93
 
There is a Roadmap that was handed to both sides in April 2003, in the first phase there are 
commitment on the both sides, the Israeli side and the Israeli government, should freeze settlement 
activities, including natural growth, and remove all settlement outposts erected since 2001, and 
they should open all the Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem and restore things to the status that 
prevailed in 2000 and stop incursions and release the detainees, these are commitments. 
                                                          
93
 ‘Annapolis Meeting: Political Optimism or Reinforcing the Split in the Homeland?’, seminar published by 
Jerusalem Media and Communication Center in 2008, pages 33-54, available at 
http://www.jmcc.org/documents/JMCCissue_and_audience.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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On the other hand, all Hebrew translations followed a literal translation strategy and thus 
preserved the ambiguity of the English text. In the three cases discussed above – i.e. Israeli 
withdrawal, Jewish settlement outposts and closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East 
Jerusalem – ambiguous formulation plays a crucial role in deciding how much each side 
would give up or get. 
 
5.3 Naming Practices  
One significant site of struggle for power and competing ideologies is naming practices. In 
situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, these practices assume greater importance. 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a case in point. Naming practices in the context of this 
conflict – which is enormously asymmetric in nature,94 militarily,95 politically and 
economically, with Israel as the stronger side in such an asymmetric conflict (Klein 2008: 
93) – should be seen as a manifestation of the power struggle between the Palestinians and 
Israelis. In this context, Peteet (2005: 157) points out that: 
In the context of the Israeli – Palestinian conflict, naming can be a diagnostic of power; conflicts 
over naming reflect and are integral to contests over control and ownership. Each party tries to 
superimpose its name over territory, places, actions and interpretations of events. Whose 
nomenclature prevails derives from the ability to have one’s narration and lexicon accepted as the 
standard one.  
 
Naming practices are employed by each side to legitimize its claims and uphold its power 
while delegitimizing and contesting the claims of the other side. Suleiman (2004: 183) 
argues that names in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are “ideologically loaded linguistic 
constructs. They are used to validate or contest claims and proprietorship over landscape”. 
Such ‘proprietorship over landscape’ can be seen in the renaming of Palestinian towns and 
streets inside Israel proper after the 1948 war (see below). Competing naming practices can 
also be seen in the names given to key historical events of the conflict such as the 1948 
Palestine war itself – known to the Palestinians as ‘ةبكنلا’ (al-Nakba, lit. ‘The Disaster’ or 
‘The Catastrophe’) and to the Israelis as “תואמצעה םוי” (yom ha-'atsma'ut, lit. ‘the 
Independence Day’), “תואמצעה תמחלמ” (milhemet ha-'atsma'ut, lit. ‘War of Independence’) 
or “רורחשה תמחלמ” (milhemet ha-shihrur, lit. ‘War of Liberation’). The ideological and 
political difference between the Palestinian and Israeli names given to this historical event 
can be summarized as the following:  
                                                          
94
 For a comprehensive discussion of the asymmetrical nature of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, see Gee 
(1998). 
95
 For example, the Israeli army is the fourth largest army in the world and the strongest military power in the 
Middle East (Bronner 2007: 118). For a comprehensive account on the Israeli military power, see Cordesman 
(2006: 63-153). 
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For the Jews in Israel, 1948 is the historical turning point in which their state was established and 
their sovereignty constituted. For the Palestinians, the opposite is the case: 1948 is the point at 
which their society was destroyed, a large part of them expelled, and they lost their country and the 
opportunity for statehood. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were uprooted and went into 
exile outside the boundaries of the state and turned into refugees in the surrounding states (Ram 
2009: 366). 
Thus, to opt for one of these names automatically reflects the ‘narrative location’ of the 
speaker (Baker 2006) and his/her particular ideology. It can be argued then that “the very 
act of naming something is indeed a political act, for a name is always given to something 
or someone by an external force having the legitimacy to do so” (Pinchevski and 
Torgovnik 2002: 366). In this way, names can be used to “uphold or contest power” 
(Peteet 2005: 154).  
Naming practices in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict include names given to the protagonists 
of the conflict (e.g. ‘Palestinians’ and ‘Israelis’), holy places (e.g. ‘al- aram al-Sharīf’ or 
‘Har ha-Bayt’)96, Israeli military occupation practices (e.g. ‘closure’ and ‘deportation’) and 
Israeli military offensives (e.g. ‘Operation Just Reward’).97  
Naming practices are particularly significant in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict taking into account the systematic and gradual erasure of Arabic Palestinian names 
and replacing them by Hebrew-Zionist ones, for example, names of streets, towns and 
villages.
98
  
In Israel, the choice of place names, i.e. toponyms, “has become a powerful tool for 
reinforcing competing national Zionist ideologies” (Cohen and Kliot 1992: 653). The 
Israeli-Zionist naming practices, as  Peteet (2005: 157) explains,  have an overlapping two-
fold purpose: firstly, they “attempt to nativise Israelis by consciously and methodically 
elaborating historically deep ties to place” and secondly, they achieve this “by, in part, 
erasing a Palestinian presence and history, and thus any claim to the land of Palestine and 
legitimate rights to reside there”. Moreover, Israeli place names are intended to reflect “a 
combination of continuity and change, which signifies the nation-building ethos and 
Zionist revival, as well as the redemption of an ancient land and the return to a pristine 
                                                          
96
 See Azaryahu and Golan (2001) and Ben-Ze'ev and Aburaiya (2004) for detailed accounts on the naming 
practices in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
97
 See Gavriely-Nuri (2010) for a detailed account of naming practices of Israeli military offensives. 
98
 See particularly Azaryahu (1986, 1996) and Pinchevski and Torgovnik (2002) for a detailed account on the 
systematic erasure of Palestinian names and replacing them with Jewish-Zionist ones. 
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origin” (Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002: 374). This is utilized to consolidate Zionist 
claims to historic Palestine (cf. Chapter 1.1.1).  
The political decision to erase Arab Palestinian place names and replace them with 
Hebrew-Zionist ones was justified by Ben Gurion – the first Prime Minister of the State of 
Israel and its chief architect in his letter to the “Israel Place-Names Committee” as follows: 
We are obliged to remove Arab names for reasons of state. Just as we do not recognize their 
political proprietorship over the land so also do we not recognize their spiritual proprietorship and 
their names (Benvenisti 2000: 14, cited in Ram 2009: 379). 
With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, the “Israel Place-Names Committee” 
replaced the “Names Committee” which was formed in the 1930s for the task of replacing 
Palestinian names with either biblical or national/Zionist ones (Peteet 2005: 158). One 
example of this task was naming streets in the Palestinian town of Ramle (Arabic: ‘ةلمرلا’). 
In July 1948, the Israeli army occupied Ramle and declared it an Israeli town. Soon after 
this, the Israel Ministry of the Interior at that time assigned an administrative committee to 
run the town’s affairs (Pinchevski and Torgovnik 2002: 370). The first thing this 
committee did after assuming power was the erasure of all Arab names and replacing them 
with new names including all the streets which did not have names before (ibid.: 370-371). 
The names given to old Ramle’s streets were primarily Zionist and nationalist in nature, 
e.g. ‘Lord Balfour’, ‘Hashomer’, ‘Exodus’ (ibid.: 371). Those chosen names have histories 
and reflect Zionist ideology, for example, ‘Hashomer’ was a group founded in 1909 to 
protect Jewish settlers, whereas ‘Exodus’ was a ship with 4500 Jewish “immigrants” 
attacked and deported back to Germany by the British forces (ibid.: 371). 
Another example concerns the Palestinian Negev region (Arabic: ‘ نلا ءارحصبق ’). In 1949, 
the government of Israel appointed a committee of experts with the specific task of the 
designating Hebrew place names in the Negev region. During the first two years, the 
committee “re-named 533 places, while obliterating their former Arab, or even Greek or 
Latin, names. In contrast to the 533 new Hebrew names, only 8 place names remained 
intact” (Ram 2009: 378-279). 
This Israeli policy of erasure – which started in 1948 – continues today in Occupied East 
Jerusalem. Two cases suffice to illustrate this point. The first case concerns replacing road 
signs in Israel (including Occupied East Jerusalem). Suleiman (2011: 199) explains this 
case as follows: 
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In summer of 2009, Yisrael Katz, the transport minister in the newly formed Likud-led 
government of Benjamin Netanyahu decided to replace existing road signs in Israel with new ones, 
‘so that all the names appearing on them in English and Arabic would be a direct transliteration of 
[their] Hebrew [names],’ instead of being directly in English and Arabic. Under this new policy 
initiative, the name of the city of Jerusalem would appear as Yerushalayim in English and Arabic, 
replacing the English and Arabic names Jerusalem and Al-Quds, respectively. 
 
The second case occurred on 16 June 2011 when WAFA – the Palestinian News and 
Information Agency – reported that the Israeli municipality of Occupied Jerusalem 
changed the name of one street and another historical location in the Eastern part of the 
city from Arabic to Hebrew. The municipality changed the name of ‘the Sultan Suleiman 
Street’ (Arabic: ‘ ناميلس ناطلسلا عراش’) – that extends between Damascus Gate and Herod's 
Gate of the Old City Wall – to “Eliyahu Street” and ‘the Sultan Suleiman Cave’ (Arabic: 
‘ناميلس ناطلسلا ةراغم’) – on the same road – to “Eliyahu Cave”.99 Such an action aims to 
change the Arab-Islamic character of the occupied city and cement Israel’s claims of 
ownership. 
 
This systematic process of erasure has never been limited to names but also extended to the 
erasure of hundreds of Palestinian towns, villages and neighbourhoods during and after the 
1948 war
100
 (see for example, Abdel Jawad 2006: 90; Hussein 2002: 277). One example of 
this was the demolition of ‘the Moroccan Quarter’101 (in Arabic: ‘ةبراغملا ةراح’,  ārat al-
Maghāriba) in the Old City of Jerusalem following the 1967 war in order to create “the 
Western Wall Plaza” (Khalidi 1992: 139-143).  
This Israeli practice has been in line with the late nineteenth century Zionist slogan of “a 
land without people for a people without a land” and Golda Meir’s – former Israel Prime 
Minister – infamous 1969 statement, “the Palestinian people do not exist” (Doumani 2007: 
50).  
Naming practices in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict are thus obvious acts of 
“appropriation” (Azaryahu 1996: 313) and demonstrate particular power relations 
(Azaryahu and Golan 2001: 181). Previous studies on naming practices (e.g. Azaryahu 
                                                          
99
 ‘Israeli Municipality Gives Jewish Names to East Jerusalem Locations’, WAFA website, published on 16 
June 2011: http://english.wafa.ps/index.php?action=detail&id=16459 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
100
 Masalha (2007: 66) points out that “[A]n exhaustive study by a team of Palestinian field researchers and 
academics under the direction of Walid Khalidi details the destruction of 418 villages falling inside the 1949 
armistice lines”. The main objective of erasing Palestinian towns and villages in 1948 was twofold: firstly, 
“to prevent the return of refugees to their homes” and secondly, to disseminate the Zionist claim that 
“Palestine was virtually empty territory before the Jews entered” (ibid.: 66). 
101
 See Khalidi (1992: 139-140) for the history of the Muslim ownership of ‘the Moroccan Quarter’ in the 
Old City of Jerusalem. 
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1996, Peteet 2005, Ram 2009) and aspects of naming practices within the framework of 
broader studies in language and translation (e.g. Baker 2006, Suleiman 2004) provided the 
motivation to examine this issue in the language versions of peace initiatives in detail.  
In fact, detailed analysis of these language versions revealed that naming practices were 
significant across corpus. During negotiations, conflict over the choice of one or another 
name or label is very common. Each party typically insists on using a name or label that 
reflects its narrative, best serves its political interests and advances its negotiating position. 
This is particularly significant with regard to names given to holy places, where the choice 
of one particular name would infer some sort of legitimacy to claims of ownership of one 
side of the conflict at the expense of the other.  
 
In order to bridge the gap between the conflicting narratives of the two sides of the 
conflict, sometimes names important to both sides are included side by side as some sort of 
a compromise. This can be seen, for instance, with regard to the toponym ‘al- aram al-
Sharīf’/ ‘the Temple Mount’ in the English original source text of the Geneva Accord. 
However, such compromises soon disappear in translation (see section 5.3.2 below).  
 
Naming practices is a major part of this chapter. Other linguistic features, particularly 
cases of intertextuality (cf. section 5.4) and the use of political concepts (e.g. cf. section 
5.6) – although discussed separately – are integral parts of the issue of naming practices. In 
the following sub-sections, naming practices with regard to the protagonists of the conflict 
and holy places will be investigated in detail in their full historical and political contexts. 
 
5.3.1 The Protagonists of the Conflict 
The Middle East conflict has been referred to in different terms over the last sixty years, 
mainly, ‘the Palestine Question’, ‘the Palestine-Jewish Question’, ‘the Palestinian-Israeli 
Conflict’, ‘the Arab-Zionist Conflict’ (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 2009: xi). In the 
Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives, this conflict is referred to as either the ‘Arab-Israeli’ or 
the ‘Israeli-Palestinian’ conflict. Choices made by the authors of original and translated 
texts are indicative of their personal or institutional perspectives on the ongoing tensions 
and power relations. Such terminological choices can thus be interpreted as attempts to 
give more political weight to one of the parties at the expense of the other. Moreover, such 
choices “raise claims of partisanship by one side or the other” (Bassiouni and Ben Ami 
2009: xi).  
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While the Palestinian political discourse refers to the conflict as ‘ ينيطسلفلا عارصلا-يليئارسلاا ’ 
(lit. ‘the Palestinian-Israeli conflict’) and the general conflict between the Arab countries 
(Lebanon, Syria as well as the Palestine Liberation Organization, PLO) and Israel as 
‘ يبرعلا عارصلا-يليئارسلاا ’ (lit. ‘the Arab-Israeli conflict’), the terms ‘ ילארשיה-יניטסלפ  ךוסכסה’ 
(lit. ‘the Israeli-Palestinian conflict’) and ‘ ילארשיה ךוסכסה-יברע ’ (lit. ‘the Israeli-Arab 
conflict’) are predominantly used in Israeli political circles. 
 
As far as the source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives are concerned, the term 
‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’ is consistently used throughout, except for one occurrence of 
the term ‘Arab-Israeli conflict’ in the original source text of the Arab Peace Initiative (see 
example 5.8 below). All Arabic and Hebrew translations of peace initiatives followed a 
literal translation strategy in rendering the term the ‘Israeli-Palestinian conflict’, except for 
the Al-Quds translation of the Roadmap Plan which chose to reverse the word order in six 
occurrences, as in the following two examples: 
(5.5) The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 
1967 [The Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 لحتس ةيوستلا هذهينيطسلفلا عازنلا- يليئارسلإا ماعلا يف أدب يذلا للاتحلاا يهنتو ،1567 ىلا ادانتسا،
 يلودلا نملأا سلجم تارارقو ،ملاسلا لباقم ضرلأا أدبمو ،ديردم رمتؤم سسا242  و338 و1357... 
This settlement will resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict… 
 
 
 
 (5.6) A two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will only be achieved through an end to 
violence and terrorism, when the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against 
terror and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance and liberty [The 
Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 لح ناينيطسلفلا عازنلا- يليئارسلإا  باهرلإاو فنعلا ءاهنإ للاخ نم طقف هقيقحت نكمي نيتلود ءاشناب
ةيطارقميد ءانب ىلع ةرداقو ةبغارو باهرلإا دض مساح لكشب كرحتت ةدايق ينيطسلفلا بعشلل نوكي امدنع 
ةيرحلاو حماستلا ىلإ دنتست ةيقيبطت. 
The resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict by establishing two states can be 
achieved… 
 
This same pattern – namely, the reversing of word-order – can be observed elsewhere in 
the Al-Quds translation. In phrases such as ‘GOI and PA’ (where ‘GOI’ stands for 
‘Government of Israel’ and ‘PA’ stands for ‘Palestinian Authority’), ‘Israeli-Palestinian 
engagement’ or ‘Israeli-Palestinian negotiations’, word-order is reversed throughout, as the 
following examples illustrate: 
(5.7) GOI and PA continue revenue clearance process and transfer of funds, including arrears, in 
accordance with agreed, transparent monitoring mechanism [The Roadmap Plan: 3]. 
 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 لصاوتةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا و ةينيطسلفلا ةطلسلا  ةباقر ةيللآ ًاقفو لاوملأا لقنو دراوملا حيضوت  ةيلمع يف
ةفافش  عضولا ةيوست ىلا  ةطحمك ديدجلا روتسدلا ىلا دانتسلااب ةدايس تاموقم و ةيئزج دودحب اهيلع قفتم
مئادلا. 
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Back 
translation: 
The Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government continue. 
 
(5.8) Phase III objectives are consolidation of reform and stabilization of Palestinian institutions, 
sustained, effective Palestinian security performance, and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations aimed 
at a permanent status agreement in 2005 [The Roadmap Plan: 4]. 
 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ينملأا ءادلأاو ،ةينيطسلفلا تاسسؤملا رارقتساو حلاصلإا تايلمع عيمجت يه ةثلاثلا ةلحرملا فادهأ
 ،لعافلا ينيطسلفلاةينيطسلفلا تاضوافملاو- ةيليئارسلإا  مئادلا عضولا ةيقافتا ىلإ لصوتلا فدهتست يتلا
 ماعلا لولحب2009. 
...and the Palestinian-Israeli negotiations... 
 
 
This terminological choice is consistent with the conventions of Al-Quds newspaper in 
referring to the conflict as the following two excerpts show: 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 
الله مار - سلجم اهتمدقم يف هتاسسؤمو يلودلا عمتجملا نينثلاا مويلا ةينيطسلفلا ريرحتلا ةمظنمل ةيذيفنتلا ةنجللا تعد
 " يضارلأا عيمج ىلع ةينيطسلفلا ةلودلا دودحب عطاقلاو حضاولا فارتعلاا ىلا ةدحتملا مملأل ةماعلا ةيعمجلاو نملأا
 ماع "ةلتحملا 1567 .ىلا ةدحتملا تايلاولا تعد امك  لحل ةنهارلا و ةقباسلا اهتاسايس يف رظنلا ةداعا عارصلا
ينيطسلفلا-يليئارسلاا يبرعلاو-يلودلا نوناقلا و ةيعرشلا ساسا ىلع يليئارسلاا. 
 
Back translations: Ramallah- The executive committee of the PLO today (Monday) called 
on the international community and its institutions, particularly the UN Security Council 
and the General Assembly, to acknowledge the borders of the Palestinian state clearly on 
all occupied territories of 1967. It also called on the United States of America to 
reconsider its former and current policies to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli and the Arab-
Israeli conflict based on the international law and legitimacy. 
 
ةزغ-  ناودع لظي28 ربمسيد/لوأ نوناك2008  رياني/ناث نوناك نم رشع نماثلا ىتح رمتسا يذلاو2005  رثكلأا وه
 رمع يف دوقع ةعبرأ للاخ يف ،سيياقملا لكب ةوارضينيطسلفلا عارصلا-يليئارسلإا  برح ذنم1567. 
 
Back translation: Gaza-The aggression of 28 December 2008, which lasted until 18 
January 2009, remains the most severe by all standards during four decades of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the 1967 war. 
 
The only exception to this convention is when this term – namely, the ‘Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict’– occurs in direct or indirect quotations. In such cases, the original word-order is 
preserved as in the following excerpts of news reports from this newspaper: 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 
 بيبا لت-  ب ف ا ، سدقلا-…" نا ةيكريملاا ةيدوهيلا تامظنملا تايربك ىلثمم ماما نامربيل لاقو عارصلا
يليئارسلاا-ينيطسلفلا ."ةيولوا سيل 
Back translation: Tel Aviv- Jerusalem, A.F.B, and Lieberman declared before the 
representatives of the largest American Jewish organizations “the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is not a priority”. 
 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 
 
 ، ندنل ،لسكوربسدقلا أ ب د ،-  ،ريلب ينوت ، طسولأا قرشلا يف ملاسلا ةيلمعل ةيعابرلا ةنجللا ثوعبم دكأ
 ةبسنلاب نيتلودلا لح ةرورض ىلع ءاعبرلأا سمأ ، ةدح ىلع لك ، لكريم لايغنأ ةينامللأا ةراشتسملاو عارصلل
يليئارسلإا-ينيطسلفلا. 
Back translation: Brussels, London, Jerusalem, DBA- Tony Blair, the representative of 
the Quarter for the Middle East process, and the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, 
emphasized, separately yesterday Wednesday, the necessity of the two-state solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 
As mentioned above, the tensions and hostilities that the peace initiatives set out to resolve 
are also referred to in original source texts of peace initiatives as ‘ يبرعلا عازنلا–يليئارسلاا ’ (lit. 
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‘the Arab-Israeli conflict’). This specific terminological choice – which is used only in the 
text of the Arab Peace Initiative and only once – is due to the fact the Arab Peace Initiative 
deals with the more general Arab-Israeli conflict rather than the specific Palestinian-Israeli 
one. All English and Hebrew translations adopted a literal translation strategy, except for 
the translations of God Israel Bless (GBI) and Yediot Aharonot newspaper which both 
opted for reversing the word order as in the following example: 
(5.9) 
 
 
.ةقطنملا لود عيمجل نملاا قيقحت عم ليئارسا نيبو اهنيب ملاس ةيقافتا يف لوخدلاو ايهتنم يليئارسلاا-يبرعلا عازنلا رابتعا 
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]. 
Back translation: consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended and enter into a peace agreement with 
Israel and achieve security for all the states of the region. 
 
 
 
[LAS] Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with 
Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region. 
[CPS] They will regard the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and they will enter into 
agreements with Israel, thereby providing security for the entire region. 
[PA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 תא תובישחמיברעה ךוסכסה-ילארשי  ,לארשי םע םולש םכסהל תוסנכנו ,וציק לא אבכ
רוזאה תונידמ לכל ןוחטיב תוקפסמו. 
They consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended… 
 
[GBI] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 םויס לע וריהציילארשיה ךוסכסה-יברע לארשי םע םולש םכסה לע ומתחיו , ןוחטיב איביש
רוזאה תונידמ לכל. 
They declare the end of the Israeli-Arab conflict... 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 
 לש ופוס הז ברע תונידמ תניחבמילארשיה ךוסכסה-יברע םע םולש םכסה לש ותליחתו ,
 ןמולשל וגאדי תונידמה .לארשירוזאב תונידמה לכ לש. 
…Arab conflict-the IsraeliThe Arab states testify that  
The term ‘Arab-Israeli’ is used – other than with the word ‘conflict’ – with the word 
‘peace’. This term, i.e. ‘Arab-Israeli’ is used only in the text of the Roadmap Plan and only 
once as in the following example: 
(5.10) Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of the 
region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace [The Roadmap Plan: 6]. 
 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
 לכ רובע ןוחטיבו לארשי םע םיסחיה לש האלמ היצזילמרונל ברע תונידמ לש המכסה
 תרגסמב רוזאה תונידמילארשי םולש-יברע ללוכ. 
…Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 תונידמ לכל ןוחטיבלו ,לארשי םע םיילמרונו םיאלמ םיסחיל ומיכסי תויברעה תונידמה
 תרגסמב רוזאהילארשי םולש-יברע ללוכ. 
…Israeli-Arab comprehensive peace. 
 
All Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap adopted a literal translation strategy, 
except for the translations of the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) and Ha’aretz newspaper, 
which choose to reverse the word order. 
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Of particular significance is also the translation of ‘IDF’, an acronym that stands for ‘Israel 
Defence Forces’ (in Hebrew: ‘ הצ"אבצ ל הנגהה לארשיל ’ (tsahal)). Acronyms are used 
throughout the original source texts of peace initiatives, e.g. ‘PLO’ (Palestine Liberation 
Organization), ‘IPCC’ (the Israeli-Palestinian Cooperation Committee), ‘MF’ (the 
Multinational Force), and ‘PSF’ (the Palestinian Security Force), etc. These acronyms were 
rendered quite literally into Arabic and Hebrew as in the following example: 
(5.11) An Implementation and Verification Group (IVG) shall hereby be established to facilitate, 
assist in, guarantee, monitor, and resolve disputes relating to the implementation of this 
Agreement [The Geneva Accord: 6]. 
 
[PPC] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 
 سيسأت ةيقافتلاا هذه بجومب متي(ققحتو ذيفنت ةعومجمIVG)  ةيقافتلاا هذه ذيفنت نامضو ليهست لجأ نم
.اهذيفنتب ةقلاعلا تاذ تاعازنلا ضفو اهتبقارمو اهذيفنت يف ةدعاسملاو 
According to this agreement, an implementation and verification group will be 
established… 
 
[YA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
םקות תאזב תצובק עוציב תומיאו( ןלהל: "בק"א") ידכ לקהל, עייסל, חיטבהל, חקפל 
בשיילו תוקולחמ תורושקה עוציבל םכסהה. 
will be established implementation and verification group  …an 
 
However, other acronyms, such as ‘IDF’, were translated differently into Arabic and 
Hebrew as the following example shows: 
(5.12) As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from 
areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed 
prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The 
Roadmap Plan: 2]. 
 
[UN] 
Back 
translation: 
… بحـسنتةيليئارـسلإا عاـفدلا تاوـق اـيجيردت… 
…the Israel defense forces withdraw progressively…                                         
   
[IMFA]  
Back 
translation: 
… بحسنييليئارسلإا عافدلا شيج  ًايجيردت… 
…the Israel defense army withdraws... 
 
[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
… موقييليئارسلإا شيجلا  ًاجيردت باحسنلااب… 
…the Israeli army withdraws progressively… 
 
Al-Quds: 
Back 
translation: 
 بحسنييليئارسلإا شيجلا  ًاجيردت…  
…the Israeli army withdraws progressively … 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
… גוסנל"הצ הגרדהב…  
 
…IDF withdraws progressively... 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
ל"הצ הגרדהב גוסיי… 
 
…IDF will withdraw progressively… 
 
The acronym ‘IDF’ appears only in the text of the Roadmap Plan in reference to the Israeli 
withdrawal from reoccupied Palestinian territories since 28 September 2000. In the Arabic 
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translations by the US Department of State (USDS), CNN, the Almtym network and Al-
Quds, a cultural filtering strategy is used. As a result, ‘IDF’ is translated consistently as 
‘ شيجلا يليئارسلاا ’ (al-jaysh al-´Isrāailī, lit. ‘the Israeli army’) (three occurrences). By 
removing the same component of this multi-word term from the four Arabic versions, the 
‘defensive’ role of these forces is minimised and implicitly questioned. As is also the case 
with the Arabic translations produced by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) and 
the United Nations (UN), all of the four Hebrew translations remained faithful to the 
source text and opted for a literal translation strategy, as the Hebrew term ‘ל"הצ’ (tsahal) 
means ‘Israel defence forces’. The same can be said of the Arabic translation of the Israel 
Ministry of foreign Affairs (IMFA) in which the acronym ‘IDF’ was rendered as ‘ شيج  عافدلا
يليئارسلإا’ (Jaysh al-difā‘ al-Isrāailī, lit. ‘Israel Defense Forces’). 
 
The term Jaysh al-difā‘ al-Isrāailī is predominantly used in Israeli state-owned television 
and radio as well as official websites in Arabic, such as the Arabic website of the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, altawāsul. When searching this website, the term ‘ شيجلا
يليئارسلاا’ (al-jaysh al-´Isrāailī, lit. ‘the Israeli army’) returned 86 hits whereas the term 
‘يليئارسلاا عافدلا شيج’ (jaysh al-difā‘ al-´Isrāailī, lit. ‘Israel defense forces) returned 8,810 
hits as in the following excerpt from this website: 
(ST)  
 
 
 رَبتعُيعافدلا شيج يليئارسلإا ماع سّسأت دقو ,8492 ّىلوتي ناك هّنإ ذإ اًبيردت رثكلأا ملاعلا شويج دحأ  نمأ نع عافدلا
مخ للاخ ةلودلا.ىربك بورح س102                                                                   
Back translation:  Israel defense army, which was established in 1948, is considered as one of 
the world’s most trained armies and it was defending the security of the state during five major 
wars. 
 
Power relations are evident in the way the acronym ‘IDF’ is perceived by the Palestinians 
and Israelis. In Israel – a country often described as a “nation-state-in-arms” (Ben-Eliezer 
2004: 49) – the Israeli army – which Israeli political and military leaders routinely describe 
as “the most moral army in the world” (Khalidi 2010: 6) – is regarded as a “citizen army” 
(Peri 2005: 53). It has always been perceived by the Israelis as their “defender and savior” 
against “national security threats” (Seidman 2010: 721-722) and, thus, essential for their 
protection and “survival” (Sheffer 2007: 709).  
The same army is conventionally referred to by the Palestinians and Arabs as ‘ تاوق/شيج
يليئارسلاا للاتحلاا’ (jaysh/quwāt al-iḥtilāl al-Isrāailī, lit. ‘the Israeli occupation army/forces’), 
                                                          
102
 ‘ شيج يليئارسلإا عافدلا ’, altawāsul website, published on 30 December 2010: 
http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/this+is+israel/political+structure/idf.htm [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
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‘للاتحلاا تاوق/شيج’ (jaysh/quwāt al-iḥtilāl, lit. ‘the occupation army/forces’) or ‘ شيجلا تاوقلا/
ةيليئارسلاا’ (al-jaysh/al-quwāt al-Isrāailīyah, lit. ‘the Israeli army/forces’) for short. For the 
Palestinians and Arabs alike, this army – which they perceive as aggressive and oppressive 
and which its actions are often taken under the pretext of “self-defense” – is the tool by 
which Israel has been maintaining its occupation to Palestinian land for more than 44 
years.
103
 Moreover, this army is responsible for waging many wars and offensives against 
some of the Arab countries throughout the history of the conflict, to name a few, the 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the war on Lebanon (2006)
104
 and the war on Gaza (2008)
105
, 
all resulting in the killing of many civilians and massive destruction.
106
 Against this 
background, it comes as no surprise that Arab media, including Palestinian newspapers 
such as Al-Quds, refuses to circulate the official Israeli lexicon, i.e. ‘IDF’ when reporting 
on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Referring to this army as a “defense” army automatically 
legitimizes its actions and practices inside as well as outside the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. 
 
Another case of the protagonists of the conflict concerns the translation of the term 
“residents” in the context of Occupied East Jerusalem. This term – i.e. “residents” – 
appears twice and only in the original text of the Geneva Accord in reference to resolving 
the issue of Jerusalem: once as in the phrase “residents of East Jerusalem” and once as in 
the phrase “residents of Jerusalem”. When this term – i.e. “residents” occurred with the 
toponym ‘Jerusalem’, it was rendered following a literal translation strategy in both Arabic 
and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord. However, when it occurred with the 
toponym ‘East Jerusalem’, it was rendered differently in the Arabic translation as the 
following example shows: 
(5.13) The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, 
expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall 
be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of 
East Jerusalem [The Geneva Accord: 24]. 
 
 
[PPC] 
 
 
 
 ةيعامتجلاا تلااجملا ضعب يف نافرطلا قبطي–  تايحلاصلا لقن نامضل ةيلاقتنا تاءارجإ ةيداصتقلاا
 قوقحلا نمضت ةقيرطب كلذ متيسو نيطسلف ىلإ ليئارسإ نم ماظنو ةعرسب اهيلع قفتملا تامازتللااو
 ةيعامتجلاا–  ةمكارتملا ةيداصتقلااةيقرشلا سدقلا ينطاومل. 
 
                                                          
103
 For a detailed account on Israel’s matrix of control in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Gordon 
(2008b). 
104
 For a detailed account on the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006, see Hovsepian (2008). 
105
 For a detailed account on the Israeli War on Gaza in 2008, see Pappé and Chomsky (2010a). 
106
 For example, the Israeli war on Gaza resulted in more than 1,400 Palestinians dead and over 5,000 
wounded. More than half of the dead were civilians, with 400 of them women or children (Denes 2011: 185). 
  
158 
 
Back 
translation: 
…citizens of the Eastern Jerusalem. 
 
[YA] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
םימוחתב ויצוס-םיימונוקא םימיוסמ םידדצה וטקני ידעצ םייניב חיטבהל רבעמ םכסומ, 
ריהמ רדוסמו לש תויוכמסה תויוביוחמהו לארשימ ןיטסלפל. רבד הז השעיי ןפואב 
רמשייש תא תויוכזה ויצוסה-תוימונוקא תורבטצמה לש יבשות חרזמ םילשורי. 
…residents of East Jerusalem. 
 
The Hebrew translation of Yes to an Agreement (YA) translated the term ‘residents’ in the 
example above – following a literal translation strategy – as ‘יבשות’ (toshavi). On the other 
hand, the translation of the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) rendered the same term – 
following a meaning shift strategy – as ‘ينطاوم’ (muwāṭinī, lit. ‘citizens’). 
East Jerusalem, according to the Geneva Accord, would come under Palestinian 
sovereignty and be declared as the capital of the independent Palestinian state. In this 
context, the translation shift from “residents” into ‘ينطاوم’ (muwāṭinī, lit. ‘citizens’) in the 
Arabic translation of the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) is of high political significance. 
‘Citizens’ are people who “have rights over their homeland”, whereas “residents” by 
contrast “cannot claim such rights but have limited rights enabling them to reside, work, 
and pursue an education in the country” (Rouhana and Sultany 2003: 17).  
Israel officially considers the Palestinians of the Occupied East Jerusalem – ‘Palestinian 
Jerusalemites’ as they define themselves – “permanent residents” rather than national 
citizens, even though they “were born in Jerusalem, have lived in the city their entire lives, 
and have no other home” (Jabareen 2010: 35). After its occupation of East Jerusalem and 
its surroundings following the June 1967 war, Israel conducted a census there and granted 
“permanent residency status” to the Palestinian Jerusalemites who were present at the time 
the census was taken. Those who were not present in the city for whatever reason “forever 
lost their right to reside in Jerusalem”.107 This “permanent residency” status is the same as 
the one “granted to foreign citizens who have freely chosen to come to Israel and want to 
live there. Israel treats Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem as immigrants who live in 
their homes at the beneficence of the authorities and not by right”.108 
One of the key features of this “permanent residency” is that it is always “under a serious 
threat of being lost” (Jabareen 2010: 35). According to what the Israeli Ministry of the 
Interior announced in 1995, this residency is “conditional upon the circumstances in which 
                                                          
107
 ‘East Jerusalem: Legal Status of East Jerusalem and its Residents’, B’Tselem website, published on 6 May 
2010: http://www.btselem.org/jerusalem/legal_status [last accessed: 24 November]. 
108
 Ibid. 
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individuals live; when these circumstances change, permanent residency may expire” 
(Jabareen 2010: 35). For example, a Palestinian who leaves the city for “an extended 
period of time for legitimate reasons, such as for the purposes of study overseas, or in order 
to live in closer proximity to a work situation on the West Bank, may be denied the right to 
return” (Sheleff 2001: 302). In fact, “[I]n 1996, thousands of East Jerusalemites lost their 
residency rights because they moved to Jerusalem’s suburbs where they could find better 
housing than in the city, where Israel would not let them build” (Klein 2008: 91). 
Moreover, contrary to citizenship, “permanent residency” is “only passed on to the 
holder’s children where the holder meets certain conditions. A permanent resident with a 
non-resident spouse must submit, on behalf of the spouse, a request for family unification. 
Only citizens are granted the right to return to Israel at any time”.109  
As “permanent residents” of Israel, Palestinian Jerusalemites pay full taxes and in return 
they are entitled to work in Israel (Klein 2008: 91) and receive “social security and health 
insurance benefits” (Abu Nahleh 2006: 167). However, they do not have “the right to vote 
in national elections but only in local municipal elections” (Jabareen 2010: 35) as in order 
to be able to do so, they need first to become Israeli citizens.  
The Palestinian Jerusalemites have been boycotting Israeli municipal elections since the 
city’s occupation in 1967 fearing that participation in such elections would be equivalent to 
“an explicit or implicit recognition of, and acquiescence to, Israeli sovereignty over their 
city” (Sha'ban 2007: 49). Consequently, they have not been part of “decision making 
institutions that manage their daily life” (Klein 2008: 92). 
Israel offered the Palestinian Jerusalemites the option to apply for Israeli citizenship on the 
condition that they “swear allegiance to Israel and renounce all other citizenships, which 
most of them refused to do” (Jabareen 2010: 31). They saw that obtaining the Israeli 
citizenship means giving up their right of self-determination (Kawar 2010: 576). More 
importantly, they did not wish to legitimize the city’s occupation (Talhami 1997: 64). 
These two politically motivated decisions were meant to challenge the status quo in 
Occupied East Jerusalem and the Israeli attempts to control the holy city.  
                                                          
109
 Ibid. 
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The most recent case of cancelation or revocation of the so-called “Residency of East 
Jerusalem Palestinians” 110 occurred on 30 June 2006 when Israel revoked the “residency” 
of four members of the Palestinian Legislative Council (the Palestinian Parliament) 
affiliated with Hamas. Israel declared that those four men must renounce their membership 
in Hamas if they want to continue to have “residency rights” in East Jerusalem.  
This policy, i.e. the revocation of “Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians”, is one of 
numerous illegal Israeli policies and practices in the occupied city
111
 – including home 
demolitions,
112
 private land expropriation, denial of family unification requests, building 
and expanding Jewish settlements and the construction of the illegal Wall – that turned the 
Palestinian Jerusalemites into a persecuted people in their own city.
113
  
 
To the Palestinians, these policies and practices are primarily informed by Israel’s goal to 
effectively ‘Judaize’ Jerusalem – i.e. “to change the demographic makeup of the city by 
increasing the Jewish presence and severely limiting the Palestinian presence to no more 
than 24 percent of the population” (Farha 2001: 161). This will enable Israel to create an 
overwhelmingly Jewish majority in the city and thus tightens its grip over the city. 
Ultimately, Israel – by implementing these policies – would have created enough facts on 
the ground that will make any division of Jerusalem in favour of a future independent 
Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital “physically impossible” (Rubenberg 
2003: 198). 
5.3.2 Names of Holy Places 
The Palestinians and Israelis have conflicting claims vis-à-vis a number of holy places that 
each side considers as part of its national and religious identity (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). These 
holy places are mainly located in the Occupied West Bank cities of Jerusalem, Hebron and 
                                                          
110
 For further information on this specific policy, see B’Tselem and HaMoked joint report by Yael Stein 
‘The Quite Deportation: Revocation of Residency of East Jerusalem Palestinians’, B’Tselem website, 
published in April 1997: http://www.btselem.org/download/199704_quiet_deportation_eng.doc [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
111
 These policies and practices are illegal according to many UN Security Council Resolutions, such as 465 
of 1980. 
112
 Demolishing Palestinian homes and property in the Occupied West Bank (including East Jerusalem) is 
one of the practices which Israel is required to stop according to the Roadmap Plan. On the general 
Palestinian housing conditions in Occupied East Jerusalem, including home demolitions, see Farha (2001: 
161-164).  
113
 For more details on these Israeli policies and practices in the Occupied East Jerusalem, see the United 
Nations report published in March 2011, available at:  http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/OCHASpFocus_230311.pdf 
[last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Bethlehem. However, the most contentious holy places are those located in the Old City of 
Jerusalem. Jerusalem is of significant importance to the world’s three major monotheistic 
religions: Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The city is not only religiously important to the 
two sides of the conflict, but also politically as each side claims it to be the capital of its 
state (Peteet 2005: 163-164). 
 
Khalidi (1997: 14) argues that the “process of seeking validation for conflicting claims is 
most fittingly symbolized, however, by the unremitting struggle over the naming of 
Jerusalem”. Jerusalem is known in Arabic as ‘سدقلا’ (Al-Quds) and in Hebrew as ‘םילשורי’ 
(Yerushalayim) – “a word derived from Aramaic, meaning, ironically, “city of peace”” 
(Khalidi 1997: 14). Detailed analysis of data showed that the English name of the city, 
Jerusalem, appears twenty times in the original source texts of peace initiatives in the 
corpus, three times in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, fifteen times in the 
Geneva Accord and twice in the Roadmap Plan.  
 
The toponym ‘Jerusalem’ was translated – following a cultural filtering strategy – as ‘سدقلا’ 
(Al-Quds) and ‘םילשורי’ (Yerushalayim) into Arabic and Hebrew languages respectively as 
in the following example:  
(5.14) The Parties recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural significance of 
Jerusalem and its holiness enshrined in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam [The Geneva Accord: 
18]. 
 
 
[PPC] 
 
Back 
translation:  
 
 ةيملاعلا ةيفاقثلاو ةيناحورلا ،ةينيدلا ،ةيخيراتلا ةيمهلأاب نافرطلا فرتعيسدقلل ،ةيدوهيلل اهتيسدقبو ،
.ملاسلإاو ةيحيسملاو        
The two sides recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural 
significance of Jerusalem...     
[YA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 
םידדצה םיריכמ תובישחב תירוטסיהה, תיתדה, תינחורה תיתוברתהו תילסרבינואה לש 
םילשורי התשודקו תודהיל, תורצנל םלסאלו. 
The two sides recognize the universal historic, religious, spiritual, and cultural 
...Jerusalemsignificance of  
 
The detailed analysis also showed that the Arabic and Hebrew names of the city – i.e. 
‘سدقلا’ (Al-Quds) and ‘םילשורי’ (Yerushalayim) respectively – were never used together 
side by side – e.g.‘ ميلاشوري/ سدقلا’ or ‘סדקרא/םילשורי’ – in any of the Arabic or Hebrew 
translations of peace initiatives. 
 
The toponym ‘East Jerusalem’ appears six times in the source texts of peace initiatives 
(twice in the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, once in the 
Geneva Accord, twice in the Arab Peace Initiative and once in the Roadmap Plan). This 
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toponym was predominantly translated into Arabic as ‘ةيقرشلا سدقلا’ (Al-Quds al-Sharqiyah, 
lit. ‘the Eastern Jerusalem’) and into Hebrew as ‘ חרזמ םילשורי ’ (Mizrah Yerushalayim, lit. 
‘East Jerusalem’). The following two examples from the Geneva Accord and the Arab 
Peace Initiative respectively illustrate this point: 
(5.15) The Parties will apply in certain socio-economic spheres interim measures to ensure the agreed, 
expeditious, and orderly transfer of powers and obligations from Israel to Palestine. This shall 
be done in a manner that preserves the accumulated socio-economic rights of the residents of 
East Jerusalem [The Geneva Accord: 24]. 
 
 
 
[PPC] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ةيعامتجلاا تلااجملا ضعب يف نافرطلا قبطي–  تايحلاصلا لقن نامضل ةيلاقتنا تاءارجإ ةيداصتقلاا
 متيسو نيطسلف ىلإ ليئارسإ نم ماظنو ةعرسب اهيلع قفتملا تامازتللااو قوقحلا نمضت ةقيرطب كلذ
 ةيعامتجلاا– ينطاومل ةمكارتملا ةيداصتقلاا ةيقرشلا سدقلا. 
…citizens of Eastern Jerusalem... 
 
[YA] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
םימוחתב ויצוס-םיימונוקא םימיוסמ םידדצה וטקני ידעצ םייניב חיטבהל רבעמ םכסומ, 
ריהמ רדוסמו לש תויוכמסה תויוביוחמהו לארשימ ןיטסלפל. רבד הז השעיי ןפואב 
רמשייש תא תויוכזה ויצוסה-תוימונוקא תורבטצמה לש יבשות חרזמ םילשורי. 
…residents of East Jerusalem… 
 
 
      (5.16) 
 
 وينوي نم عبارلا ذنم ةلتحملا ةينيطسلفلا يضارلأا ىلع ةدايس تاذ ةلقتسم ةينيطسلف ةلود مايق لوبق1567  ةيبرغلا ةفضلا يف
 اهتمصاع نوكتو ةزغ عاطقوةيقرشلا سدقلا                                          .  [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1] 
Back translation: …with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
 
[LAS] The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State 
on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank 
and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
[Reuters] Acceptance of the establishment of an independent and sovereign Palestinian state 
in the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 םייניטסלפה םיחטשב תונוביר תלעבו תיאמצע תיניטסלפ הנידמ לש התמקה תלבק
, ינויב העבראה זאמ םישובכה7691  רשא ]הנידמ[ ,הזע תעוצרבו ,תיברעמה הדגב
 התריבתיחרזמה םילשורי. 
Acceptance of the establishment of independent and sovereign Palestinian state in 
the Palestinian territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip, [state] its capital is Eastern Jerusalem. 
 
[Haayal 
Hakore] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 זאמ ושבכנש םיניטסלפה םיחטשב תינובירו תיאמצע תיניטסלפ הנידמ לש התמקה תלבק
 ,ינויב יעיברה7691 התריבש ,הזע תעוצרבו תיברעמה הדגב ,םילשורי חרזמ. 
 
Acceptance of establishment of independent and sovereign Palestinian state in the 
Palestinian territories which were occupied since 4 June 1967, in the West Bank 
and the Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
However, this toponym – i.e. ‘East Jerusalem’ – was translated differently in the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan. Examine the 
following example: 
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(5.17) GOI reopens Palestinian Chamber of Commerce and other closed Palestinian institutions in 
East Jerusalem [The Roadmap Plan: 3]. 
 
[IMFA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 تِقلغأ يتلا ةينيطسلفلا تاسسؤملا نم اهريغو ةينيطسلفلا ةيراجتلا ةفرغلا حتف ليئارسإ ةموكح ديُعت يف
سدقلا ميلشروأ يقرش نيفرطلا نيب ةقباسلا تايقافتلااب اًمامت ّديقتلاب اهدهعت ىلع ءانب. 
…in East Yerushalayim Al-Quds… 
 
[USDS] 
 
 
Back 
translation:  
 ةقلغملا ةينيطسلفلا تاسسؤملا نم اهريغو ةينيطسلفلا ةيراجتلا ةفرغلا حتف ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ديعت سدقلا يف
ةيقرشلا نيفرطلا نيب ةقباسلا تايقافتلال ًاقفو مات لكشب لمعت تاسسؤملا هذه نأب مازتلا ىلع ءانب. 
 
…in the Eastern Jerusalem… 
 
[Peace  
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 םירחא םיניטסלפ תודסומו תיניטסלפה רחסמה תכשל תא שדחמ תחתופ לארשי תלשממ
 ורגסנשםילשורי חרזמב םאתהב קר ולעפי הלא תודסומש תוביוחמ לע ססבתהב ,
םידדצה ןיב םימדוק םימכסהל. 
…in East Jerusalem… 
The translation of the Israel Ministry of foreign Affairs (IMFA) is the only case across 
corpus where the Hebrew-Arabic compound name ‘ يقرش  ميلشروأسدقلا ’ (East Yerushalayim 
Al-Quds) is used. This case is of particular interest as it shows an Israeli attempt to force 
on one language a name based on usage in another (Khalidi 1997: 14). In this sense, Israel 
forces the Palestinians to acknowledge the Hebrew name for the city “although speakers of 
Arabic had a perfectly serviceable name of their own for the city for well over a 
millennium” (Khalidi 1997: 14). 
 
In its own Arabic-language broadcast, radio and TV, Israel refers to Jerusalem exclusively 
as ‘  ميلشروأسدقلا ’ (Yerushalayim Al-Quds) (usually shortened as Yerushalayim) and to the 
eastern part of it as ‘ يقرش  ميلشروأسدقلا ’ (East Yerushalayim Al-Quds) (Khalidi 1997: 14). 
These specific compound names are also found in all official Israeli Arabic documents 
published on governmental websites such as the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic 
website – i.e. altawāsul. The following two examples show this point: 
(ST) 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
ءاهتنا دعب ةتسلا مايلاا برح لا يف ،ريصق تقوب27  وينوي ناريزح نم1567ىلع يليئارسلإا ناملربلا قداص ، 
يف قطانملا عيمج هبجومب تحبصأ نوناق عورشم سدقلا ميلشروا  عضخت برحلا للاخ ليئارسإ اهيلع تلوتسا يتلا
 ةيرادإ ةرطيسلةيئاضقو ةيليئارسإ.  ةيدلب ذوفن ةقطنم دودح عيسوت مت مويب كلذ دعبوسدقلا ميلشروأ  لمشتل يقرش
ميلشروأ سدقلا اهبونجب وليِغو ةنيدملا لامشب بوقعي يفينِو تورَطَع ىلإ ةفاضلإاب. 114 
Shortly after the end of the six-day war on 27 June 1967, the Israeli Parliament approved 
a law by which all the territories in Yerushalayim Al-Quds, which Israel captured during 
the war, became under Israeli administrative and legal control. One day later, the borders 
of the jurisdiction of the municipality of Yerushalayim Al-Quds were expanded to include 
East Yerushalayim Al-Quds in addition to Atarot, Nabi Ya’qob northern the city and Gilo 
eastern the city. 
 
                                                          
114
 ‘ ميلشروأ ( ّةتسلا مّايلأا برح دعب سدقلا1567) ’ (lit. ‘Yerushalayim Al-Quds after the six-day war (1967)’), Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Arabic website, altawāsul: 
http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/israel+in+maps/jerusalem+after+the+six+day+war.htm [last accessed: 
24 November 2011]. 
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(ST) 
 
Back 
transaltion: 
 ةميدقلا ةدلبلا ربتعتيف سدقلا ميلشروأ بسح .ناكسلاب ةلوهأم رمتسم لكشبو تناك يتلا ملاعلا يف ندملا مدقأ نم  ءاملع
 نم رثكأ ىلإ ةنيدملا خيرات دوعي راثلآا4900 .ماع  راوسلأا ةحاسم غلبت  عبرم رتموليك ثلث ةميدقلا ةدلبلاب ةطيحملا
داكلاب.115 
The old city in Yerushalayim Al-Quds is considered one of the oldest cities in the 
world… 
 
Israel, by using Hebrew-Arabic compound names such as Yerushalayim Al-Quds – to refer 
to the whole of Jerusalem – or East Yerushalayim Al-Quds – to refer to part of it – 
disseminates “Hebrew-based state ideology through the Arabic language” (Suleiman 2004: 
175). As Khalidi (1997: 14) notes, such a practice – although it may seem “petty” – is 
associated with the major process of “attempting to signal control by imposing place 
names”. The Hebrew-Arabic compound name Sharqī Yerushalayim Al-Quds implies that 
the city is not divided but rather “unified” under Israeli sovereignty. This reflects the 
“unquestioned” public position of all Israeli governments since 1967 that Jerusalem should 
always remain “Israel’s eternal and undivided capital” (Silberman 2001: 488). This 
position is clearly expressed in a number of official Israeli documents and legislations, 
most notably, the Knesset basic law on Jerusalem 1980.
116
 
 
Holy Places in Jerusalem 
The main site of conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied Old City of 
Jerusalem vis-à-vis two holy sites: firstly, what is called by Muslims ‘فيرشلا مرحلا’ (al-
 aram al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary’) and by Jews ‘תיבה רה’ (Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the 
Temple Mount’) and secondly, what is called by Muslims ‘قاربلا طئاح’ (Hāaiṭ al-Burāq, lit. 
‘al-Burāq Wall’) and by Jews ‘יברעמה לתוכה’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’).  
Detailed analysis of corpus showed that these two holy places appear in the source texts of 
the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord but not in the Roadmap Plan or the Arab 
Peace Initiative. In the following sub-section, the way these toponyms are rendered in the 
Arabic, Hebrew and English translations across corpus will be examined. 
 
                                                          
115
 ‘  نيب سدقلا ميلشروأراوسلأا ’ (lit. ‘Yerushalayim Al-Quds inside the walls’), Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Arabic website, altawāsul: 
http://www.altawasul.com/MFAAR/this+is+israel/jerusalem/within+the+walls.htm [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
116
 ‘Basic Law- Jerusalem- Capital of Israel’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, published on 30 July 
1980:  
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/1980_1989/Basic%20Law-%20Jerusalem 
%20Capital%20of%20Israel [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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The first toponym to be examined is ‘al- aram al-Sharīf’ or ’the Temple Mount’. These 
two names appear together side by side only in the English source text of the Geneva 
Accord in the heading of the fifth clause of Article 6 on Jerusalem as the following excerpt 
shows: 
(ST) 5. Al-Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount (Compound) 
I. International Group 
a. An International Group composed of the IVG and other parties to be agreed upon by the 
Parties, including members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), shall 
hereby be established to monitor, verify, and assist in the implementation of this clause.  
 
For this purpose, the International Group shall establish a Multinational Presence on the 
Compound, the composition, structure, mandate and functions of which are set forth in Annex 
X. 
 
This heading was rendered in the Arabic translation of Al-Ayyam newspaper following a 
cultural filtering strategy as ‘ مرحلا فيرشلا/ مرحلا( لكيهلا لبج) ’ (al- aram al-Sharīf/ Jabal al-
Haykal (‘al- aram’), lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary/ the Temple Mount’ (al- aram). It was also 
rendered following a cultural filtering strategy in the Hebrew translation of Yes to an 
Agreement as ‘(םחתמה) תיבה רה /  ףירשא םארחה םחתמ  (Mitham ha-  aram al-Sharīf/ Har ha-
Bayt (ha-Mitham), lit. ‘Compound of the Noble Sanctuary/ the Temple Mount (the 
Compound)’). Both translations kept the two names side by side but only in the heading.  
 
The English source text of the Geneva Accord later on talks about ‘the compound’ as 
shorthand, instead of both names together, i.e. al-  aram al-Sharīf and the Temple Mount. 
The term, ‘the compound’ appears eleven times and only in the English source text of the 
Geneva Accord. In the Al-Ayyam translation, this term was consistently rendered as ‘مرحلا’ 
(al- aram, lit. ‘the Sanctuary’). On the other hand, in the Hebrew translation, it was 
consistently rendered as ‘םחתמה’ (ha-mitham, lit. ‘the compound’) as in the following 
example: 
(5.18) The International Group shall draw up rules and regulations to maintain security on and 
conservation of the Compound [The Geneva Accord: 19]. 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
ميمرت و ةنايصلو نملأا ىلع ةظفاحملل تاميظنتو دعاوق ةغايصب ةيلودلا ةعومجملا موقت مرحلا. 
The international group drafts rules and regulations to maintain security and 
conserve al- aram. 
 
[YA]: 
 
Back 
translation: 
הצובקה ןיבה-תימואל שבגת םיללכ תונקתו הרימשל לע ןוחטיבה םחתמב רומישלו 
םחתמה. 
The international group forms regulations and rules to preserve the security in the 
compound and to preserve it. 
 
In Arabic, the term ‘مرحلا’ (al- aram) is shorthand for ‘ مرحلا فيرشلا ’ (al- aram al-Sharīf) 
and both terms have the religious and historical package associated with the place. When 
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talking about al- aram, the Palestinian readers would know immediately that what is 
meant is al- aram al-Sharīf and nothing else. On the other hand, in Hebrew the Temple 
Mount is referred to as ‘תיבה רה םחתמ’ (mitham Har ha-Bayt, lit. ‘the compound of the 
Temple Mount’) and not by the shorthand ‘םחתמה’ (ha-mitham, lit. ‘the compound’). The 
negotiated compromise – i.e. the inclusion of the two names side by side – in the Geneva 
Accord with regard to this holy place has disappeared in translation.  
 
The toponym ‘al- aram al-Sharīf’/the ‘Temple Mount’ also appears in the Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement. In the Hebrew and English language 
versions of this proposal the two names appear side by side. On the other hand, the Arabic 
language version contains only the Arab name of this place. The following example shows 
this point: 
(5.19) 
 
 
חטש םארח-לא-ףירש) רה תיבה(  היהי קלח תנידממ ןיטסלפ.  
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 1] 
Back transaltion: the area of  aram al-Sharīf (Temple Mount) will be part of the state of 
Palestine. 
 
 
 
Gush-
Shalom  
Back 
translation: 
نيطسلف ةلود نم ءزج فيرشلا يسدقلا مرحلا ةقطنم نوكت 
 
The area of the al- aram al-Qudsi al-Sharīf will be part of the state of Palestine. 
 
Gush-
Shalom  
The Haram Al-Sharif (the Temple Mount) will be part of the State of Palestine. 
 
 
The differences between the English and Hebrew language versions, on the one hand, and 
the Arabic language version, on the other, can be explained with regard to the audience 
design of each language version (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). 
 
In the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the toponym ‘al- aram al-Sharīf’ is the 
only name used. All the Arabic and Hebrew translations rendered this toponym following a 
cultural filtering strategy except in the Hebrew translation of the National Consensus, 
which employed an implicitness change strategy and thus avoided any direct reference to 
this toponym by its Arabic name. The following example illustrates this point: 
(5.20) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be 
designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims [Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles: 1]. 
 
[NC] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 
 "תרמוש"כ רדגות ןיטסלפ תנידמ .םישודקה תומוקמה לע תונוביר היהת אל דצ םושל
םימלסומה תבוטל םאלסאל םישודקה תומוקמה.    
The state of Palestine will be designated as guardian of the holy places of Islam for 
the benefit of the Muslims. 
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This ambiguous rendering of such a sensitive toponym can be seen in light of the efforts to 
market the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles to the Israeli public by concealing 
political compromises made during negotiations.  
 
The second toponym to be examined is what is called by Muslims ‘قاربلا طئاح’ (Hāaiṭ al-
Burāq, lit. ‘al-Burāq Wall’) and by Jews ‘יברעמה לתוכה’ (Ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi, lit. ‘the 
Western Wall’). In the Muslim tradition, Hāaiṭ al-Burāq is “the site where the prophet 
Mohammad tied his miraculous horse [called al-Burāq] that brought him from Mecca to 
al-Aqsa on his way to heaven” (Klein 2007: 29). This significant event in Muslim tradition 
is recorded in Qur’an in (17:1) (Khalidi 1997: 17). The very same site, called by Jews Ha-
Kotel ha-Ma'ravi has been “the scene of public Jewish worship since the sixteenth or 
seventeenth century, before which time such worship took place on the Mount of Olives” 
(Khalidi 1997: 17). 
 
This wall is “among the holiest of sites to two faiths, and is naturally considered by each to 
be its exclusive property” (Khalidi 1997: 17). In 1929, clashes between Arab Palestinians 
and Jews erupted due to the claim of each side of ownership of this wall. Following these 
events in 1930, an international committee formed by the League of Nations at that time 
was appointed and after investigations ruled that this wall belongs to Muslims and is an 
integral part of the al- aram al-Sharīf but Jews have the right to pray there (Unterman 
2011: 178).  
 
This wall is referred to as ‘the Wailing Wall’ in the English source text of the Geneva 
Accord, ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi in the Hebrew source text of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of 
Principles for Peace Agreement and the ‘Western Wall’ in the English source text of the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. The name of this wall was translated 
differently only in the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord as the following example 
shows: 
(5.21) The Wailing Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty [The Geneva Accord: 19] 
 
 
[PPC]: 
Back 
translation: 
ةيليئارسلإا ةدايسلا تحت ىكبملا طئاح نوكي 
The Wailing Wall will be under the Israeli sovereignty. 
[YA] 
Back 
translation: 
תילארשי תונוביר תחת היהי יברעמה לתוכה 
The Western Wall shall be under Israeli sovereignty. 
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The toponym, the ‘Wailing Wall’ appears twice in the English text of the Geneva Accord. 
This name was translated twice into Hebrew – following a meaning shift strategy – as 
‘יברעמה לתוכה’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi, lit. ‘the Western Wall’). The ‘Wailing Wall’ is not the 
same as the ‘Western Wall’. The ‘Wailing Wall’ is a “section of the outer western wall of 
the al-Haram” (Khalidi 2003: 61). This section of the ‘Western Wall’ is called the ‘Wailing 
Wall’ because Jews – who believe that it is “all that remains of the Second Temple 
destroyed by the Romans in AD 70” (Hart 2010: 291) – for centuries have come to this 
wall to mourn the destruction of their Temple (Reiter et al 2000: 116). This meaning shift 
can be explained in light of the persuasive function of the Hebrew translation which tries to 
elicit the Israeli public’s support by emphasizing that the Palestinian negotiating team 
conceded sovereignty over the ‘Western Wall’ or ‘al-Burāq Wall’ to the Israeli side. 
 
In the Hebrew source text of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace 
Agreement, the ‘Western Wall’ is referred to as ‘יברעמה לתוכה’ (ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi, lit. 
‘the Western Wall’). This wall was rendered in the English language version of the 
declaration as the ‘Western Wall’ but changed in the Arabic language version into ‘ طئاح 
ىكبملا’ (Hāaiṭ al-Mabkā, lit. ‘the Wailing Wall’) as in the following example: 
(5.22) 
 
 
לתוכה יברעמה) קלחה הנוכמה םג"לתוכ תועמדה (" היהי קלח תנידממ לארשי. 
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 2].     
Back transaltion: the Western Wall (the part also known as ‘the tears Wall’) will be Part of the 
State of Israel. 
 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
Back 
translation: 
 نوكيىكبملا طئاح طئاح مساب فورعملا ءزجلا( )عومدلا ليئارسا ةلود نم ءزج. 
 
The Wailing Wall (the part known as the tears wall) will be part of the state of 
Israel. 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
The Western Wall (the part also known as “the wailing Wall”) will be part of the 
State of Israel. 
In this sense, the ‘Western Wall’ becomes under Israeli sovereignty in the Hebrew and 
English language versions whereas the ‘Wailing Wall’ is what becomes under Israeli 
sovereignty in the Arabic language version of the declaration. These changes correspond to 
the conflicting narratives of the two sides and their political positions on the issue. 
In the English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the wall is 
referred to as ‘the Western Wall’. The following example shows how this toponym is 
rendered in the Arabic and Hebrew translations: 
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(5.23) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places... Israel will be Guardian of the Western 
Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1]. 
 
 
[PCPD] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ةسدقملا نكاملأا ىلع ةدايس نيفرطلا نم يأ سرامي نل…  ىلع ةياصولا ليئارسإ ىلوتتيبرغلا طئاحلا 
.يدوهيلا بعشلا حلاصل 
…the Western Wall… 
 
[NC] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ةسدقملا نكاملأا ىلع ةدايس نيفرطلا نم يأ سرامي نل…  ىلع ةياصولا ليئارسإ ىلوتتىكبملا طئاح 
يدوهيلا بعشلا حلاصل. 
…the Wailing Wall… 
 
[Al-eman] 
 
Back 
translation: 
.ةسدقملا نكاملاا ىلع ةدايس فرط يلأ نوكت نل. ةسراحك ليئارسا ةلود فّرعتسو . طئاح( يبرغلا طئاحلل
)قاربلا يدوهيلا بعشلا ةحلصمل. 
…the Western Wall (al-Burāq Wall)… 
 
[NC] 
 
            Back        
translation: 
םישודקה תומוקמה לע תונוביר היהת אל דצ םושל… "תרמוש"כ רדגות לארשי לתוכה לש
יברעמה  .ידוהיה םעה תבוטל 
…the Western Wall… 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
םישודקה תומוקמה לע תונוביר היהת אל דצ םושל… לש תרמושכ רדגות לארשי . לתוכה
יברעמה ידוהיה םעה תבוטל. 
…the Western Wall… 
In all Hebrew translations, the toponym ‘the Western Wall’ was rendered – following a 
cultural filtering strategy – as ha-Kotel ha-Ma'ravi. In the Arabic translation of the 
National Consensus, this toponym – i.e. ‘the Western Wall’ was translated – following a 
meaning shift strategy – as ‘ىكبملا طئاح’ (Hāaiṭ al-Mabkā, lit. ‘the Wailing Wall’). This shift 
can be explained with regard to the intended readership of this specific translation, i.e. the 
Palestinians of 1948. 
 
In the translation of al-eman network the two names, ‘the Western Wall’ and ‘al-Burāq 
Wall’ appear together side by side. The choice of ‘al-Burāq Wall’ in al-eman translation is 
particularly interesting as it reflects the Palestinian narrative that this wall is an Islamic 
property and brings the whole issue of claims back to the surface. 
 
Other holy places concern those in the cities of Hebron, Bethlehem and Jerusalem. Firstly, 
the ‘Tomb of the Patriarchs’ in Hebron, which is known to Muslims as ‘ يميهاربلإا مرحلا
فيرشلا’ (al- aram al-Ibrāhimi al-Sharīf, lit. ‘the Noble Sanctuary of Abraham’) and to 
Jews as ‘הלפכמה תרעמ’ (Me’arat ha-Makhpelah). Secondly, Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, 
which is known to Muslims as ‘ليحار ةبق دجسم’ (Masjid Qubbat Rahīl, lit. ‘the Mosque of 
the Dome of Rachel’) or ‘  نب للابحابر  دجسم’ (Masjid Bilāl bin Rabāh, lit. ‘the Mosque of 
Bilāl bin Rabāh’) and to Jews as ‘לחר רבק’ (Kever Rahel, lit. ‘Rachel’s Tomb’). Finally, 
what is known to Muslims as ‘ليئومص يبنلا ماقم’ (Maqām al-Nabī Ṣamū´īl, lit. ‘the site of the 
Prophet Samuel’) or ‘ليئومص يبنلا دجسم’ (Masjid al-Nabī Ṣamū´īl) and to Jews as ‘רבק 
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לאומש’ (Kever Shmuel, lit. ‘the Tomb of Samuel’). These three places are only mentioned 
in the English text of the Geneva Accord. The following example shows how these 
toponyms were dealt with in the Arabic and Hebrew translations: 
(5.24) The Parties shall establish special arrangements to guarantee access to agreed sites of religious 
significance, as will be detailed in Annex X. These arrangements will apply, inter alia, to the 
Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron and Rachel’s Tomb in Bethlehem, and Nabi Samuel [The 
Geneva Accord: 34]. 
 
 
  [PPC] 
  Back 
  translation: 
 
 يف لصفم وه امك ، اهيلع قفتملا ةينيدلا ةيمهلأا تاذ عقاوملا ىلإ لوصولا نامضل ةصاخ تابيترت نافرطلا
قحلملا X ىلع تابيترتلا هذه قبطنتو محل تيب يف ليحار ةبقو ليلخلا يف يميهاربلإا مرحلا  يبنلا ماقمو
ليئومص .اهريغو           
 
… al- aram al-Ibrāhimi in Hebron, Rachel’s Dom in Bethlehem, and the site of 
the prophet Samuel and others. 
  [YA] 
 
 
 
 
  Back 
  translation: 
 
 
םידדצה ושבגי םירדסה םידחוימ לע תנמ חיטבהל השיג םירתאל םימכסומ ילעב תובישח 
תיתד, יפכ  טרופיש חפסנבX.  םירדסה הלא ולוחי, ןיב ראשה, לע תרעמ הלפכמה 
ןורבחב, רבק לחר תיבב םחל יבנו לאומס. 
 
… Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron, Rachels Tomb in Bethlehem, and prophet 
Samuel. 
In the above example, these holy places were rendered differently in the Arabic and 
Hebrew translations. Firstly, the toponym ‘Tomb of the Patriarchs’ was translated – 
following a cultural filtering strategy – as ‘يميهاربلإا مرحلا’ (al- aram al-Ibrāhimi) and as 
‘הלפכמה תרעמ’ (Me’arat ha-Makhpelah) into Arabic and Hebrew respectively. Secondly, 
‘Rachel’s Tomb’ was translated literally as ‘ليحار ةبق’ (Qubbat Rahīl) and following a 
cultural filtering strategy as ‘לחר רבק’ (Kever Rahel) into Arabic and Hebrew respectively. 
Of particular interest is that the Arabic translation does not refer to this holy place as a 
mosque but simply a ‘dome’. 
Finally, the toponym ‘Nabi Samuel’ (‘Nabi’ is the transliteration of the Arabic word ‘يبن’, 
lit. ‘prophet’) is a mosque – originally a 12th-century crusader church – that “Jewish, 
Christian and Muslim traditions alike regard as the resting place of the Prophet Samuel” 
(Kedar 2000: 110). Following the 1967 war, Israel turned the cellar of this mosque where 
the tomb is placed into a synagogue. The English source text, although adopting the Arabic 
transliterated name of the place, does not refer to it as either ‘mosque’ or ‘tomb’. The 
Arabic and Hebrew translations follow suit. This could be due to lack of agreement on this 
issue. 
 
These three holy places have always been the site of ongoing religious conflict and power 
struggle over their ownership between the Palestinians and Israelis. In February 2010, the 
Israeli government, led by the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, added the ‘Tomb of 
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the Patriarchs’ in Hebron and ‘Rachel's Tomb’ in Bethlehem to its list of national heritage 
sites, a step faced with strong condemnation and protest by the Palestinians. In response to 
the Israeli decision, the UNESCO Executive Board in its 185
th
 session from 5-21 October 
2010 ruled that these two sites, i.e. ‘يميهاربلإا مرحلا’ (al- aram al-Ibrāhimi) and ‘  نب للابحابر  
دجسم’ (Masjid Bilāl bin Rabāh, lit. ‘the Mosque of Bilāl bin Rabāh’) are Palestinian and “an 
integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories and that any unilateral action by the 
Israeli authorities is to be considered a violation of international law, the UNESCO 
conventions and the United Nations and Security Council resolutions” and urged Israel to 
“remove the two sites from the Israeli national heritage list”.117 
Rivalry between the two sides can also be seen with regard to the names given to the gates 
of Old City of Jerusalem. The Old City of Jerusalem has eleven gates (seven open and four 
sealed). The English source text of the Geneva Accord mentions two of these gates:  the 
Jaffa Gate (Arabic: ‘ باب ليلخلا ’, Bāb al-Khalīl, Hebrew: ‘ופי רעש’, Sha'ar Yafo) and Zion 
gate (Arabic: ‘ باب دواد يبنلا ’, Bāb al-Nabi Dāwud, Hebrew: ‘ רעש ןויצ ’, Sha'ar Tsiyon). The 
following example shows how these names are translated into Arabic and Hebrew: 
(5.25) Along the way outlined in Map X (from the Jaffa Gate to the Zion Gate) there will be 
permanent and guaranteed arrangements for Israelis regarding access, freedom of movement, 
and security, as set forth in Annex X [The Geneva Accord: 21]. 
  
                 [PPC] 
 
 
                 Back      
translation:  
 ةطيرخلا يف نيبملا قيرطلا لوط ىلعX  ) نمليلخلا باب باب ىتحو دواد يبنلا ( تابيترت كانه نوكتس
 وه امبسح نملأاو ةكرحلا ةيرحو لوصولا ةيناكمإب قلعتي اميف نييليئارسلإل ةبسنلاب ةنومضمو ةمئاد
 قحلملا يف هيلع صوصنمX. 
…from Bāb al-Khalīl to Bāb al-Nabi Dāwud… 
 
   [YA] 
 
                    Back      
translation: 
הפמב תטרופמה ךרדה ךרואלX  )ןויצ רעשל ופי רעשמ םיעובק םירדסה ויהי )
חפסנב טרופמכ ,ןוחטיבלו העונת שפוח ,השיגל רשאב םילארשיל םיחטבומו  . 
…from Sha’ar Yafo to Sha’ar Tsiyon … 
A cultural filtering strategy was followed in both Arabic and Hebrew translations, i.e. the 
names of these two gates are rendered according to how they are conventionally known in 
Arabic and Hebrew. These names are part of each side’s narrative of Jerusalem which is 
used to consolidate legitimacy and ownership of the city. 
 
5.4 Intertextuality  
Intertextuality is a key feature of peace initiatives. Intertextuality – which is defined as “the 
relationship between embedded quotation, or explicit reference to another text” (Chilton 
                                                          
117
 ‘UNESCO Resolution 185 EX/SR.9’, UNESCO website: 
 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001899/189993e.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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and Schäffner 2002: 17) – is closely linked to the issue of naming practices (cf. Chapter 
5.3).  
 
Cases of intertextuality include references to previous peace agreements and negotiations 
between the Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), e.g. the Oslo 
Agreements 1993, the Wye River Memorandum 1998, the Camp David Negotiations 2000, 
and the Taba Negotiations 2001, etc. Also, references to numerous United Nations Security 
Council Resolutions (e.g. 242, 338, 1397, etc.) and major turning points in the long history 
of the conflict (e.g. the Madrid Conference of 1991) are made. The following two 
examples are illustrations of this point: 
The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 
1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, 
UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397, agreements previously reached by the parties, and the initiative of 
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah – endorsed by the Beirut Arab League Summit – calling for 
acceptance of Israel as a neighbour living in peace and security, in the context of a comprehensive 
settlement [The Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
Confirming  that this Agreement is concluded within the framework of the Middle East peace 
process initiated in Madrid in October 1991, the Declaration of Principles of September 13, 1993, 
the subsequent agreements including the Interim Agreement of September 1995, the Wye River 
Memorandum of October 1998 and the Sharm El-Sheikh Memorandum of September 4, 1999, and 
the permanent status negotiations including the Camp David Summit of July 2000, the Clinton 
Ideas of December 2000, and the Taba Negotiations of January 2001 [The Geneva Accord: 1].  
 
These cases of intertextuality were translated following a literal translation strategy in the 
different language versions of peace initiatives. Other cases of intertextuality are more 
significant and have ideological and political implications (see below). In the following 
sub-sections, two cases of intertextuality, ‘national home’ and ‘to incline to peace’, will be 
discussed in detail. Other cases of intertextuality will be discussed under the heading of 
political terms (cf. Sections 5.6.4 and 5.6.5). 
 
5.4.1 National Home 
In the English source text of the Geneva Accord, the two parties of the conflict, Israel and 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), recognize their respective countries as the 
‘homelands’ of their peoples. This statement touches on the sensitive issue of conflicting 
claims of the two sides – whether historical or religious – to land. This statement was 
changed in the Hebrew translation of the initiative from recognizing Israel as ‘the 
homeland’ to ‘ תיב ימואלה ’ (bayt ha-le'umi, lit. ‘the national home’) of the Israeli people as 
the following example shows:  
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(5.26) The parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their respective peoples [The 
Geneva Accord: 5]. 
 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
 امه ليئارسإو نيطسلف نأب نافرطلا رقيانطو  امهضعب نوؤش يف لخدتلا مدعب نافرطلا مزتليو ،امهيبعش
ةيلخادلا ضعبلا. 
...the homelands of their peoples… 
 
[YA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 לארשיבו ןיטסלפב םיריכמ םידדצהםיימואלה םיתבכ  אלש םיביוחמ םידדצה .ןהימע לש
ינשה דצה לש םיימינפה ויניינעב ברעתהל. 
...as the national homes of their peoples… 
 
The term ‘national home’118 is derived from the founding document of political Zionism – 
that is Basel Programme – which declared that the aim of Zionism is “to create for the 
Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law” (Renton 2010: 21). The term 
‘the national home’ or bayt ha-le'umi in Hebrew is intertextually linked to four key 
documents concerning the establishment of the state of Israel: the Balfour Declaration 
(1917)
119
, the British Mandate for Palestine (1922), an American Congress resolution on 
this issue (1922) and the “Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel” (1948). The 
term ‘national home’ appears in the text of the Balfour Declaration that was in the form of 
a letter (drafted originally in English) from the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur James 
Balfour to Lord Lionel Walter Rothschild, on 2 November 1917 stating that: 
[H]is Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this 
object.
120
 
It also appears – five times – in the text of the British Mandate for Palestine on 24 April 
1922 (drafted originally in English) as the following two examples show: 
The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative, 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid 
down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and for safeguarding the 
civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion. 
The Zionist Organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the 
Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognized as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with 
His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the cooperation of all Jews who are willing to assist 
in the establishment of the Jewish national home.
121
 
                                                          
118
 For more on the history of this term and Arab reactions to it, see Renton (2010: 15-38) and Thomas (1999: 
9-14). 
119
 Ben Gad (1991: 158) explains that Balfour Declaration “endorsed the basic Zionist thesis that the Jews 
were a separate people, that they were entitled to a national home, and that it would be established in their 
ancestral homeland”. 
120
 ‘Balfour Declaration’, published on the Middle East Information Network website: 
http://www.mideastweb.org/Middle-East-Encyclopedia/balfour_declaration.htm [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
 
121
 ‘The Palestine Mandate (1922)’, published on the Middle East Information Network website: 
http://www.mideastinfo.com/documents/mandate.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Also, it appears in the 1922 US Congress resolution in support of the creation of a 
“national home” for the Jews in Mandate Palestine as in the following excerpt: 
Whereas the Jewish people have for many centuries believed in and yearned for the rebuilding of 
their ancient homeland; and whereas owing to the outcome of the World War and their part therein 
the Jewish people are to be enabled to re-create and reorganize a national home in the land of their 
fathers, which will give to the House of Israel its long-denied opportunity to re-establish a fruitful 
Jewish life and culture in the ancient Jewish land: Therefore be it Resolved, etc. That the United 
States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it 
being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the Holy places and 
religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected.
122
 
 
Finally, the term bayt ha-le'umi appears in the Declaration of the Establishment of the 
State of Israel (drafted originally in Hebrew) as in the following excerpt: 
 
 תוכז וז הרכוה תרהצהב רופלב םוימ ב 'רבמבונב 8481 הרשואו טדנמב םעטמ רבח םימואלה ,רשא ןתנ 
דחוימב ףקות ןיב-ימואל רשקל ירוטסיהה ןיבש םעה ידוהיה ןיבל ץרא-לארשי תוכזלו םעה ידוהיה םיקהל 
שדחמ תא ותיב ימואלה.
123
 
 Back translation: this right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2 November 1917 and 
re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations, which, in particular, gave international 
sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of 
the Jewish people to rebuild its national home. 
The ideological and political implications of the use of the term bayt ha-le'umi are twofold. 
Firstly, it means that the Palestinians conceded the right of return of the Palestinian 
refugees to their homes in historical Palestine (now Israel). Secondly, it jeopardizes the 
rights of approximately 1.3 million Palestinians in Israel (cf. Chapter 6.4). 
 
The term bayt ha-le'umi was chosen to help market the initiative in Israel by showing that 
the Palestinians recognize Israel as a Jewish state with all the implications of such 
recognition, a recognition that has been demanded by successive Israeli prime ministers.
124
 
A heated political debate based on this specific translation choice was stirred in Israel. This 
debate and the political and ideological implications of the term ‘national home’ will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.4.  
 
 
 
                                                          
122
 ‘Congressional Record: House joint resolution favoring the establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people’, published on the website of Emory University Institute for the Study of Modern Israel 
(ISMI): http://www.ismi.emory.edu/PrimarySource/jnh1922part1.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
123
 ‘Declaration of Independence’ (Hebrew: תואמצעה תליגמ), published on the Knesset website: 
http://www.knesset.gov.il/docs/heb/megilat.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
124
 For example, in his address to the United Nations’ 66 opening session on 23 September 2011, Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated the Israeli demand that the Palestinians must recognize Israel 
as a Jewish state. 
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5.4.2 To Incline to Peace 
The second case of intertextuality is vis-à-vis the term ‘ملسلل حنجت نأو’ (wa an tajnaḥa lil-
silmi, lit. ‘to incline to peace’) in the Arabic source text of the Arab Peace Initiative as the 
following example shows: 
(5.27) 
 
 
.اضيأ يجيتارتسلاا اهرايخ وه لداعلا ملاسلا نأ ةنلعم ملسلل حنجت نأو اهتاسايس يف رظنلا ةداعا ليئارسا نم سلجملا بلطي   
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]  
Back translation: ...and to incline towards peace... 
 
[LAS] 
 
The council Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace 
is its strategic option as well.  
[CPS] 
 
The Assembly requests that Israel re-examine her policies and declare that for her 
too, a just peace is the correct strategic choice. 
[CNN] The summit asks Israel to re-evaluate its policies and to work for peace. Israel 
should declare that a just peace is also Israel’s strategic option. 
 
[Reuters] The Council asks Israel to reconsider its policies and opt for peace by announcing 
that a just peace is its strategic option, too. 
 
[PA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
תשקבמ לארשימ לוקשל שדחמ תא התוינידמ ריהצהלו יכ םולש קדוצ אוה םג התריחב 
תיגטרטסאה. 
Asks Israel to reconsider its policy and declare that a just peace… 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
תשקבמ הצעומה לארשימ ןייעל שדחמ התוינידמב ,תוטנל םולשל ,זירכהלו יכ םולשה 
קדוצה אוה הריחב תיגטרטסא םג הרובע. 
...and to incline towards peace... 
 
This term an tajnaḥa lil-silmi (lit. ‘to incline to peace’) is part of the Islamic religious 
discourse on peace and war. It carries a reference to the Quranic verse (60-61) of Chapter 8 
(al-Anfal) as shown below: 
(ST) 
 
 
 
 ِلْيَخْلا ِطَاب ِّر نِمَو ٍة َُّوق ن ِّم ُمتْعََطتْسا ا َّم ُمَهل ْاو ُّدَِعأَو  َلا ْمِِهنوُد نِم َنيِرَخآَو ْمُك َّوُدَعَو ِّالله َّوْدَع ِِهب َنُوبِهُْرت  ُْمهَُملَْعي ُّالله ُُمَهنوَُملَْعت
 ِلِيبَس ِيف ٍءْيَش نِم ْاُوِقفُنت اَمَو  ْمُكَْيِلإ َّفَُوي ِّالله َنوَُملُْظت َلا ُْمتَنأَو .َاَهل َْحنْجَاف ِمْل َّسِلل ْاوَُحنَج ِنإَو  ِّالله َىلَع ْلَّكََوتَو  ُعيِم َّسلا َُوه ُهَِّنإ
 ُمِيلَعْلا. ميظعلا الله قدص ]لافنلأا ةروس  تايلآا60-61.[ 
 
[Yusuf Ali translation] against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, 
including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your 
enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. 
Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be 
treated unjustly. But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou (also) incline towards 
peace, and trust in Allah, for He is One that heareth and knoweth (all things).  
 
The above Quranic verse discusses the issues of peace and war in Islam and sets the 
conditions for Muslims on when to opt for peace with the enemy. The general context for 
this verse urges Muslims to be prepared for war all the time and not to discard this as an 
option; only if the ‘enemy’ ‘inclines’ to peace should Muslims then accept and do the 
same. This context of situation is important in order to understand the significance of the 
term an tajnaḥa lil-silmi in the Arab Peace Initiative. This term was employed by drafters 
of this initiative, i.e. the Arab states, in order to legitimize opting for peace with Israel as a 
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strategic option for the Arab states by presenting this option in an Islamic religious context. 
This verse is usually referred to by the peace camp in the Arab world to justify concluding 
peace with Israel.  
 
The Arabic verb ‘حنجت’ (tajnaḥa, lit. ‘to incline’) implies some sort of a forced action. The 
term an tajnaḥa lil-silmi was omitted in all the English and Hebrew translations except in 
the Hebrew translation published by Peace Now. The omission of this phrase in the official 
English translation of the initiative can be explained with regard to the intended addressees 
and function of the source text. This term – with its religious connotations – was intended 
to help convince the Arab masses – who were angered by the Israeli oppressive practices in 
the occupied Palestinian Territories during the Palestinian Al-Aqsa intifada – of adopting 
peace as not only a strategic option but also a religious duty. This religious message, of 
course, was not needed for the intended readers of the official English translation.  
 
The lack of background knowledge of this religious discourse could perhaps be the reason 
why this phrase was not translated in some of the English and Hebrew translations. The 
translation published by Peace Now shows exactly such knowledge (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). 
 
5.5 Modality  
The frequent use of modality, specifically, modal auxiliary verbs, is another key feature of 
peace initiatives. Modality is a universal aspect of all languages; however, its usage is 
culture-bound (Guido 2008: 174). Modality – a vague term – can be generally classified 
into two main categories: epistemic and deontic (Holes 2004: 223). Epistemic modality 
expresses notions of possibility, probability and certainty whereas deontic modality 
expresses notions of ability, obligation and permission (Darwish 2010: 155). 
Modality can be expressed through a variety of linguistic forms such as modal verbs, 
adjectives, adverbs and certain nominalizations (Lillian 2008: 2). Fowler (1985) explains 
this:  
[C]entrally, the modal auxiliary verbs may, shall, must, need, and others; sentence adverbs such as 
probably, certainly, regrettably; adjectives such as necessary, unfortunate, certain. Some verbs, 
and many nominalizations, are essentially modal: permit, predict, prove; obligation, likelihood, 
desirability, authority” (Fowler 1985: 73 quoted in Lillian 2008: 2). 
 
Detailed analysis of corpus showed that modal verbs (e.g. shall, may, must, etc.) are 
predominantly used in the original source texts of peace initiatives rather than other forms 
of modality (e.g. sentence adverbs, adjectives, etc.) to express notions of obligations, 
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permissions, possibility, etc. However, the use of modal auxiliary verbs is not 
homogeneous across corpus. For example, the modal verb ‘shall’ is only used in the 
Geneva Accord whereas in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the only 
modal verb used is ‘will’. In the Roadmap Plan, obligations – for example – are not 
expressed by the use of ‘shall’ or ‘must’ but by the use of the simple present tense as in the 
following example: 
GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001. Consistent with the 
Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements). 
 
This particular choice of the simple present tense is politically motivated. Saeb Erikat 
pointed out that the Palestinian government insisted on the use of the present tense in the 
Roadmap Plan as it believed it is much stronger than the modal verbs must or shall 
(personal communication 2005).  
 
Based on a systematic comparison of individual translation profiles against each source 
text and amongst each other, one regularity vis-à-vis modal verbs was identified. This 
regularity in translation concerns the modal verb may in the original English source text of 
the Geneva Accord. 
The English language has nine modal verbs: can, could, may, might, must, shall, should, 
will and would (Darwish 2010: 155). The modal verb may – although could express 
epistemic possibility – has so long been the recommended expression of permission and 
sanction in legal language (Trosborg 1997: 132). The same notion of permission which is 
expressed by may can also be expressed by using the form entitled to; however, the 
difference between the two forms is that “may recognizes potential agency and action, 
entitled to reflects only the possession of a right” (Trosborg 1997: 132). 
The two Semitic languages, Arabic and Hebrew, have different means of expressing and 
realizing notions of modality, including permission. Generally, modality in Arabic is 
expressed by means of either modal verbs, e.g. ‘عيطتسي’ (yastaṭī‘), ‘نكمي’ (yumkin), ‘بجي’ 
(yajib) or by means of particles, e.g. ‘دق’ (qad), ‘فوس’ (sawfa), ‘امبر’ (rubbamā), ‘لعل’ 
(la‘ala) (Darwish 2010: 156). The notion of permission in Arabic is expressed through the 
modal verbs ‘نكمي’ (yumkin) and ‘زوجي’ (yajūz) and the particle ‘دق’ (qad). 
 
In Modern Hebrew, the modality system consists of both verbal and nominal constructions 
(Dromi 1980: 104). For example, the notion of permission is expressed by means of ‘לוכי’ 
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(yahol) or ‘efshar’ (Dromi 1980: 102; Glinert 1989: 136). One alternative way to express 
permission in Hebrew is by using one of two predicate adjectives, ‘לגוסמ’ (msugal) which 
corresponds to the English expression ‘is able to’ or ‘רתומ’ (mutar) which corresponds to 
the English expression ‘is permitted’ (Dromi 1980: 103). 
 
The modal verb may is used fifty times in the English source text of the Geneva Accord. It 
was translated into Arabic as ‘نكمي’ (yumkin), ‘زوجي’ (yajūz) and ‘دق’ (qad) forty-one times 
and changed nine times into ‘قحي’ (yaḥiqu, lit. ‘has the right to’ or ‘entitled to’). On the 
other hand, may was translated twenty-six times into Hebrew as ‘לוכי’ (yahol) (may), ten 
times as ‘יאשר’ (rashai) (entitled to) and fourteen times as simple present tense.  
 
In the Arabic translation, may was changed into yaḥiqu five times vis-à-vis the issue of 
Jerusalem, three times vis-à-vis the issue of the Palestinian refugees and once vis-à-vis 
dispute settlement mechanism. The following two examples illustrate this point with regard 
to the question of the Palestinian refugees: 
(5.28) The solution to the PPR aspect of the refugee problem shall entail an act of informed choice on 
the part of the refugee to be exercised in accordance with the options and modalities set forth in 
this agreement. PPR options from which the refugees may choose shall be as follows [The 
Geneva Accord: 25]. 
 
 
[PPC] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 يئجلالا لبق نم سوردم رارق ىلع نيئجلالا ةلكشم يف مئادلا ةماقلإا ناكمب صاخلا قشلا لح يوطني
 ةمئادلا ةماقلإا نكامأ نوكت  .ةيقافتلاا هذه يف اهيلع صوصنملا لاكشلااو تارايخلا ىلع ًءانب سرامي يتلا
قحي :يلي امك اهنيب رايتخلاا نيئجلال 
...The permanent places which the refugees have the right to choose from are as 
following. 
 
    
  (5.29) 
 
(Refugees) The Parties may make submissions to the Committees as deemed necessary [The 
Geneva Accord: 28] 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
يرورض هايري امبسح ناّجلل ضورع ميدقت نيفرطلل قحي 
Both parties have the right to present proposals to the committees as they see it 
necessary. 
 
The modal verb may was changed into rashai in the Hebrew translation six times vis-à-vis 
security issues (e.g. the defensive character of the future Palestinian state and international 
border crossings),  three times vis-à-vis the issue of Jerusalem and once vis-à-vis the issue 
of dispute settlement mechanism. The following two examples illustrate this point: 
(5.30) In passenger terminals, for thirty months, Israel may maintain an unseen presence in a 
designated on-site facility, to be staffed by members of the MF and Israelis, utilizing 
appropriate technology [The Geneva Accord: 17]. 
 
[YA] 
 
 
לארשי אהת תיאשר ריתוהל תוחכונ יתלב תיארנ םינקתמב םידעוימה ךכל יפוסמב 
םיעסונה, ךשמל 30 םישדוח, ושיואייש לע ידי חוכה ברה-ימואל לארשיו, ושמתשישו 
היגולונכטב המיאתמ. 
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Back 
translation: 
 
Israel will be entitled to maintain unseen presence… 
 
(5.31) No individuals or organizations in Palestine other than the PSF and the organs of the IVG, 
including the MF, may purchase, possess, carry or use weapons except as provided by law [The 
Geneva Accord: 12]. 
 
 
[YA] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
ףא םדא וא ןוגרא ןיטסלפב, תלוז תוחוכ ןוחטיבה םיניטסלפה תוקלחמו בקה"א, ללוכ 
חוכה ברה-ימואל, אל היהי יאשר שוכרל, קיזחהל, תאשל וא שמתשהל קשנב, טרפ 
רתומל קוחב. 
 
No person or organization in Palestine except the Palestinian security forces...will 
be entitled to purchase, possess, or use weapons... 
 
What is interesting is that may was changed into yaḥiqu in Arabic and rashai into Hebrew 
three times with regard to the same clauses of the Geneva Accord: twice with regard to 
policing and free movement in the Old City of Jerusalem and once with regard to dispute 
settlement mechanism . The following example illustrates this point: 
(5.32) If a dispute is not settled promptly by the above, either Party may submit it to mediation and 
conciliation by the IVG mechanism in accordance with Article 3 [The Geneva Accord: 38]. 
 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
 للاخ نم اعيرس عازنلا ضف متي مل اذإ،هلاعأ ةنيبملا ةيللآا قحي  ةحلاصملاو ةطاسولا بلط نيفرطلا نم يلأ
 ةداملا بجومب ققحتلاو ذيفنتلا ةعومجم ةيلآ للاخ نم3. 
...each party has the right to... 
 
[YA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
םא תקולחמ אל בשוית תוריהמב ךרדב נה"ל, לכ דצ יאשר התונפהל ןונגנמל רושיגה 
רושיפהו לש בקה"א, םאתהב ףיעסל. 
…each party is entitled to… 
 
 
The above analysis shows that the change of may into yaḥiqu in the Arabic translation and 
into rashai in the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord are in accordance with each 
sides’ priorities and political interests: the final-status issues of Jerusalem and refuges for 
the Palestinian side and the issues of security and Jerusalem for the Israeli side. The 
specific choice of the word ‘قحلا’ (al-ḥaq, lit. ‘the right’) in the Arabic translation reflects 
undisputed entitlement to carry out an action contrary to yumkin, yajūz and qad which 
reflect only permission. On the other hand, the change of may into yaḥiqu and rashai with 
regard to similar issues could perhaps be the result of negotiations and common interest. 
 
5.6 Politically Sensitive Concepts and Terms 
Schäffner (2004: 121) points out that one of the important areas of investigation in political 
discourse is the consideration of the strategic use of political concepts or terms in order to 
achieve certain political purposes. These concepts or terms are normally rooted in 
particular ideologies and would have different meanings in different languages and 
cultures. Historical and ideological contexts are two fundamental elements in 
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understanding political concepts and terms. Schäffner (1997: 130) explains that 
“[c]oncepts have histories, they not only evolve historically, but they cannot be understood 
without linking them to total historical process”. 
The choice or avoidance of particular political terms in negotiated texts is never random or 
neutral but serves strategic political interests and reflects particular ideologies and power 
relations. The Oslo Accords is a case in point. Aruri (2011: 4) explains this case as follows: 
Israeli control of the process was carefully crafted with deliberate use and misuse of strategic 
terminology, nuances and manipulation of the legal nomenclature…The lawyers of the Israeli 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ensured that the legal basis of what they crafted for Arafat’s signature 
would exclude Palestinian sovereignty on any portion of the land extending between the River 
Jordan and the Mediterranean. In hundreds of pages of the Oslo documents, there was no mention 
whatsoever of such terms as occupation, withdrawal, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, 
Palestinian sovereignty or any wording that might hint that the endgame might possibly include 
Palestinian liberation and independent statehood. 
 
The overall language of the Oslo Accords was carefully chosen by the Israeli side to the 
extent that the attitude of the late Yitzhak Rabin was termed by two Israeli journalists as 
“creative recalcitrance”, i.e. “examining every word with a magnifying glass and refusing 
any proposal from which there was no turning back” (Shlaim 1994: 32). 
Another case concerns the exclusion of the term ‘Right of Return’ in the text of the Geneva 
Accord. During the negotiations of the Geneva Accord, the Israeli negotiators showed 
strong objection to the use of the term ‘right of return’ or even ‘return’ in the final draft of 
the Geneva Accord. David Kimche, a member of the Israeli negotiating team, in an 
interview with Gilead Light (2003) said: “[W]e fought like tigers over every single word”. 
Kimche on the specific term of ‘return of return’ explains that: 
[T]he central point of this agreement for the Israelis was this question of the right of return for 
Palestinian refugees. We actually spent a whole morning at Movenpick hotel on one single word, 
‘return’. Towards the end of the session, the Palestinians asked to include the word ‘return’ in the 
subtitle of the article on refugees. We said, ‘If you include the word return, we are going to pack 
our bags and go home. We’re not going to accept anything that has to do with return. 
Amos Oz (2003), another member of the Israeli negotiating team, argued that the term 
‘return’ is “a code name for the destruction of Israel and the establishment of two 
Palestinian states on its ruins. If there’s return, there’s no agreement”. In the end, neither 
the term ‘right of return’ nor the term ‘return’ appeared anywhere in the final draft of the 
Geneva Accord. These two cases from actual both ‘track-one’ and track-two’ Palestinian-
Israeli negotiations, Oslo Accords and the Geneva Accord respectively, show clearly the 
significant use of political terms in negotiated texts. 
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Ideological aspects of terms are usually multiplied when translation is involved, 
particularly in the context of the Middle East conflict where one political term could mean 
different things in different languages. For example, research in negotiation theory showed 
that certain political concepts and terms that are “value-free in one language imply value 
judgments in another” (Cohen 2001: 73). One example of this is the term ‘normalisation’ – 
which in the context of the Middle East conflict – has different connotations in Arabic, 
English and Hebrew (see below). This term as well as other terms are part of the lexicon of 
the conflict and have specific meaning in this context. The following sub-sections analyse 
cases of political concepts and terms in the different peace initiatives and how they were 
dealt with in translation. 
5.6.1 Land  
Chapter 1.1.1 has outlined the rationale for the narratives of land and the significance of 
land to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This significance has provided the motivation to 
investigate this concept in the different language versions of Palestinian-Israeli peace 
initiatives in detail. In the following sub-sections, issues related to this concept such as the 
principle of ‘land for peace’, the term ‘land’ itself and its synonyms, historical claims and 
land swap will be discussed in detail. 
 
The Principle of Land for Peace 
The principle of ‘land for Peace’ constituted the essence of the Arab-Israeli ‘peace process’ 
which was launched at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991. This principle appears only 
in the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan as in the two following examples: 
(5.33) 
 
 
 
 
 
 نلعأ يتلا ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا دهع يلو زيزعلا دبع نب الله دبع ريملأا يكلملا ومسلا بحاص ةملك ىلا عمتسا نأ دعبو
 ذنم ةلتحملا ةيبرعلا يضارلأا عيمج نم لماكلا ليئارسا باحسنا ىلا ايعاد هتردابم اهللاخ نم1567  يرارقل اذيفنت
سلجم  نملاا242  و338  ماع ديردم رمتؤم ترارق امهتززع نيذللاو1551 ضرلأا أدبمو ملاسلا لباقم  مايق اهلوبق ىلاو
سدقلا اهتمصاعو ةدايس تاذو ةلقتسم ةينيطسلف ةلود  راطا يف ةيعيبط تاقلاع ءاشناب ةيبرعلا لودلا مايق لباقم كلذو ةيقرشلا
 .ليئارسا عم لماش ملاس                         [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1] 
Back translation: …and the principle of the land for peace… 
 
[LAS] Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah Bin 
Abdullaziz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his 
highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the 
Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the 
land for peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian 
state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal 
relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel. 
 
[PA] 
 
 
 
רחאל הבשקה ותרהצהל לש ךיסנה הללאדבע ןב דבע-זיזעלא ,שרוי רצעה לש ברע 
תידועסה ,הבש גיצה תא ותמזוי ,תארוקה הגיסנל תילארשי האלמ לכמ םיחטשה 
םייברעה ושבכנש ינויב 8491 ,ךות םושיי לש תוטלחה תצעומ ןוחטיבה 898 ו-332  ,
ורשואש שדחמ תדיעווב דירדמ תנשב 8448 לשו ןורקע םיחטש תרומת םולש ;
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Back 
translation: 
התמכסהלו לש לארשי הנידמל תיניטסלפ תיאמצע ,םע חרזמ םילשורי התריבכ ,הרומתב 
ןוניכל םיסחי םיילמרונ רשקהב לש םולש ללוכ םע לארשי. 
…principle of territories for peace… 
 
 
                  [Yediot 
Aharonot] 
 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
לא דבע ןב הללאדבע ךיסנה ותלעמ דוה לש ותעדוהל הבישקהש רחאל- רצעה שרוי ,זיזע
 תילארשי הגיסנל תארוקה ,ותמזוי תא ותלעמ דוה שרפ הבש ,תידועסה הכלממה לש
 ינוי זאמ ושבכנש םייברעה םיחטשה לכמ האלמ7691 ןוחטיבה תצעומ תוטלחה םושייל ,
242 ו-002רדמ תדיעווב ולבקתהש תוטלחהה ,ב די-7667  תרומת םיחטש לש ןורקעהו
םולש חרזמ התריבש תיאמצעה תיניטסלפה הנידמה ןויערל לארשי לש התמכסה ןכו ,
 םילשורי- .לארשי םע ףיקמ םולש לש רשקהב םיילמרונ םיסחי סוסיבל הרומתב 
 …and the principle of territories for peace… 
 
 
     (5.34) The settlement will resolve the Israel-Palestinian conflict, and end the occupation that began in 
1967, based on the foundations of the Madrid Conference, the principle of land for peace, 
UNSCRs 242, 338 and 1397 [The Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
[USDS] 
 
Back 
translation: 
يليئارسلإا عازنلا ةيوستلا لحت فوسو- ماع يف أدب يذلا للاتحلاا يهنتو ،ينيطسلفلا1567 ىلع ءانب ،
 ،ديردم ملاس ةمق رمتؤمل ةيعجرملا سسلأاملاسلا لباقم ضرلأا أدبمو ةدحتملا مملأا تارارقو ،242  و338 
و1357. 
... the principle of the land for the peace... 
 
[UN] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 يليئارسلإا عارصلا لح ىلإ ةيوستلا هذه يدؤتسو-  ماـع يف أدـب يذـلا للاتحلاا ءاهنإو ينيطسلفلا1567 
 ىلاو دـيردم رـمتؤم اهاـسرأ يتـلا سـسلأا ىلإ ادانتـسا كـلذوملاسلا لباــقم ضرلأا أدـبم  تارارق ىلإو
 نملأا سلجم242  و338  و1357. 
…and the principle of the land for the peace… 
[The 
Knesset] 
 
Back 
translation: 
תא רותפי רדסהה ילארשיה ךוסכסה-ב לחהש ,שוביכה תא םייסיו יניטסלפ-7691 לע ,
תדיעו תודוסי סיסב דירדמ ,'םולש תרומת םיחטש' לש ןורקיעה ןוחטיבה תצעומ תוטלחה ,
242 ,002 ו-7061. 
...the principle of territories for peace... 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
רדסהה רותפי תא ךוסכסה ילארשיה-יניטסלפ םייסיו תא שוביכה לחהש ב-8491 ,
ססבתהב לע תודוסיה לש תדיעו דירדמ ,ןורקע םיחטש תרומת םולש, תוטלחה תצעומ 
ןוחטבה לש ואה"מ 898 ,332 ו-8341. 
…territories for peaceprinciple of … 
 
This principle – i.e. ‘the land for peace’ was rendered in all Arabic translations – following 
a literal translation strategy – as ‘ملاسلا لباــقم ضرلأا’ (al-arḍ muqābil al-salām, lit. ‘the land 
for peace’) and in all Hebrew translations – following a meaning shift strategy – as םיחטש’ 
םולש תרומת’ (shtahim tamorit shalom, lit. ‘territories for peace’). The Arabic phrase al-arḍ 
muqābil al-salām belongs to the Arabic political lexicon on the Arab-Israeli conflict 
whereas the Hebrew phrase shtahim tamorit shalom belongs to the Israeli political lexicon. 
The Arabic phrase al-arḍ muqābil al-salām for example, appears in numerous resolutions 
of summits of the League of Arab States. The following two examples show this point: 
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(ST)  
 
 
 
امك دكؤن ىلع ةرورض ديدحت راطإ ينمز ددحم مايقل ليئارسإ ءافولاب اهتامازتلاب هاجت ةيلمع ملاسلا كرحتلاو تاوطخب 
ةحضاو ةددحمو وحن ذيفنت تاقاقحتسا ةيلمع ملاسلا ةمئاقلا ىلع تايعجرملا ةلثمتملا يف تارارق مملأا ةدحتملا تاذ ةلصلا 
أدبمو ضرلأا لباقم ملاسلا كلذكو ةردابم ملاسلا .ةيبرعلا125 
 
Back translation: …and the principle of land for peace and also the Arab Peace Initiative. 
 
 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 ملاسلا ةيلمعل اهيلع قفتملا تايعجرملا ساسا ىلع فارطلاا نيب ةرشابملا تاضوافملا ربع متي نا بجي ملاسلا اذه قيقحت نا
 ةيلودلا ةيعرشلا تارارق يف ةلثمتملا وملاسلا لباقم ضرلأا أدبم و.126 
Back translation: and the principle of land for peace. 
 
There is a fundamental political difference between the Arabic and Hebrew translations of 
the phrase ‘land for peace’. To the Arab states, al-arḍ (lit. ‘the land’) constitutes one entity 
comprising all the territories occupied by Israel following the 1967 war. According to the 
principle of al-arḍ muqābil al-salām, Israel is required to return all of these territories in 
exchange for peace with the Arab states. By contrast, to Israel, the principle of shtahim 
tamorit shalom does not mean the return of all occupied territories for peace (Rabinovich 
2004: 36). Based on this specific Israeli interpretation, withdrawing from some of these 
territories should suffice to achieve peace with the Arab states. These two conflicting 
positions originate from the Arab states’ and Israel’s own interpretations of the 242 UNSC 
resolution (cf. section 5.2). 
 
The Term Land and its Synonyms 
The use of the term ‘land’ and its synonyms ‘areas’ and ‘territories’ is not homogenous in 
the original source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. For example, the term 
‘ضرلأا’ (al-arḍ, lit. ‘the land’) is used in the Arabic source text of the Arab Peace Initiative 
but not ‘قطانملا’ (al-manāṭiq, lit. ‘areas’ or ‘territories’). In the English source text of the 
Roadmap Plan, the terms ‘land’ and ‘areas’ are used but not ‘territories’. The specific 
choice of the term al-arḍ in the Arab peace initiatives reflects the high value attached to 
land in the Arab political discourse. 
 
The term ‘areas’ – which appears three times in the English source text of the Roadmap – 
was translated differently in the Arabic and Hebrew as shown in the following example: 
 
                                                          
125
 ‘The Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held in Doha’, Qatar on 30 March 2009, the League of 
Arab States website: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/picture_gallery/doha30-31mar2009.pdf [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
126
 ‘The Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held in Khartoum’, Sudan on 29 March 2006, the 
League of Arab States website: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/picture_gallery/decision28-
29mar2006.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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(5.35) As comprehensive security performance moves forward, IDF withdraws progressively from 
areas occupied since September 28, 2000 and the two sides restore the status quo that existed 
prior to September 28, 2000. Palestinian security forces redeploy to areas vacated by IDF [The 
Roadmap Plan: 2]. 
 
[UN] 
Back 
translation: 
 نـم اـيجيردت ةيليئارـسلإا عاـفدلا تاوـق بحـسنتاهـلتحت يتـلا قطاـنملا  ذـنم28  ربمتبـس /لوـليأ2000.  
The Israel defense forces withdraw progressively from the territories, which they 
occupy since 28 September 2000.  
 
[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًاجيردت باحسنلااب يليئارسلإا شيجلا موقيةلتحملا قطانملا  ذنم28  ،ربمتبس/لوليأ2000. 
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the occupied territories since 28 
September 2000. 
 
[IMFA] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًايجيردت يليئارسلإا عافدلا شيج بحسني قطانمللاتحا متاه لا ذنم28 ربمتبس لوليأ نم.2000 
The Israel defense army withdraws progressively from territories, which were 
occupied since 28 September 2000. 
 
[Almtym] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ةدرطضم ةروصب يليئارسلإا شيجلا بحسنيةلتحملا قطانملا  دعب18  ماعلا لوليأ2000. 
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the territories occupied after 18 
September 2000. 
 
[CNN] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم درطم باحسناب يليئارسلاا شيجلا موقيةلتحملا قطانملا     دعب28    ماع لوليا ربمتبس2000.  
The Israeli army makes a progressive withdrawal from the territories occupied 
after 28 September 2000. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
Back 
translation: 
 نم ًاجيردت يليئارسلإا شيجلا بحسنياهلتحا يتلا قطانملا  ذنم28  لوليأ2000.  
The Israeli army withdraws progressively from the territories it occupied since 28 
September 2000. 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
 הגרדהב ל"הצ גוסנםישובכה םירוזאמ ה זאמ-22  רבמטפסב0222. 
 
since 28 September 2000. areas occupiedIDF withdraws progressively from  
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
הצ"ל גוסנ הגרדהב םירוזאמ ושבכנש זאמ 82 רבמטפסב 2000. 
 
IDF withdraws progressively from areas, which were occupied since 28 September 
2000. 
 
[Ha'aretz]  
Back 
translation: 
הצ"ל גוסיי הגרדהב םיחטשמ םיקזחומה זאמ ה-82 רבמטפסב 2000. 
IDF will withdraw progressively from territories held since 28 September 2000. 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 הגרדהב גוסיי ל"הצםירוזאמ ושבכנש ה זאמ-22  רבמטפסב0222. 
 
since 28 areas, which were occupied IDF will withdraw progressively from 
September 2000. 
 
The specific use of the term ‘areas’ rather than ‘territories’ corresponds to the classification 
given to the Occupied Palestinian Territories according to the Oslo Agreements, i.e. ‘Areas 
A’, ‘Areas B’, and ‘Areas C’ (cf. Chapter 5.2). The use of this term – i.e. ‘areas’ – could 
perhaps be to distinguish between the Palestinian lands occupied since 4 June 1967 and 
those which were re-occupied after 28 September 2000. The Roadmap Plan requires Israel 
to withdraw only from the latter. 
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All Arabic translations rendered the term ‘areas’ as ‘قطانملا’ (al-manāṭiq) or ‘قطانم’ 
(manāṭiq) (both terms mean ‘areas’ or ‘territories’). On the other hand, all Hebrew 
translations rendered the term ‘areas’ as either ‘םירוזא’ (azurim, lit. ‘areas’) or ‘םיחטש’ 
(shtahim, lit. ‘territories’). In the Peace Now translation, for instance, ‘areas’ was rendered 
consistently as azurim whereas in all other Hebrew translations it was rendered twice as 
azurim and once as shtahim. 
 
This spread of choices has to be considered against their meaning in the target language 
context. In Hebrew, ha-shtahim is shorthand for ‘םישובכה םיחטשה’ (ha-shtahim ha-kvushim, 
lit. ‘the conquered territories’), ‘םיקזחומה םיחטשה’ (ha-shtahim ha-muhzakim, literally 
means ‘held territories’ but has standardly been translated as ‘administered territories’ 
(Gorenberg 2006: 392) or ‘םיררחושמה םיחטשה’ (ha-shtahim ha-mishuhrarim, lit. ‘the 
liberated territories’). 
 
The term ha-shtahim ha-kvushim (lit. ‘conquered territories’) was used for a short period 
after the 1967 war to describe the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which came under Israeli 
occupation during this war (HaCohen 1997: 397). This term, i.e. ha-shtahim ha-kvushim – 
which is commonly used today in Israel to refer to the Occupied Palestinian Territories – 
“conspicuously neglects to mention the continuing act of occupation” (Stähler 2007: 241) 
as describing these territories as ‘occupied’ entails that these territories belong to another 
people. 
The term ha-shtahim ha-kvushim was soon replaced in Israel by the term ha-shtahim ha-
muhzakim (‘the administered territories’) (HaCohen 1997: 397). The term ha-shtahim ha-
muhzakim underscores Israel’s position that these territories are not ‘occupied’ and thus 
they are not “necessarily subject to legal framework of the international law of occupation” 
(Amichai 2005: 24). After Likud came to power in 1977, the Israeli policy towards the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories changed (Gazit 2003: 161). The Begin government in its 
advancement of Jewish settlement in the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 
campaigned “fervently and forcefully” for the replacement of the term ha-shtahim ha-
muhzakim by the biblical names “Judea, Samaria and Gaza” (Hebrew:  לבחו ןורמוש ,הדוהי
הזע) (Domínguez 1989: 20). The ultimate goal of the Likud’s policy was “integrating the 
Territories as part of the ‘Land of Israel’, thus strengthening their Jewish character and 
conveying to the local Palestinian population that they had better accommodate to the 
continuing Israeli rule” (Gazit 2003: 161). 
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Against this historical background, the use of the term ha-shtahim ha-muhzakim in the 
Ha’aretz translation serves to present the status of the areas under discussion in a different 
light, i.e. as “disputed” rather than ‘occupied’ – thus supporting the legitimacy of Israel’s 
control over such areas to a certain extent. This kind of interpretation is consistent with the 
official Israeli position on this issue as the following excerpt taken from Israel Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (IMFA) shows: 
     (ST)  
 
 
Politically, the West Bank and Gaza Strip is best regarded as territory over which there are 
competing claims which should be resolved in peace process negotiations. Israel has valid 
claims to title in this territory based not only on its historic and religious connection to the land, 
and its recognized security needs, but also on the fact that the territory was not under the 
sovereignty of any state and came under Israeli control in a war of self-defense, imposed upon 
Israel.
127
 
 
This kind of interpretation is in clear violation of the international law and numerous 
United Nations General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which unequivocally 
refer to these territories as occupied.  
 
The term ‘occupied’ in example (5.35) above, represents a controversial aspect of the 
original text. Its two occurrences – one of them as part of example (5.35) – were translated 
differently into Arabic and Hebrew. ‘Occupied’ remained as a pre-modifying adjective in 
the Arabic translations of the US Department of State, CNN and the Al-mtym network. 
However, the translations produced by Al-Quds and the United Nations turned this element 
into a verb (in simple past tense and present continuous tense, respectively) which in turn 
brings about an explicitation of the agent of such occupation, i.e. ‘IDF’. As for the Hebrew 
translations, ‘occupied’ was also retained as an adjective pre-modifying ‘areas/territories’, 
except in the translation by Peace Now – where the agent responsible for the occupation, 
however, remains implicit. 
 
The specific rendering of the term ‘occupied’ as ‘اهلتحت يتلا’ (lit. ‘which it [Israel] is 
occupying’), i.e. a present continuous verb, can be found in Arabic translations by the 
United Nations of numerous Security Council (UNSC) and General Assembly (UNGA) 
resolutions concerning the Palestine Question. This choice reflects the official position of 
the United Nations which considers these territories as occupied since 1967. The following 
two examples illustrate this point: 
                                                          
127
 ‘Israeli Settlements and International Law’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, published on 20 
May 2001: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Settlements+and+Internati
onal+Law.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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(ST) 
 
 
 
 
UN:  
Having learned with deep concern that Israel, the occupying Power, in contravention of its 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, deported to Lebanon on 17 
December 1992, hundreds of Palestinian civilians from the territories occupied by Israel since 
1967, including Jerusalem
128
.  
 
 موي ،نانبل ىلإ تدعبأ دق ،للاتحلااب ةمئاقلا ةطلسلا ،ليئارسإ نأ قلقلا غلابب ملع دقو٧٧  ربمسيد/لوأ نوناك٧٣٣٢ نم تائم ،
 يضارلأا نم نيينيطسلفلا نييندملااهلتحت يتلا  ذنم٧٣٧١ فينج ةيقافتا بجومب اهتامازتلا كلذب ةكهتنم ،سدقلا اهيف امب ،
 ماعل ةعبارلا٧٣٩٣ .129 
 
(ST) 
 
 
UN:  
Expressing its grave concern at the continued deterioration of the situation on the ground in the 
territory occupied by Israel since 1967
130
.  
 
ذإو برعي نع هقلق غلابلا رارمتسلا روهدت ةلاحلا يف ناديملا يف ضرلأا يتلا اهلتحت ليئارسإ ذنم ماع٧٣١٧.131  
 
Historical Claims to Land  
Another issue related to the narrative of land is the contentious claims of ownership of land 
(cf. Chapter 1.1.1). These claims are conflicting in every single detail. Acknowledgement 
of one side’s claims automatically de-legitimizes the other’s claims. This issue of claims of 
ownership of land is mentioned in two peace initiatives: the Geneva Accord and the 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. In the Geneva Accord, this issue caused a 
political debate as the drafters of this initiative attempted to convince the Israeli public that 
the Palestinian people acknowledged Israel as a “Jewish” state by changing the term 
‘homeland’ into ‘national home’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.1 and Chapter 6.3).  
 
In the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, this issue of claims to land is 
mentioned in the Arabic introduction drafted by Sari Nusseibeh for the needs of the 
Palestinian public. This introduction was picked up by many institutions (among which is 
the Israeli Ha’aretz newspaper) which treated it as part of the original text of the initiative. 
The following example illustrates how this issue of claims of ownership of land was 
                                                          
128
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 799 (1992), adopted on 18 December 1992, published on the 
United Nations website: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/831/38/IMG/N9283138.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
129
 Arabic translation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 799 (1992), adopted by on 18 
December 1992, published on the United Nations website:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/831/36/IMG/N9283136.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
130
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1544 (2004), adopted on 19 May 1992, published on the 
United Nations website:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/357/21/PDF/N0435721.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
131
 ‘Arabic translation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1544 (2004), adopted on 19 May 
1992, published on the United Nations website: 
 http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/357/19/PDF/N0435719.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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treated in the Arabic and Hebrew translations: 
 
(5.36) 
 
 
 
 
 ينيطسلفلا نابعشلا كردييليئارسلإاو ةدحاو ضرأب قلعتي اميف امهنم لكل ةيخيراتلا قوقحلا. 
 بعشلا دارأ ، لايجأ ذنمفيليئارسلإا  ةلودلا ةماقإليئارسإ يضارأ يف ةيليئارسلإا  ةلود ةماقإ ينيطسلفلا بعشلا دارأ امنيبيف 
نيطسلف يضارأ لك.[The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles:1]                                             
 
Back translation: the Palestinian and Israeli peoples recognize the historical rights of each other 
with regard to one land. For generations, the Israeli people wanted to establish the Israeli state 
in the lands of Israel, whereas the Palestinian people wanted to establish a state in all lands of 
Palestine. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 םעהו יניתשלפה םעהידוהיה התויוכזב דחא לכ םיריכמ  סחיב ותלוז לש תוירוטסיה
המדא התואל.  םעה שקיב תורוד ךשמבידוהיה  הנידמה תא םיקהלתידוהיה לכב  יקלח
ץרא לארשי הנידמ םיקהל אוה ףא שקיב יניתשלפה םעהש דועב ,ןיתשלפ יקלח לכב. 
 
The Palestinian and Jewish peoples recognize the historical rights of each other 
with regard to the same land. For generations, requested the Jewish people to 
establish its Jewish state in all parts of land of Israel. In addition, the Palestinian 
people requested to establish a state in all parts of Palestine. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 بعشلاو ينيطسلفلا بعشلا فرتعييدوهيلا   ىدم ىلعف. ضرلاا تاذ يف  ةيخيراتلا قوقحلاب رخلاا ءازا لك
 بعشلا ىعس لايجلاايدوهيلا   ةلودلا ةماقإليئارسإ ضرأ  ءاجرا لك يف  ةيدوهيلا  بعشلا ىعس اميف
 ةلود  ةماقا ىلا رخلاا وه ينيطسلفلانيطسلف  ءاجرا لك يف  هل. 
 
The Palestinian and Jewish peoples acknowledge the historical rights of each other 
with regard to the same land. For generations, the Jewish people sought to 
establish the Jewish state in all the land of Israel, whereas the Palestinian people 
also sought to establish its state in all areas of Palestine. 
 
[Baheth 
Center] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 بعشلاو ينيطسلفلا بعشلا فرتعييدوهيلا  ىدم ىلعف .ضرلأا تاذ يف ةيخيراتلا قوقحلاب رخلآل دحاو لك
 بعشلا ىعس لايجلأايدوهيلا  ةلودلا ةماقإ،"ليئارسإ" ضرأ ءاجرأ لك يف ةيدوهيلا يف بعشلا ىعس ام
 ةلود ةماقإ ىلع رخلآا وه ينيطسلفلانيطسلف ءاجرأ لك يف. 
 
The Palestinian and Jewish peoples acknowledge the historical rights of each other 
with regard to the same land. For generations, the Jewish people sought to 
establish the Jewish state in all the lands of ‘Israel’, whereas the Palestinian people 
also sought to establish its state in all areas of Palestine. 
 
[Al-eman] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
بعشلاو ينيطسلفلا بعشلا نإ يدوهيلا  قلعتي ام يف رخلآا بعشلل ةيخيراتلا قوقحلاب امهنم دحاو لك فرتعي
سفنب  بعشلا ىعس لايجا ىدم ىلع .ضرلاايدوهيلا  ةلودلا ةماقا ىلاضرا ءاحنا لك يف ةيدوهيلا ليئارسا ،
 ةلود ةماقا ىلا اضيا وه ىعس ينيطسلفلا بعشلا نا نيح يفءاحنا لك يف نيطسلف. 
 
The Palestinian and Jewish peoples acknowledge the historical rights of each other 
with regard to the same land. For generations, the Jewish people sought to 
establish the Jewish state in all the land of Israel, whereas the Palestinian people 
also sought to establish its state in all areas of Palestine. 
 
The above extract from the Arabic introduction deals with the controversial issue of claims 
of ownership of Palestine. In this introduction, these claims are only recognized, which 
does not necessarily mean acknowledgment of such claims. In all Arabic language 
versions, this act of ‘recognition’ was changed into an unequivocal ‘acknowledgement’ of 
the Palestinian and Jewish claims as equal. Moreover, the conflict in the introduction is 
portrayed as one between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples. In the Ha’aretz and all Arabic 
language versions (which were based on Ha’aretz translation) – and following a meaning 
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shift strategy – the adjective ‘يليئارسلاا’ (al-Isrāailī, lit. ‘the Israeli’) was replaced by the 
adjective ‘يدوهيلا’ (al-yahūdī, lit. ‘the Jewish’). This specific shift – which highlights the 
religious nature of the conflict – is contrary to the drafter’s intention of presenting the 
conflict as a secular one. Delyani argues: “we are seculars and we do not deal with the 
conflict from a religious point of view, although religion has influence on the conflict; but 
we insist that we are dealing with the Israeli people as a state, not as a Jewish people which 
we consider a religion. Not every Jew is an Israeli and not every Israeli is a Jew” (personal 
communication 2005).  
 
The choice of the lexical item ‘يضارأ’ (arāḍī, lit ‘lands’) in the two terms ‘نيطسلف يضارأ’ 
(arāḍī Falasṭīn, lit. lands of Palestine) and ‘ليئارسا يضارأ’ (arāḍī Isrāail, lit. ‘lands of Israel’) 
in the Arabic source text creates some sort of political symmetry between the claims of the 
two sides. This symmetry was changed in the Hebrew and Arabic language versions. The 
Ha’aretz translation rendered the term ‘ليئارسا يضارأ’ (lit. ‘lands of Israel’) in the singular 
form as ‘ ץרא ארשיל ’ (Eretz Israel, lit. ‘Land of Israel’) which is how historic Palestine (now 
Israel, the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip) is referred to in the Israeli-Zionist 
political and religious discourses.  
 
A political and ideological competition between the two toponyms, ‘نيطسلف’ (Falasṭīn, lit. 
‘Palestine’) and “ ץרא לארשי ” (Eretz Israel, lit. ‘Land of Israel’) has always existed. During 
the British Mandate of Palestine (1922-1948) and before the establishment of the state of 
Israel, Falasṭīn was the name given to the territory west of the Jordan River and the 
government appointed by the British was called the Government of Palestine
132
 (Bernstein 
1992: 19). The Zionists  “insisted on Palestine being referred to officially as the (biblical) 
‘Land of Israel’, but the most that the mandatory authorities were willing to concede was 
the use of the Hebrew for Eretz Yisrael after the name Palestine on all official documents, 
currency, stamps, and so on” (Rolef 1933: 101 quoted in Masalha 2007: 33). 
 
The lexical items ‘ أءاحن ’ or ‘ءاجرأ’ (anḥāi and arjāi respectively, both mean parts) in the 
Arabic language versions, on one hand, and ‘يضارأ’ (arāḍī, lit. ‘lands’) in the source text, 
on the other hand, all occurring with the name Palestine, represent two within-group 
Palestinian narratives of land. 
                                                          
132
 At that time, as Bernstein (1992: 19) explains, there was “Palestinian citizenship (for both Jews and Arabs 
living in the territory) as well as Palestinian currency. Jews used the term Palestine (Palestina) both in 
everyday speech and in writing, as did the British and the Arabs”. 
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The terms, Anḥāi and arjāi falasṭīn (lit. ‘parts of Palestine’) imply that Palestine is one 
geographical unit whereas the term arāḍī falasṭīn (lit. ‘lands of Palestine’) corresponds to 
the geopolitical classifications of ‘ ا ةلتحملا يضارلأ67 ’ (lit. the occupied lands of 1967) and 
‘  ةلتحملا يضارلأا48 ’ (lit. the occupied lands of 1948). The latter represents the Palestinian 
pragmatist political position which accepts the partition of historic Palestine, acknowledges 
the existence of Israel and calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the lands 
occupied in 1967  (i.e. the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is 22% of historic 
Palestine). Today, the Palestinian Authority (PA) refers to these lands as simply ‘ يضارلأا
ةينيطسلفلا’ (lit. the Palestinian land) without mentioning the adjective ‘ةلتحملا’ (lit. ‘the 
occupied’) in order to create an illusion of sovereignty. By contrast, the former represents 
the totalist position which rejects the partition of Palestine.  
 
Land Swap 
Demarcation of final borders between the state of Israel and the future state of Palestine is 
crucial for the viability of the two-state solution to the conflict. Palestinian-Israeli peace 
initiatives talk about land swap as part of this demarcation of borders.  
 
The principle of land swap was first suggested by the American president Bill Clinton 
during Camp David II negotiations between Israel and the PLO in 2000, which the 
Palestinians and Israelis accepted, but the “proportionality of the swap remained under 
discussion” (Enderlin 2003: 352). The main purpose behind introducing this principle is to 
accommodate the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Balaban 
2005: 254). Israel refuses to withdraw to the lines of the 1967 borders. Such a withdrawal 
would mean dismantling more than 149 Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank, 
including in and around Occupied East Jerusalem. Israel claims that its “security needs” 
require a presence in some strategic parts of the West Bank and thus needs to annex some 
large settlement blocs, particularly in the areas near Occupied East Jerusalem. The idea of 
land swap responds to these needs. 
 
The most important aspect of the principle of land swap is the question of equal value, i.e. 
size and quality of the land to be given to the Palestinians in return for annexing Jewish 
settlement blocs. This issue is of particular significance since “many of the Israeli 
settlements are constructed on the best agricultural land of the West Bank, and located in 
water shortage areas” (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 77). Israeli proposals for land to be 
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swapped to the future Palestinian state include areas adjacent to the Gaza Strip and areas 
southwest of the West Bank (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 77). These areas are known to be 
infertile. The Palestinian negotiators of the Geneva Accord “[f]rom the beginning of the 
official negotiations…demanded not only territory of an equivalent size to that annexed by 
Israel, but also of equivalent quality” (Klein 2007: 71). This demand finds its way in 
Arabic translation, as made clear in the following example: 
(5.37) In accordance with UNSC Resolution 242 and 338, the border between the states of Palestine 
and Israel shall be based on the June 4
th
 1967 lines with reciprocal modifications on a 1:1 basis 
as set forth in attached Map [The Geneva Accord: 8]. 
 
[PPC] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 يلودلا نملأا سلجم يرارق بجومب242 و338ليئارسإ و نيطسلف يتلود نيب دودحلا طخ ماقي ،  ساسأ ىلع
 ناريزح/وينوي نم عبارلا طوطخ1567ةلدابتملا ةيدودحلا تلايدعتلا ضعب عم ،  يف يواستلا ةدعاق ىلع
ةيعونلا و ةحاسملا  مقر ةطيرخلا يف نيبم وه امك1 ةقفرملا. 
 …with some border modifications on the basis of equality in area and quality. 
 
[YA] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 מ"ואה לש ןוחטיבה תצעומ תוטלחהל םאתהב242 ו-002 ןיבל ןיטסלפ תנידמ ןיב לובגה ,
ה יווק לע ססובמ היהי לארשי-4  ינויב7691  םיידדה םייוניש םע לש סחיב7:7,  טרופמכ
 הפמב7 .תפרוצמה 
on a 1:1 basis. …with reciprocal modifications 
 
The term ‘on a 1:1 basis’ in the above example is vague, i.e. it does not specify the nature 
of border modifications other than that they would be of the same ratio. On one hand, the 
Hebrew translation of Yes to an Agreement rendered this phrase following a literal 
translation strategy and thus kept its vagueness. The Al-Ayyam translation, on the other 
hand, followed an explicitness change strategy and, thus, specified that these border 
modifications would be of the same quality and quantity. This stipulation reflects the 
position of the Palestinian negotiating team of the Geneva Accord. 
 
Critics of the Geneva Accord accused its Palestinian negotiators of accepting the Israeli 
annexation of fertile lands in the occupied West Bank in return for infertile or desert land 
next to the Occupied Gaza Strip. Spelling out the exact nature of these border 
modifications in the Al-Ayyam translation can be seen as part of the drafters’ efforts to 
market the agreement to the Palestinian people and refute any accusations. 
 
5.6.2 Jewish Settlement Activity  
The Jewish settlements
133
 in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (including in and around 
East Jerusalem) are the most vivid manifestation of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian 
                                                          
133
 For an illustration of the geography and size of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, see for example the map published by B’Tselem’s in June 2011: 
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land. These settlements are illegal under the international law, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention (e.g. Article 49(6))
134
, the International Court of Justice and numerous United 
Nations Security Council (UNSCRS) (e.g. 452 (1979), 446 (1979), 465 (1980)) and 
General Assembly resolutions (GARS) (e.g. 36/226 (1981), 39/146 (1984), 51/133 (1996)). 
The following two excerpts from the United Nations Security Council Resolution 446 
(1979) and the General Assembly Resolution 51/133 (1996) respectively are examples of 
this point:   
Determines that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and 
other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious 
obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
135
 
Reaffirms that Israeli settlements in the Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and in the 
occupied Syrian Golan are illegal and an obstacle to peace and economic and social 
development.
136
 
 
This widespread international consensus is rejected by Israel which considers these 
settlements to be “legal” as in the following excerpt from a text published by the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on this issue of Jewish settlements:  
Jewish settlement in West Bank and Gaza Strip territory has existed from time immemorial and 
was expressly recognised as legitimate in the Mandate for Palestine adopted by the League of 
Nations, which provided for the establishment of a Jewish state in the Jewish people's ancient 
homeland…Repeated charges regarding the illegality of Israeli settlements must therefore be 
regarded as politically motivated, without foundation in international law. Similarly, as Israeli 
settlements cannot be considered illegal, they cannot constitute a "grave violation" of the Geneva 
Convention.
137
 
Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are built on expropriated private 
Palestinian land. The international community considers these settlements both illegal and 
obstacles to peace. These settlements and the extensive road network that exclusively serve 
them destroy the territorial contiguity of the Palestinian land (Effarah 2007: 497). This 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/download/20110612_btselem_map_of_wb_eng.pdf [last accessed: 
24 November 2011]. 
134
 Paragraph 6 of this article states that “[T]he occupying power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own 
civilian population into territories it occupies” (Canfield 2001: 11).  
135
 ‘The United Nation Security Council Resolution 446 (1979), United Nations website, drafted on 22 March 
1979:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/370/60/IMG/NR037060.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
136
 ‘The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 51/133 (1996), United Nations website, drafted on 13 
December 1996:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N97/772/03/PDF/N9777203.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 27 July 2011]. 
137
 ‘Israeli Settlements and International Law’, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, published on 20 
May 2001: 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israeli+Settlements+and+Internati
onal+Law.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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complicates the establishment of a viable Palestinian state (Thorpe 2006: 242) and 
consequently threatens the chances for achieving a ‘two-state solution’ to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict. 
The number of Jewish settlers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories has doubled during 
Oslo from 200,000 to 400,000 (cf. Chapter 1.1.2). In 2007, there were more than 450,000 
Jewish settlers living in 149 settlements in the Occupied West Bank including East 
Jerusalem.
138
 These settlements are in continuous expansion. In the text of the Roadmap 
Plan, this expansion is referred to as “settlement activity” including the “natural growth” of 
settlements, a vague term that has never been precisely defined and allowed Israel to 
continue expanding settlements (Efrat 2006: 42). Statements by consecutive Israeli 
governments on the Jewish settlements have always included the requirement that they 
would take into account the “natural growth” of the settlements (Ghanem 2010: 32). In 
fact, the Israeli leaders downplay expanding Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories as “natural growth” (Dunsky 2008: 161). 
The term “natural growth” of settlements would normally refer to “population growth due 
to births within particular settlements in the West Bank (and formerly in Gaza)” (Prainsck 
2007: 243). However, all Israeli governments and since the signing of Oslo Accords in 
1993, have “interpreted this phrase as including not only the natural growth of the existing 
population (i.e. birth rates), but also the growth of the population by migration”.139 Indeed, 
Israeli governments themselves “have strongly encouraged migration from Israel to the 
settlements by offering generous financial benefits and incentives”.140 
The Palestinians have never accepted the pretext of “natural growth” and considered it – as 
once put by Nabil Shaath, the former Palestinian minister of planning – to be a “lie” that is 
designed to “deepen occupation and to create facts on the ground to pre-empt the outcome 
of permanent negotiations” (Dunsky 2008: 162). Israel has always used this “natural 
growth” as a pretext to expropriate more Palestinian land, expand the settlements and 
construct bypass roads that connect them (Ghanem 2007: 32).  
                                                          
138
 ‘Israeli settlements and other infrastructure in the West Bank’, United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs Occupied Palestinian Territory website: 
http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/TheHumanitarianImpactOfIsraeliInfrastructureTheWestBank_ch1.pdf 
[last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
139
 ‘Land Grab: Israel’s Settlements Policy in the West Bank’, B’Tselem website, published in May 2002: 
http://www.btselem.org/download/200205_land_grab_eng.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
140
 Ibid. 
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The term “natural growth” was added in the original text of the Roadmap Plan as a 
Palestinian demand (Saeb Erikat, personal communication 2005) and in response to the 
Israeli argument that a freeze on settlement activity should not include those due to 
“natural growth”. Thus, the purpose of this inclusion is to make it clear that Israel is 
required to freeze all settlement activities, including those it considers as due to “natural 
growth”. 
(5.38) Consistent with the Mitchell Report, GOI freezes all settlement activity (including natural 
growth of settlements) [The Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
.تانطوتسملل يعيبطلا ومنلا كلذ يف امب ةيناطيتسلاا تاطاشنلا عيمج ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا دمجت 
The Israeli government freezes all the settlement activities including the natural 
growth of the settlements. 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
.תויולחנתה לש יעבט לודיג תוברל תולחנתה תוליעפ לכ האיפקמ לארשי תלשממ 
 
Government of Israel freezes all the settlement activities including natural 
expansion of the settlements. 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
 
.)תויולחנתה לש יעבט לודיג ללוכ( תיתולחנתה תוליעפ לכ האיפקמ לארשי תלשממ 
 
Government of Israel freezes all settlement activities including natural expansion 
of the settlements. 
[Ha’aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
 יוביר בקע היינב ללוכ ,תויולחנתהה לכ תא איפקת לארשי תלשממ
.יעבט 
Government of Israel will freeze all the settlements including building because of 
natural birth rate.  
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 איפקת לארשי תלשממתויתובשייתהה תוליעפה לכ תא תוברל החימצ  לש תיעבט
תויולחנתה. 
Government of Israel will freeze all the settlement activities including natural 
growth of the settlements. 
 
The term ‘settlement activity’ appears twice in the English source text of the Roadmap 
Plan. This term was rendered in all the Arabic translations – following a literal translation 
strategy – as ‘ةيناطيتسلاا تاطاشنلا’ (al-nashāṭāt al-aistīṭānīyah). In the Hebrew translations, it 
was rendered as either ‘ תוליעפ תולחנתה ’ (pe'ilut hitnahlut) or ‘תובשייתה תוליעפ’ (pe'ilut 
hityashvut), both mean ‘settlement activities’. However, these two Hebrew terms means 
different things to different people in Israel.  
The Jewish settlement enterprise in the West Bank is generally known in Israel by the 
Hebrew term hitnahlut whereas the general Jewish “settlement” enterprise that has taken 
place throughout historic Palestine during the twentieth century prior to the establishment 
of the state of Israel in 1948 is termed as hityashvut (Newman 1996: 71). The Israeli 
society distinguishes between what it considers as the “positive” notion of hityashvut and 
the negative notion of hitnahlut (Newman 2005: 207). Hityashvut represents “the 
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formation of rural, agricultural, self-sustaining village communities” (Newman 1996: 71) 
whereas the use of the term hitnahlut – particularly by those opposed to the settlement in 
the West Bank – “has come to denote a negative form of action” (Newman 1996: 71). The 
Jewish settlers on the other hand view the term hitnahlut – which evokes “biblical 
injunctions and promises to “inherit” the land through settlement” (Lustick 1993: 359) and 
describes the original conquests of the Land of Israel in ancient times by the Hebrew 
people under the leadership of Joshua” (Newman 1996: 72) – as positive.  
The distinction between the two terms is often used by “left wing and centrist political 
leaders” in Israel as a means of criticizing and opposing the West Bank settlement 
activities (Newman 2005: 208). Those leaders, as well as others in Israel such as Peace 
Now, use the term hitnahlut rather than hityashvut to describe the settlement process 
beyond the Green Line.
141
 Such a distinction is denied by the Israeli settler community 
(Newman 1996: 72) who perceive both terms – i.e. hitnahlut and hityashvut – as positive 
(Newman 2005: 207). This is because they consider the Occupied Palestinian Territories to 
be their “heritage” (Bisharah 2003: 147), i.e. part of the “land of Israel” and thus they have 
the right to settle down in any part of it. 
In sum, the term hitnahlut is used by those who oppose Jewish settlement in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories to de-legitimize such activity, whereas the terms hitnahlut and 
hityashvut has been used interchangeably by the Jewish settlers of the ‘Yesha Council’ and 
its predecessor Gush Emunim
142
 to add legitimacy to such activity. The term hityashvut in 
particular, belongs to the narrative of ‘Greater Israel’ in which these settlements are 
considered not only ‘legal’ but also ‘legitimate’. 
In the translation of Peace Now, the term ‘settlement activity’ was translated consistently 
as pe'ilut hitnahlut, whereas in the translations of Ha'aretz and the Knesset, it was rendered 
interchangeably, once as pe'ilut hitnahlut and once as pe'ilut hityashvut, perhaps to satisfy 
                                                          
141
 The Green Line refers to the “borders determined by armistice with neighboring States (1948–49), 
separating the State of Israel-controlled territory from the other areas of Palestine (Jerusalem, West Bank & 
Gaza Strip). Indigenous Palestinians remaining inside the Green Line became citizens of Israel. Palestinians 
living in the other areas of Palestine, including refugees originating from inside the ‘green line’ came under 
the administration of Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip) until Israel conquered those 
territories in the 1967 War”, extract published on the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cerd/docs/ngos/jointngo3.pdf [last accessed: 2 
September 2011].  
142
 Gush Emunim (Hebrew: שוג םינומא  , lit. ‘Bloc of the faithful’) is the movement behind most of the Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Klein 2008: 94). 
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the different political positions of the Knesset members on the issue. In the translation of 
Yediot Aharonot, the term ‘settlement activity’ was translated consistently as pe'ilut 
hityashvut.  
The particular choice of the term hitnahlut in the translation of Peace Now reflects the 
political affiliation and ideological position of both the organization and the translator of 
this target text, Hagit Ofran. Ofran is the director of the Peace Now watchdog on Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. In her reporting on the Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – published on Peace Now website – 
Ofran uses the term hitnahlut rather than hityashvut. 
The term “natural growth” of settlements appears only once and only in the text of the 
Roadmap Plan. In the above example, this term was rendered in all the Arabic translations 
following a literal translation strategy. On the other hand, the same term was rendered 
differently into Hebrew. The choice of ‘יעבט יוביר’ (ribbuy tiv'i, lit. ‘natural birth rate’) in the 
Ha’aretz translation represents a human metaphor: Israel is required to freeze settlements 
activity, including those that are considered as due to demographic reasons, i.e. new births of 
Jewish settlers. The choice of ‘תיעבט החימצ’ (tsmihah tiv'it, lit. ‘natural growth’) in the 
translation of the Yediot Aharonot, on the other hand, is guided by the metaphor of 
growing plants which permits the casting of expanding Jewish settlements on expropriated 
Palestinian land as ‘natural’. This specific choice reflects the right-wing political affiliation 
of the Yediot Aharonot and its support of the Jewish settlements in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. 
5.6.3 Jewish Settlement Outposts 
Section (5.2.2) sat the rationale for the issue of Jewish settlement outposts in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. This section looks at how the term ‘settlement outposts’ and the 
verb ‘dismantle’ were translated in the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap 
Plan. The following example shows this: 
(5.39) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap 
Plan: 3]. 
 
 
[UN] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 روـفلا ىـلع ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا موقتةيناطيتـسلاا عـقاوملا ةـلازإب  سرام /راذآ ذنم تئـشنأ يتـلا ةـلغوتملا
2001. 
The Israeli government immediately removes the settlement locations deep into 
land.  
[IMFA] 
Back 
translation: 
 روفلا ىلع ليئارسإ ةموكح موقتةيناطيتسلاا طاقنلا ءلاخإب  سرام راذآ ذنم تميقأ يتلا2001. 
Government of Israel immediately evacuates the settlement points... 
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[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
ككفت  روفلا ىلع ليئارسإةيناطيتسلاا عقاوملا  سرام/راذآ رهش ذنم تميقأ يتلا2001. 
Israel dismantles immediately the settlement locations... 
 
 
[CNN] 
Back 
translation: 
 
ككفت  عيمج اروف ةيليئارسلاا ةموكحلاةيناطيتسلاا رؤبلا   ماع راذا سرام رهش ذنم تميقا يتلا2001. 
The Israeli government immediately dismantles all the settlement focal points... 
 
 
[Almtym] 
Back 
translation: 
 
 ًاروف ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ككفت رؤبلا لكةيناطيتسلاا ماع )سرام( راذآ رهش ذنم تميقا يتلا2001  .  
 The Israeli government dismantles immediately all the settlement focal points 
which were established since March 2001. 
 
[Al-Quds]  
Back 
translation: 
 
كيكفتب يروف لكشب ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا موقت  ةيناطيتسلاا عقاوملا  ماع راذا نم تبصن يتلا2001 . 
The Israeli government immediately dismantles the settlement locations which 
were created since March 2001. 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
 לארשי תלשממתקרפמ  רתלאלםיזחאמ  סראמ זאמ ומקוהש2337. 
Government of Israel dismantles immediately settlement outposts... 
 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
Back 
translation: 
 
 לארשי תלשממתקרפמ  תא תידיימםיזחאמה  סראמ זאמ ומקוהש2337. 
Government of Israel dismantles immediately the settlement outposts. 
 
 
[Ha'aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
 
 לארשי תלשממקרפת  תא תידיימתויולחנתהה  סראמ שדוחמ ומקוהש2337. 
Government of Israel will dismantle immediately the settlements. 
 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 
2337 סרמ זאמ ומקוהש םיזחאמה תא קרפת לארשי תלשממ   
Government of Israel will dismantle the settlement outposts... 
The term ‘settlement outposts’ and the verb ‘dismantle’ were rendered differently in the 
Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the Roadmap. The choice of the term ‘رؤبلا 
ةيناطيتسلاا (al-bu´ar al-istyṭaniyah, lit. ‘the settlement focal points’) in the translations of 
CNN and Almtym implies the starting point of something with the potential of spreading, 
whereas the choice of the term ‘ةيناطيتسلاا عقاوملا’ (al-mawaqi‘ al-istyṭaniyah, lit. ‘the 
settlement locations’) in the translations of the US Department of State, United Nations 
and Al-Quds indicates something static. The Arabic lexical item ‘هرؤب’ (bu´rah, lit. ‘focal 
point') can be related to the Arabic term ‘داسف ةرؤب’ (bu´rat fasad, lit. ‘a focal point of 
corruption’) which has negative connotations. Corruption in the context of Jewish 
settlement outposts can be seen in the damage and harm which these settlement outposts 
cause to the Palestinian land. These bu´ar (lit. ‘focal points’) are the centre from which 
settlement outposts spread out like cancer to expand already existing settlements or to form 
new ones.  
  
198 
 
The term ‘settlement outposts’ is rendered in the Hebrew translations of the Knesset – 
following a literal translation strategy – as ‘םיזחאמ’ (ma'hazim, lit. ‘settlement outposts’) or 
– following an explicitness change strategy in the translations of Peace Now and Yediot 
Aharonot – as םיזחאמה’ (ha-ma'hazim, lit. ‘the settlement outposts’). In the Hebrew 
translation of Ha'aretz newspaper, however, it was rendered – following a meaning shift 
strategy – as ‘תויולחנתהה’ (ha-hitnahluyot, lit. ‘the settlements’).  
 
Also, in this example, the verb ‘dismantle’ itself was translated differently into Arabic. It 
was translated literally as ‘ككفت’ (tufakik) in the translations by the Almtym network, Al-
Quds, CNN and the US Department of State. However, a meaning shift strategy was used 
in the translation by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA), where the verb 
‘dismantle’ was rendered as ‘ءلاخا’ (ikhlāa, lit. ‘evacuation’) and the United Nations’ 
version, that opted for the term ‘ةلازا’ (izālat, lit. ‘removal’). Evacuating settlement outposts 
does not necessarily mean dismantling them. They could be evacuated now and populated 
later on.  
 
On the other hand, in all Hebrew translations the verb ‘dismantle’ is translated literally into 
Hebrew in the future tense, e.g. ‘קרפת’ (tefarek, lit. ‘will dismantle’) in the translations of 
the two newspapers Ha'aretz and Yediot Aharonot, indicating a future action, whereas it 
was translated in the simple present tense, e.g. ‘תקרפמ’ (mefaraket, lit. ‘dismantles’) in the 
translations of the Knesset and Peace Now. 
 
5.6.4 Terms Related to the Question of the Palestinian Refugees  
The question of the Palestinian refugees is one of the most contentious and sensitive issues 
of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). Detailed analysis of different 
language versions of peace initiatives revealed that a number of terms and phrases related 
to this question were rendered differently into Arabic, English and Hebrew, namely, with 
regard to ethical responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem, experience of 
refugeehood and resettlement of Palestinian refugees. In the following, translation shifts 
with regard to these three main themes will be examined in their ideological and political 
contexts. 
 
Ethical Responsibility  
The question of who is responsible for the creation of the Palestinian refugees problem 
and how much responsibility is admitted has always been a point of heated debate and 
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conflict between the Palestinians and Israelis (cf. Chapter 1.1.1). This issue is drafted 
differently in the Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions of the Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement as the following two examples show: 
(5.40) 
 
 
לארשי הריכמ התוירחאב תיזכרמה תורצוויהל הידגרט וז ךלהמב תמחלימ1948  תמחלימו1967 
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4].  
Back translation: Israel acknowledges its main responsibility... 
  
[Gush-
Shalom]  
Back 
translation: 
.1567 و 1548 برح للاخ ةاسأملا هذه لوصح نع ةيساسلاا اهتيلوؤسمب ليئارسا فرتعت 
 
Israel acknowledges its main responsibility... 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
Israel acknowledges its share of responsibility for the creation of this tragedy during 
the course of the wars of 1948 and 1967. 
 
(5.41) 
 
 
לארשי הריכמ תינורקע תוכזב-הבישה תוכזכ תישונא תיסיסב.  
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4]                                                                                      
Back translation: Israel acknowledges in principle the right of return as basic human right. 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
Back 
translation: 
ليئارسا فرتعت ايئدبم .يساسا يناسنا قح هنا ىلع ،نيئجلالا ةدوع قحب 
   
Israel acknowledges in principle the Right of Return as a basic human right. 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
Israel acknowledges the principle of the Right of Return as a basic human right. 
 
In the Hebrew source text and the Arabic language version of the Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement, Israel bears the full responsibility for the 
creation of the Palestinian refugees problem which corresponds to the Palestinian narrative, 
whereas in the English language version Israel bears only a share of that responsibility. 
Acknowledging “share” or “all” of the responsibility for the creation of this tragedy would 
have, other than an ethical and historical responsibility, financial implications as the one 
party found responsible for it would be obliged to pay financial compensation to the 
Palestinian refugees. 
 
In the second example above, Israel acknowledges the principle of the right of return 
explicitly only in the English language version. Chiller-Glaus (2007: 316), commenting on 
the English language version of the declaration, explains the political implications of this 
choice as follows: 
A crucial point of the Gush Shalom proposal is the provision that “Israel acknowledges the 
principle of the Right of Return, as a basic human right.” This formulation is interesting in several 
aspects. First, Israel would not recognize the right of return but merely acknowledge it; 
significantly, an acknowledgement is less binding and declaratory than an official recognition of 
the right. Second, although the right of return to be acknowledged by Israel as a “basic human 
right,” it carefully avoided adding a specification like “the State of Israel”…In other words while 
“acknowledging” the right of return as “a basic human right,” the proposal does not unequivocally 
include the return to Israeli territory to be part of this right. 
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Experience of Refugeehood and Dispersion 
The way the experience of the Palestinian refugeehood is referred to reflects particular 
ideological and political position. The following examples show how this experience is 
described in the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and, 
consequently, how it is rendered into Arabic and Hebrew translations: 
(5.42) Refugees shall be compensated for the loss of property resulting from their displacement [The 
Geneva Accord: 26]. 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
.مهريجهت نع ةجتانلا تاكلتمملا يف  مهتراسخ نع نيئجلالا ضيوعت متيس  
The refugees will be compensated for their loss in properties resulted from their 
dispersion. 
 
[YA] 
Back 
translation: 
.םתריקעמ עבונה שוכרה ןדבוא לע וצופי םיטילפ  
Refugees will be compensated for loss of the properties resulted from their 
displacement. 
 
 
     (5.43) The Parties shall request the International Commission to appoint a Panel of Experts to estimate 
the value of Palestinians' property at the time of displacement [The Geneva Accord: 27]. 
 
[PPC] 
Back 
translation: 
 ةينيطسلفلا تاكلتمملا ةميق ريدقتل ءاربخ ةنجل نييعت ةيلودلا ةيضوفملا نم نافرطلا بلطيحوزنلا تقو يف. 
…at the time of internal displacement. 
 
[YA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
םידדצה ושקבי תוביצנהמ ןיבה-תימואל תונמל לנאפ לש םיחמומ ךירעיש תא יווש שוכרה 
לש םיניטסלפה ןמזב הריקעה. 
…at the time of displacement. 
 
In the original English source text of the Geneva Accord, the Palestinian refugeehood 
experience is referred to as ‘displacement’. This term was translated into Arabic as ‘ لاريجهت ’ 
(al-tahjīr, lit. ‘the dispersion’) and as ‘حوزنلا’ (al-nuzūh, lit. ‘the internal displacement’), 
and into Hebrew as ‘הריקעה’ (ha-'akirah, lit. ‘the displacement’). Al-tahjīr in the context of 
the Palestinian refugeehood experience activates the scene of the Palestinian refugees 
being forced to leave their homes in 1948, whereas al-nuzūh – which refers to the time 
when the Palestinians were internally displaced during the 1967 war – activates the scene 
of a second tahjīr (lit. ‘dispersion’). The Palestinian refugees of 1967 are called ‘ لانوحزان ’ 
(al-nāzihūn). This term, i.e. al-nāzihūn, is used to differentiate between those Palestinian 
refugees of 1948 and 1967. The use of both terms as translation equivalents of 
‘displacement’ could perhaps be to include both groups in the discussions on this issue. 
 
In the English source text of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the 
Palestinian refugeehood experience is described as neither al-nuzūh nor al-tahjīr but as 
‘plight’, which changes in translation. The following example is illustrative of this point: 
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(5.44) Right of Return: recognizing the suffering and the plight of the Palestinian refugees the 
international community, Israel and the Palestinian state will initiate and contribute to an 
international fund to compensate them [The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1]. 
 
 
[NC] 
Back 
translation: 
:ةدوعلا قح و ةاناعمب افارتعاقزأم  نيطسلف ةلودو ليئارسإو يلودلا عمتجملا لمعي نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا
نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ضيوعتل صاخ يلود قودنص معدو سيسات ىلع . 
The right of return: acknowledging the suffering and trouble of the Palestinian 
refugees... 
 
[PCPD] 
 
Back 
translation: 
:ةدوعلا قح ةاناعمب افارتعا و ديرشت  نيطسلف ةلود و ليئارسا و يلودلا عمتجملا لمعي نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلاا
ضيوعتل صاخ يلود قودنص معد و سيسأت ىلع .نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا 
of the Palestinian  dispersionThe right of return: acknowledging the suffering and 
refugees... 
 
[Baheth 
Center] 
Back 
translation: 
و ةاناعمب فارتعلاا نم ًاقلاطنا :ةدوعلا قحةمزأ  "ليئارسإ"و ةيلودلا ةرسلأا نإف ،نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا
نيئجلالا ضيوعتل يلود قودنصل لاوملأاب عربتتو ردابت ةينيطسلفلا ةلودلاو. 
The right of return: emanating from the acknowledgment of the suffering and 
of the Palestinian refugees... crisis 
 
[NC] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 לבסב הרכה ךותמ :הבישה תוכזהקוצמבו  הליהקה ומזיי ,םיניטסלפה םיטילפה לש
 ןרקל ומרתיו םיטילפה יוציפל תימואלניב ןרק תמקה ןיטסלפ תנידמו לארשי ,תימואלניבה
וז. 
The right of return: emanating from the recognition of the suffering and plight of 
the Palestinian refugees... 
The lexical item ‘plight’ in the above example is translated into Arabic as ‘قزأم’ (ma´ziq, 
lit. ‘trouble’), ‘ةمزأ’ (azmah, lit. ‘crisis’) and ‘ديرشت’ (tashrīd, lit. ‘dispersion’). Ma´ziq and 
azmah represent a less serious condition and experience than tashrīd. The terms ma´ziq and 
azmah reduce the Palestinian cause to a humanitarian problem rather than a cause of a 
people being uprooted from their land by an occupation power and wish to return to their 
homes and properties. This is exactly the meaning which the term tashrīd activates in the 
mind of the Palestinian readers. The term Tashrīd represents a process that started in 1948 
and still ongoing.  
 
Tashrīd is a key political term in the lexicon of the Palestinian refugees narrative. This 
term – which implies a premeditated action by the use of force – appears in key Palestinian 
documents such as the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat’s famous speech at the 
United Nations General Assembly on 13 November 1974 and his last speech to the 
Palestinian people on the 56
th
 occasion of the Nakba on 15 May 2004, as well as in the 
Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988. The 
following examples illustrate this point: 
(ST)  
 
 
.نمثب ضّوعي ام مهحاورأو هئانبأ ءامد نم انبعش عفدو ،ةليوط نينس ديرشتلاو رامدلاو برحلا تلايول انبعش ضرعت دقل 
نم ىناعو و للاتحلااديرشتلا  ملحي ًادقاح انبعش لعجي لا هلك كلذ نكلو .رخآ بعش هنم ناعي مل ام باهرلإاو حوزنلاو
 انئادعأ ديدحت يف ةيقيقحلا ةيؤرلا قفن وأ ةيرصنعلا انودع ةطقس يف عقت سيئرلا ةدايس اي انلعجي لا هنأ امك ،ماقتنلااب
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 انئاقدصأو
143. 
Back translation: and it suffered from the occupation, dispersion, internal displacement and 
terrorism as no other people… 
 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 نيينيطسلفلا ةيبلاغ علاتقاو ةيبرعلا ضرلأا نم ءازجأو ةينيطسلفلا ضرلأا ةيليئارسلإا تاوقلا للاتحا نإمهديرشتو  نع
 كاهتنا وه ،ةينطولا مهتايح ملاعم ريمدت تايلمعلو داهطضلإاو للاتحلال مهنم نيقابلا عاضخاو ،مظنملا باهرلإا ةوقب ،مهرايد
 ،ةدوعلا قح اهيف امب ،ةينطولا ينيطسلفلا بعشلا قوقحب فرتعت يتلا اهتارارقلو ةدحتملا مملأا قاثيملو ةيعرشلا ئدابمل خراص
سلااو ريصملا ريرقت قحونطوو هضرأ ىلع ةدايسلاو للاقت.ه
144
 
 
Back translation: the Israeli forces occupation to the Palestinian land and parts of the Arab land, 
and the uprooting of the majority of Palestinians and their dispersion from their land by power 
of organized terror and subjugated who remained to occupation, persecution and processes of 
destroying characteristics of their national life, is a severe violation to the principles of 
legitimacy and the convention of the United Nation… 
 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 
 يذلا مويلا ،رايأ نم رشع سماخلا موي ،ةبكنلا موي وه مويلادرش  رزاجملاو ناودعلا حلاس ةوقب ينيطسلفلا بعشلا اذه هيف
 رمتؤملا تارارق ذيفنتلو ةيلودلا ةيعرشلا تارارق برض كلذكو ،ةبذاكلا دوعولاو لذاختلاو ؤطاوتلاو رمآتلا لسلسم ةازاومب
 ةنس لزاب يف ينويهصلا1857 طسلفلا انبعشل دب لاو ةيملاسلإاو ةيحيسملا انتاسدقمو انضرأو انبعش دض تحت حزري يذلا يني
و للاتحلاا اذهدرشملا و ئجلالاو هنطو يفدرشملا ةبكنلا تعقو اذاملو فيك فرعي نأ هنطو جراخ. 145 
 
Back translation: today is the day of al-Nakba , the 15
th
  of May, the day when the Palestinian 
people was disperesed by force and masacres… 
 
In summary, the choice of the political terms tahjīr and tashrīd in the Arabic translations of 
the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, respectively reflect 
the Palestinian narrative of the Right of Return which emphasizes that Israel bears the sole 
responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugees tragedy. These choices can be seen 
as part of the attempts to appeal to Palestinian public opinion in hope of winning its support. 
 
Resettlement of Palestinian Refugees 
How to resolve the Palestinian refugees problem is a particularly contentious and complex 
issue in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with a particular humanitarian dimension (cf. 
Chapter 1.). This complexity has to do with the possible scenarios outlined to resolve this 
issue. These scenarios include the possible return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes 
in what is now Israel (according to the Palestinian narrative, i.e. totalist narrative), possible 
return to the future Palestinian state only (according to the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration 
of Principles, i.e. Palestinian pragmatist narrative), to reach a solution to this problem to be 
agreed on in accordance of the UN resolution 194 (according to the Arab Peace Initiative, 
                                                          
143
 ‘Late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat Speech at the United Nations on 13 November 1974’, published 
on Yasser Arafat Association website:  http://www.yasserarafat.ps/ya/collection_details.php?pid=67 [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
144
 ‘The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988, Palestinian News and 
Info Agency website: http://www.wafainfo.ps/atemplate.aspx?id=4938 [last accessed: 29 July 2011]. 
145
 ‘Late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat last Speech to the Palestinian people on the 56th occasion of the 
Nakba on 15 May 2004’, published on Yasser Arafat Association website: 
http://www.yasserarafat.ps/ya/collection_details.php?pid=80 [last accessed: 24 November 2001]. 
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i.e. Arab pragmatist narrative) or resettlements in host Arab countries (according to the 
Israeli narrative, i.e. totalist narrative). Although the Arab Peace Initiative shows political 
flexibility with regard to this issue, it rejects resettlement as one of the possible scenarios. 
This stipulation is translated differently in the English and Hebrew translations. 
(5.45) نامض ضفر  لاكشأ لكنيطوتلا صاخلا عضولاو ىفانتي يذلا ينيطسلفلا ةفيضملا ةيبرعلا نادلبلا يف. 
[The Arab peace Initiative: 1]                                                                                                           
Back translation:  assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation, which contradicts 
the special circumstances in the Arab host countries. 
 
[LAS] 
 
Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the 
special circumstances of the Arab host countries. 
 
[CPS] The Assembly undertakes to oppose any form of permanent settlement of 
Palestinians that is not compatible with the needs of countries presently hosting 
Palestinian refugees. 
 
[CNN] The summit rejects all forms of resettlement of Palestinians, which conflicts with 
the special circumstances in the Arab countries. 
 
[Reuters] Rejection of all forms of Palestinian resettlement those conflicts with the special 
status of the host Arab countries. 
 
[PA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
הצעומה תרשאמ תא תייחד לכ תורוצה לש חורזא םיניטסלפה רשא םירתוס תא תוביסנה 
תודחוימה לש תונידמה תויברעה תוחראמה. 
…all forms of naturalization of the Palestinians… 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
] תונידמ ברע[ תוברע תייחדל לכ הרוצ לש תובשייתה ]עבק[ תיניטסלפ הניאש הלוע 
הנקב דחא םע תוביסנה תודחוימה] תוררושה [תונידמב תויברעה תוחראמה] תא 
םיטילפה םייניטסלפה[ 
of refugees… permanent settlement…all forms of  
 
[GBI] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 יגוס לכ תייחד תא החיטבמתולגה  לש תודחוימה תוביסנל תודגונמה תיניטסלפה
תוחראמה תויברעה תונידמה. 
…all forms of exile of the Palestinians… 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 לש רדסה לכ תוחדלהביש  תונידמב תודחוימה תוביסנל דגונמ היהיש תיניתשלפ
םיטילפה תא תונכשמה. 
…Palestinian return… 
 
[Haayal 
Hakore] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 טלחומ ןפואב ברסל החיטבמתטילקל םיניטסלפ,  לש תודחוימה תוביסנה תא דגונש רבד
תוחראמה תויברעה תונידמה. 
 
…to absorb Palestinian refugees… 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 לש גוס לכ תוחוד ברע תונידמתונוביר  תודחוימה תוביסנל דוגינב תדמועש תיניטסלפ
.תוחראמה ברע תונידמ וביצהש  
…all forms of Palestinian sovereignty… 
 
In the Hebrew translation of the Palestinian Authority, the term ‘نيطوتلا’ (al-tawtīn, lit. 
‘settlement’) – following a meaning shift strategy – was translated as ‘חורזא’ ('izruah, lit. 
‘naturalization’). In Israel, there is a difference between the two Hebrew terms ‘תוחרזא’ 
(izrahut, lit. ‘citizenship’) and ‘םואל’ (le’um, lit. ‘nationality’). Izrahut “may be held by 
Arabs as well as Jews while nationality (le’um), which bestows significantly greater rights 
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than citizenship, may be claimed by Jews alone” (Tekiner 1990: 20; in Baker 2006: 66). 
Thus, the formulation of ‘rejecting all forms of naturalization of Palestinians’ is ambiguous 
as rejecting such naturalization of Palestinian refugees and granting them citizenship is not 
the same as rejecting their resettlement.  
 
This specific choice of the term 'izruah could perhaps be to show Israel some sort of Arab 
political flexibility with regard to the Palestinian refugees issue. Ambiguous formulation 
can also be seen in meaning shifts from al-tawtīn to ‘תטילק’ (klitah, lit. ‘absorption’), 
‘תונוביר’ (ribonut, lit. ‘sovereignty’) and ‘תולגה’ (ha-galut, lit. ‘the banishment’ or ‘exile’). 
Galut is a biblical term which refers to “the exile of Jews during Babylonian times” 
(Ohliger and Munz 2003: 3). 
 
5.6.5 Terms Related to Israeli Occupation Policies and Practices  
According to the Roadmap Plan, Israel is required to take a number of measures in order to 
improve the humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people living in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories as well as enhancing trust between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority. These measures – which include lifting curfews, refraining from deporting 
Palestinian civilians and stopping the confiscation of Palestinian private land – are illegal 
under the international law and constitute “forms of collective punishment” (Darcy 2003: 
65). The United Nations has condemned these Israeli “measures” (called policies and 
practices by the UN) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in its numerous General 
Assembly resolutions, including resolutions 43/58 (1988)
146
, 45/69 (1990)
147
 and 46/47 
(1991)
148
. These policies and practices were translated differently in the Arabic and Hebrew 
translations of the Roadmap as the following sub-sections will show.  
 
                                                          
146
 ‘United Nations General Assembly Resolution 43/58’, adopted on 6 December 1988, United Nations 
website:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/530/37/IMG/NR053037.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
147
 ‘United Nations General Assembly Resolution 45/69’, adopted on 6 December 1990, United Nations 
website:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/564/58/IMG/NR056458.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
148
 ‘United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/47’, adopted on 9 December 1991, United Nations 
website:  
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/581/35/IMG/NR058135.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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The first policy to be examined is ‘curfews’.149 ‘Curfews’, particularly lengthy ones, have 
been regularly imposed by the Israeli army in the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
throughout the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Darcy 2003: 61). The term ‘curfew’ (Arabic: ‘ عنم
لوجتلا’, ‘man‘a al-tajawul’) – which appears only in the text of the Roadmap Plan – was 
translated differently into Arabic and Hebrew as the following example shows: 
(5.46) Israel takes measures to improve the humanitarian situation. Israel and Palestinians implement 
in full all recommendations of the Bertini report to improve humanitarian conditions, lifting 
curfews and easing restrictions on movement of persons and goods, and allowing full, safe, and 
unfettered access of international and humanitarian personnel [The Roadmap Plan: 5]. 
 
[IMFA] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ينيتْرِيب ريرقت تايصوت نوينيطسلفلاو ليئارسإ قبُطتو .ةيناسنلإا عاضولأا نيسحتل تاءارجإ ليئارسإ ذختت
 ةيناسنلإا فورظلا نيسحت فدهب اهلماكبلّوجتلا عنم ماظن تلااح عفرو  ىلع ةضورفملا دويقلا نم فيفختلاو
ةيناسنلإاو ةيلودلا مقاوطلل ةدودحم ريغو ةنمآو ةلماك لوصو ةيرح حنمو عئاضبلا لقنو صاخشلأا تاكرحت 
…and lifting cases of curfew system… 
 
[USDS] 
Back 
translation: 
   تايصوت عيمج لماكلاب نوينيطسلفلاو ليئارسإ قبطت .يناسنلإا عضولا نيسحتل تاءارجإ ليئارسإ ذختت
 ،ةيناسنلإا عاضولأا نيسحتل ينيترب ريرقتلوجتلا عنم عفرتو  كرحت ىلع ةضورفملا دويقلا نم ففختو
ييناسنلإاو نييلودلا نيفظوملل قاعم ريغو نمآو لماك لوصوب حمستو ،علسلاو صاخشلأان. 
…and lifts curfew… 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ةفاك مات لكشب نوينيطسلفلاو نويليئارسلإا قبطي يناسنلإا عضولا نيسحتل تاوطخلا ةفاكب ليئارسإ موقت
 ةيناسنلإا فورظلا نيسحتل ينيترب ريرقت تايصوتراصحلا عفرو  و صاخشلأا لقنت ىلع دويقلا فيفختو
ةلماك و ةرح ةروصب ةيلودلا و ةيناسنلاا تائيهلا يفظوم كرحتب حامسلا و عئاضبلا. 
…and lifting the siege ... 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ןאולמב תועצבמ םיניטסלפהו לארשי .יראטינמוהה בצמה תא רפשל םידעצ תטקונ לארשי
צלמהה לכ תאםייראטינמוהה םיאנתה רופישל יניטרב ח"וד לש תוםירגס םיריסמ , 
 החוטב ,האלמ השיג םירשפאמו ,תורוחסו םישנא לש העונתה תולבגה תא םילקמו
םיימואלניב םייראטינמוה םיתווצ לש תישפוחו. 
… removes closures… 
 
[Ha'aretz] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ןפואב ומשיי םיאניתשלפהו לארשי .ירטנימוהה בצמה רופישל םיעצמא טוקנת לארשי
 ,םיירטינמוהה םיאנתה רופישל יניטרב ח"וד לש תוצלמהה לכ תא אלמרצוע תרסה 
 תלבגומ אלו החוטב ,האלמ השיג רשפאתו ,תורוחסו םישנא תעונת לע תולבגהה תלקהו
םיימואלניב םיירטינמוה עויס יתווצ לש. 
…removal of curfew… 
 
Translation shifts in the above example are found in the Arabic translation of Al-Quds 
newspaper and the Hebrew translation of Peace Now which both employed a meaning shift 
strategy, thus translating ‘curfews’ as ‘راصحلا’ (al-hisār, lit. ‘the siege’) and as ‘םירגס’ 
(sgarem, lit. ‘closures’) respectively. The translation shift from ‘curfew’ into ‘siege’ in Al-
Quds’ Arabic translation is of high political significance. The term al-hisār or ‘siege’, 
according to B’Tselem (an Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories) refers to “fully or partially preventing residents from entering or leaving a 
certain area, while isolating the area from other parts of the West Bank. This is done by 
                                                          
149
 For a detailed account of the Israeli policy of curfews in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, see Hanieh 
(2006: 324-337). 
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blocking the access roads to the area by means of physical obstructions, which forces the 
residents to pass through a staffed checkpoint on their way in and out of the area. The 
degree to which the siege is enforced varies from place to place and from one period to 
another”.150 
 
This term al-hisār belongs to the Palestinian political lexicon on the discourse of 
occupation and resistance. It appears in a number of key Palestinian documents, for 
example, the Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine on 15 November 1988 
in Algeria as in the following example: 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 مامأ يروطسلأا هدومصو ،يلثملا ةينطولا هتدحو يف رهصنملا ،ميظعلا اهبعش كراعم ةينيطسلفلا ريرحتلا ةمظنم تداق
و رزاجملاراصحلا  ،يملاعلا يعولا يفو يبرعلا يعولا يف ةينيطسلفلا ةمواقملا ةمحلم تلجتو .نطولا جراخو نطولا يف
.رصعلا اذه يف ينطولا ررحتلا تاكرح زربأ نم ةدحاو اهتفصب
 151
  
Back transaltion: the PLO led the fights for its great people…and its legendary steadfastness in 
front of the mascaras and siege inside as well as outside the homeland… 
 
It also appears in the Palestinian National Conciliation document – also known as the 
Palestinian Prisoners’ Document – which was drafted on 11 May 2006 by the Palestinian 
political prisoners in Israeli jails and detention centres as the basis for national conciliation 
and unity between the Palestinian factions. The following example shows this point: 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 ةنادإو ضفرراصحلا  معدل ًايمسرو ًايبعش برعلا ءاقشلأا ةوعدو انبعش ىلع ليئارسإو ةدحتملا تايلاولا هدوقت يذلا ملاظلا
 م ( و ينيطسلفلا بعشلا ةدناسمو-  ت-  ةيسايسلا ةيبرعلا ممقلا تارارق ذيفنتل ةيبرعلا تاموكحلا ةوعدو ةينطولا هتطلسو ) ف
انبعشل ةمعادلا ةيملاعلإاو ةيداصتقلااو ةيلاملاو هتيضقو هدومصو ينيطسلفلا.
 152
 
 
Back translation: To reject and condemn the unjust siege which the United States and Israel are 
leading against our people… 
 
The term al-hisār appears in a number of speeches of the late Palestinian President and 
PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, such as his speech before the 58th Commission on Human 
Rights in Geneva on 26 March 2002 and his speech on the second occasion of the second 
Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 September 2002, as the following two examples show: 
(ST) عشلا نإ ضرعتي ،خيراتلا يف يقبتم يركسع للاتحا رِخآ رين نم يناعي ينيطسلفلا براصحلل  لايتغلااو ريمدتلاو فصقلاو
 حبصأ انتايح طامنأ نم طمن لكو انداصتقاو ةيتحتلا انانبو انراجشأو انليصاحمو انتويبو انضرأ نإ .لئاسولا ىتشب باهرلااو
ةلصاوتملا ةيليئارسلاا ةيركسعلا تامجهلل ًافده. 153 
                                                          
150
 ‘Restriction of Movement: Siege’, B’Tselem website, published on 6 May 2010: 
http://www.btselem.org/freedom_of_movement/siege [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
151
 The Declaration of Independence of the State of Palestine can be found on numerous websites including 
‘the society of the Palestinian Prisoner’, published on 16 November 2010: 
 http://www.ppsmo.ps/portal/index.php/news-and-reports/2010-05-03-17-14-26/2565-2010-11-16-10-35- 
08.html [last accessed: 24 November 2010]. 
152
 ‘The Palestinian Prisoners’ Document’ can be found on many websites such as the Palestinian Return 
centre website , published on 5 October 2009:  http://www.prc.org.uk/newsite/en/ بتك/319-2005-10-09-10-92-
93.html [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Back translation: the Palestinian people are suffering from the last military occupation in 
history; it is exposed to siege, bombardment, destruction, assassination and terrorism in all 
ways…  
 
(ST)  
 
 
يلهأ لك اي ..يعبر اي ..يلهأ اي…  اذه نم مكييحأراصحلا انمهي لا نيينيطسلفك اننكلو ،راصح  انه ةيرمآت تلاواحم انمهت لاو
 لا نيرهاظ مهودعل نيظفاحم نيدلا ىلع يتمأ نم ةئف لازت لا" ميركلا انيبن مهيف لاق امك ،نيرابجلا بعش اننلأ ،كانه وأ
 تيب فانكأو سدقملا تيب يف لاق ؟مه نمو مه نيأ الله لوسر اي ليق ،"الله لوحب نورصتنمل مهنإو مهاداع نم مهرضي
مهو ،سدقملا .نيدلا موي ىلإ طابر يف 154 
Back translation: my people…I greet you from this siege. But, we – as Palestinians– do not 
care about siege… 
 
The term al-hisār also appears in a number of the League of Arab States’ summit 
resolutions describing the living conditions of the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories. The following two examples illustrate this point: 
(ST)  
 
 
 ءاهنإ ةرورض ىلع ةداقلا دكأراصحلا .ىنيطسلفلا بعشلا ىلع ضورفملا ىليئارسلإا 155 
Back translation: the leaders stressed the necessity of ending the Israeli siege imposed on the 
Palestinian people. 
 
(ST)  
 
 
 
156.ىليئارسلإا لزعلاو راصحلا ةسايس ةهجاوم ىف ةيداصتقلاا هتاردق زيزعتو ىنيطسلفلا بعشلا دومصل همعد دكؤي 
Back translation: the council stresses its support to the Palestinian people and enhance its 
economic capabilities in confronting the Israeli siege and isolation policy. 
 
Finally, al-hisār regularly appears in headlines of major Palestinian newspapers such as Al-
Quds, as the following three examples show (relevant stretches underlines):  
 
                    Figure 5.1: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper 
 ةهجاومل ايلع ةنجل ليكشتراصحلا ةزغ عاطق ىلع ضورفملا يليئارسلاا 
(13  طابش2008) 
 
 
                    Figure 5.2: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper 
ليئارسا قفاوت ىلع ةطخ فيفختل راصحلا ايئزج سردتو ةركف ةكراشم ةيلود يف 
ةبقارملا ىلع رباعملا 
18) ناريزح  (2010  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
153
 ‘Statement of the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat before the 58th Commission on Human Rights 
in Geneva on 26 March 2002’, published on Yasser Arafat Association website:  
http://www.yasserarafat.ps/ya/collection_details.php?pid=121 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
 
154 ‘Speech of the late Palestinian President Yasser Arafat on the second occasion of the second Palestinian 
intifada on 28 September 2002, published on Yasser Arafat website: 
 http://www.yasserarafat.ps/ya/collection_details.php?pid=123 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
 
155
 The Resolution of the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo, Egypt on 21-23 June 1996: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=337&level_id=202&page_no=2 [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
156
 The Resolution of the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo, Egypt on 21-23  October  
2000: http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=338&level_id=202&page_no=3 [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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                   Figure 5.3: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper 
 اياحض ددع عفري ةضيرم ةديس ةافوراصحلا  ىلإ ةزغ عاطق يف581ةلاح 
(8   ناريزح2008) 
 
 
The Palestinians identify with the term al-hisār which summarizes their harsh living 
conditions under the oppressive Israeli military occupation. They have been using this term 
more frequently since the outbreak of the second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa on 28 
September 2000, to describe their feelings of entrapment, persecution and humiliation. 
More recently, al-hisār has been widely used by the Palestinians, Arabs, some Israeli 
human rights organizations such as B’Tselem157 as well as some members of the 
international community (e.g. peace activists, politicians, etc.) to describe the daily 
suffering of the Palestinians living in the Occupied Gaza Strip, which has been sealed off 
the from the outside world
158
 since the election of the Palestinian government led by the 
Palestinian faction, Hamas in 2007.
159
 
 
The term al-hisār also reminds the Palestinians of some key historical events in their long 
struggle against the Israeli military occupation – both outside and inside the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories – for example, the Israeli siege of Beirut (Arabic: ‘ اصحتوريب ر ’) in 
1982 during which Israel forced the political leadership of the PLO out of Lebanon. Also, 
al-hisār brings to the Palestinian mind the Israeli siege of the Jenin Palestinian refugee 
camp (Arabic: ‘نينج ميخم راصح’) in which the Israeli army – as part of its military offensive 
“Operation Defensive Shield” in 2002 – laid siege to the camp for eleven days ending with 
the Israeli army killing “at least 52 Palestinians” – according to some estimates of the 
United Nations
160
 – and the entire camp being flattened by armored Israeli bulldozers.161 
                                                          
157
 The term ‘siege’ is used in many publications of B’Tselem to describe  the situation in the Occupied Gaza 
Strip, for example, B’Tselem report ‘Gaza Strip, the Siege on Gaza’, B’Tselem Website, published on 1 
January 2011: http://www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/siege [last accessed: 24 November 2011].  
158
 The Palestinians in the Occupied Gaza Strip and since the start of the Israeli blockade formed the ‘Popular 
Committee Against Siege’ which reports on the situation there and the various activities against the siege: 
http://www.freegaza.ps/en/ [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
159
 The situation in Gaza is described in the United Nations ‘Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ – 
better known as ‘Goldstone Report’ – in English as ‘the blockade’. This term was translated officially by the 
United Nations into Arabic as ‘راصحلا’ (al-hisār, lit. ‘the siege’). Goldstone’s report and related UN 
resolutions are available at: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/FactFindingMission.htm [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
 
160
  ‘Illegal Israeli actions in the Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory: 
Report of the Secretary-General prepared pursuant to General Assembly resolution ES-10/10, United Nations 
website, published on 30 July 2002: 
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Finally, the al-hisār brings to mind the Israeli siege on the late Palestinian President Yasser 
Arafat in his compound in Ramallah (Arabic: ‘تافرع راصح’) on 29 March 2002 during the 
same Israeli military offensive – i.e. “Operation Defensive Shield” – that ended on 11 
November 2004 with the assassination of the Palestinian president.  
 
The Hebrew term used in the Peace Now translation ‘רגס’, (seger, lit. ‘closure’) – whose 
Arabic equivalent is ‘ينملأا قوطلا’ (al-ṭawq al-amnī, lit. ‘the security ring’) – designates 
another of the illegal and controversial measures that Israel imposes on the Palestinian 
civilians in the occupied territories of the West Bank, where closures are routine 
particularly during periods of religious Jewish festivities. Indeed, since the outbreak of the 
second Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa, on 28 September 2000, the Palestinian cities, towns 
and villages have been under various types of curfews, sieges and closures (Koran 2004: 
210).  
 
The Israeli policy of seger or al-ṭawq al-amnī was first established in January 1991 as a 
“temporary measure during the Gulf War” (Saleh 2009: 19) and later “institutionalized” 
with the Oslo Accords (Farsakh 2000: 23). Closures involves “physically preventing 
Palestinians either permanently or temporarily from leaving or entering those areas under 
closure. This is achieved by placing cement blocks, boulders, banks of rubble or earth, or 
manned checkpoints on all the roads leading to the closed town or village” (Darcy 2003: 
64).
162
 Closures can be either internal or external. On the one hand, internal closures ban 
movement between and within the West bank and the Gaza Strip. On the other hand, 
external closures  closes off ‘the Green Line’, i.e. between the Occupied Territories and 
Israel altogether and renders it “illegal for any Palestinian to exit the region regardless of 
whether he or she held an entry permit” (Gordon 2008a: 39). ‘Closures’– taken by the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/499/57/IMG/N0249957.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
161
 Amnesty International delegates who returned from the camp found “credible evidence of serious 
breaches of human rights and humanitarian law. These include unlawful killings, excessive use of lethal 
force, and failure to give civilians warning before attacks by helicopters. They found extensive destruction of 
property without apparent absolute military necessity, denial of medical and humanitarian assistance and ill-
treatment of detainees”. ‘Israel/OT: Statement to the United Nations about the fact-finding team to inquire 
into the events in Jenin’, Amnesty International website, posted on 24 April 2002: 
http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=13473 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
162
 For an overview of the current situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territories with regard to movement 
and Israeli restrictions, see the recent United Nations report ‘Movement and Access in the West Bank’ 
published on 27 September 2011:  
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/8F5CBCD2F464B6B18525791800541DA6 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
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Israeli army in the name of “security” (Darcy 2003: 64) – are viewed by several 
nongovernmental organizations as “a form of collective punishment in violation of Article 
50 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention” (Darcy 
2003: 64). 
 
The next two Israeli policies to be examined are deportation of Palestinian civilians and 
“confiscation” of their private property. These two policies – which the Roadmap describes 
as “undermining trust” between the Palestinians and Israelis – were translated differently 
into Arabic and Hebrew as the following examples show: 
(5.47) GOI takes no actions undermining trust, including deportations, attacks on civilians; 
confiscation and/or demolition of Palestinian homes and property, as a punitive measure or 
to facilitate Israeli construction; destruction of Palestinian institutions and infrastructure; 
and other measures specified in the Tenet work plan [The Roadmap Plan: 2]. 
 
[UN] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 كـلذ يف اـمب ةقثلا ةعزعزل تاءارجإ يأ ليئارسإ ةموكح ذختت لاليحرتـلا تاـيلمع  دـض تامجهلا نشو
و ؛نيـيندملا ةرداـصمةينيطـسلفلا تاـكلتمملاو لزاـنملا مدـه وأ /و… 
Government of Israel does not take any measures to shake the trust including 
operations of deportation, waging attacks against the civilians and 
confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.  
 
[IMFA] 
 
Back 
translation: 
يأب ليئارسإ ةموكح موقت لا   كلذ يف امب ةقثلا ةعزعزل لامعأدرط تايلمع نييندم ىلع تامجهو 
ةرداصم ةينيطسلف تاكلتممو لزانم مده وأ/و… 
The government of Israel does not make any actions to shake trust including 
the operations of expulsion, attacks on civilians and confiscation or/and 
demolition of Palestinian homes and property.  
 
[USDS] 
 
Back 
translation: 
لا  كلذ يف امب ،ةقثلا ضوقت تاءارجإ يأ ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا ذختتليحرتلا  ؛نييندملا دض تامجهلاو
وةرداصم ةينيطسلف كلامأو لزانم مده وأ/و. 
The Israeli government does not take any measures that undermine the trust 
including the deportation, the attacks against the civilians and confiscation 
or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.  
 
[Almtym] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 كلذ يف امب ةقثلا فعضت تاءارجإ ةموكحلا ذختت لاداعبلإا تايلمع  و نييندملا ىلع موجهلا وةرداصم 
نيينيطسلفلا تاكلتمم و لزانم. 
The government does not take measures that weaken trust including 
operations of deportation, the attack on the civilians, and confiscation of the 
homes and properties of the Palestinians.  
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 اهنيب نم و،ةقثلا ضوقت تاكرحت ةيأب ليئارسإ ةموكح موقت لاداعبلإا  وأ نييندملا ةمجاهموةرداصم  مده و
ةينيطسلفلا تاكلتمملاو لزانملا. 
Government of Israel does not make any moves that undermine trust 
including the deportation, attacking the civilians and confiscation or/and 
demolition of Palestinian homes and property.  
 
[CNN] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 كلذ يف امب ةقثلا ضوقت نأ اهناش نم لامعأ يأب ةيليئارسلإا ةموكحلا موقت نلداعبلإا  دض تامجهلاو
ةينيطسلفلا تاكلتمملاو لزانملا مده وأ ةرداصمو نييندملا. 
The Israeli government will not do any action which could undermine the 
trust including the deportation, the attacks against the civilians and 
confiscation or/and demolition of Palestinian homes and property.  
 
[The 
Knesset] 
 
 תוברל ,ןומאה תא תורערעמה תולועפב תטקונ הנניא לארשי תלשממםישוריג ,
 ,םיחרזא לע תופקתהתעקפה םיניטסלפ לש שוכרו םיתב תסירה וא/ו. 
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Back 
translation: 
Government of Israel does not take actions which undermine trust including 
expulsions, attacks on civilians, expropriation/ or demolition homes and 
property of Palestinians.  
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
תלשממ לארשי אל תטקונ םוש םידעצ םיתיחפמה תא ןומאה, ללוכ שוריג; הפקתה לע 
םיחרזא העקפה ו/וא הסירה לש םיתב שוכרו םיניטסלפ. 
 
Government of Israel is not taking steps which reduce trust including 
expulsion, attack on civilians, expropriation/ or demolition homes and 
property of Palestinians.  
 
[Ha'aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
תלשממ לארשי אל טוקנת תולועפ תועגופה ןומאב, ללכבו הז שוריג תפיקתו םיחרזא; 
המרחה ו/וא סרה םיתב שוכרו לש םיאניתשלפ.  
Government of Israel will not take actions which harm trust including 
expulsion, attacking civilians, confiscation/ or demolition Palestinian homes 
and property. 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 
 תוברל ,ןומאב ועגפיש תולועפ טוקנת אל לארשי תלשממשוריגלע תופקתה ,  ;םיחרזא
המרחה םייניטסלפ םיתבו שוכר לש הסירה וא/ו.                  
                                                                                                       
Government of Israel will not take actions which harm trust including 
expulsion, attacks on civilians, confiscation/ or demolition homes and 
property of Palestinians. 
 
The example above concerns the only occurrence of the term ‘deportation’ in the original 
source texts of the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. This term is used only once in the 
English source text of the Roadmap, nevertheless, it is important. In the translations of 
Almtym, Al-Quds and CNN, the term ‘deportation’ was rendered as ‘داعبلإا’ (al-ib‘ād, lit. 
‘the deportation’), whereas in the translations of the United Nations (UN) and the US 
Department of State (USDS), it was rendered as ‘ لاليحرت ’ (al-tarḥīl) (which also means 
‘deportation’). In the translation of Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) it was 
rendered – following a meaning shift strategy as ‘درطلا’ (al-ṭard, lit. ‘the expulsion’). 
 
Although the terms al-ib‘ād and al-tarḥīl are translated into English as ‘deportation’, they 
have different political connotations in Arabic. The Israeli policy of deporting Palestinian 
civilians – a violation of the international law and conventions, e.g. the Fourth Geneva 
Convention – is defined as “the compulsory departure of an individual from the country of 
which he or she is a national, and implies the compulsory loss of that person’s national 
rights” (Hiltermann 1986: 2). Hiltermann (1986: 2) further explains that in the case of the 
Palestinians who have no national rights, it means “being deprived of the right of residence 
in their homeland”. This idea of the deporting Palestinian nationals rather than individuals 
who have no right to their homeland is expressed in Arabic by the use of the term ‘ اداعبلإ ’ 
(al-ib‘ād, lit. ‘the deportation’) rather than tarḥīl or al-ṭard. 
 
  
212 
 
Israel – a few weeks after and its occupation of the West Bank in 1967 – conducted a 
census and issued identity cards only to the Palestinians who were physically present at 
that time in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Baramki 1992: 127). Israel considered 
those Palestinians as “foreign residents” rather than national citizens (Shiblak 1996: 40). 
Moreover, Israel considers this residency a privilege rather than a right (Baramki 1992: 
127). In sum, Israel treats the Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territories like 
immigrants and not like the indigenous population of the land – i.e. historic Palestine. This 
perhaps explains the use of the Arabic term ‘درطلا’ (al-ṭard, lit. ‘the expulsion’) in the 
translation of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) which is equivalent to the 
Hebrew term of ‘שוריג’ (girush, lit. ‘expulsion’) or the plural form of it – i.e. ‘םישוריג’ 
(girushim, lit. ‘expulsions’) used in all the Hebrew translations above.  
 
The Israeli policy of girush (lit. ‘expulsion’) – which is “euphemistically known as 
‘transfer’ in Zionist literature” (Aruri 2011: 6)163 – has deep resonance in the Israeli-
Zionist ideology, namely that Palestine claimed as “the land of Israel” is “a Jewish 
birthright and belongs exclusively to the Jewish people as a whole, and, consequently 
Palestinians are ‘strangers’ who should either accept Jewish sovereignty over land or 
depart” (Masalha 2007: 5). Such policy aims at emptying the land of its indigenous 
Palestinian population. For example, in 1948 the Zionist movement expelled an estimated 
750,000 Palestinians of the indigenous population of historic Palestine and in that way 
achieved an overwhelmingly Jewish state (Finkelstein 2003: xi). Moreover, five out of the 
eleven Palestinian cities that fell to the Israeli control in 1948 – namely, Safad, Majdal, 
Tiberiade, Beisa and Beer-Saba’– “were completely depopulated, reducing their 
inhabitants to uprooted, homeless, and penniless refugees” (Abdel Jawad  2006: 90). 
 
Al-ib‘ād – a term that belongs to the Palestinian political lexicon – is used by Palestinian 
people, rather than the terms al-tarḥīl or al-ṭard, to de-legitimize the Israeli policy of 
deportation and to emphasize its illegal status.
164
 This term – i.e. al-ib‘ād regularly appears 
– for example, in the headlines of major Palestinian newspapers such as Al-Quds and Al-
Ayyam as the following examples show (relevant lexical items underlined):  
                                                          
163
 The concept of ‘transfer’ refers to “the idea of expelling the Palestinian citizens of today’s Israel in order 
to achieve an ‘ethnically pure’ Jewish state, and/or to the idea of expelling the entire Palestinian population to 
the East of the Jordan River in order to secure a Jewish ‘greater Israel’” (Emerson and Tocci 2003: 32).  
 
164
 On the legal basis of the Israeli policy of deportation, see the report published by B’Tselem on 6 May 
2010: http://www.btselem.org/side_links/deportation [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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                    Figure 1.4: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper 
 لكلا لاطت ةيليئارسلاا داعبلاا تارارق : داعبلااب نوددهملا باونلل يفحص رمتؤم للاخ
يسدقملا 
 (3 December 2010)  
 
                    Figure 1.5: News Headline from Al-Quds Newspaper 
 رخا ثحبل باونلا ماصتعا ةميخ يف عمتجت "داعبلإا ةمواقمل ةينطولا ةنجللا"
ةيضقلاب ةقلعتملا تاروطتلا 
(24 August 2010)  
 
                   Figure 1.6: News Headline from Al-Ayyam Newspaper 
 داعبلإاب ةددهملا ةيسدقملا تايصخشلا عم ًانماضت سدقلا يف ماصتعا 
(3 June 2008)  
                  
                   Figure 1.7: News Headline from Al-Ayyam Newspaper 
ندرلأا ىلإ رهوج ملاحأ ةريسلأا دعبي للاتحلاا 
(25 June 2010)  
 
The choice of the term al-tarḥīl in the United Nations Arabic translation is of particular 
interest. Goldstein (2005: 208) points out that the Israeli policy of deportations “have 
prompted the adoption of more critical U.N. Security Council resolutions than any other 
Israeli abuse”.165 Indeed, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted 11 
resolutions precisely on the issue of Israel’s policy of deportation of Palestinian civilians. 
These resolutions are 468 (1980), 469 (1980), 484 (1980), 607 (1988), 608 (1988), 636 
(1989), 641 (1989), 694 (1991), 726 (1992) and 799 (1992), besides resolution 681 (1990) 
which contained a paragraph on Israeli deportation. When comparing the English and 
Arabic language versions of these UN resolutions with regard to the Israeli policy of 
deporting Palestinian civilians, it turns out that in the UNSC resolutions 468, 469 and 484 
– the term ‘expulsion’ rather than ‘deportation’ was used to describe Israel’s policy. This 
term – i.e. ‘expulsion’– is translated by the UN into Arabic – following a literal translation 
strategy – as ‘درطلا’ (al-ṭard) as in the following example: 
(ST)  
 
 
 
Calls again upon the Government of Israel, as occupying Power, to rescind the illegal measures 
taken by the Israeli military occupation authorities in expelling the Mayors of Hebron and 
Halhoul and the Sharia Judge of Hebron, and to facilitate the immediate return of the expelled 
Palestinian leaders, so that they can resume their functions for which they were elected and 
                                                          
165
 Goldstein (2005: 207) notes that Israel has deported more than 1,000 Palestinians between 1967 and 1987 
and another sixty-six in the first five years of the first Palestinian intifada. During the second Palestinian 
intifada – and after a siege at Bethlehem’s Church of Nativity in April and May 2002 – Israel deported 
thirteen Palestinians to Europe and twenty-six to Gaza (ibid: 207). 
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UN: 
 
 
appointed;
 166
 
 
وعدي ةموكح ،ليئارسإ ،اهتفصب ةوقلا  يركسعلا للاتحلاا تاطلس اهتذختا يتلا ةينوناقلا ريغ تاءارجلاا ءاغلا ىلا ،ةلتحملا
 ةيليئارسلاادرطب  نينيطسلفلا ةداقلا ةدوع ليهست ىلإ و ، يعرشلا ليلخلا ضاقو لوحلحو ليلخلا يتيدلب يسيئرنيدورطملا 
نييعتو اهل مهباختنا ىرج يتلا فئاظولا فانئتسا مهنكمي ثيحب اروف؛ اهيف مه167 
 
These three UNSC resolutions (i.e. 468, 469 and 484), concern the deportation of the 
Mayors of the Palestinian cities of Hebron and Halhoul and of the Sharia Judge of Hebron. 
In the rest of the UNSC resolutions on the issue of Israel’s policy of deporting Palestinian 
civilians – and after the outbreak of the Palestinian intifada on 9 December 1987 – the term 
‘deportation’ replaced the term ‘expulsion’. This term – i.e. ‘deportation’ – was translated 
in the UNSC Resolutions 607 and 608 as al-tarḥīl whereas in UNSC resolutions 636, 641, 
694, 726, 799 and 681 as al-ib‘ād. The following two examples show this point:  
(ST)  
 
 
UN: 
Calls upon Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and to ensure the safe and 
immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported;
 168 
 
 رمأ ءاغلا ليئارسا ىلا بلطيليحرت  ةلتحملا ةينيطسلفلا يضارلأا ىلا ةيروفلا و ةنملاا ةدوعلا ةلافك و ،نيينيطسلفلا نييندملا
 مت نملمهليحرت لعفلاب.169 
 
(ST)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UN: 
Having learned with deep concern that Israel, the occupying Power, in contravention of its 
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, deported to Lebanon on 17 
December 1992, hundreds of Palestinian civilians from the territories occupied by Israel since 
1967, including Jerusalem; 
 
Strongly condemns the action taken by Israel, the occupying Power, to deport hundreds of 
Palestinian civilians, and expresses its firm opposition to any such deportation by Israel.
 170
 
 
 دق ،للاتحلااب ةمئاقلا ةطلسلا ،ليئارسإ نأ قلقلا غلابب ملع دقتدعبأ  موي ،نانبل ىلإ٧٧  ربمسيد/لوأ نوناك٧٣٣٢ نم تائم ،
 ذنم اهلتحت يتلا يضارلأا نم نيينيطسلفلا نييندملا٧٣٧١ فينج ةيقافتا بجومب اهتامازتلا كلذب ةكهتنم ،سدقلا اهيف امب ،
 ماعل ةعبارلا٧٣٩٣،  
                                                          
166
 ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 469 (1980), aadopted by the Security Council on 20 May 
1980, published on the United Nations website: 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/D2F670D2A6C66F82852560E500759FA9 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011].  
167
 ‘Arabic translation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 469 (1980) adopted on 20 May 
1980, published on Palestinian Arabic website: 
http://www.palestineinarabic.com/Docs/inter_arab_res/UNSC/UNSC_Res_469_A.pdf [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
168
 United Nations Security Council Resolution 608, adopted on 14 January 1988 by the Security Council, 
published on the United Nations website: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/541/35/IMG/NR054135.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
169
 ‘Arabic translation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 608, adopted on 14 January 1988 
by the Security Council, published on the United Nations website:  
http://www.un.org/arabic/docs/SCouncil/SC_Res/S_RES_608.pdf [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
170
 ‘United Nations Security Council resolution 799 (1992), adopted by the Security Council on 18 December 
1992, published on the United Nations website: 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/831/38/IMG/N9283138.pdf?OpenElement [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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 ،للاتحلااب ةمئاقلا ةطلسلا ،ليئارسإ هتذختا يذلا ءارجلإا ةوقب نيديداعبإب  هتضراعم نع برعيو ،نيينيطسلفلا نييندملا تائم
 يلأ ةتباثلاداعبإ ؛ليئارسإ هب موقت ليبقلا اذه نم171 
 
Deportation of Palestinians civilians “was one of the most contested weapons used by 
Israel against suspected political activists” (Goldstein 2005: 208). The largest single Israeli 
deportation of Palestinian civilians occurred on 17 December 1992 when Israel – in an 
unprecedented step – deported 418 Palestinian civilians allegedly for being Hamas activists 
from the Occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Marj al-Zuhur in South Lebanon.
172
 
The following day of this Israeli mass deportation, the United Nations Security Council 
condemned this Israeli action and unanimously adopted the UNSC Resolution 799.  
 
The third Israeli policy to be discussed is the ‘confiscation’ of Palestinian private land. 
However, the more accurate term to describe such a policy is ‘expropriation’, as other than 
it indicates political motivation behind such a process, it also “signifies various arbitrary 
decisions on land seizure in Palestine by the Israeli authorities, especially in the early years 
of the state and specifically after the immediate termination of military hostilities” (Falah 
2004: 958). 
 
The struggle to control land is the most significant aspect of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
(Fischbach 2005: 291). Israel has been controlling land in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories through the process of expropriation. 
 
In Arabic, and in the context of land, both terms ‘confiscation’ and ‘expropriation’ are 
translated into Arabic as ‘هرداصم’ (muṣādarah), which is used in all Arabic translations 
above. On the other hand, in Hebrew, the Israeli control of private Palestinian land is 
usually referred to as ‘ קפההע ’ (hafka’ah, lit. ‘expropriation’)173 rather than ‘המרחה’ 
(hahramah, lit. ‘confiscation’).  
 
One of the differences between hafka’ah (expropriation) and hahramah (confiscation) is 
that the former involves the payment of compensation (Somanath 2011: 539). According to 
                                                          
171
 Arabic translations of the United Nations Security Council resolution 799 (1992), adopted by the Security 
Council on 18 December 1992, published on the United Nations website: http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N92/831/36/IMG/N9283136.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
172
 For more information on this case, see the report published by B’Tselem on 6 May 2010: 
http://www.btselem.org/deportation/1992_mass_deportation [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
173
 For a detailed account on the Israeli policy of land expropriation, see Forman and Kedar (2004), Holzman-
Gazit (2007) and Hussein and McKay (2003: 66-103). 
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the Israeli Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance of 1943, the person whose 
land has been expropriated for “public purposes” is entitled to compensation; nevertheless, 
no compensation has ever been paid to Palestinians (Schmidt 2001: 522).  
 
The other difference between the hafka’ah and hahramah is with regard to the history and 
politics of the term hafka’ah which the term hahramah lacks. Expropriation is defined as 
“seizure of private property by the government” (Sharan 2005: 230). Since 1948, Israel has 
been expropriating private Palestinian land and property by a means of dozens of military 
orders (e.g. ‘Military Order 59’ – Order Concerning Government Properties – of 1967 and 
‘Military Order 364’ of December 1969)174 and legislations. Ashmore (1997: 131) explains 
these legislations as follows: 
 [A] 1948 law authorized seizure of “uncultivated” land; a 1949 law permitted expropriation 
of land for “security” reasons; a 1950 law transferred property from “absentees” to the 
state…a 1953 law legitimized all previous confiscations of land. 
 
The latest major case in this context occurred on 9 January 2011 when Israel demolished a 
four-story building known as the Shepherd Hotel in the Palestinian neighbourhood of 
Sheikh Jarrah in Occupied East Jerusalem in order to build 20 Jewish settlement units in its 
place. This hotel “was once the headquarters of Hajj Amin al-Husseini, mufti of Jerusalem 
and Arab nationalist leader during British rule of Palestine (Gorenberg 2009). Israel 
confiscated this hotel following its occupation of East Jerusalem in 1967 under the 
“Custodian of Absentee property” and then sold it in the mid-1980s to “a corporation 
owned by American millionaire Irving Moskowitz, the financial angel of far-right Israeli 
groups intent on settling Jews in Palestinian neighborhoods inside and encircling the Old 
City” (Gorenberg 2009). 
The other two main pretexts for Israeli expropriation of Palestinian property are “security” 
and use for “public purposes”. The Israeli military commander has full authority to declare 
specific areas “closed areas”, generally on “security” grounds. This effectively means that 
Palestinian owners cannot enter to farm their land. After three successive years, the area 
can then be declared “state land” and confiscated; many Jewish settlements in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories have been erected on land expropriated in this way 
(Dajani 1994: 12).  
 
                                                          
174
 These two specific orders provided the Israeli military administration authorization to “possess and 
dispose of all government property” of the former Jordanian government in the West Bank and oversee state 
lands in the Gaza Strip (Dajani 1994: 12). 
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Since the late 1950s, the Land (Acquisition for Public Purposes) Ordinance (1943) has 
been the main tool for expropriating Palestinian land and “turning it over to Jewish 
settlement and development” (Hussein and McKay 2003: 86). This legislation – introduced 
by the British Mandate administration – allows the expropriation of private Palestinian 
land in the public interest; however, Israel “has implemented this legislation in a highly 
discriminatory and arbitrary manner” (Hussein and McKay 2003: 86). Schmidt (2001: 522) 
explains that this is because the Palestinians: 
Were, are and will never be considered as the “public” and the claim that expropriations are 
intended to serve a “public” purpose is accurate only if the “public” for whom it is 
justifiable to harm Palestinian property rights consists entirely of Jews.  
 
5.6.6 Future Relations between Arab States and Israel 
The nature of future relations between Arab states and Israel has traditionally been a matter 
of dispute and controversy. Arab states prefer the term ‘normal relations’ to 
‘normalization’ as they regard the latter “an instrument of Israeli penetration and 
domination” (Shamir 2004) – i.e. Israel with its strong economy would swallow the weaker 
Arab economies and then control the region politically. For its part, Israel favours 
‘normalisation’ of relations with Arab states as part of the “peace process” (Massoud 2000: 
340). Israel understands ‘normalization’ as “the creation of economic, cultural, and social 
relationships between the two peoples. Such a relationship creates a web of a mutual 
economic interests built on joint projects in the fields of tourism, transportation, energy, 
and infrastructure, as well as by joint investments in business ventures” (Sneh 2005: 29). 
Israel claims that ‘normalization’ of relations is “the ultimate test of sincerity of peace 
overtures and readiness for stable peace” (Shamir 2004) as well as “the most solid 
guarantee that peace will be irreversible” (Sneh 2005: 29). 
 
The term ‘normalisation’ has very different connotations in Hebrew, Arabic and English. 
While it is considered neutral by speakers of English, it is considered as positive by 
speakers of Hebrew and as negative by speakers of Arabic. In English, ‘normalisation’ 
describes relations between countries which have hostilities and wish to end these 
hostilities and establish normal relations. In Hebrew, there was no word for ‘normalisation’ 
and that is why “normalizatzia soon caught on in Israel” (Cohen 2001: 73). This Hebrew 
term has a familiar ring to another Hebrew foreign loan word ‘normali’ (lit. ‘normal’) 
(Cohen 2002: 73). Normalisation (Hebrew: ‘היצזילמרונ’) refers to the kind of relations Israel 
has always been looking to have with the Arab states in the Middle East. The Arabic term 
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‘عيبطت’ (taṭbī, ‘normalisation’) is equated with submission and domestication (Cohen 2002: 
74).  
 
The term ‘normalisation’ was not opted for at all in any of the peace initiatives – i.e. the 
original source texts in the corpus. Instead, the term ‘full normal relations’ was used, such 
as in the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. This specific choice can be 
explained with regard to the history and sensitivity of the term ‘normalisation’ in the 
context of the Middle East conflict as explained above. The implications of these 
connotational differences are illustrated in the following example: 
(5.48) Arab state acceptance of full normal relations with Israel and security for all the states of 
the region in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace [The Roadmap Plan: 5]. 
 
[USDS] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ةماقإ ةيبرعلا لودلا لوبقةلماك ةيعيبط تاقلاع  ليئارسإ عم…   
 
The acceptance of the Arab states to establish full normal relations with Israel… 
 
[CNN] 
Back 
translation: 
ةيبرعلا لودلا لبقت تاقلاعلل لماك عيبطتب ليئارسإ عم…  
The Arab states accept full normalisation of relations with Israel… 
 
[The 
Knesset] 
Back 
translation: 
לארשי םע םיסחיה לש האלמ היצזילמרונל ברע תונידמ לש המכסה... 
 
The acceptance of Arab states of full normalisation of relations with Israel… 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
לארשי םע םיילמרונהו םיאלמה םיסחיה תא ולבקי ברע תונידמ… 
 
Arab states will accept the full and normal relations with Israel… 
 
 
All Arabic translations rendered the phrase ‘full normal relations’ literally, except for the 
CNN version that used a meaning shift strategy and opted for ‘عيبطت’ (lit. ‘normalisation’). 
Among the Hebrew translations, only the Knesset version chose not to translate this term 
literally, replacing it instead with the term preferred in Israel ‘היצזילמרונ’ (lit. 
‘normalisation’). 
 
5.7 Addition of Information  
In Chapter Four, addition of information was examined at the macro-structural level. In 
this section, it will be examined at the micro-structural level. Detailed analysis of the 
corpus showed that cases of addition of information occurred in translations of two non-
governmental organizations and one Palestinian newspaper. These are the Arabic 
translations of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement published 
by Gush-Shalom and the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative published by 
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Peace Now in addition to the Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan published by Al-
Quds newspaper. 
 
The Arabic translation of the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement 
includes two cases of addition of information which concern two of the final-status issues 
of the conflict: firstly, the Jewish settlements and secondly, the Palestinian refugees. The 
added information in the Arabic language version in the two examples below reflects the 
Palestinian negotiating positions with regard to these issues, namely that all Jewish 
settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories are illegal and that any resolution of the 
refugees issue should be resolved according to the UN resolution 194: 
(5.49) יבשות תויולחנתהה תומקוממה חטשב ךופהיש תנידמל-ןיטסלפ ואצוי חטשהמ ינפל םות שוביכה 
ילארשיה [The the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 3]                    . 
                                                          
[Gush-
Shalom] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 تارارق و ةعبارلا فينج ةدهاعم قفو قطانملا يف تميقا يتلا تانطوتسملا ةفاك ناف ، ةدحتملا مملاا ةئيه
 ماع تلتحا يتلا1567 ةينوناق ريغ ربتعت يف ةعقاولا تانطوتسملا نونكسي نيذلا نينطوتسملا جارخا متي .
.يليئارسلاا للاتحلاا ةياهن لبق نيطسلف ةلود ىلا لوحتتس يتلا ةقطنملا 
 
According to the fourth Geneva Convention and the UN resolutions, all 
settlements built in the area occupied in 1967 are considered illegal. Those 
settlers who reside in the settlements located in the area that will be transferred 
to the state of Palestine will be evacuated before the end of the Israeli 
occupation. 
 
(5.50) 
 
 
 
םאתהב תוכזל וז, ןתנית לכל טילפ תורשפאה רוחבל ןיב תלבק םייוציפ תובשייתהו-עבק ץראב 
תרחא, הביש תנידמל ןיטסלפ וא הביש ימוחתל לארשי םאתהב תונורקעל םיאבה. 
[The Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement: 4]    
Back translation: according to this right, each refugee will be given the option to choose… 
 
[Gush-
Shalom] 
 
Back 
translation: 
قحلا اذهل اقفو  مقر ةدحتملا مملاا رارقل و154،  ىلا ةدوعلا نيب ينيطسلف ءىجلا لكل رايتخلاا قح ىطعي
ىلا ةدوعلا وا نيطسلف ةلود  كلذ و ،ىرخا ةلود يف مئادلا ثوكملا و تاضيوعت ىلع لوصحلا وا ليئارسا
ةيلاتلا ءىدابملا بسح: 
According to this right, and the United Nations resolution 194, each refugee will 
be given... 
 
Furthermore, the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative, authored by Professor 
Ilai Alon and published by Peace Now, had seventeen cases of addition of information. 
These additions, with other recontextualization strategies, had a double aim: on the one 
hand, presenting a clear non-ambiguous text to the Israeli reader and, on the other, showing 
the language expertise and academic competence of the translator (cf. Chapter 6.2.3). 
Added information concerns the adding of subjects and objects where they are implicit in 
sentences. The following examples illustrate this point: 
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(5.52) سلجملا بلطي  يجيتارتسلاا اهرايخ وه لداعلا ملاسلا نأ ةنلعم ملسلل حنجت نأو اهتاسايس يف رظنلا ةداعا ليئارسا نم
يلي امب مايقلا اهبلاطي امك اضيأ[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                                               
        :    
Back translation: the council asks Israel to reconsider its policies and to incline to peace 
declaring that the just peace is also its strategic option. Also demands it to do the following: 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
תשקבמ הצעומה לארשימ ןייעל שדחמ התוינידמב, תוטנל םולשל, זירכהלו יכ םולשה 
קדוצה אוה הריחב תיגטרטסא םג הרובע. ומכ ןכ תשרוד [הצעומה ]מ[לארשי ]אלמל 
תא [תושירדה ]תואבה :    
 
The council asks from Israel to reconsider its policy, to incline to peace and to 
declare that the just peace is also its strategic option. Also asks [the council] 
[from Israel] to fulfil the following [demands]: 
 
The translator here is trying to remove any kind of ambiguity in the source text by adding 
information he thinks are necessary for the reader. 
(5.53) 
 
 
ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا دهع يلو زيزعلا دبع نب الله دبع ريملأا يكلملا ومسلا بحاص ةملك ىلا عمتسا نأ دعبو.  
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                                                                        
Back translation: Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince 
Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia... 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
רחאל וניזאהש [ירבח הצעומה] ומואנל לש דוה ותלעמ ,רימאה הללאדבע ןב דבע לא-
זיזע ,שרוי רצעה לש הכלממה תיברעה תידועסה. 
After they listened [members of the council] to the statement of his royal 
highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia... 
 
 
(5.54) 
 
 
 
 وينوي نم عبارلا ذنم ةلتحملا ةينيطسلفلا يضارلأا ىلع ةدايس تاذ ةلقتسم ةينيطسلف ةلود مايق لوبق1567  ةفضلا يف
 عاطقو ةيبرغلاسدقلا اهتمصاع نوكتو ةزغ .ةيقرشلا [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                  
                  
Back translation: The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent 
Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the 
West Bank and Gaza strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. 
 
[Peace 
Now] 
 
Back 
translation: 
תלבק התמקה לש הנידמ תיניטסלפ תיאמצע תלעבו תונוביר םיחטשב םייניטסלפה 
םישובכה זאמ העבראה ינויב ,8491 הדגב תיברעמה ,תעוצרבו הזע[ ,הנידמ ]רשא 
התריב םילשורי תיחרזמה . 
Acceptance the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state in 
territories occupied since 4 June 1967 in the West bank and Gaza Strip, [state] its 
capital Eastern Jerusalem. 
 
Finally, one case of addition of information is found in the Arabic translation of the Al-
Quds newspaper. This addition of information concerns the issue of the rebuilding the 
Palestinian security forces, as in the following example: 
(5.51) Restructured/retrained Palestinian security forces and IDF counterparts progressively resume 
security cooperation and other undertakings in implementation of the Tenet work plan, 
including regular senior-level meetings, with the participation of U.S. security officials [The 
Roadmap Plan: 2]. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 ةينيطسلفلا ةينملأا ةزهجلأا نم ءارظن فنأتسيةيقبتملا قيسنتلا يف يليئارسلإا شيجلا نمو اهتلكيه داعملا/
ينملأا… 
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Back 
translation: 
Resume counterparts from the remaining Palestinian security apparatus /the 
restructured and from the Israeli army the security coordination… 
 
In this example, the addition of the Arabic adjective ةيقبتملا (al-mutabaqiyah, lit. ‘the 
remaining ones’) is particularly interesting. The Palestinian Authority (PA) – according to 
the Roadmap Plan – is required to resume security cooperation with their counterparts in 
the “IDF” (“Israel Defense Forces”) and fight “terror” organizations. In order to do so, the 
PA needs sufficient security forces with good infrastructure. However, during the second 
Palestinian intifada, Al-Aqsa which broke out on 28 September 2000 and particularly after 
2001, the Israeli army steadily escalated its attacks on the infrastructure of the Palestinian 
Authority, particularly its security infrastructure (Cordesman 2006: 81). These attacks 
reached their peak when Israel waged a full-scale military offensive, “Operation Defensive 
Shield”, in 2002 during which its army systematically and effectively destroyed the 
Palestinian security forces and their infrastructure (Esposito 2005: 87; Ghanem 2007: 59). 
This is why the Roadmap Plan talks about the re-building of these forces. Against this 
backdrop, the addition of the adjective al-mutabaqiyah is highly evaluative as it implicitly 
blames Israel for destroying something that has to be rebuilt. 
 
5.8 Omission of Information  
Detailed analysis of corpus showed that patterns of omission of information are only found 
in the translations of mass media: three newspapers, two Israeli (Ha’aretz and Yediot 
Aharonot) and one Palestinian (Al-Quds) in addition to one news agency, CNN. Omission 
of information occurred mainly with regard to the final-status issues of the conflict at the 
level of word, phrase and sentence. In the following sub-sections, these cases of omission 
of information will be discussed focusing on their political and ideological implications. 
 
5.8.1 Omissions in Translations Published by Ha’aretz Newspaper 
The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz published three Hebrew translations of three peace 
initiatives: the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Arab Peace Initiative and 
the Roadmap Plan. These three translations had eighteen cases of omission of information, 
which will be examined and commented on in the following sub-sections. 
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Omissions in the Translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
With regard to the Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, 
the two cases of omission of information found concern the phrases ‘agreed upon’ and 
‘without mutual consent’ as in the two following examples: 
(5.55) Border modifications will be based upon an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange 
(1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial 
continuity and demographic considerations [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 
1]. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 לע וססבתי לובג ינוקית לש סחי( םיינויווש םיחטש יפוליח7:7 םיכרצל םאתהב ,)
,םידדצה ינש לש םיינויחה ילאירוטירט ףצר ,ןוחטיב הז ללכבו םילוקישו .םייפרגומד  
 
Border modifications will be based on exchange of equal territories (basis of 
1:1) in accordance to needs of the two sides... 
 
The omission of the term ‘agreed-upon’ in the above example perhaps does not have any 
serious political significance. However, it does in other contexts (see example 5.64 below).  
 
The second case of omission in the Ha’aretz Hebrew translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles concerns the issue of archaeological excavations in or underneath 
the holy sites in Jerusalem as in the following example: 
(5.56) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be 
designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be Guardian 
of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy 
sites will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without 
mutual consent [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1]. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
שכ רדגות ןיתשלפ תנידמ .םישודקה תומוקמה לע תונוביר היהת אל דצ םושל תרמו
guardian א םארח לש- לתוכה לש תרמושכ רדגות לארשי .םימלסומה תבוטל ףירש
 אל .תורצנל םישודקה תומוקמה ןיינעב ווק סוטטסה רמשיי .ידוהיה םעה תבוטל יברעמה
םהיתחתמ וא םישודקה תומוקמה ךותב ןהשלכ תוריפח ומייקתי. 
The omission of the phrase ‘without mutual consent’ in the above translation can be 
explained keeping in mind that this Hebrew translation was based on the Arabic translation 
of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), which also omitted this 
phrase. In other words, the omission of this phrase occurred originally in the Arabic 
translation of the People’s Campaign for Peace and Democracy (PCPD) – whose ‘main 
addressees’ are Palestinian readers in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – and was then 
preserved in the Ha’aretz Hebrew translation. This phrase was also deleted in all the 
Arabic and Hebrew translations of the initiative except in the Hebrew translation published 
by the National Consensus. The Arabic translation published by Al-Quds newspaper, 
which was based on the Hebrew translation of Ha’aretz newspaper, includes other cases of 
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omission of important information (see sub-section on Omission of Information in 
Translation published by Al-Quds newspaper below).  
 
The omission of the phrase ‘without mutual consent’ is in the Palestinian political interest, 
namely, that no archaeological excavations be allowed in or underneath the holy sites in 
Jerusalem, particularly al- aram al-Sharīf. In the context of competing Palestinian and 
Israeli narratives and exclusive political claims in Jerusalem, archaeology and 
archaeological excavations – other than they tell “the story of the country” (Glock 1994: 
71) – can also provide “hard evidence” to validate such claims (Ross 2007: 164). 
 
The first Israeli excavations in Jerusalem began following the June 1967 war and for many 
years on the south and south western slopes of al- aram al-Sharīf in February 1968 (Abu 
El-Haj 1998: 168). From the standpoint of the Israelis, archaeology played an important 
role in Israel’s foreign image and foreign policy, presenting “the Jewish state in revival, 
investigating its past with the tools of science” (Hallote and Joffe 2002: 87). In other 
words, archaeology is closely linked to their “nation-state building” (Abu El-Haj 2001: 1) 
and in emphasizing and producing the “eternal link of the Jewish people with the city of 
Jerusalem” (Ricca 2007: 65)  
 
The Palestinians, on the other hand, do not view Israeli excavations in Occupied East 
Jerusalem – particularly in or underneath al- aram al-Sharīf – in their interest due to the 
fact that the Israelis control Jerusalem and are “able to expropriate, excavate, label, and 
describe antiquities there as they please. They can thus put the stamp of authority on 
narratives that give extraordinary weight to selected strata, thereby successfully 
manipulating both the spatial and temporal aspects of identity, in pursuit of a clear 
nationalist political agenda” (Khalidi 1997: 18). The Palestinians believe that the Israeli 
archaeological excavations – while giving careful attention to the validation of a Jewish 
presence in Jerusalem – “distorts” and “diminishes” the notion of uninterrupted Arab 
presence in the city (Rajjal 2005: 42). They also believe that Israel uses excavations and 
diggings, particularly, in or underneath al- aram al-Sharīf, to search for “the ruins of the 
Second Temple or to build a prayer area” (Ross 2003: 198). Finally, they who have been 
protesting and opposing these excavations since they began in 1967 (Klein 2001: 274) 
believe that these excavations are undermining the walls of the al-  aram al-Sharīf and 
would ultimately cause the collapse of the al-Aqsa Mosque (Gonen 2003: 161). 
 
  
224 
 
The Israeli archaeological excavations in Jerusalem have always been a major source of 
religious and political tensions between the Palestinians and Israelis. In September 1996, 
the newly elected Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, ordered the opening of the 
“Western Wall tunnel” (Silberman 2001: 500) which “ran alongside the Western Wall and 
the Haram Al-Sharif to the Muslim Quarter” (Ma’oz 2009: 104). Consequently, violent 
confrontations erupted between the Palestinians and the Israeli army in Occupied East 
Jerusalem which later spread to cities, towns and refugee camps throughout the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories (Abu El-Haj 2001: 228). These violent confrontations resulted in 
hundreds of Palestinian civilians killed and injured (Silberman 2001: 500). 
 
Another example concerns the Palestinian village of Silwan in Occupied East Jerusalem. 
Israel claims that this village – with a population of 30,000 Palestinians – is the site “where 
King David founded his city” (Friedland and Hecht 2000: 436). The Israeli municipality of 
Jerusalem plans to demolish more than 88 Palestinian homes in the Al-Bustan 
neighbourhood of Silwan in order to create an “archaeological park” (Shulman 2007: 92). 
On 7 September 2011, Israel finished the digging of a new tunnel – 600 meters long – 
reaching from Silwan to al-Aqsa Mosque. What reactions such practices will yield in the 
future remains to be seen. 
 
Archaeological excavations and naming practices (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) are two closely linked 
practices in the sense that they are both used to validate claims of exclusive ownership in 
the Old City of Occupied Jerusalem. 
 
Omissions in the Translation of the Roadmap Plan 
The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan shows three cases of omission of 
information: the lexical items ‘reciprocal’ and ‘fully’ and one whole sentence as in the 
following examples: 
(5.57) The following is a performance-based and goal-driven roadmap, with clear phases, timelines, 
target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in 
the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the 
auspices of the Quartet [the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia] [The 
Roadmap Plan: 1]. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
ךמסמה וניה תפמ םיכרד תנווכמ הרטמ, תססובמה לע יבלש עוציב םירורב, תורדגה 
ןמז, יכיראת דעי ינויצו ךרד, םידעוימש איבהל תומדקתהל תועצמאב םידעצ לש ינש 
םידדצה, ימוחתב הקיטילופה, ןוחטיבה, הלכלכה, תויוכז םדאה תיינבו תודסומ, תחת 
תוסח טטרווקה.     
 ...which aim at bringing progress with the help of steps by the two sides… 
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(5.58) GOI fully facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC and Cabinet sessions, 
internationally supervised security retraining, electoral and other reform activity, and other 
supportive measures related to the reform efforts [ The Roadmap Plan: 3]. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
תלשממ לארשי רשפאת תא םתעונת לש םיריכב םיאניתשלפ תובישיל הצעומה 
טניבקהו םייניתשלפה, ןומיא שדחמ לש תוחוכ ןוחטיבה חוקיפב ימואלניב, תוליעפ 
הרושקה תוריחבל תומרופרלו תורחא, יעצמאו הכימת םיפסונ םירושקה ץמאמל 
תומרופרה. 
The government of Israel allows the travel of Palestinian officials... 
 
The stipulations in Ha’aretz translation – as in the two examples above – correspond to 
what came in the first draft of the Roadmap Plan on 15 October 2002. The first draft of the 
Roadmap Plan – issued on 15 October 2002 – lacked any description of implementation 
mechanisms. The addition of the phrase “through reciprocal steps” in the final draft of the 
plan removed ambiguity of how to implement this plan and emphasized that both sides 
needed to carry out their obligations reciprocally. Also, the first draft of the Roadmap 
stipulated that Israel “facilitates travel of Palestinian officials for PLC sessions, 
internationally supervised security retraining, and other PA business without restriction”. 
175
 This requirement was further emphasized in the final draft of the Roadmap with the 
addition of the adverb “fully”. The omission of this adverb in the Ha’aretz translation 
leaves the issue of facilitating travel for Palestinian officials at the hands of the Israeli 
government. The third case concerns the omission of one whole sentence which points to 
the role of the Quartet in achieving peace between the Palestinians and Israelis as in the 
following example: 
(5.59) Implementation, as previously agreed, of U.S. rebuilding, training and resumed security 
cooperation plan in collaboration with outside oversight board (U.S.– Egypt – Jordan). 
Quartet support for efforts to achieve a lasting, comprehensive cease-fire [ The Roadmap 
Plan: 3]. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
המושיי, יפכ םכסוהש רבעב, לש תינכות הרא"ב םוקישל, ןומיא שודיחו ףותישה 
הלועפה ינוחטיבה, ךות ףותיש םיפיקשמ םיינוציח (הרא"ב-םירצמ-ןדרי.   
 
Omissions in the Translation of Arab Peace Initiative 
The Ha’aretz translation of the Arab Peace Initiative shows thirteen cases of omission of 
information at the levels of both word and phrase. At the word level, two adjectives were 
                                                          
175
 ‘Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict’, Miftah website, published on 2 November 2002: 
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1220&CategoryId=10 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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omitted. The omitted information removes reference to the occupied territories as ‘Arab’ or 
‘Syrian’ as in the following example: 
(5.60)  يضارلأا نم لماكلا باحسنلااةيبرعلا  نلاوجلا كلذ يف امب ةلتحملايروسلا  )ناريزح( وينوي نم عبارلا طخ ىتحو1567 
نانبل بونج يف ةلتحم تلاز ام يتلا يضارلأاو.[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                            
 
Back translation: full withdrawal from the Arab occupied territories including the Syrian 
Golan until the lines of the 4 June 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese 
territories in the south of Lebanon. 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
ב ושבכנש םיחטשה לכמ הגיסנל םיכסהל-67',  ןונבל םורדב םיחטשהו ןלוגה ללוכ
ילארשי שוביכ תחת ןיידעש. 
To agree to withdrawal from all the territories, which were occupied in 67, 
including the Golan and the territories in southern Lebanon, which are still 
under Israeli occupation. 
 
At phrase level, nine cases were found. In some of these cases, as in the following two 
examples, omitted information could be argued to be not important to the Israeli reader. 
(5.61)  عانتقا نم اقلاطناوةيبرعلا لودلا فارطلأا نم فرط يلأ نملأا وأ ملاسلا ققحي مل عازنلل يركسعلا لحلا نأب. 
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1] 
Back translation: emanating from the conviction of the Arab states that the military solution 
to the conflict achieved neither peace nor security to any party. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
Back  
translation: 
הטלחהה הלבקתה ךותמ עונכש אלש ןכתיי ןורתפ יאבצ ךוסכסל.  
The decision taken was based on the conviction that there will not be a military 
solution to the conflict. 
 
(5.62) 
 
 
 
 
سلجم  ةمقلا رمتءوم هرقأ ام دكؤي ذإ .رشع ةعبارلا ةيداعلا هترود يف دقعنملا ةمقلا ىوتسم ىلع ةيبرعلا لودلا ةعماج
 وينوي يف ةرهاقلا يف يداعلا ريغ يبرعلا1556  يف ققحتي ةيبرعلا لودلل يجيتارتسا رايخ لماشلاو لداعلا ملاسلا نأ نم
ددصلا اذه يف ليئارسا هدكءوت لاباقم امازتلا بجوتسيو ةيلودلا ةيعرشلا لظ.[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]       
                      
Back translation: the council of the League of Arab States at the Summit level at its 14
th
 
ordinary session reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo Extra-ordinary Arab 
summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East ... 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
 ינויב הלבקתהש הטלחהה תא תררשאמ תיברעה הגילה תצעומ1996  תיברעה הגספב
ריהקב, ןוכיתה חרזמב קדוצ םולש היפל,  תנידמ תמכסהבו ימואלניב םואיתב לבקתהש
לארשי, תויברעה תונידמה לש תיגטרטסא הטלחה אוה. 
 
The council of the League of Arab States reaffirms the resolution taken in June 
1996 at the Arab summit in Cairo that a true peace in the Middle East... 
 
 
(5.63) 
 
 
 
 نلعأ يتلا ةيدوعسلا ةيبرعلا ةكلمملا دهع يلو زيزعلا دبع نب الله دبع ريملأا يكلملا ومسلا بحاص ةملك ىلا عمتسا نأ دعبو
هتردابم اهللاخ نم. [The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                                                              
  
Back translation: having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah 
Bin Abdullaziz, the crown Prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which he presented his 
initiative... 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
 
Back 
translation: 
יגיצנ תונידמה ועמש תא ותעצה לש רימאה הללאדבע, םיסחיל םיילמרונ ןיב לארשי 
תונידמל תויברעה הרומתב הגיסנל האלמ םיחטשהמ םייברעה ושבכנש זאמ ינוי .1967 
 
Representatives of the states listened to the statement of the Prince Abdullah, 
regarding normal relations between Israel and the Arab states in return of full 
withdrawal from the Arab territories, which were occupied since June 1967. 
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By contrast, in some other cases, omissions have serious political implications. Examine 
the following three examples: 
(5.64) 
 
 
 
.154 مقر ةدحتملا مملأل ةماعلا ةيعمجلا رارقل ًاقفو هيلع قفتي نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ةلكشمل لداع لح ىلإ لصوتلا 
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]   
                                                                                                         
Back translation: to reach a just and agreed upon solution to the Palestinian refugees problem 
according to the UN General Assembly resolution 194. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
םיכסהל ןורתפל קדוצ םיטילפל םיאניתשלפה יפל הטלחה 194 לש תצעומ ןוחטיבה לש 
ואה"ם. 
To agree to just solution to Palestinian refugees according to resolution 194 of the 
Security Council of the United Nations. 
 
The phrasing of the proposed solution to the Palestinian refugees problem in the Arab 
Peace Initiative as “to be agreed upon” is of significant political importance. This phrasing 
represents a turning point in the long-time position of the League of Arab States vis-à-vis 
the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The League of Arab States has always 
maintained the position that the Palestinian refugees problem must be resolved in 
accordance with the UN General Assembly resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 which 
“called on Israel to facilitate the return of the refugees and compensate those who did not 
wish to return” (Massoud 2000: 342). Before the drafting of the Arab Peace Initiative, this 
position was not open for any negotiations with Israel but to be implemented as it is – i.e. 
full return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in now Israel. The following three 
excerpts from previous Arab summit resolutions illustrate this point: 
(ST)  
Back  
translation: 
 
 نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ةلكشم لح رارقل اقفو مقر ةدحتملا مملال ةماعلا ةيعمجلا154 (1548).176 
To resolve the Palestinian refugees problem According to the UN General Assembly 
resolution 194 (1948). 
 
(ST)  
 
Back 
translation: 
 
 ىضارلأاو نيطسلف ىلإ دوهيلا ةرجهل دح عضو ىلع لمعلاب ىلودلا عمتجملا ةبلاطم عيمج نامضو ةلتحملا ةيبرعلا
ىنيطسلفلا بعشلل ةينطولا قوقحلا  ةماعلا ةيعمجلا رارقل اذيفنت ةدوعلا ىف هقح كلذ ىف امب154  ماعل1548.177 
…and guarantee of all national rights of the Palestinian people including its right of return 
in implementation of the UN General Assembly resolution 194 (1948). 
 
                                                          
176 ‘The Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held in Casablanca’, Morocco 23-26 May 1989: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=462&level_id=202 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
177 ‘The Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held in Baghdad’, Iraq 28-30 May 1550: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=468&level_id=202 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
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(ST)  
Back 
translation: 
 
ةدحتملا مملأا تارارقو ةيلودلا ةيعرشلا ساسأ ىلع ةدوعلا ىف مهقح ىلإ ًادانتسا نيينيطسلفلا نيئجلالا ةلكشم ةيوست.178 
Settlement of the Palestinian refugee’s problem based on their right of return according to 
the international legitimacy and UN resolutions. 
The addition of the term ‘هيلع قفتي’ (yutafaqu ‘alayhi, lit. ‘to be agreed upon’) in this 
initiative – and in resolutions of the League of Arab States from 2001 onwards on the issue 
of the Palestinian refugees (e.g. Arab Summits in Algeria 2005, Riyadh 2007, Damascus 
2008 ) – thus marks a dramatic change in the sixty-year-old Arab political position on this 
issue. This term was meant to show the political pragmatism of the Arab states with regard 
to this issue. That is to say, any solution to this problem is something to be agreed on 
between all parties concerned, (e.g. the PLO, Israel and the Arab host countries of the 
Palestinian refugees). Therefore, for the first time in the history of the conflict, Israel 
would have a say or a veto in this matter.  
 
The omission of the term yutafaqu ‘alayhi (lit. ‘to be agreed upon’) in the Hebrew 
translation of Ha’aretz portrays the Arab Peace Initiative as nothing new in the traditional 
Arab position on the refugees issue. The omission of this term in a number of Hebrew 
translations of the Arab Peace Initiative led to the drafting of other alternative translations 
which aimed to show the true elements of the initiative (e.g. Alon’s translation published 
by Peace Now, cf. Chapter 4.4.3 ). 
 
In the second example below, ending the conflict between Israel and the Arab states does 
not necessarily mean concluding peace agreements between them. It could mean perhaps 
just ending the hostilities between these states and going from the state of war to the state 
of ‘no war’ only. 
(5.65) 
 
 
ايهتنم يليئارسلإا يبرعلا عازنلا رابتعاليئارسإ نيبو اهنيب ملاس ةيقافتا يف لوخدلاو ، ةقطنملا لود عيمجل نملأا قيقحت عم .
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1] 
Back translation: consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement 
with Israel, with providing security for all the states of the region. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
Back 
translation: 
יברעה ךוסכסה ףוסב ריכהל-רוזאה תונידמ לכל ןוחטיב חיטבהלו ילארשי. 
To recognize the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to guarantee security to all 
states of the region. 
 
The third example below concerns one of the fundamental requirements of the Arab Peace 
Initiative to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e. the establishment of the Palestinian state with 
                                                          
178 The Resolution of the Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo, Egypt 21-23 May 1996: 
http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/arabic/details_ar.jsp?art_id=337&level_id=202 [last accessed: 24 
November 2011].  
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East Jerusalem as its capital. In the Ha’aretz translation, the explicit reference to East 
Jerusalem as the capital of the future Palestinian state was deleted. The phrase ‘ חרזמב
םילשורי’ (be Mizrah Yerushalayim, lit. ‘in East Jerusalem’) could mean anywhere in East 
Jerusalem. In fact, there have been some Israeli proposals in the past to have the capital of 
the future Palestinian state in the town of Abu Dies, which is “outside the Jerusalem 
boundary of the British mandate, inside the U.N partition’s Jerusalem, outside of Jordanian 
East Jerusalem during period 1949-67, and straddling the line separating the post-June 
1967 expanded Jerusalem from the West Bank” (Klinghoffer 2006: 38). 
(5.66) 
 
 
 ةدايس تاذ ةلقتسم ةينيطسلف ةلود مايق لوبقةلتحملا ةينيطسلفلا يضارلأا ىلع  وينوي نم عبارلا ذنم1567  ةيبرغلا ةفضلا يف
 نوكتو ةزغ عاطقوسدقلا اهتمصاع ةيقرشلا[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]                                              
Back translation: the acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian 
State on the Palestinian territories occupied. 
 
[Ha’aretz] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 תיאמצעו תינוביר תיניתשלפ הנידמ תמקהל םיכסהלהדגב םיחטשב,  חרזמבו העוצרב
םילשורי,  ינוי רחאל ושבכנש67 
To agree to the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian State in 
territories in Bank, in Strip and in East Jerusalem, which were occupied after June 
67. 
 
5.8.2 Omissions in Translations Published by Yediot Aharonot Newspaper 
The Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot published two Hebrew translations: one of the 
Roadmap Plan and one of the Arab Peace Initiative. The translation of the Roadmap Plan 
shows omission of information with regard to the issue of the Jewish settlements and 
settlement outposts, as shown below. 
(5.67) GOI immediately dismantles settlement outposts erected since March 2001 [The Roadmap 
Plan: 4]. 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
 לארשי תלשממקרפת  סרמ זאמ ומקוהש םיזחאמה תא2337. 
 
Government of Israel will dismantle the settlement outposts, which were erected 
since March 2001. 
 
The Yediot Aharonot translation, unlike other Hebrew translations of the Roadmap, 
removes any reference to the timeframe set for the dismantling of settlement outposts in 
the Roadmap text (i.e. ‘immediately’). This results in a new requirement, different from 
what is stipulated in the original source text of the Roadmap. This new requirement 
corresponds to what came in the first draft of the Roadmap Plan on 15 October 2002, 
namely that “GOI [government of Israel] dismantles settlement outposts erected since 
establishment of the present Israeli government and in contravention of current Israeli 
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government guidelines”.179 The adverb ‘immediately’ was added in the final draft of the 
Roadmap Plan based on a Palestinian demand (Saeb Erikat, personal communication 
2005).  
 
Far from being an oversight, this deletion is consistent with other omissions elsewhere in 
the Yediot Aharonot version. This is the case, for instance, with the deletion of a fragment 
under the ‘Phase II: Transition – June 2003-December 2003’ of the Roadmap, as part of a 
stipulation on Israel’s contribution to the agreement on permanent borders. The omitted 
fragment (underlined below) confirms the interest of the Yediot Aharonot translator(s) in 
downplaying the role of settlement outposts in the peace process: 
(5.68) Creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional borders through a process of 
Israeli-Palestinian engagement, launched by the international conference. As part of this 
process, implementation of prior agreements, to enhance maximum territorial contiguity 
including further action on settlements in conjunction with establishment of a Palestinian state 
with provisional borders. Enhanced international role in monitoring transition, with the active, 
sustained, and operational support of the Quartet. (Roadmap Plan, Phase II: Transition – June 
2003-December 2003. 
 
[Yediot 
Aharonot] 
Back 
translation: 
תוניידתה ךילהת ךות םיינמז תולובג םע תיאמצע תיניטסלפ הנידמ תמקה  לארשי ןיב
תימואלניבה הדיעווב חתפייש ,םיניטסלפל. 
The establishment of sovereign Palestinian state with provisional borders through a 
process of talks between Israel and Palestinians, which will be started by 
international conference.  
 
The political importance of the deleted sentence is that it touches on the main principle of 
the Roadmap Plan, i.e. the ‘two-state’ solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The 
Roadmap Plan proposes the creation of an independent Palestinian state with provisional 
borders. The viability of such a state depends on territorial contiguity between its parts in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In order to achieve this territorial contiguity, 
‘implementation of prior agreements’ and ‘further action on settlements’ is required. These 
two measures have serious implications for the size of the proposed Palestinian state and 
its viability. The omission of this information reduces Israel’s obligations according to the 
Roadmap Plan to only what is required in phase (I) of the plan, i.e. a freeze of ‘settlement 
activity’ and dismantlement of ‘settlement outposts’. 
 
5.8.3 Omissions in Translations Published by Al-Quds Newspaper 
The Palestinian newspaper, Al-Quds published two Arabic translations: one of the 
Roadmap Plan and one of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Omission of 
                                                          
179
 ‘Elements of a Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian 
Conflict’, Miftah website, published on 2 November 2002:  
http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?DocId=1220&CategoryId=10 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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information appears only in three cases in the translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles. These are related to the issues of land and Jerusalem, as shown 
in the following three examples:  
(5.69) Border modifications will be based upon an equitable and agreed-upon territorial exchange 
(1:1) in accordance with the vital needs of both sides, including security, territorial continuity 
and demographic considerations [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles:1]. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
Back 
translation: 
 موقتس ةيدودحلا تلايدعتلا ةبسنب واستم لكشب يضارلاا لدابت ساسا ىلع1:1 ةيويحلا ضارغلاا اقفو ،
.ةيفارغميدلا تارابتعلاا و يميلقلاا لصاوتلا و نملاا كلذ يف امب ،نيفرطلل 
Border modifications will be based on exchanging the lands equally 1:1… 
 
(5.70) Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem will come under Palestinian sovereignty, Jewish 
neighbourhoods under Israeli sovereignty [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles: 1]. 
 
[Al-Quds] Omission 
 
(5.71) Neither side will exercise sovereignty over holy places. The State of Palestine will be 
designated Guardian of al-Haram al-Sharif for the benefit of Muslims. Israel will be Guardian 
of the Western Wall for the benefit of the Jewish people. The status quo on Christian holy sites 
will be maintained. No excavation will take place in or underneath the holy sites without 
mutual consent [Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles:1]. 
 
[Al-Quds] 
 
 فصوت ةينيطسلفلا ةلودلا  ةسدقملا نكاملاا ىلع ةدايس فرط يلا نوكيلا فيرشلا مرحلا ىلع ةيصوك
 ظافحلا يرجي و يدوهيلا بعشلا حلاصل يبرغلا رادجلا ىلع ةيصوك فصوت ليئارسا و ،نيملسملا حلاصل
 ةسدقملا نكاملاا لخاد تايرفح يا يرجت لا و .ةسدقملا ةيحيسملا نكاملاا عوضوم يف نهارلا عضولا ىلع
.اهقاطن يف وا 
 
All underlined information in the above three examples was omitted in the translation of 
Al-Quds newspaper. These omissions can be linked to the conditions of text production of 
this specific translation. This translation was based on the Hebrew translation published by 
the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. The implications of these omissions are the same as the 
ones explained in (5.6.1). The issue of translations based on other translations and their 
implications in the institutional context of newspapers will be discussed in Chapter 6.1.2. 
 
5.8.4 Omissions in Translations Published by CNN 
CNN published two Arabic translations: one of the Arab Peace Initiative and one of the 
Roadmap Plan. Omission of information occurred only in the translation of the Arab Peace 
Initiative. This translation had three paragraphs omitted at the macro-structural level (cf. 
Chapter 4.5.3). At the micro-structural level, one whole sentence was omitted as the 
following example shows:  
(5.72) 
 
 
 
 
فارطلأا نم فرط يلأ نملأا وأ ملاسلا ققحي مل عازنلل يركسعلا لحلا نأب ةيبرعلا لودلا عانتقا نم اقلاطناو.  بلطي
سلجملا اضيأ يجيتارتسلاا اهرايخ وه لداعلا ملاسلا نأ ةنلعم ملسلل حنجت نأو اهتاسايس يف رظنلا ةداعا ليئارسا نم. 
[The Arab Peace Initiative: 1]. 
 
Back translation: emanating from the conviction of the Arab countries that the military 
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solution to the conflict did not achieve peace or security for any of the parties, the council 
request from Israel to reconsider its policies and to incline to peace while declaring that 
the just peace is its strategic option as well. 
 
[CNN] 
 
The summit asks Israel to re-evaluate its policies and to work for peace. Israel 
should declare that a just peace is also Israel’s strategic option. 
 
The omitted underlined sentence represents the general premise of the Arab Peace 
Initiative – i.e. peace rather than war is the only means to resolve the conflict between the 
Arab states and Israel. This omission is better explained keeping in mind that this 
translation looks like a summary of the Arab Peace Initiative, which is a common practice 
in news agencies – i.e. providing quick coverage to the latest news by focusing on the main 
points. 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
The main objective of this chapter was to examine how aspects of ideology, political 
affiliations and power struggles manifest themselves in the different language versions of 
the Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives at the micro-structural level. The analysis showed 
that, when translated, negotiated texts, such as peace initiatives, can be interpreted 
differently by different institutions and news media in their attempt to promote their 
respective political interests and construct narratives that resonate with their constituencies.  
 
The analysis has also showed that the main translation shifts between the different 
language versions of peace initiatives were predominantly with regard to the final 
settlement issues of the conflict, e.g. land, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, etc. These 
translation shifts reflected the – in some cases – the competing narratives of the two sides 
of the conflict as well as those within-group narratives. For example, the competition 
between the narratives of the two sides over Jerusalem is evident in the names given to the 
city itself (e.g. ‘Al-Quds’ or ‘Yerushalayim’), labels given to its inhabitants (e.g. 
‘residents’ or ‘citizens’), names of its holy places (‘al-  aram al-Sharif’ or ‘the Temple 
Mount’), archaeological excavations, claims of exclusive sovereignty by closing down 
institutions and practices which aim to change geography and demography of the city. The 
within-group narratives can be seen in referring to the ‘Western Wall’ as Hāaiṭ al-Mabkā 
or Hāaiṭ al-Burāq. 
 
The analysis has also demonstrated that ambiguity and vagueness play a crucial role in the 
drafting of the Roadmap Plan. The proponents of this specific peace initiative deliberately 
sought to steer clear from the main negotiating obstacles (willingly or unwillingly) that had 
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previously hindered the peace process and postponed them to the final settlement 
negotiations. Instead, the Quartet’s text aims to generate consensus on less sensitive issues, 
at least in the early stages. 
 
The range of examples discussed in this chapter indicates that issues like territorial claims, 
settlement policies, and sovereignty over Jerusalem can become even more sensitive as a 
result of translation. This form of mediation provides agents with an opportunity to select 
and circulate one of the conflicting interpretations afforded by the use of ambiguous and 
vague structures. As the examples have shown, most of the translating institutions tend to 
align themselves with ‘their’ side (i.e. government or country) and opt for translation 
strategies supporting their own interpretation of the issues at hand. Decisions prompted by 
the demands of the translation process ultimately contribute to reinforcing ideologies and 
political agendas. Specifically, Arabic translators have been found to favour explicitating 
(and, hence, disambiguating) strategies when mediating controversial matters such as 
Israel’s withdrawal or settlement outposts. In other words, their translations seek to 
promote a single interpretation and, in doing so, pin Israel down to a specific course of 
action. 
 
The analysis has also brought into sharp relief the political implications of lexical choices – 
as shown in previous research (e.g. Schäffner and Chilton 2002) – both in the original and 
translated texts. Politically sensitive terms are normally value-laden and thus they cannot 
be separated from their socio-political and historical contexts. These terms, e.g. 
‘normalisation’, are rooted in particular ideologies and have different connotations in 
Arabic, English and Hebrew. As was also the case with the translators’ approach to 
ambiguity, lexical choices tend to reinforce the political narratives of the institutions that 
have made them available. Peace Now’s use of ‘תיתולחנתה’ rather than ‘תויתובשייתהה’ to 
refer to Israel’s settlement activity in its translation is indicative of the organisation’s 
ideology and political position, particularly its opposition to Israeli settlements in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories. Both avoidance and choice of certain political terms, both 
in negotiated texts and their language versions, are ideologically motivated and they create 
different frames of interpretations. 
 
More widely, it has also been found that those translations produced in Palestine or Israel, 
particularly by newspapers, feature a higher number of such translation shifts – in what 
appears to be an attempt to strengthen the narratives that their respective readerships 
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subscribe to. One clear example of this was Arabic and Hebrew language versions of the 
Roadmap Plan. This could perhaps be explained by pointing to the fact that the Roadmap 
Plan has the largest number of translations (the same number as the Arab Peace Initiative), 
and also to the fact that the Roadmap Plan is the only approved and officially accepted plan 
by the Israeli and Palestinian governments. 
 
Finally, the discussion showed that certain translation strategies were dominant in texts 
published by certain institutions. For instance, omission of information appeared most 
frequently in translations published by newspapers. This confirms findings of research on 
media translation (e.g. Bielsa and Bassnet 2009).  
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Chapter Six  
Institutional Settings and Textual Profiles 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters Four and Five investigated how the different language versions of peace 
initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations at the macro-
and micro-structural levels. Chapter Six aims to account for these aspects in terms of the 
socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the translations? In doing 
so, this chapter attempts to provide answers to the fourth research question of the thesis:  
4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations 
be accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of 
the production of the translations? 
 
In other words, who is producing or publishing which texts? In which institutional 
contexts? For which purposes and addressees? In fact, there has been hardly any research 
on translation policies and practices in institutions in general and in political institutions in 
particular within the discipline of Translation Studies. The only exceptions are the studies 
by Bielsa and Bassnett (2009) in the context of media institutions, and Koskinen (2008) in 
the context of the European Union. This thesis, thus, contributes to filling part of this gap 
in knowledge by investigating translation practices and policies in political institutions.  
  
6.2 Institutions 
As mentioned previously in Chapter 3.2, language versions of peace initiatives were 
published by four main types of institutions: international, governmental, non-
governmental organizations and mass media. These institutions are either located outside 
the Middle East (e.g. the League of Arab States, the US Department of State) or inside the 
Middle East (e.g. Palestinian and Israeli newspapers such as Al-Quds and Ha’aretz). These 
institutions published these language versions for different purposes (e.g. to inform, 
persuade, evaluate, etc.) and different readerships (e.g. representatives of states, members 
of parliament, the public, etc.).  
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Some of these institutions (e.g. the Council for Peace and Security) only published one 
language version which has been translated elsewhere, whereas others actually produced 
translations and published them (e.g. the United Nations). Some language versions were 
published only for internal purposes (e.g. circulation among members of a specific 
organization, such as the Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan of the Knesset). Other 
language versions were published for external purposes (e.g. external circulation as part of 
a press release, such as the official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative of the 
League of Arab States). Information about the conditions and constraints of text production 
is publically available only for a few of these language versions. For instance, the names of 
the translators of the different language versions of peace initiatives are known in only four 
out of 31 cases. This reflects the complex circumstances surrounding the production of 
such politically sensitive texts (target texts) and the invisibility of translation. In addition, 
information about translation policies of institutions is unavailable in many cases. 
 
The majority of the language versions of peace initiatives were not labelled as ‘translation’. 
This label, i.e. ‘translation’, was used to describe 12 out of 31 texts in the corpus (cf. 
Chapter 4.3). However, not every language version presented as a ‘translation’ was based 
on an original source text. In many cases, language versions were based on other target 
texts. Information about which language versions were based on original source texts and 
which language versions were based on other target texts is available in only six cases (see 
table 6.1 below). This means that – technically speaking – ‘translation strategies’ is not the 
most appropriate term to describe shifts between language versions. In this case, these 
strategies are better described as ‘recontextualization’ strategies. In this way, it is possible 
to talk about both conditions of text production as well as conditions of text 
recontextualization. Translation shifts between the different language versions of peace 
initiatives are part of the textual amendments and the recontextualization process.  
 
Table 6.1 Language versions of peace onitiatives based on original source texts and target texts 
Type of institution Institution         Initiative published   Target language  Translation based on 
International 
organizations 
The United         The Roadmap               Arabic                   Original English 
 Nations (UN)     Plan 
                                           
Governmental 
institutions 
The Knesset 
 
The League 
of Arab 
States (LAS) 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
Hebrew  
 
English 
Original English 
 
Original Arabic 
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Non-governmental 
organizations 
 
Peace Now 
 
 
 
 
Council for 
Peace and 
Security 
(CPS) 
 
The Roadmap Plan 
 
The Arab Peace 
Initiative 
 
The Arab Peace 
initiative 
 
Hebrew  
 
Hebrew  
 
 
English  
 
Original English  
 
Original Arabic 
 
 
Hebrew translation  
 
In order to be able to investigate the institutional conditions and constraints of text 
production of the language versions of peace initiatives, a number of important questions 
need to be answered first. These include, for example, what is the institution’s translation 
policy and practice? Who are the translators? What kind of texts are translated and 
published? Why, when and for whom?  
 
However, answering such questions depends largely on available information about 
institutions involved in the translation and publication of peace initiatives and their 
translation practices and policies. In many cases, such information is not available to 
researchers. In fact, the majority of these institutions do not make their translation policies 
and publishing practices public, particularly with regard to documents as sensitive as 
peace initiatives. For example, newspapers take collective rather than individual 
responsibility for what is published. Furthermore, asking questions about such policies and 
practices in this context raises suspicions about the researcher and the real motivation for 
investigating such a politically sensitive topic. This was the case when attempting to 
obtain some information about some of the institutions of the Palestinian Authority 
involved in the publication of language versions of peace initiatives regarding their 
translation and publication policies (e.g. PLO Department of Negotiations Affairs) and 
newspapers (e.g. Al-Quds).  
 
The following sub-sections will present the four types of institutions involved in the 
translation and publication of language versions of peace initiatives. Conditions of text 
production as well as conditions of text recontextualization of these language versions and 
translation policies of these institutions will be discussed as available.  
 
6.2.1 International Institutions 
The United Nations (UN) is the only international institution involved in the translation 
and publication of peace initiatives that form part of the corpus. This organization 
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translated the Roadmap Plan into Arabic, Spanish, French, Chinese and Russian and 
published them on 7 May 2003. These languages – in addition to English – are the six 
official languages of the United Nations (Cao and Zhao 2008: 40). The language policy of 
the United Nations stipulates that documents are produced in the six official languages and 
“issued simultaneously when all the language versions are available” (ibid.: 40). The 
Department of General Assembly and Conference Management is in charge of matters 
related to documentation including translation of documents into the official languages of 
the organization (ibid.: 40). This department is responsible for producing over 200 
documents a day in the six official languages of the United Nations (ibid.: 40). It also 
provides the services of meeting support, technical secretariat, interpretation, documents or 
verbatim and summary records to the organization’s bodies, such as the General Assembly 
and the Security Council (ibid.: 40). It is thus safe to assume that the Arabic translation of 
the Roadmap Plan was produced in this department in line with the official language policy 
of the organization. 
 
Cao and Zhao (2008: 41) describe documentation at the UN as “the life-blood of virtually 
all gatherings” at the United Nations. Documentation involves nine different processes: 
documentation programming and monitoring, documents control, editorial control, 
reference and terminology, translation, text processing and typographic style, official 
records, copy preparation and proof-reading and publishing (ibid.: 41). 
 
The United Nations language policy applies to documents produced inside as well as 
outside the United Nations. The Roadmap Plan, for instance, is a document produced 
outside the United Nations by the Quartet which the UN is one of its members. The 
Roadmap plan – drafted originally in English – was translated into the other five official 
languages of the United Nations. They were made available for the purposes of circulation 
and discussion among the members of the Security Council ahead of a meeting to vote on a 
resolution concerning the endorsement of the Roadmap plan as the plan to resolve the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. On 19 November 2003, during their meeting, all 15 Security 
Council members voted in favour of resolution 1515.
180
 
                                                          
180
 ‘UNSCR 1515’, United Nations website, adopted on 19 November 2003:  http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/621/85/PDF/N0362185.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
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Over the years, the United Nations has “established a set of translation norms and forms a 
unique translation system” (Cao and Zhao 2008: 40). Cao and Zhao (2008: 40) talk about 
translation at the United Nations as norm governed behaviour and activity in Toury’s terms 
(1995); however, they do not provide specific information about these translation norms 
and criteria. The focus is that documents at the United Nations are produced following an 
“institutional system of standards and criteria” such as compliance with quality and 
accuracy standards (ibid.: 44-45).  
This is evident in the Arabic translation of the Roadmap plan. This translation is 
contextualized as a document of the United Nations. This contextualization is seen in the 
introduction attached to it in the form of a letter from the Secretary General to the 
President of the Security Council (cf. Chapter 4.4.1). 
The United Nations Arabic translation of the Roadmap Plan was labelled as ‘translation’ 
and it mentions the text on which the translation was based, i.e. the original English text. 
The investigation of the macro-structural level of this Arabic translation of the Roadmap 
Plan shows that there were no major additions or omissions of information, no changes or 
additions of headings or sub-headings and no translator’s footnotes or prefaces. At the 
micro-structural level, translation strategies employed in this specific text can generally be 
described as literal translation. This can be seen, for example, where the translation of 
acronyms and political terminology occur, e.g. ‘IDF’, ‘settlement outposts’, ‘settlement 
activities’, ‘normal relations’, etc. (cf. Chapter 5.3.3 and 5.6). However, with regard to 
ambiguous phrases and structures (e.g. the issue of definiteness) (cf. Chapter 5.2); an 
explicitness change of strategy was employed. This shows that professional translators, 
such as those who work for international organizations (e.g. the United Nations), do not 
always comply with guidelines and regulations. With regard to ambiguous formulation in 
international instruments, the United Nations regulations states that translators “should not 
attempt to clarify vague or ambiguous wording when translating such instruments” in order 
to preserve the balance achieved in negotiations (Cao and Zhao 2008: 47). 
Translation plays a crucial “political and practical role in the functioning of the 
Organization” (Cao and Zhao 2008: 39). However, translation policies and practices in this 
organization are still largely underinvestigated within Translation Studies. In this respect, 
Cao and Zhao (2008: 39) point out that “[d]espite the long history of translation and 
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multilingual practice at the UN, very little has been studied and written as to the nature and 
difficulties of translating documents at the UN in translation studies”. 
 
6.2.2 Governmental Institutions 
Five governmental institutions were involved in the publication of five language versions 
of peace initiatives in the corpus. These institutions are the Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset (the Israeli parliament), the League of Arab States (LAS), the 
US Department of State and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (IMFA), the Knesset and the US Department of State (USDS) published Arabic 
and Hebrew translations of the Roadmap Plan whereas the League of Arab States (LAS) 
and the Palestinian Authority (PA) published English and Hebrew translations of the Arab 
Peace Initiative. Both initiatives – i.e. the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan – 
are classified as track-one initiatives. 
 
The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan published by the Knesset was made available 
for the purpose of internal circulation. The other four translations were published for the 
purpose of external circulation. These translations are the English translation of the Arab 
Peace Initiative published by the League of Arab States, the Arabic translation of the 
Roadmap Plan published by the US Department of State, the Hebrew translation of the 
Arab Peace Initiative published by the Palestinian Authority and the Arabic translation of 
the Roadmap published by Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Two of these five language versions were labelled as ‘translation’. These are the 
translations published by the Knesset and the League of Arab States. Both translations 
were based on original English and Arabic texts respectively. The translation of the 
Knesset was labelled as ‘unofficial translation’, whereas the translation of the League of 
Arab States was labelled as ‘the official translation’. The translation of the League of Arab 
States is the only one in the corpus labelled as ‘official translation’. The difference 
between the use of the two labels, ‘unofficial’ and ‘official’ translation, in this context, can 
be established on the basis of whether the publishing institution is the one which drafted 
the initiative or not. The League of Arab States drafted the Arab Peace Initiative then 
translated it officially into English, whereas the Knesset only translated the Roadmap Plan 
into Hebrew.  
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The following sub-sections present the five governmental institutions involved in the 
translation and publication of language versions of peace initiatives and their translation 
policies. 
 
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) has an in-house translation service. An in-
house translation service can be defined as a translation service which is provided by a 
particular institution and carried out by qualified and well-trained professional translators 
(full-time or freelance) who follow specific translation guidelines and procedures and 
provide translation service on a regular basis to the institution. Examples of such 
translation services can be found in international institutions (e.g. the United Nations, the 
European Commission) and governmental institutions (e.g. Parliaments, ministries, 
embassies and consulates). 
 
The in-house translation service of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs is provided by the 
Language Services Department, which is one of four departments (Protocol, Official 
Guests, and Management and Budget) comprising the Protocol and Official Guests Bureau. 
The Language Services Department provides “writing, translation, and editing services for 
all the departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The department is responsible, 
amongst other things, for drafting official letters, translating speeches (including those of 
the minister of foreign affairs), drafting statements and communiqués and preparing 
various official documents, including note verbales”.181 
 
The website of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IMFA) is available in Arabic, 
English, Hebrew and Farsi. On the Arabic website of this institution, the only peace 
initiative published – under the title ‘ملاسلا ةيلمع’ (lit. ‘the peace process’) – is an Arabic 
translation of the Roadmap Plan. This translation has an introduction similar to the one 
published in Arabic by the US Department of State (USDS). The IMFA translation follows 
a literal translation strategy with no major omissions or additions of information. For 
example, it preserves the ambiguity of the source text of the Roadmap Plan with regard to 
the use of the indefinite form and the way the conflict is referred to, i.e. the Palestinian-
                                                          
181
 ‘The Protocol and Official Guests Bureau’, the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: 
www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Structure+and+departments/Protocol+and+Official+Guests+Bur
eau.htm [last accessed: 24 November 2011].  
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Israeli conflict. In addition, it renders acronyms, e.g. ‘IDF’ and place names, e.g. ‘East 
Jerusalem’ according to the conventions of the Israeli official discourse. 
 
On the Hebrew website, no original source texts of peace initiatives or their target texts are 
published. On the English website – and under the title “peace process” – key documents 
(e.g. United Nations resolutions, peace treaties, peace initiatives) related to the “peace 
process” between Israel and the Arab countries (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and the PLO) are 
published. Peace initiatives published on this website are only the Arab Peace Initiative 
and the Roadmap Plan, i.e. those classified as track-one initiatives. The English translation 
of the Arab Peace Initiative is the official translation circulated by the League of Arab 
States at the conclusion of the Beirut Summit.  
 
The Israeli Parliament, the Knesset 
Hebrew is the dominant language in Israel and it is used in all aspects of government and 
education (Amit–Kochavi 1998: 1). Members of the Knesset use Hebrew in their official 
speeches (ibid.: 1). Most Arab members of the Knesset, even though legally entitled to 
give their speeches in Arabic and have them interpreted into Hebrew, prefer to use Hebrew 
(ibid: 2). Arabic, which is spoken by “Israel’s 18% Arab minority” as well as “Oriental 
Jews”, is legally Israel’s second official language (ibid: 1).  
 
The website of the Knesset is available in four languages: Arabic, English, Hebrew and 
Russian. On the Arabic website – and under the title ‘ةمهم تادنتسم’ (lit. ‘important 
documents’) – a number of key documents are published (e.g. the Declaration of 
Independence of the State of Israel, the International Declaration of Human Rights, a 
speech of the former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, etc.). However, no peace 
documents, e.g. plans, agreements, initiatives, etc. are published. Some of these published 
documents are translations, for example, the Declaration of Independence of the State of 
Israel is translated from Hebrew, whereas others, such as the former Egyptian President’s 
Speech, were delivered originally in Arabic. Neither the label translation nor any other 
label is used to describe these language versions. In other words, translation is kept 
invisible on the Arabic website of this institution.  
 
On the English website, different political documents from 1947 to 2007 are published. 
These documents include United Nations resolutions, peace plans, initiatives and 
agreements. Among these documents are three peace initiatives drafted originally in 
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English and covered in this thesis: the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the 
Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan.  
 
On the Hebrew website, and under the tile ‘תומזויו תוינכות’ (lit. ‘plans and initiatives’), 
Hebrew language versions of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, the Geneva 
Accord and the Roadmap Plan are published. The Hebrew language version of the 
Roadmap Plan was translated by the Knesset and labelled as ‘unofficial translation’, 
whereas the Hebrew language versions of the Geneva Accord and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles are the same as those published on the websites of the National 
Consensus and Yes to an Agreement. These two language versions were not labelled at all. 
Furthermore, the website of the Knesset does not specify the sources from which these 
language versions were taken. Finally, it is noted that both the Gush-Shalom Declaration of 
Principles for Peace Agreement and the Arab Peace Initiative are not published on the 
website of the Knesset in any language. 
 
Other plans are also published on the Hebrew website. These include the Israeli 
disengagement plan (2004), Reagan Plan (1982), Fahd Plan (1981), Allon Plan (1967), etc. 
The Hebrew website of the Knesset justifies the publication of all these texts as in the 
following: 
(ST)  :רבסה ירבד 
 ךוסכסל תונורתפב םינד הז רודמב םיאבומה םיכמסמהילארשיה-ילארשיהו ללכב יברעה 
.טרפב יניטסלפה .תסנכה םעטמ וא הלשממה םעטמ םיימשר םיכמסמ םניא םה ללכ ךרדב 
.הז אשונב ןווגמ עדימ בחרה רוביצהו תסנכה ירבח ינפל גיצהל איה םתאבה תרטמ  קלח
םושמ רתאב םתגצהב ןיאו ,תוקולחמ ,רבעב וררוע וא ,םויכ םיררועמ םיכמסמהמ  הדמע תעבה
ב.םניינע 
 
:םיכמסמה תגצהל םינוירטירקה 
8. ילארשיה ךוסכסל ןורתפ איבהל ותרטמ רשא ינידמ ךילהת ןודינ םיכמסמב- ,ללכב יברעה 
ילארשיהו-.טרפב יניטסלפה  
8.  םיקסועה םירמאמ ואבוה אל( . 'דכו תונורקע , תינכות ,םכסה תרוצב םיבותכ םיכמסמה 
.)אשונב  
3.  וכזו ,תסנכב ונודנ םיכמסמה. תרושקתב תירוביצ תוסחייתהל  
וא )םירחאו םייטילופ( םיהוזמ םיירוביצ םיפוגו םישיא םידמוע םיכמסמה ירוחאמ  תונידמ
ןיב םינוגראו-.םיימואל 
 
Back 
translation: 
Points of the Explanation: 
The following documents in this section deal with solutions to general Israeli-Arab 
conflict and the more specific Israeli-Palestinian one. These documents are not official 
ones in the name of the government or the Knesset. The reason for providing them is to 
present before the members of the Knesset and the general public various information 
regarding this issue. Some of the documents are causing or have caused in the past 
disputes and presenting them does not reflect opinion on issues. 
 
The Criteria for Presenting the Documents: 
1. In these documents, the political process was discussed whose aim was to bring a 
solution to the general Israeli-Arab conflict and the specific Israeli-Palestinian one. 
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2. The documents are drafted in the forms of agreement, plan, principles, etc. (we did not 
bring articles dealing with issue). 
3. The documents were discussed at the Knesset and gained public treatment in the 
media. 
 Behind these documents stand known individuals and public bodies (political and  
others), countries or international organizations. 
 
The above introduction shows that the publication of these texts is not random but 
politically motivated. The decision not to publish Arabic translations of these texts on the 
Arabic website can also be seen in the same light. Such decisions reflect the institutional 
context in which these texts are presented. As the above introduction shows, the Roadmap 
Plan, as one of the published texts, was made available in Hebrew as part of the 
institutional policy, namely, for discussion in the Knesset (see below). The Hebrew 
translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord 
were originally published by their drafters to win the support of the Israeli public, i.e. they 
have persuasive functions. These two translations were re-published by the Knesset for the 
purpose of discussion among members of the Knesset. In other words, these translations 
were recontextualized for different audiences and different purposes from those for which 
they were translated for in the first place. 
 
On 16 June 2003, the Knesset conducted its first parliamentary debate on the Roadmap 
Plan based on a request by opposition parties (member of the Knesset Zahava Gal'on on 
Meretz) who managed to obtain the 40 Knesset Member signatures necessary to hold the 
session. During the session, the-then Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, and the-then Foreign 
Minister, Silvan Shalom, delivered their speeches. At the end of the debate a vote was 
conducted. The vote was 57 to 42 in favour of Sharon. The second debate and vote in the 
Knesset took place on 12 January 2004 when Sharon gave a speech in which he stated that: 
As you know, about eight months ago, the Government of Israel accepted the political plan called 
the Roadmap to Peace, and added 14 reservations. The Roadmap is accepted by most of the 
international community and is the only way to reach a settlement, and eventually peace, between 
Israel and the Palestinians… I would like to remind the members of Knesset that in my speech 
here, on June 16, 2003, I announced that agreements signed by us and the Palestinians as a result 
of the Roadmap would be brought before the Knesset for approval…At the conclusion of this 
discussion, a vote will be taken on my announcement. I ask the members of the Knesset to support 
it. Mr. Chairman, in order to dispel any doubt, I again ask the members of Knesset to support this 
announcement.
182
 
 
                                                          
182
 The Knesset translated Ariel Sharon’s speech from Hebrew into English. 
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The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap Plan published by the Knesset was produced for 
the purpose of governmental and parliamentary debates and later as the basis for decision-
making.  
 
The League of Arab States  
The website of the League of Arab States (LAS) is available in Arabic and English. The 
only peace initiative published on the Arabic website is the Arab Peace Initiative. This 
initiative – published under the title ‘ةيبرعلا ةمقلا تارمتؤم’ (lit. ‘Arab summit conferences’) – 
is part of the Beirut Summit resolution in 2002. Information about what is published on the 
English website is not available as the website is currently under construction. 
 
On the Arabic website, though, some of the summit resolutions of the League of Arab 
States are translated and published in English (e.g. Doha Summit 2009), whereas some 
others are translated and published in French (e.g. Khartoum Summit 2006). A copy of 
these translations was attached to a letter and sent from the permanent observer of the 
League of Arab States to the United Nations to the president of the UN Security Council as 
in the following example: 
(ST) United Nations                                                                                     
S/2006/285 
Security Council 
Distr.: General 
1 May 2006 
                                                                                                                                      
English 
                                                                                                                                      
Original: Arabic 
Letter dated 27 April 2006 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to 
the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. 
 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter addressed to you by the Secretary-
General of the League of Arab States together with a compact disc (CD) containing all 
the decisions and documents (see annexes) adopted and issued by the eighteenth session 
of the Council of the League of Arab States at the summit level, held in Khartoum on 28 
and 29 March 2006. I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its 
annexes circulated as a document of the Security Council in accordance with Article 54 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
(Signed) Yahya Mahmassani 
Ambassador 
Head of the New York Mission 
 
Information about in which cases English or French translations are sent and based on what 
criteria is not available. This issue is left for future research on the translation policy of the 
League of Arab States. 
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The US Department of State 
The US Department of State (USDS) has an in-house translation service that is provided by 
the Translating Division of the Office of Language Services. This division provides 
translation services to the Department of State, the White House and other U.S. 
Government agencies. The division’s mission is to “facilitate communication with non-
English speaking governments and people by providing high-level interpreting (spoken 
word) and translating (written word) support to the Executive Office of the President, the 
Department of State and other federal agencies”.183 
 
On the institution’s website, it is said that “much of this work is handled by permanent 
staff, but we also have an extensive roster of contract translators. The Office of Language 
Services (LS) contracts for translation and related services in virtually every language used 
in international diplomacy. Contractors must demonstrate a high degree of translating 
proficiency as well as professionalism, reliability and versatility”.184 In addition, freelance 
translators must have the necessary professional qualifications, and pass the Language 
Service translation test for each language combination the translator offers.
185
  
 
The third point above is interesting particularly with regard to the issue of ‘feedback on 
assignments’. What is meant by an assignment? Is it the translation or the text to be 
translated? What is meant by feedback? What are the criteria for deciding on feedback on 
assignments/translations? In addition, who chooses the translators? These questions are 
relevant for further investigation of translation practices of this institution. 
 
Other than these professional requirements, translators undergo security checks, which can 
take a few months to complete. If the translator were not a US citizen then he/she would 
need to have appropriate visa status and a work permit (e.g. green card). 
 
When a translation service is needed, a form entitled ‘Request for Translation Service’ is to 
be filled in. Information needed includes the ‘requesting agency’ (if other than the US 
                                                          
183
 ‘Language Services’, the US Department of State website: 
http://languageservices.state.gov/?menu_id=109 [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
184
 ‘Language Services’, the US Department of State website:  
http://languageservices.state.gov/content.asp?content_id=177&menu_id=108 [last accessed: 24 November 
2011]. 
185
 The list of these professional qualifications can be found on the US Department of State website available 
at http://languageservices.state.gov/Content/documents/LS%20information%20for%20translators.pdf [last 
accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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Department of State), the ‘title or description of material to be translated’, ‘from (source 
language)’, ‘into (target language)’, ‘billing address’, ‘subject matter expert’, ‘related 
material previously translated?’, ‘level of security classification’, ‘level of difficulty’ (i.e. 
general, semi-technical or technical), and finally, whether the translation job required is in 
a ‘rush’ or ‘no rush’.  
 
Other than this, information about the type of service requested is needed. The Office of 
Language Services provides five types of services: 
1.  Formal Translation (a polished, carefully researched and reviewed translation intended for official 
and/or wide distribution). 
2.  Unreviewed Translation (a full translation, unreviewed, recommended when needed for 
information only). 
3.  Comparison (certification of treaty or international agreement). 
4.  Summary. 
5.  Other.  
 
Finally, for the Language Services use only, name of translator(s), reviewer(s) typist and 
proofreader are required. The type of service required would have an impact on the choice 
of the translator and the final translation product. The Office of the Language Services at 
the US Department of State translated the Roadmap Plan into Arabic. This translation 
belongs to the first category above (i.e. formal translation) as it was meant for wide 
circulation (e.g. journalists, news agencies, governments, international organizations, etc.). 
In fact, the Roadmap Plan was announced during a press conference. This translation is 
also published on the website of America.gov (www.america.gov/). This website, which is 
produced by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs, 
is available in seven languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, Farsi, French, Russian, and 
Spanish. It provides information about the current U.S. foreign policy and about American 
life and culture. 
 
The Palestinian Authority 
Different ministries and departments of the Palestinian Authority employ full time 
translators (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Relations, the PLO Negotiations Affair Department, 
etc.). The Palestinian Authority commissioned the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative 
into Hebrew and published it in four major Israeli newspapers. The decision to publish this 
translation in those major Israeli newspapers is in itself politically motivated. The 
Palestinian Authority argued that the Israeli public had a distorted idea about this initiative. 
They hoped that by publishing a Hebrew translation of the initiative in those four major 
newspapers it would reach out to the Israeli people and win its support ahead of the Israeli 
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elections in February 2009. In other words, this translation had a persuasive function 
different from the source text. This function can be seen in a number of macro-structural as 
well as micro-structural strategies applied in this translation. At the macro-structural level, 
the layout of the translation (cf. Chapter 4.2) and the persuasive introduction added to it 
(cf. Chapter 4.4.2) are designed to help in marketing the initiative to the Israeli public. At 
the micro-structural level, the emphasis that the solution to the Palestinian refugees 
question is ‘to be agreed upon’ (cf. Chapter 5.8.1), the meaning shift from ‘resettlement’ to 
‘naturalization’ of Palestinian refugees (Cf. Chapter 5.6.4), the omission of the intertextual 
Quranic reference of ‘to incline to’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.2) can also be seen as contributing to 
the same persuasive function of the translation. The Palestinian Authority, by publishing 
this Hebrew translation in four major Israeli newspapers aimed at influencing the Israeli 
public opinion before the general elections.  
 
6.2.3 Non-Governmental Organizations 
Seven non-governmental organizations were involved in the publication of 10 language 
versions of peace initiatives in the corpus. These organizations comprise four joint 
Palestinian-Israeli ones: National Consensus and People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy (i.e. Palestinian-Israeli campaigns for the promotion of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles), the Palestinian Peace Coalition and Yes to an Agreement (i.e. 
Palestinian-Israeli campaigns for the promotion of the Geneva Accord) and three Israeli 
organizations: Gush-Shalom, Peace Now and the Council for Peace and Security.  
 
None of these organizations has an in-house translation service. The two drafters 
themselves, Sari Nusseibeh and Ami Ayalon, produced the Arabic and Hebrew translations 
of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles. Two teams of professional translators 
produced the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Geneva Accord. An Israeli political 
activist, Hagit Ofran, and an Israeli academic, Ilai Alon, produced the Hebrew translations 
of the Arab Peace Initiative and the Roadmap Plan. 
 
Non-governmental organizations published translations of peace initiatives for different 
purposes and readerships. In the following sub-sections, these translations will be 
discussed in their institutional contexts. 
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The Joint Palestinian-Israeli Organizations 
The four joint Palestinian-Israeli organizations: the National Consensus, the People’s 
Campaign for Peace and Democracy, Yes to an Agreement (YA) and the Palestinian Peace 
Coalition (PPC) were established for the aim of promoting the Ayalon-Nusseibeh 
Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord respectively to the Israeli and Palestinian 
publics (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). These four organizations published two Hebrew and three 
Arabic translations of these two initiatives. The publication of these translations is 
politically motivated as the drafters of these initiatives wanted to persuade their respective 
publics of the political solutions they were proposing in their initiatives. This persuasive 
function can be seen at both macro- and micro-structural levels. At the macro-structural 
level, this can be seen in the introductions added to the Arabic translation of the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published on the website of the People’s Campaign for 
Peace and Democracy and to the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord distributed by 
Yes to an Agreement (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). The careful design of the cover of the booklet of 
the Hebrew translation of the accord can be seen in the same light (cf. Chapter 4.2) as is 
also the case with the different maps attached for the Israeli and Palestinian public (cf. 
Chapter 4.8). At the micro-structural level, a number of textual amendments can be traced 
and linked to the persuasive function of these translations. Firstly, with reference to 
Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, textual amendments can be seen, for 
example, in the explicitness change with regard to the place name al- aram al-Sharīf in the 
translation of the National Consensus (cf. Chapter 5.3.2) and in the meaning shift from 
‘plight’ to ‘dispossession’ in the translation of the People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy, among many others. 
 
Secondly, with reference to the Geneva Accord, textual amendments can be seen in the 
change in modality (cf. Chapter 5.5), naming practices of holy places (cf. Chapter 5.3.2), 
and the case of intertextuality ‘national home’ (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). 
 
There are three websites created for the promotion of the Geneva Accord, internationally, 
in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The English joint Palestinian-Israeli 
website (www.geneva-accord.org) published a summary, maps, annexes and the full 
English original text of the Geneva Accord. The summary lists the main accord’s 
principles as follows: 
 End of conflict. End of all claims. 
 Mutual recognition of Israeli and Palestinian right to two separate states. 
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 A final, agreed upon border. 
 A comprehensive solution to the refugee problem. 
 Large settlement blocks and most of the settlers are annexed to Israel, as part of a 1:1 land swap. 
 Recognition of the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and recognition of the 
Arab neighbourhoods of Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital. 
 A demilitarized Palestinian state. 
 A comprehensive and complete Palestinian commitment to fighting terrorism and incitement. 
 An international verification group to oversee implementation. 
The second point, ‘mutual recognition’, is later spelled out as “[A]s part of the accord, the 
Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to their own state and recognize the 
State of Israel as their national home. Conversely, the Israelis recognize the Palestinian 
state as the national home of the Palestinian people”. This issue of ‘national home’ was the 
subject of heated debate in Israel (see 6.3 below). 
The website also provides direct links to both Palestinian and Israeli websites of the 
initiative. Under the heading ‘full text’, beside the English original text, Arabic, Danish, 
German, French, Hebrew, Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish translations of the 
initiative are published. The Arabic translation published is an earlier draft of the 
translation published on the Palestinian website. This is evident when comparing the two 
texts in addition to the translators’ footnotes left unintentionally in the earlier draft. The 
Hebrew translation, on the other hand, is the same as the one distributed to the Israeli 
public.  
 
Furthermore, the Israeli website (www.heskem.org.il) is only available in Hebrew. On the 
website and under the heading ‘the agreement’ a number of things are published: ‘main 
points of the agreement’, ‘appendices’, ‘full text’, ‘briefings’, ‘maps’ and ‘the agreement in 
other languages’. In this section, the Geneva Accord is available in nine languages186: 
Arabic, Danish, English, French, Hebrew Italian, Portuguese, Russian and Spanish. The 
Hebrew translation is the same as the one distributed to the Israeli public whereas the 
Arabic one is the same as the one published by the Palestinian Peace Coalition (PPC) in the 
Al-Ayyam newspaper. This is one example of recontextualization of translations of peace 
initiatives. The Arabic translation was produced for specific readership, i.e. Palestinians 
living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and then it was republished for other readers, 
i.e. Palestinians living in Israel. Under the heading of ‘םימכסה’ (lit. ‘agreements’) a number 
of agreements between Israel and the PLO are published in Hebrew, for example, the 
Crossings Agreement 2005, Memorandum of Sharm Al-Sheik 1999 and the Oslo Accords 
                                                          
186
 The order of these languages is as in the original. 
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1993. Under the heading of ‘םיכמסמ’ (lit. ‘documents’) documents are classified into 
‘official’ and ‘unofficial’. Published official documents include the Declaration of 
Annapolis 2007, the Roadmap Plan 2003, the Arab Peace Initiative 2002 and Tenet Plan 
2001. The Hebrew translation of the Roadmap is the same as the one published by the 
Israeli Parliament, the Knesset whereas the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiative 
is the same as the one published by the Palestinian Authority in major Israeli newspapers 
(cf. Chapter 3). The Israeli website does not provide any information about the source of 
these two texts. Only close examination of these two translations and comparing them to 
other published translations of these two initiatives reveals their source.  
 
Published unofficial documents include the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles 
2001, Beilin-Etan Document 1997 and Abu-Mazen-Beilin Document 1995. The Hebrew 
translation of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is the same as the one 
published by the National Consensus (NC). Again, the website does not provide any 
information about the source of the translation and thus it is presented as produced by the 
website of Yes to an Agreement (YA).  
 
In addition, the Palestinian website (www.ppc.org.ps) is only available in Arabic. 
However, the website provides direct links to the joint Palestinian-Israeli website and the 
Israeli website. The only peace initiative published on this website – in Arabic – is the 
Geneva Accord. This Arabic translation is the same as the one published in the Al-Ayyam 
newspaper.  
 
The Gush-Shalom Organization 
The Gush-Shalom organization published Arabic and English language versions of its 
peace initiative. These language versions are published on its website which is available in 
six languages: Arabic, Dutch, English, French, Hebrew and Russian.  
 
On the Hebrew website and under the title ‘ ןויכרא םיכמסמ ’ (lit. ‘archive of documents’) a 
number of political articles written by peace activists and politicians are published. Other 
than this, the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement and the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles are published. The Gush-Shalom Declaration of 
Principles for Peace Agreement Proposal is the first draft which was published by Gush-
Shalom in Ha’aretz newspaper, whereas the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles is 
the same text published by the National Consensus. Other peace initiatives in the corpus, 
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e.g. the Arab Peace Initiative, the Geneva Accord and the Roadmap Plan are not published 
on the Hebrew website of the organization. These are all cases of recontextualization of 
texts. 
 
On the Arabic website – under the title ‘فيشرلأا’ (lit. ‘the archive’) – two political articles 
and the Gush-Shalom Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement are published. On the 
English website and under the title ‘archive’ a number of news and political articles and 
peace initiatives are published. These initiatives are the Roadmap Plan (published under 
the title ‘The Roadmap a Drug for the Addict’), the Geneva Accord and the Gush-Shalom 
Declaration of Principles for Peace Agreement (the second draft). The choice of the title 
‘The Roadmap a Drug for the Addict’, for example, is a clear case of recontextualization. 
Here the Roadmap Plan is reframed negatively, which would affect how readers react to it. 
 
The Gush-Shalom does not have an in-house translation service but rather relies on 
volunteer translators. This can be seen in the following call for translators circulated by 
translation scholar Mona Baker on behalf of Gush-Shalom: 
 Gush Shalom is an excellent Israeli Peace Movement. They have an important document, which 
is now available in a range of languages, but are calling for volunteers to help with translation 
into Spanish, Dutch, German, and any other languages not already available. 
 
Please respond to Gush Shalom <otherisr@actcom.co.il> direct.  
Mona Baker 
 
Relying on volunteer translators raises the issue of ethics of translators (cf. Chapter 7) and 
the general sociology of the translators which is still not fully addressed in the discipline of 
Translation Studies.  
 
The Peace Now Organization 
The Peace Now organization published Hebrew language versions of two peace initiatives. 
These language versions are of the Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace Initiative. The 
former was translated by the political activist, Hagit Ofran, whereas the latter was 
translated by Professor Ilai Alon. Other than these two language versions, the organization 
re-published Hebrew language versions of the Geneva Accord which was distributed by 
Yes to an Agreement (YA) and the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published 
on the website of the National Consensus (NC) and an English language version of the 
Arab Peace Initiative. All of these language versions are published under the title ‘peace 
initiatives’. The publication of these particular initiatives rather than others, for example, 
the Alon Plan, could be because these peace initiatives were drafted within the framework 
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of the two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is in line with the long-
standing political position of Peace Now which has endorsed such a two-state solution to 
the conflict since 1977 (Pappé 2005: 257). 
 
The official English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative – which was circulated by the 
League of Arab States – is found on the English website. The other three peace initiatives 
published on this website (the Roadmap Plan, the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles and the Geneva Accord) were drafted originally in English. On the Hebrew 
website, the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative has a direct link to the one published 
by Ha’aretz newspaper. Such a choice of re-publishing texts taken from the Ha’aretz 
newspaper rather than, for example, Yediot Aharonot, can be explained with regard to the 
political affiliation of Peace Now and Ha’aretz, i.e. both are considered leftists. Neither 
Ha’aretz nor Peace Now mentions that this text is a translation. Another Hebrew 
translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is found under the section entitled ‘Articles and 
Speeches’. This translation is part of an article written by Professor Ilai Alon in which he 
explains the political and historical significance of the initiative. In this article, he mentions 
that this text is a translation from Arabic. 
 
Next, the published translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the 
Geneva Accord are the same as the ones produced and published by the National 
Consensus and Yes to an Agreement (YA). There is no explicit reference to where these 
translations are taken from, but this is evident when comparing these translations on both 
micro- and macro-structural levels. Finally, the published translation of the Roadmap Plan 
is produced by Hagit Ofran. All of the published Hebrew versions of these four peace 
initiatives, with the exception of the one of the Roadmap Plan and the one of the Arab 
Peace Initiative by Ilai Alon, neglect to mention that these texts are translations. 
 
The two Hebrew texts published by the Israeli Peace Now are the only two in the corpus in 
where the names of translators appear, i.e. Hagit Ofran and Ilai Alon. Ofran translated the 
Roadmap Plan, whereas Alon translated the Arab Peace Initiative, both into Hebrew. Ofran 
is the Peace Now Settlement Watch Director and a long time peace activist. The Peace 
Now Settlement Watch “which monitors – and protests, the building of settlements, 
including housing tenders, expropriation of lands in the West Bank and East Jerusalem”.187 
                                                          
187
 ‘Who we Are’, Peace Now website: http://peacenow.org.il/eng/content/who-we-are [last accessed: 24 
November 2011]. 
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Alon
188
 is a professor of Philosophy at Tel Aviv University He is the author of publications 
on topics such as negotiations in the Arab and Islamic world. He served from 1999-2001 as 
a member of the Israeli team in negotiations with the Palestinian Authority and Syria 
(www.tau.ac.il/humanities). 
The Hebrew language version of the Arab Peace Initiative mentions that it is ‘תיברעמ םוגרת’ 
(lit. ‘translation from Arabic’). The Hebrew text was based on the original Arabic as 
mentioned in the introduction added to the translation. The main addressees of this 
translation are Hebrew-speaking members and supporters of Peace Now who share its 
values and ideological and political positions. This article mainly has a persuasive function 
as the writer explains to his readers why this initiative deserves attention.  
 
In fact, this translation is part of an article written by Alon. The headline of the article is 
eye-catching. It says, “The League knocked on our door and we said that we are not at 
home”. The persuasive function of this article starts with the choice of the headline. The 
attempt to persuade the readers continues with the first part of the article, i.e. the 
introduction. Alon provides a nine-point introduction which is not part of the source text. 
The first point of the introduction puts the initiative in its historical context by stating when 
it was drafted and by whom. Then, the author justifies the need for his Hebrew translation 
by arguing that “it seems that most of the public is not aware even of the real implications 
of the Arab Peace Initiative” (my translation). Moreover, he argues that “the Hebrew 
translation of the document as published in public is flawed and this can be attributed to 
Israeli ignorance of the initiative” (my translation). Here Alon does not specify to which 
translation he is referring.   
 
Alon could be referring here to one of the early Hebrew translations of the Arab Peace 
Initiative published by some of the Israeli newspapers such as the one published by 
Ha’aretz newspaper and had major omissions of information. In some parts, this 
translation looks like a summary, whereas in other parts it followed a literal translation 
strategy. In this translation, as well as in another one, presented by God Bless Israel, one of 
                                                          
188
 Alon was featured in a number of Israeli news bulletins and talk shows discussing culture and negotiations 
in the Arabic-Speaking world as well as the Arab Peace Initiative as in the following links: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aH03LuRc4MQ [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eiRFeXjEX7k&feature=related [last accessed: 24 November 2011]. 
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the most controversial clauses of the initiative about the Palestinian refugees was changed. 
The phrase ‘to be agreed upon’ in the clause “achievement of a just solution to the 
Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 194” was omitted in these two translations. This phrase means that “the Arab 
countries have accepted the principle that Israel as well must agree to the solution, in 
contrast to the PLO's traditional conception” (Klein 2004: 7). This is the main selling point 
of the initiative which a number of Israeli politicians and political commentators have tried 
to stress (e.g. Klein 2004, Baskin 2007, Majdalani 2007, Remba 2007). The omission of 
this phrase makes the initiative look like nothing new in the long-term position of the Arab 
states insisting on the return of millions of Palestinian refugees to their homes in Israel.  
 
Alon concludes his introduction with a statement urging his readers to give the initiative a 
chance. He makes the point that “the state of Israel has always taken the Arab declarations 
seriously, why not this time while taking means of caution?”. The article ends with eight 
points of explanations. One of the most significant points is the author’s reference to the 
clause on Palestinian refugees. He explains that the addition of the term ‘agreed upon’, 
“offers Israel the right of veto to solutions which are not comfortable to the refugees 
problem”.  
 
Council for Peace and Security 
The website of this organization is available in English and Hebrew. Peace initiatives and 
their translations are not published on this website except one English translation of the 
Arab Peace Initiative. This language version was published as part of an article written by 
Ilai Alon in a section entitled ‘articles’. In this section articles written by various Israeli 
writers, political analysts, strategists and security experts are found. Some of these articles 
are written by members of the organization, e.g. Joseph Alpher and Shaul Arieli, whereas 
others are taken from English newspapers, e.g. the Herald Tribune or Hebrew newspapers, 
e.g. Yediot Aharonot and republished on the website of the organization. Some of these 
articles are written originally in English whereas others are in Hebrew. 
 
In Alon’s article, it is mentioned that the translation of the Arab Peace Initiative is from 
Arabic. Comparative analysis between this article and the article written by the same 
author and published on the website of the Peace Now organization revealed that this 
English translation was based on the Hebrew text published by Peace Now. Alon wrote a 
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number of articles on the Arab Peace Initiative (e.g. 2002, 2010). In these articles, Alon 
provides his expert analysis of the initiative’s provisions.  
 
6.2.4 Mass Media 
Mass media here can be classified into three main categories: newspapers, news agencies 
and online networks. Four newspapers were involved in the publication of language 
versions of peace initiatives in the corpus. These newspapers are two Israeli (Ha’aretz, 
Yediot Aharonot) and two Palestinian (Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam). These newspapers 
published five Hebrew and three Arabic language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 
3.2.3). Two news agencies, CNN and Reuters, published two English and one Arabic 
language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). Five online networks published 
three Arabic and two Hebrew language versions of peace initiatives (cf. Chapter 3.2.3). In 
mass media, conditions of text production are still underinvestigated. In this section, cases 
for which information is available will be discussed. 
 
Research on mass media (e.g. Bassnett 2005, Bielsa and Bassnett 2009) showed that 
“translation is normally invisible in media reports” (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010: 9). 
These outlets usually do not have in-house translation services as in the case of 
international organizations. Some of them depend on freelance translators for translations 
whereas others simply republish translations taken from other websites or sources.  
 
The Arabic language version of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles published 
by the Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds is a case in point. This text was based on the 
Hebrew language version of the same initiative published by the Israeli newspaper 
Ha’aretz. The Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles was originally drafted in 
English. Information on whether the Hebrew text published by Ha’aretz was based on the 
original English text or on another text is not available. In the following, the institutional 
conditions of publication of this text will be explained and accounted for. This will be done 
by explaining the differences between these two Arabic and Hebrew texts and accounting 
for political and ideological implications of such differences. 
 
Two major Palestinian newspapers, Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam publish selected political 
articles taken from different local and international newspapers. These articles provide the 
Palestinian readers with different political views, both international as well as Israeli. The 
two newspapers have whole pages dedicated for this purpose. Firstly, Al-Quds newspaper 
  
257 
 
has four pages (page 14, 15, 16, and 17) entitled ‘ةيليئارسا نوؤش’ (lit. ‘Israeli affairs’) 
dedicated to political articles published only in Israeli newspapers such as Ha’aretz, Yediot 
Aharonot, Maariv, etc. Secondly, Al-Ayyam newspaper has two pages (pages 19 and 20) 
entitled ‘ةفاحصلا اماروناب’ (lit. ‘press panorama’) dedicated to articles taken from regional 
Arabic newspapers, e.g. Al-Safeer, English-language newspapers, e.g. Washington Post, 
New York Times, and Herald Tribune and Hebrew-language newspapers, e.g. Maariv and 
Yediot Aharonot.  
 
Articles published in Al-Quds and Al-Ayyam have similar features: headlines are followed 
by the name of the writers of these articles. In Al-Quds newspaper, the name of the Israeli 
newspaper from which the article was taken appears immediately after the name of the 
writer, whereas in the Al-Ayyam newspaper, it appears at the end of the article
189
. The 
following two examples illustrate this point: 
                    Figure 6.1: Headline of an Article from Al-Quds newspaper 
لباقملا وه امف نواعتلا ةمظنم ليئارسا تلخد امابوا لضفب 
 نب فولأ :ملقب\ستراه  
 
                    
                    Figure 6.2: Headline of an article from Al-Ayyam newspaper 
ليئارسا ىلع رطخ عضو 
تيبساك نب :ملقب 
 
 
These Hebrew articles are translated and published in Arabic in these Palestinian 
newspapers to meet the needs of the Palestinian readers. The label ‘translation’ does not 
appear on any of these articles published by either newspaper, i.e. translation is kept 
invisible. Palestinian readers would know that they are reading translations without any 
clear reference from these newspapers to this fact. This is because these newspapers 
mention that these articles are taken from Hebrew newspapers, i.e. published in Hebrew. 
 
These two Palestinian newspapers are similar with regard to the information they carry and 
according to Jamal (2000: 56), they: 
[R]run the stories of the news agencies, especially WAFA, the official Palestinian news agency. 
They introduce scarcely any changes based on their own investigations. They also repeat news 
from the Israeli press. The contributions of local journalists are therefore very limited, and in-
depth investigations of issues of concern to the public are unknown. 
                                                          
189
 This also applies to articles taken from Arabic and English newspapers at Al-Ayyam newspaper. 
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This ‘repetition’ of news from Israeli press involves processes of translation and 
recontextualization for the needs of the Palestinian public. This can be seen in the 
pages of these newspapers dedicated to reporting from Israeli press. However, Israeli 
newspapers have no pages dedicated solely to reporting from the Palestinian press.  
 
Israeli media is self-sufficient in filling their Arabic-Hebrew translation needs. Amit-
Kochavi (1998: 3) points out that: 
Middle East and Arab affairs experts do their own translations of newspaper and journal articles, 
written and oral speeches and interviews. They often demonstrate high-level performance thanks 
to their subject-matter expertise, reinforced by direct activity in the field, in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip as well as such Arab countries as Egypt and Jordan that are accessible to the Israeli 
media. 
 
 
6.3 Political Debate 
In the world of politics, political debates over controversial issues are a very common 
practice. These debates become more interesting – from Translation Studies perspective – 
when they are based on cases of translation. Although reception of language versions of 
peace Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives is reserved for future research, one case of a 
political debate based on a translation of one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord will 
be discussed. 
 
This debate was based on the Hebrew translation of the Geneva Accord which was 
distributed to every household in Israel by the Israeli negotiating team of the initiative. 
This distribution was part of a well-planned marketing campaign to win the support of the 
Israeli public. The debate was mainly on the controversial issue of the Jewish nature of the 
state of Israel. 
 
One of the selling points of the initiative to the Israeli public was the claim of the Israeli 
negotiators that the Palestinian side recognized Israel in the initiative as the ‘national 
home’ of the Jewish people. This alleged recognition means that the Palestinian side 
agreed to give up the right of return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes in historical 
Palestine (now Israel). This alleged recognition caused a heated debate between some 
politicians and one member of the Israeli negotiating team of the initiative. In the 
following, this political debate and its implications will be explained.  
 
The issue of the Jewish nature of the state of Israel is ideologically and politically 
significant. To begin with, this issue brings back the more than 100 years struggle between 
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the Palestinian national movement and Zionism about claims to land and legitimacy. In 
addition, it raises the issue of the rights of more than one million Palestinians living in 
Israel nowadays.  
 
This issue, i.e. the Jewish nature of Israel, has always been on the Israeli political agenda. 
For example, it was one of the 14 points of Israeli reservations on the Roadmap Plan: 
“declared reference must be made to Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state and to the 
waiver of any right of return for Palestinian refugees to the state of Israel”. This issue was 
again raised in the Annapolis Peace Conference between Israel and the Palestinian 
Authority on 26 November 2007. 
 
The Israeli Prime Minister then, Ehud Olmert, demanded that the Palestinians recognize   
Israel as a Jewish state, which the Palestinians had been repeatedly rejected on the basis 
that it would mean giving up the right of return for the Palestinian refugees and, even more 
than that, legitimizing discrimination against Israeli Palestinians living in Israel. More 
recently, at the launch of the direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations in September 2010, the 
Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, reiterated his demand for the Palestinians to 
recognize Israel as a Jewish state. 
 
Palestine and Israel are recognized in the English source text of the Geneva Accord as the 
‘homelands’ of their respective peoples. The term ‘homeland’ was then changed into ‘ תיב
מואלהי ’ (bayt ha-le'umi, lit. ‘national home’) in the Hebrew translation distributed to the 
Israeli public by the Israeli organization Yes to an Agreement (YA). As explained before, 
this term – i.e. ‘national home’ appears in key documents related to the establishment of 
the state of Israel (cf. Chapter 5.4.1). 
 
A number of Israeli academics and politicians such as Shmuel Amir, Moty Cristal and 
Asher Susser – who compared the Hebrew translation to its original English source text –
criticized the translation and the Israeli negotiating team for misleading the Israeli public. 
Amir (2004), for instance, expressed his doubt that the Palestinians would actually put 
their signature to a document which recognizes Israel as a Jewish state. He argues that:  
In the booklet entitled ‘The Geneva Initiative – A Model for a Lasting Israeli-Palestinian 
Agreement,’ the section called ‘Essentials of the Geneva Document’ (page 7 in the Hebrew edition 
– my translation since English version is not yet available) opens with the following statement: 
“The Palestinians recognize the right of the Jewish people to a state…This is not merely 
Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel – that appears immediately after: “The Palestinians 
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recognize the State of Israel as our national home… It seems to me that the Palestinians have never 
yet affixed their signature to a document containing such a comprehensive demand from them. 
 
Amir’s (2004) remarks – which are based on the Hebrew translation (booklet) distributed 
to the Israeli public – show that a Palestinian recognition of Israel as the “national home” 
for the Jewish people would imply a “Palestinian agreement to Zionism”. One of the basic 
tenets of Zionism is the “right” of all Jews around the world to a state and this “right” was 
“anathema to the Palestinian national movement from its very beginnings” (Amir 2004).  
 
In fact, the Palestinians never agreed to Zionism as they accuse Zionists of “deliberately 
and forcefully expelling the Palestinian Arabs who lived in what has become the state of 
Israel in 1948” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). The Palestinian leadership of the PLO has 
always refused to acknowledge the Jewish identity of Israel and preferred, like in the case 
of the Oslo Accord, only to recognize Israel’s “right” “to exist as an independent state'” 
(Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315). A Palestinian recognition of Israel as a Jewish state 
clearly touches on “an exposed nerve” (Shamir and Shikaki 2005: 315) among Palestinians 
in Israel and this can explain why the Palestinian leadership rejects such recognition.  
 
Susser (2003) wrote an article A Shaky Foundation which appeared in the Israeli 
Ha’aretz190newspaper on 15 December 2003. In this article, Susser – who also refers to the 
Hebrew translation distributed to the Israeli public – makes the point that:  
The cover of the Geneva Accords Booklet notes that the 'recognition of the State of the Jewish 
people' is one of the accomplishments of the initiative. However, this phrase does not appear in the 
Accords. There is phraseology that seemingly comes close to the aforementioned recognition, but, 
in actual fact, the Palestinians evade doing so. 
 
Another criticism to the Hebrew translation with regard to the same issue comes from 
Cristal (2004). In his article The Geneva Accords: A Step Forward in the Wrong 
Direction? he argues that: 
Article 2.4 stipulates that the parties recognize Israel and Palestine as “the homelands of their 
respective peoples.” The document is lacking the additional formulaic step of stating explicitly 
“The State of Israel is the state of the Jewish people, and Palestine is the state of the Palestinian 
people.” This wording appears in the “Document's Main Points” distributed to the public, and even 
in the Ayalon-Nusseibeh proposal, but it was omitted from the Geneva document text. At issue is 
more than a negligible point of semantics. 
 
                                                          
190
 Professor Asher Susser, Dayan Centre Director and Senior Fellow, published this critique of the refugees 
chapter in Ha’aretz in Hebrew on 11 December 2003. The Hebrew article appeared in translation in the 
English version of Ha’aretz on 15 December (These comments are based on the published English 
translation which  does not differ from the Hebrew original text) 
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Cristal here compares between the English source text and the Hebrew translation 
distributed to the Israeli public. The first quotation is from the English source text whereas 
the second is from the Hebrew translation. Cristal raises suspicion about the motivation of 
such difference between the two texts. Shlomo Avineri (2003), an Israeli political scientist, 
goes beyond that to plainly accusing the Israeli negotiators of lying to the Israeli public: 
The initiators of the Geneva document are, of course, entitled to express their views and publicize 
them in any manner they see fit. But do they have the right to brazenly lie to the public as to what 
the document does or does not contain? 
 
He claimed that the ambiguous reference to Israel as the homeland of its people without 
specifically referring to the Jewish people leaves the whole issue open to different 
interpretations: 
Before the document was made public, the initiators said it contains Palestinian recognition of the 
State of Israel as “the state of the Jewish people.” Not so. The “Jewish people” is not mentioned in 
the document. What is does say that “the two sides recognize Palestine and Israel as the national 
homes for their nations.” Whoever wishes can certainly say that Israel as “the state of all its 
citizens “is the national home of” of the Israeli nation,” which includes Jews and Arabs. It is no 
coincidence that the word “Jew” doesn’t appear in the document. The Palestinian signators do not 
include anyone who believes there is a “Jewish people”. 
 
In response to the critics, Klein, one of the Israeli negotiators of the Geneva Accord 
(2004), wrote an article in which he defended translating the term ‘homelands’ as ‘ימואלה 
תיבכ’ (literally: their national homes). He argues that:  
Many critics have argued that the Geneva Accords does not explicitly recognize Israel as a Jewish 
state, and some have even accused its endorsers of misleading the Israel public. I start with this 
issue because it relates directly to Israel's fundamental identity. First, the agreement recognizes 
"the right of the Jewish people to statehood." Second, it recognizes Israel's status as the homeland 
of the Jewish people, ("The Parties recognize Palestine and Israel as the homelands of their 
respective peoples"). It should be noted that the Hebrew version of the agreement translates the 
word "homeland" as bayit le'umi (national home). However, it would have been more accurate to 
translate it as moledet (homeland). Use of the term homeland constitutes a far-reaching Palestinian 
statement recognizing that Israel is not only the state of the Jewish people but the Jewish people's 
homeland as well. Members of the Jewish people - who, as stated in the agreement's preamble, 
have a right to a state - are neither foreigners nor immigrant invaders. They were born here, in the 
land of Israel, and have returned to it.  
This translation choice of ‘national home’ is a deliberate as it serves the aims of the Israeli 
drafters in marketing the agreement to the Israeli public. It is safe to assume that most of 
the reactions to this initiative as well as others are reactions to translations. This debate 
shows the key role translation plays in politics. Translation is an essential part of political 
communication. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated how different language versions of peace initiatives were 
produced in different institutional settings for different purposes. Firstly, in international 
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settings, texts were used as the basis for debate and decision-making. Secondly, in 
governmental settings, texts were used for parliamentary discussions and debates as well as 
for declarative purposes. In non-governmental settings, texts were used to support certain 
political solutions to the conflict and finally, in media settings, texts were used to report 
(positively or negatively) on peace initiatives.  
 
This chapter also showed that, very frequently, translations produced in one institutional 
context are recontextualized and reframed for use in another one. These recontextualization 
and reframing processes are usually accompanied by further textual amendments.  
 
Translation practices and policies differ according to institutions. These institutions 
translate or publish language versions of peace initiatives for different purposes and 
functions. Some of these institutions, for example, media outlets and online networks, do 
not have in-house translation services. Translations are produced by journalists rather than 
professional translators. These findings, particularly with regard to translations published 
by newspapers, confirm findings in literature in Translation Studies that translation is 
invisible in media (e.g. Bassnett 2009). In media institutions, translation has a low status 
and these institutions are not explicit about translation. This can be seen, for example, in 
the way journalists refer to themselves as international journalists rather than translators.  
 
In other institutions, for example, international ones, e.g. the United Nations, and 
governmental ones, e.g. the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US Department of 
State, translation plays a more important role. 
The use of translation in the advocacy of certain political solutions is particularly 
interesting in the context of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This is due to the fact that 
translation, framing and recontextualization play a major role not only in disseminating 
peace initiatives to the Palestinian and Israeli public but also to mobilizing public opinion 
in support of certain political solutions to the conflict. This is found in the case of the 
language versions of three peace initiatives: the Arab Peace Initiative, the Ayalon-
Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles and the Geneva Accord. 
 
The case of peace initiatives has shown that translators are not only professional ones but 
also politicians, academics and political activists. Those translation agents have different 
views about the very concept of translation and translation process. For instance, Delyani 
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(2005), the technical manager for the Palestinian People’s Campaign for Peace and 
Democracy promoting the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of Principles, considers 
translating this initiative from English into Arabic by Sari Nusseibeh as ‘rendering’ rather 
than translating. This perhaps explains why these language versions are not labelled as a 
‘translation’ but as a ‘document’, ‘text’ or ‘version’.  
 
In this thesis, there is less scope for generalization than expected about translations of 
peace initiatives. This could perhaps be due to the different conditions of text production of 
these texts: not all ‘translations’ were based on original ‘source texts’. In many cases, 
‘translations’ were based on other ‘target texts’. In this light, it is hard to speak about 
translation strategies as in chapters four and five but it is more appropriate to talk about 
recontextualization strategies. 
 
Scope for generalization is even more difficult on the more abstract level. This could be 
because of the nature of peace initiatives. Peace initiatives are still a largely under-
researched genre of political texts. More research is still needed in this direction. Another 
possible reason is that peace initiatives are not negotiated and drafted very frequently but 
produced at certain critical times of ongoing contemporary conflicts. 
 
The final reason for the difficulty of generalizing about peace initiatives is that there are 
not many language versions of one peace initiative published by the same institution. Peace 
initiatives are published by different institutions. Therefore, it is not possible to say that 
texts produced in mass media will show certain translation strategies. That is because texts 
published in media could have been taken from different types of institutions and then 
were simply recontextualized for new functions and audience. Thus, translations shifts 
found in the target texts could have occurred somewhere else other than mass media. These 
conditions highlight the complex nature of translation and particularly of political texts. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Major Findings of the Research 
The present thesis has examined Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives as politically 
negotiated texts and their different Arabic, English and Hebrew language versions in their 
socio-political, historical and institutional contexts. It aimed to examine how aspects of 
ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
manifest themselves on these language versions and how these aspects could be accounted 
for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the production of the 
translations. In doing this, the thesis aimed to make a an original contribution to the 
discipline of Translation Studies by contributing to a deeper understanding of the role of 
translation and recontextualization of politically negotiated texts in situations of ongoing 
contemporary conflict.  
 
In order to achieve this overall aim, the thesis applied the descriptive analytical model 
suggested by Lambert and Van Gorp (1985) and Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional 
discourse-analytical model. In linking textual profiles of translations of peace initiatives to 
conditions of text production, the analysis presented an example of causal models as 
described by Chesterman (1997).  
 
In Translation Studies, there has been an increasing interest in “ideas and ways of 
explanation” of the translational phenomena (Chesterman 2008: 364). The present thesis 
presented a case of a qualitative research which could help in reaching conclusions about 
the translational phenomenon of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives. Explanation of such 
phenomenon would be possible if “we understand its causes or the factors that seem to 
influence it; or if we know how it works; or if we know what its function is” (Williams and 
Chesterman 2002: 61). In this thesis, conclusions would account for “what is possible, 
what can happen, or what can happen at least sometimes” but not about “what is probable, 
general, or universal” (Williams and Chesterman 2002: 64).  
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The following section outlines the major conclusions and findings of the thesis and then 
reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of the chosen framework. 
 
To begin with, the present thesis has highlighted the significance of translation – as both 
product and practice – in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict, namely, the 
Palestinian-Israeli one. The very fact that there existed 31 translations of five Palestinian-
Israeli peace initiatives into three languages – Arabic, English and Hebrew – is one 
indication of such significance.  
 
The thesis has shown that translations of peace initiatives have played different roles in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict depending on the institutional context in which they were 
presented and the purposes they set to serve. One of these roles was disseminating 
information about negotiated texts. For example, it was through translation that the 
Palestinian and Israeli publics knew about the majority of peace initiatives, i.e. three 
initiatives were drafted in English and were then translated into Arabic and Hebrew. In 
other words, translations constituted a major source of information. This finding has 
further substantiated, and as other research has shown, that “political discourse relies on 
translation” (Schäffner 2004: 120). 
 
Another significant role of these translations was influencing and shaping the Palestinian 
and Israeli public discourses, attitudes and ideological thinking regarding the conflict and 
the peace process in the Middle East. Peace initiatives, as explained before (cf. Chapter 
1.1.3), were drafted at a very critical time of the conflict – i.e. the collapse of the peace 
process following the failure of the Camp David II negotiations and the outbreak of the Al-
Aqsa intifada. These two major events posed a serious threat to the fundamental principles 
of the peace process, most importantly, the ‘two-state’ solution to the conflict.  
 
Peace initiatives – which were designed to revive the collapsed peace process and keep the 
‘two-state’ solution (as the only solution) on the table – tackled the complicated and 
sensitive final-status issues of the conflict which have always been deferred to future 
negotiations and offered political compromises on them. Some of the peace initiatives, 
namely, those belonging to ‘track-two’ (cf. Chapter 3.2.2), directly targeted public opinion 
in both Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories and strived to elicit their support. 
For political marketing purposes, these initiatives were translated into Arabic and Hebrew. 
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However, the sensitivity of these political compromises were largely multiplied and 
refracted in translation. The overall textual analysis has demonstrated that these political 
compromises were interpreted differently by different institutions in their attempts to 
promote their respective political interests and narratives. Such compromises disappeared 
in translation and instead one interpretation reflecting one ideological and political position 
prevailed. This was evident, for example, in instances of deliberately ambiguous or vague 
formulations (cf. Chapter 5.2), names of holy places important to both sides of the conflict 
(cf. Chapter 5.3.2) and modality (cf. Chapter 5.5). Such disappearance – particularly in 
translations published by local Palestinian and Israeli newspapers –  could be interpreted as 
attempts by translators, the institutions behind them or both to “protect or at least avoid 
being implicated in undermining dominant public narratives” (Baker 2006: 36). 
 
This showed that translation was “an integral part of political activity” (Schäffner and 
Bassnett 2010: 13) and that neither translations nor translators were neutral. In fact, as the 
textual analysis has shown, translations reflected aspects of ideology, power relations and 
political affiliations and translators (cf. Chapter 5) – who have ideologies – consciously or 
unconsciously played a major role in situations of ongoing contemporary conflict.  
 
However, and as the thesis has demonstrated, it is not the case that translations rather than 
translators are engaged (e.g. Tymoczko 2000) because translators are not “always those 
who use translations for purposes of activism, nor are translators always fully aware of 
how their translations could be used” (Brownlie 2007: 139-140) but both translators and 
translations are politically engaged. 
 
The thesis has indeed shown that it was difficult to speak of one translation shift originated 
in one particular context or that every target text was based on an original source text. It 
was very often the case that translations of peace initiatives produced in one particular 
institutional context were recontextualized for use in another one. Such recontextualisation 
went hand in hand with further textual amendments. Recontextualization involved 
repositioning a text for different functions, audiences and purposes. It also involved adding 
or deleting material, both textual and extra-textual, to achieve that purpose. Textual 
amendments included, mainly, addition, omission, change and re-arrangement of heading 
and sub-headings (cf. Chapter 4.6.1-4.6.4) as well as addition of introductions, particularly, 
persuasive and evaluative ones in language versions of non-governmental organizations 
(cf. Chapter 4.4.3) and mass media (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). These introductions play a major 
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role in triggering ideologically biased readings of texts. Extra-textual amendments 
concerned providing different maps attached to the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the 
Geneva Accord for the Palestinian and Israeli publics which best served the marketing 
purposes of its drafters. 
 
By disseminating and contesting public narratives and consequently keeping a certain 
population disposed to keep supporting a certain decision-maker, either for or against a 
particular peace initiative, translations of peace initiatives have played a role in the 
management of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – understood here as minimizing “the 
escalation of a conflict situation without necessarily dealing with the real source of the 
problem” (Scott 2007: 24). In other words, preserving the conflict “for resolution another 
day” (Zartman 2005: 62). This finding conforms to other findings in Translation Studies, 
namely, that translation and all its agents contribute to “shaping the way in which conflict 
unfolds” and play a major role in its management (Baker 2006: 1-2). 
 
Drawing on the intractability of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (cf. Chapter 1), peace 
initiatives (original source texts) – in their wider geopolitical context – have also been 
managing the conflict as part of an open-ended process governed and shaped by power 
relations and contradictory political interests. In this context, Pappé (2002) argues that: 
Noam Chomsky was correct in his analysis that we in Palestine/ Israel and the Middle East as a 
whole were eagerly playing the American game ever since they decided to take an active role in 
the peace process, beginning in 1969 with the Rogers Plan, and then with the Kissinger initiatives. 
Ever since then, the peace agenda has been an American game. The Americans invented the 
concept of the peace process, whereby the process is far more important than peace. America has 
contradictory interests in the Middle East, which include protecting certain regimes in the area that 
preserve American interests (therefore entailing paying lip service to the Palestinian cause) while 
also has a commitment to Israel. In order not to find itself facing these two contradictory agendas, 
it is best to have an ongoing process which is not war and not peace but something which you can 
describe as a genuine American effort to reconcile between the two sides… Such a process, which 
can and should go on forever, coached by the only superpower and supported by the peace camp 
of the stronger party in the conflict, is presented as peace. One of the best ways of safeguarding the 
process from being successful is to evade all the outstanding issues at the heart of the problem. 
The indefinite deferment of all final-status issues of the conflict in the text of the Roadmap 
Plan – the only officially accepted plan to resolve the conflict since 2003 – is an example 
of the above argument. This plan repeats the exact same mistakes of the failed Oslo 
Accords by addressing “the easy issues while putting off the thorny ‘final-status’ issues” 
(Abrahms 2003). It also employs “creative ambiguity” in dealing with aspects of these 
final-status issues such as Jewish settlement outposts, opening of closed Palestinian 
institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem and Israeli withdrawal from areas reoccupied on 28 
September 2000 (cf. Chapter 5.2). Such a technique “may give the illusion of progress, but 
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it will only inflate expectations and lead to disappointment. The result is often more 
violence and a hardening of mutually exclusive demands” (Abrahms 2003). 
 
The textual analysis (cf. Chapter 5) showed that the two sides of the conflict are already 
interpreting the Roadmap differently in their attempts to improve their negotiating 
positions. In this way, the Roadmap simply continues the façade of a “peace process” 
(Honig-Parnass 2007: 231). 
 
The validity of the argument that the Middle East “peace process” and its peace initiatives 
– including those drafted since 2000 – were designed to manage the conflict rather than 
resolving it can be verified by examining the results of more than twenty years of 
negotiations between the Palestinians and Israelis on the ground: continued land 
expropriation, rapid Jewish settlements expansion and the construction of Israel’s illegal 
Wall, to name a few (cf. Chapter 1.1.2). 
 
The interpretation that Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives and equally their different 
translations play a major role in managing the conflict is of course only one possible 
interpretation in open-ended ones. Another interpretation could be that peace initiatives 
and equally their different translations are helping in resolving the conflict by encouraging 
a wider participation in the political process and keeping these initiatives under continuous 
discussion by a multiplicity of political stakeholders. Here, these texts would be part of a 
step-by-step approach, i.e. the Palestinians and Israelis negotiate less controversial issues 
that they could agree on while deferring the most sensitive trigger points for confrontation 
to the end of the process (cf. Chapter 5.2). In this light, these texts play a positive role in 
the conflict by enhancing involvement and cooperation. 
 
To subscribe to one interpretation or another depends largely on the receivers of these 
texts, their political ideologies, interests, motivations, narrative locations and whether they 
see the conflict as ‘intractable’ – i.e. cannot be resolved – or ‘resolvable’. If the conflict is 
perceived as ‘intractable’, then these texts are part of conflict management and if perceived 
as ‘resolvable’, then these texts are part of conflict resolution. The resistance of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict to more than a century of attempts to resolve it, the 
fundamentally incompatible goals and interests of the Palestinians and Israelis and the 
political facts on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territories – as explained in 
chapter one – support the ‘conflict management’ interpretation. 
  
269 
 
One direct implication of such an argument concerns the title of this thesis. The first part of 
this title, i.e. ‘translation and peace’ – which was chosen at the very early stages of the 
research – is mesmerising as it over-romanticizes the role of translation in situations of 
ongoing conflict, namely, helping to establish peace in the Middle East. However, based 
on findings of this research, a more appropriate title would be ‘translation and conflict 
management’. 
 
Reflecting on these different roles, it has been brought into sharp relief that translation “is 
not simply a linguistic activity” (Schäffner 2009: 146) but rather a social activity (Hermans 
1995: 10) which is governed and controlled by institutions. Translators then “work in 
social-political and historical contexts, their activity is embedded in and determined by 
social, institutional, ideological norms, conditions and constraints” (Schäffner 2009: 146). 
Another major finding of the thesis – closely linked to the issue of recontextualization –
was that both translators and translation were largely invisible. This invisibility was 
reflected in the anonymity of the translators of the different language versions of peace 
initiatives and the avoidance of the label ‘translation’ to refer to these texts. The names of 
translators of peace initiatives only appeared in two cases, the Hebrew translations of the 
Roadmap Plan and the Arab Peace Initiative translated by Hagit Ofran and Ilai Alon 
respectively and both published by Peace Now. The other two cases of known translators 
concerned the Arabic and Hebrew translations of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh Declaration of 
Principles which were translated by Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh. The names of these 
two translators did not appear anywhere in these translations. These two names were 
known only through personal communications. The issue of invisibility of the translator is 
an indication of the “translator’s role in society, the translator’s status and power, the 
translator’s rights” (Chesterman 1997: 169). 
 
The four known translators were not professional ones but two politicians (Ami Ayalon 
and Sari Nusseibeh), one academic (Ilai Alon) and one political activist (Hagit Ofran). This 
reflects the increasing involvement of non-professional translators in the translation 
activity, particularly in situations of ongoing conflict and raises many questions, including, 
why would, for example, political activists or academics, translate peace initiatives 
themselves when there exist translations of these texts. One possible answer is provided by 
Ilai Alon in his added introduction to the Hebrew translation of the Arab Peace Initiatives 
in which he starts by saying that “it seems that most of the Israeli public is not aware of the 
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true significance of the Arab Peace Initiative” and then justifies the need for his translation 
as “the Hebrew translation of the Document, as distributed to the public, is faulty. This 
may have been part of the reason that Israelis ignored it” (cf. Chapter 4.4.3). 
 
With regard to the avoidance of using the label ‘translation’, the thesis has shown that 
target texts of peace initiatives were largely labelled as ‘documents’, ‘versions’ or ‘literal 
texts’ rather than ‘translations’ (cf. Chapter 4.3). Information about which language 
versions were based on original source texts and which language versions were based on 
other target texts was available in only six cases (cf. Chapter 6). This showed that 
translation “continues to be an invisible practice, everywhere around us, inescapably 
present, but rarely acknowledged, almost never figured into discussions of the translations 
we all inevitably read” (Venuti 1992: 1). 
 
The avoidance of using the label ‘translation’ in describing the target texts of the peace 
initiatives gave the impression that these texts were originals rather than translations. And 
even if translations of peace initiatives, as it is the case of other texts, were visible and 
presented as translations, and readers were aware of the facts that they were reading 
translations, still the general assumption would be that translations are exact replicas of the 
original source texts (Schäffner 2009: 144). 
As Schäffner (2009: 143) points out, the general public often comes across political 
discourse in translation without necessarily realizing it. Translation becomes visible to the 
public, when it is perceived as problematic, for example, “if some mistranslation had been 
discovered, leading to arguments about the correct or incorrect meaning of a word, a 
sentence, or a text” (Schäffner 2009: 143). This was the case in the Hebrew translation of 
the Geneva Accord published by the Israeli negotiating team (cf. Chapter 6.3). A heated 
debate was initiated based on this translation and then accusations of manipulating public 
opinion through translation were voiced against its drafters. In this way, translation was 
‘visible’ but in a negative way. 
 
In order to explain the issue of invisibility of translations, it should be linked to “the 
contexts in which translations are made available and the functions they fulfil for the 
respective communicative purpose” (Schäffner 2009: 145). For example, unlike in 
postcolonial contexts where the relative invisibility of the translator of literary texts – 
according to Venuti (1995) – is attributed “to a combination of attempts by translators to 
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produce fluent, transparent texts and the nature of acceptability judgements by readers of 
translation, who wish translations to appear as though they were originals” (Venuti 1995: 1 
quoted in Olohan 2004: 4), the invisibility of translators of negotiated texts can be 
attributed to the nature of these texts as politically sensitive ones and the need to create an 
illusion of an ‘original’ text. 
The choice of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) – which is located within “a version of 
critical social science” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999: 3) – as a research framework in 
this thesis, particularly, Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional model, has provided a 
viable postmodern framework for the study of translation as a social activity in its 
institutional context. This framework, as explained in detail before (cf. Chapter 3.3.3), 
accounted for the three levels of analysis: text production (cf. Chapter 3.2), text 
interpretation (cf. Chapters 4 and 5) and institutional contexts (cf. Chapter 6). This kind of 
analysis helped in situating peace initiatives and their translations within their wider social 
and geopolitical contexts by emphasizing that translation “as both an enactment and a 
product, is necessarily embedded within social contexts” (Wolf 2007: 1), i.e. a “socially 
regulated activity” (Hermans 1997: 10). This activity is “in all its various stages, is 
undeniably carried out by individuals who belong to a social system” (Wolf 2007: 1) and 
that it is “inevitably implicated in social institutions, which greatly determine the selection, 
production and distribution of translation and, as a result, the strategies adopted in the 
translation itself” (Wolf 2007: 1). 
 
Of particular significance in this context is the premise that texts (originals and 
translations) have effects and roles to play in social and political changes. This kind of 
research can be described as an emerging “critical translation studies” (Schäffner 2007: 
147).  
 
The following part of the conclusion returns to the specific research questions asked at the 
beginning of the thesis to establish to what extent they have been answered. This will be 
followed by reflecting on the original contributions of this thesis to Translation Studies and 
Critical Discourse Analysis. 
1) What are the key characteristic features of peace initiatives as politically 
negotiated texts? 
 
The first research question relates closely to what kind of text is a peace initiative. The 
review of literature on different political genres, such as political speeches, peace treaties, 
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political manifestos, etc., (cf. Chapter 2) showed that peace initiatives are still a largely 
under-researched genre of political texts. This research limitation – i.e. the lack of any 
studies on the genre of peace initiatives and their translations – made identifying the 
characteristic features of peace initiatives an exhausting process. This limitation was 
partially overcome by comparing peace initiatives to a closely related genre of political 
texts, namely, peace treaties. As explained in chapter two, detailed comparison between the 
two genres demonstrated that they share some key characteristic features, such as, the use 
of ambiguous formulations, modal verbs and politically sensitive concepts. Modal verbs, 
for example, are used to express legal statements of obligations, authorizations, 
permissions, requirements and prohibitions (cf. Chapter 2.3.3) whereas ambiguity is used 
by negotiators and politicians in order to bridge the gap between the conflicting positions 
of parties (cf. Chapter 5.2). 
 
2) What happens to these texts in translation? 
 
The detailed analysis has shown that peace initiatives were translated by various types 
of institutions for different purposes and readerships. Also, it was very frequently that 
translations produced in one institutional context were recontextualized for another one 
which was accompanied with further textual amendments. Recontextualization involved 
repositioning a text for different functions, audiences and purposes. It also involved 
adding or deleting material, both textual and extra-textual, to achieve that purpose. 
Textual amendments, as discussion has shown before (cf. Chapter 4), included addition, 
omission, change and rearrangement of heading and sub-headings (cf. Chapter 4.61-
4.6.4) and the addition of introductions, particularly, persuasive and evaluative ones in 
translations published by non-governmental organizations (cf. Chapter 4.4.3) and mass 
media (cf. Chapter 4.4.4). These specific types of introduction were designed to trigger 
ideologically biased readings of translations of peace initiatives. Extra-textual 
amendments concerned providing Palestinian and Israeli publics with different maps of 
the Geneva Accord which served the political interests of its drafters. 
 
3) How do the translations of peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, political 
affiliation and power relations? 
 
One of the main objectives of the thesis was to account for how language versions of 
peace initiatives reflect aspects of ideology, power relations and political affiliation at 
both macro- and micro-structural levels. On the one hand, the macro-structural analysis 
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(cf. Chapter 4) examined the textual organization of the individual translation profiles of 
the various language versions of peace initiatives, e.g. layouts, paratexts, chapter 
headings, introductions, etc. It showed that some paratextual materials, namely, added 
persuasive and evaluative introductions, reflected the ideological and political position 
of their publishers (cf. Chapter 4). These introductions framed peace initiatives in a 
particular way and thus triggered an ideologically biased reading of translations of 
peace initiatives.  
 
On the other hand, the micro-structural analysis aimed to examine how these aspects of 
ideology, political affiliation and power relations at play in the Palestinian-Israeli 
conflict manifest themselves on the translations of initiatives. The detailed textual 
analysis (cf. Chapter 5) has shown that when translated, negotiated texts such as peace 
initiatives can be interpreted differently by different institutions depending on their 
ideologies and political positions in their attempt to promote their respective political 
interests and construct narratives that resonate with their constituencies.  
 
The range of examples discussed showed that the sensitive final-status issues of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, such as withdrawal from land, settlement policies and 
sovereignty over Jerusalem became even more sensitive as a result of translation. One 
example was the explicitating strategies applied in the majority of Arabic translations of 
the Roadmap Plan (cf. Chapter 5.2) with regard to the issues of withdrawal from 
reoccupied Palestinian territories, reopening of closed Palestinian institution in 
Occupied East Jerusalem and the dismantlement of Jewish settlement outposts.  
 
Another example concerned the translations of names of holy place names important to 
each side of the conflict (cf. Chapter 5.3). For example, names important to both sides 
of the conflict – e.g. ‘al-Haram al-Sharīf’ and ‘the Temple Mount’ – and which were 
placed side by sides as a sort of a political compromise disappeared in translation (cf. 
Chapter 5.3.2). Other cases concerned changing some of the names of these holy places 
in translation in order to market a particular initiative to a particular public, e.g. the 
change of the place name ‘The Wailing Wall’ into ‘The Western Wall’ in the Yes to an 
Agreement translation of the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 5.3.2). 
 
A third example concerned the change of the modal verb ‘may’ into the formulations of 
‘has the right to’ and ‘entitled to’ respectively in the Arabic and Hebrew translations of 
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the Geneva Accord (cf. Chapter 5.5). A final example concerned the different 
interpretations provided by the various translations of the Arab Peace Initiative 
regarding the controversial issue of resettlement of Palestinian refugees (cf. Chapter 
5.6.4). 
  
The analysis has also demonstrated that different institutions selected and circulated 
interpretations – whether consciously or unconsciously – which best served their 
ideological and political interests. Most importantly, discussion of examples has shown 
that translations produced in Palestine or Israel, particularly by newspapers, featured a 
higher number of translation shifts, in what appeared to be an attempt to strengthen the 
public narratives to which their respective readerships subscribe. 
 
On the one hand, the local Palestinian newspaper, Al-Quds, in its Arabic translation of 
the Roadmap Plan, reflected the Palestinian official interpretation of the plan, namely, 
the Israeli withdrawal from all of the Palestinian territories occupied since 28 
September 2000 (cf. Chapter 5.2.1), the dismantlement of all Jewish settlement outposts 
(cf. chapter 5.2.2) and the reopening of all Palestinian institutions closed in Occupied 
East Jerusalem (cf. Chapter 5.2.3). It also disseminated the Palestinian public narrative 
and contested the Israeli one, for example, by referring to the conflict as ‘the 
Palestinian-Israeli’ rather than ‘Israeli-Palestinian (cf. Chapter 5.3.1), removing the 
‘defense’ adjective in referring to ‘IDF’ (cf. Chapter 5.3.1) and opting for the term ‘the 
siege’ to refer to Israeli occupation practice of ‘curfew’ (cf. Chapter 5.6.5). 
 
On the other hand, the local Israeli newspaper, Yediot Aharonot, in its Hebrew 
translation of the same initiative kept the ambiguity of the Roadmap with regard to the 
issues of Israeli withdrawal from reoccupied Palestinian territories, the reopening of the 
closed Palestinian institutions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the dismantlement of the 
Jewish settlement outposts. This ambiguity serves Israel’s political interests as it keeps 
these issues open for future negotiations. 
 
The newspaper also deleted important information on the issue of Jewish settlement (cf. 
Chapter 5.8.2) and used the two terms ‘hityashvut’ and ‘hitnahlut’ interchangeably thus 
not distinguishing between early Jewish settlements and those built after 1967 (cf. 
Chapter 5.6.2). These shifts reflected its right-wing position on this issue. 
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4) How can these aspects of ideology, political affiliation and power relations be 
accounted for in terms of the socio-political and institutional conditions of the 
production of the translations? 
This question concerns the second main aim of the thesis of taking a step beyond 
description of actual translation profiles by providing explanations of these profiles with 
reference to their institutional contexts of production. The thesis aimed to link aspects of 
ideology, political affiliation and power relations manifested in translation of peace 
initiatives to the socio-political and institutional conditions of production of translations. 
The aim of such linking was to bring close textual analysis with social analysis. An attempt 
was made in this direction but absence of sufficient information on institutional translation 
policies constituted left this research question largely unanswered. 
The discussion of institutional settings (cf. Chapter 6) has demonstrated that four main 
types of institutions – international, governmental, non-governmental organizations and 
mass media – were involved in the translations of the different language versions of peace 
initiatives. These institutions published these language versions for different purposes (e.g. 
to inform, persuade, evaluate, etc.) and different readerships (e.g. representatives of states, 
members of parliament, the public, etc.).  
 
Some of these language versions were published only for internal purposes (e.g. circulation 
among members of a specific organization. Other language versions were published for 
external purposes (e.g. external circulation as part of a press release, such as the official 
English translation of the Arab Peace Initiative of the League of Arab States) (cf. Chapter 
6.2). One important finding has to do with the fact that the names of the translators of the 
different language versions of peace initiatives are known in only four out of 31 cases and 
that the label ‘translation’ was largely avoided in describing these versions.  
7.2 Original Contribution of the Study 
7.2.1 Translation Studies 
Williams and Chesterman (2002: 2) point out that the aim of research in Translation 
Studies is to make “a contribution to the field which increases the sum of our knowledge” 
which can be made by one or more of the following ways: 
1) Providing new data; 
2) Suggesting an answer to a specific question; 
3) Proposing a new idea, hypothesis, theory or methodology. 
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Guetzkow et al (2004: 191), add that originality in the humanities, history and social 
sciences can also be achieved by “doing research in an understudied area”. Reflecting on 
these points, the present thesis makes an original contribution to the discipline of 
Translation Studies in the following ways. 
Firstly, the thesis has made an original contribution to the discipline of Translation Studies 
by investigating a largely under-researched genre of political texts, i.e. peace initiatives. 
Peace initiatives – as the outcome of political negotiations – presented a set of authentic 
politically sensitive contemporary texts which were produced by different institutions for 
different audiences and purposes. The thesis did not only present such a new corpus of 
texts for the discipline of Translation Studies but went further beyond this point by 
showing how these texts and their translations were recontextualized in different socio-
political, historical and institutional contexts for different purposes and readerships. In this 
way, the thesis went beyond description to explanation by highlighting the socio-political 
significance of translation as product and process and led to a deeper understanding of the 
role of their translation and recontextualization in situations of ongoing contemporary 
conflict, particularly, the Palestinian-Israeli one.  
 
Secondly, the thesis also contributed to the discipline of Translation Studies by analysing 
political discourse in translation in three languages: Arabic, English and Hebrew, which is 
still a largely under-researched combination of languages in the discipline of Translation 
Studies. One advantage of investigating these three languages in the context of the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was revealing how compromises reached during negotiations 
were interpreted by various institutions in the local languages of the two sides of the 
conflict. 
 
Thirdly, the thesis contributed to the increasingly growing interest in sociologically 
oriented research of translation, particularly with regard to the recent interest in 
investigating the discourse on translation and conflict, in particular “committed 
approaches” (e.g. Baker 2006, 2010; Inghilleri and Harding 2010; Salama-Carr 2007) and 
the interest in social, ideological and political aspects of translations within Translation 
Studies (e.g. Bassnett and Lefevere 1998; Calzada-Pérez 2003; Schaeffner 2004; 
Tymoczko 1999; Venuti 1995). Focusing its attention on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, 
the thesis had built on these studies by presenting insights about the complex nature of 
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translating politically negotiated texts such as peace initiatives in situations of ongoing 
conflict.  
 
Fourthly, the thesis contributed to the recent interest within the discipline of Translation 
Studies in studying translations in their institutional contexts (e.g. Koskinen 2008; Milton 
and Bandia 2009; Schäffner and Bassnett 2010a). Schäffner and Bassnett (2010b: 13) for 
example, point out that “[N]o detailed research has been conducted yet into the actual 
translation policies and processes of national governments, or of national political parties, 
or embassies”. This thesis thus contributes to filling part of this gap in knowledge by 
investigating translation practices and policies regarding the language versions of peace 
initiatives in political institutions (cf. Chapter 6). 
 
The decision of which peace initiatives and in what languages are to be published on 
websites of various types of institutions is in itself political. Analysis of institutional 
conditions of text production showed that not every peace initiative which was available in 
the original source text (e.g. in English) was made available in all other languages (e.g. 
Arabic and Hebrew). Some websites republished translations taken from other websites 
without any indication that they had done so. 
When studying negotiated texts – such as peace initiatives – in their institutional and socio-
political contexts insights “can be gained into institutional practices, into the respective 
roles of actual agents involved in the complex translation processes as well as into the 
power relations” (Schäffner and Bassnett 2010b: 12). These factors are of significant 
importance in investigating translations in political institutions. 
Schäffner and Bassnett (2010b: 14) summarize questions – which can be described as 
“socially driven questions” (Wolf 2007: 20) – of interest from the point of view of 
Translation Studies regarding these policies as follows:  
“[W]ho decides whether websites of governments, of individual government ministries, of 
political parties are made available in foreign languages in the first place, and more 
specifically, who decides which languages these should be? Who decides which texts are 
translated? Who translates these texts, that is, do governments and political parties have their 
own in-house translation departments? Or are translation needs outsourced to translation 
companies? In that case, on the basis of which criteria may a translation company be selected? 
Are some texts translated by politicians and/or political advisors and/or staff themselves? If 
yes, which kinds of texts and for which reasons? Who checks the translations before they are 
put on a website? Who decides which texts are used in translation for internal purposes only? 
Are different policies and procedures in place for translating relevant texts into foreign 
languages and for translating texts into the home language?  
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These questions need to be answered before it is possible to fully account for the 
institutional contexts of text production of the translations of political texts in general 
and of negotiated texts in particular. 
 
Finally, the thesis has made an original contribution to the Translation Studies by 
answering – to a large extent – the four research questions posed on the translational 
phenomenon of peace initiatives. 
 
7.2.2 Critical Discourse Analysis 
This thesis has built on research in Translation Studies applying Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) as a framework, for analyzing aspects of ideology and power relations in 
translation (Hatim and Mason 1990, 1997; Munday 2002; Schäffner 2003). Schäffner 
(2010: 275) explains that it is the “interest in analysing the influences of social, cultural, 
political, and ideological contexts on texts and discourse, which modern Translation 
Studies shares with Critical Discourse Analysis”. 
 
The study of peace initiatives and their translations provided a modest step in showing that 
the discipline of Translation Studies and Political Discourse Analysis, as Schäffner (2004: 
136) points out, can benefit from “disciplinary interaction”. Such cooperation, Schäffner 
(2004: 117) explains, begins with “presenting examples of authentic translations of 
political texts, commenting on them from the point of view of TS”.  
 
As explained previously, CDA attempts to bring the textual analysis and social analysis 
together. Gagnon (2006: 205) quotes Fairclough (2003, 2-3) as saying “[M]y own 
approach to discourse analysis has been to try to transcend the division between work 
inspired by social theory which tends not to analyse texts, and work which focuses upon 
the language of texts but tends not to engage with social theoretical issues”. She then 
explains that “[O]ne cannot help but relate this statement to translation studies’ own 
dichotomy between postmodern or cultural studies approaches on the one hand, and 
descriptive or linguistic approaches on the other (see Chesterman and Arrojo 2000). The 
translation scholar Calzada-Pérez (2001) suggested that the solution to this “clash” could 
lie in translation studies research based on CDA” (Gagnon 2006: 205). The present thesis 
should be seen as another contribution to such theoretical framework.  
 
  
279 
 
Gagnon (2006: 206) also explains, “[E]xamples of textual markers studied in translated 
political discourses are transitivity (Calzada-Pérez 2001), cohesion (Hatim and Mason 
1997, 143ff), metaphors (Al-Harrassi 2001) or lexical choices (Schäffner 2003)”. This 
thesis contributes to Political Discourse Analysis by adding other textual markers found in 
negotiated texts, namely, ambiguous formulations, naming practices and modality. 
 
Also, investigating aspects of ideology, power relations and political affiliation in 
translated texts, unlike in CDA which applies this “on the basis of discourse in one 
language and one culture” (Schäffner 2004: 132), in the case of translation, such features 
“apply both to the source text and culture and to the target text and culture” (Schäffner 
2004: 132). 
 
The thesis has demonstrated that translation is significant to political discourse. One 
example of this significance was the case of the political reactions to the Geneva Accord 
which was not based on its original source text but its Hebrew translation (cf. Chapter 6.3). 
As Schäffner (2007: 135) points out, “political discourse analysis has not yet paid 
sufficient attention to aspects of translation”. Such attention can “shed new light to 
understanding politics” (Schäffner 2004: 138). 
 
7.3 Future Research 
The analysis of the language versions of Palestinian-Israeli peace initiatives gave raise to 
numerous questions of a linguistic, ethical and political nature; it can lead off in many 
different directions. In the following, a number of avenues for future research in the 
discipline of Translation Studies as well as other disciplines will be suggested. 
 
7.3.1 The Discipline of Translation Studies  
In the discipline of Translation Studies, three main avenues for future research can be 
suggested. The first line of inquiry concerns sociology of negotiated texts in general and 
peace initiatives in particular, as products, particularly, translation reception and 
consumption. This thesis provided a modest step in this direction by presenting one case of 
a political debate based on one Hebrew translation of one peace initiative, the Geneva 
Accord (cf. Chapter 6.3). Future research will need to expand on this case to include other 
cases of reactions and debates on language versions of peace initiatives (those based on 
original source texts as well as those based on other target texts, i.e. recontextualized 
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translations) in different settings (e.g. parliaments, governmental meetings, blogs on the 
internet, etc.) in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Israel and internationally. 
 
Possible research questions in this direction can include which translation is picked up to 
comment on, by who, when and where, and what implications this translation has for 
decision making regarding the peace process and negotiations. Analysing social and 
political implications of translations will provide significant insights about reception and 
consumption of these translations in their socio-political and institutional contexts and 
ultimately further highlight the role translation plays in shaping public opinion in situations 
of conflict.  
 
The second line of enquiry concerns the sociology of translation agents of negotiated texts, 
i.e. who the translators are and whether or not they are professionals. This builds on 
existing research on positioning of translators in politically sensitive contexts, such as the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the issue of their loyalties and neutrality. In Modern 
Translation Studies, the increasing amount of literature dedicated to sociological 
approaches to translation is indicative of the increasing interest in the sociology of 
translation (e.g. Heilbron 2000; Hermans 1999; Koskinen 2008; Simeoni 1998; Wolf 
2007). However, the sociology of translators is still largely under-researched in Translation 
Studies and more research is still needed in this direction.  
 
One closely related issue to agency is ethics of translating negotiated texts. Future research 
in this direction can build on existing research in this direction (e.g. Baker and Maier 2011; 
Chesterman 1995, 2001; Meschonnic 2011; Nord 2001; Pym 2001) by examining ethical 
issues of interest in this context for translation theory and translator training such as the 
notion of authorship (i.e. negotiated texts are not the work of one author but the result of 
negotiations between many parties or authors, i.e. collective authorship), ethical and 
political implications of translational choices in the different language versions of such 
texts and the translator(s) responsibility of such choices. 
The third line of enquiry concerns sociology of translation process of negotiated texts. 
Such research would focus on how these texts are translated. In other words, who 
commissions these translations; whether there are any translation briefs and guidelines; 
whether the translators are professionals, i.e. trained as translators; the work conditions 
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under which these translations are produced; whether these translations are proofread and 
edited; and who gives the final permission to publish these translations.  
This thesis provided some insights about institutional settings in which some of the texts 
were produced. Further research can look at the process of producing other texts in the 
same or different institutional contexts. One possible way of doing that is by conducting 
ethnographic studies about political institutions and their translation policies such as the 
study by Koskinen (2008). This will allow first-hand information about these policies. 
In conclusion, this thesis has investigated translations of peace initiatives from and into 
three languages: Arabic, English and Hebrew in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. Future studies can focus on other conflicts in the world and into other languages. 
 
7.3.2 Other Disciplines  
Peace initiatives present a rich material for further research in a number of disciplines, 
notably, Political Science, Conflict Resolution, Media Studies and Genre Studies. In the 
following, some venues for further research in these disciplines will be suggested.  
 
Firstly, it could be argued that a disciplinary cooperation can take place between Conflict 
Resolution and Translation Studies that would open up new ways of thinking about violent 
conflict and resolving them. While conflict resolution studies tend to be constructed around 
discovering causes and effects of conflicts then how to resolve them, Translation Studies 
can help in showing the role translation and translators play in aggravating or resolving 
such conflicts.  
One important issue to Conflict Resolution is measuring public opinion polls and surveys 
conducted during times of ongoing conflict in order to measure public support of certain 
political formulas. The history of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is full such polls. For 
example, Jacoby (2007: 34) points out that “[A]ccording to a joint survey of Palestinian 
and Israeli public opinion between March 8-13, 2005, 59% of the Palestinians and 60% of 
the Israelis support the Quartet’s Road Map plan compared to 35% among Palestinians and 
36% among Israelis who oppose it” (Jacoby 2007: 34). This survey was conducted in 
Arabic and Hebrew about a text written originally in English. It is would be interesting to 
examine on the basis of what translations such support was measured and whether or not 
translations differ from their source texts. 
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Secondly, research on peace initiatives within the discipline of political science has largely 
focused on one peace initiative, i.e. the Geneva Accord (e.g. Beilin 2004; Kardahji 2004; 
Klein 2007; Lerner 2004). However, there is still no comprehensive study on all five peace 
initiatives in the corpus. The aim of such a study would be comparing these initiatives by 
analysing their political content, particularly with reference to the final-status issues of the 
conflict (e.g. land, Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem), and investigating the role of these 
initiatives not only in resolving but also in managing the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Also, within the discipline of Political Science social narrative theory can be applied in 
order to detect the development of conflict and peace narratives over the years in the Arab 
world and in Israel. This could be done by comparing peace initiatives in the corpus to 
others drafted before 2000, particularly the early years of the conflict. This would show for 
example that particular political concepts belong to certain historical periods. Changes in 
use of such political concepts then reflect changes in political positions, agendas and power 
relations; how did what was not acceptable, for example, in 1948 or 1967, become 
acceptable in 1988. 
Thirdly, media plays a particularly significant role during times of conflict. It can be 
argued that it promotes or demotes peace chances in one way or another. Many texts in the 
corpus were published by different media outlets (e.g. newspapers, news agencies, online 
networks, etc.). Translation played a vital role in disseminating these negotiated texts to 
readers inside as well outside the Middle East. Research in the discipline of media and 
journalism, as Bielsa and Bassnett (2009: 17) point out, “has focused on single language 
cases, and has paid scant attention to interlingual transactions”. That is why cooperation 
between Translation Studies and Media Studies can prove very useful. Such cooperation 
can provide useful insights about the role media plays in times of conflict in more than one 
language and in the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, examine both Arabic and 
Hebrew. This would also allow comparative studies and capture what is happening on both 
sides of the conflict.  
 
Finally, research in Genre Studies can provide a detailed account for more systematic 
categorizing for the characteristic features of peace initiatives as a genre of political texts. 
This research found that vagueness and ambiguity, use of political terms, modality, and 
treatment of proper names are characteristic features of peace initiatives. Future research 
can refine or add to these features. 
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